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The principal aim of this thesis is two-fold: first, to examine the way the
GATT/WTO dispute settlement system has evolved, and secondly, to highlight those
disputes in which Japan was involved. This later is done to demonstrate the clear
I
transformation of Japan's attitude vis-a-vis its trade disputes falling within the GATT
4
orWTO dispute settlement framework.
*
Although the GATT dispute settlement mechanism has been fairly successful, the
recent refinements have taken almost half century to accomplish: the GATT was
gradually strengthened and finally superseded by the WTO which provides for a
"judicialised" dispute settlement mechanism. This development has been hailed as
providing for a much more "secure", "predictable" and "effective" system for settling
trade disputes. .
m
Articles XXII and XXIII of the GATT and the Understanding on Rules and
Procedures Governing the Settlement ofDisputes constitute the core of the first part
of the thesis. The case study, which is undertaken in part two of the thesis, is limited
*
to those disputes in which Japan was a litigant party.
Part one consists of S chapters: Chapters 1, 2 and 3 examine the old GATT and its
dispute settlement system, including the Uruguay Round negotiations on dispute
settlement. Chapters 4 and S discuss the WTO and its dispute settlement mechanism
as clarified and codified in the Understanding.
Part two consists of 3 chapters: Chapter 6 provides a brief description of the Japanese
#
legal system; Chapter 7 and 8 discuss the cases in which Japan was a party.
Although the aim of the case study is to provide a legal analysis of those cases, it also
attempts to demonstrate the shift in Japanese trade policy regarding its disputes in the
0
context ofGATT on the one hand and the WTO on the other. The proposition put
i
forward here is that such a shift has been from a "power-oriented" or "bilateral" to a
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"Disputes are an inevitable part of international relations, just as disputes between individuals are
inevitable in domestic relations. Like individuals, states often want the same thing in a situation
where there is not enough ofit to go around.
ft ft ft
Disputes, whether between states, neighbours, or brothers and sisters, must therefore be accepted as a
regularpart ofhuman relations and theproblem is what to do about them".1
This dissertation examines the dispute settlement ("DS") system of the "old" GATT
and the "new" WTO.2 Its main aim is to show how this DS system has evolved from
political to legal nature. It further examines the main disputes in which Japan was
involved under both GATT andWTO.
In conducting the above examination, I have consulted a large number ofprimary and
secondary materials, including GATT/WTO official documents, in the form of
decisions, agreements or understandings; panel and appellate body reports; the
agreements of negotiation rounds; ministerial decisions and declarations; working
papers on DS of the Uruguay Round ("UR");3 interviews; practical experience;4
"Merrills, J. G., International Dispute Settlement. 2nd ed., Grotius Publications Limited,
Cambridge, 1991 at 1.
2For a brief chronology of some of significant events and achievements in the multilateral
trading system (GATT/WTO), see "Golden Jubilee of the Multilateral Trading System" in
PRESS/88 (5 February 1988).
3To obtain official (then restricted) documents of GATT, I carried out a series of research
trips to the GATT/WTO Secretariat in Geneva during my research period: the first time in
April 1994; the second time in October 1994; the third time in September 1996; the fourth
time from April through June 1997 (during the period ofmy internship); and the most recent
visit in June 1998; The Uruguay Round (1986-94), initiated on 22 September 1986 in Punta
del Este, Uruguay, has been characterised as "[t]he most complex and ambitious programme
of negotiations ever undertaken by GATT", see GATT, News of the Uruguay Round of
Multilateral Negotiations, October 1986 at 1. The countries participated in this round have
been increasing gradually: 103 (countries) in 1986, 117 by end of 1993 and finally reached
until 128 by early 1995. Negotiations at the Uruguay Round was far more ambitious in
comparison with previous rounds because of a number of reasons, especially: (i) the opening
of new areas for negotiation, such as agriculture, fibre, and services; (ii) the potentially
higher impact on national policy of the negotiations; for the previous rounds of negotiations
are: 1st Round (1947) at Geneva; 2nd Round (1949) at Annecy; 3rd Round 1950-51) at
Torquay; 4th Round (1955-56) at Geneva; 5th Round named "The Dillon Round" (1960-61)
at Geneva; 6th Round called "The Kennedy Round" (1964-67) at Geneva; 7th Round entitled
"The Tokyo Round" (1973-79).
4Practical experience was obtained through my internship at the Legal Affairs Division of the
WTO Secretariat fromApril to June 1997.
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monographs; articles in periodicals, magazines, or newspapers; the Internet and so
forth.
The old GATT DS system was criticised for its "ambiguity", "complexity" and
"ineffectuality". The reasons for these criticisms were various: for instance, its de
facto origin; the limited scope of the system, i.e., dealing only with trade in goods;
and the strong "political" or "power-oriented" (instead of "judicial" or
"rule-oriented")5 nature of the DS mechanism as a whole.6
Moreover, the GATT DS system consisted of a number of DS procedures found in
various parts of the General Agreement and related legal instruments, though the
principal and formal DS procedures were found in Articles XXII and XXIII of
GATT. Article XXIII, in particular, a pivotal provision of the DS system even under
the WTO, contained little information apart from three forms of causes of action.
The procedures for implementing the DS rules of GATT have, therefore, evolved
gradually during nearly half a century ofGATT practice, and have developed into an
elaborate, not to say labyrinthine, DS system.
This work looks at whether the above criticisms have been dealt with and it also
traces the evolutionary process of the GATT/WTO DS regime.
Two main themes emerge in this work: (i) how the GATT/WTO DS system has
evolved during nearly five decades and (ii) how Japan has shifted its policy on DS
during the evolution at the institutional level.
sFor the discussion of "power-oriented" and "rule-oriented" diplomacy, see Jackson, John.
H., Restructuring GATT System. Pinter Publisher, London, 1990, pp. 49-54, 56ff; Jackson
J.H., The World Trading System: Law and Policy of International Economic Relations. The
MIT Press, Cambridge, Massachusetts, 1989; and for the distinction between dispute
settlement systems with a "adjudication" nature (focusing on an enforcement of rules) and
"negotiation" nature (aiming at settlement), see generally, Davey, William J., "Dispute
Settlement in GATT", 11 Fordham Int'l L. J. Number 1, fall 1987, pp. 51-109.
6This is why the less-developed contracting parties found the system unfair, unpredictable
and unreliable, and accordingly, the GATT DS system was unpopular among those members.
2
With respect to the first theme, a series of agreements signed at multilateral trade
negotiations demonstrates the development of de facto GATT rules into more
4
elaborate and complex DS rules.7 For instance, the UR set a significant landmark by
consolidating the decisions, procedures and customary practices for a period of
almost a halfof a century.
The second theme is examined through a case study. The case study part starts with
. a basic overview of the legal structure of Japan, which will enable us to understand
the legal status of GATT/WTO within the Japanese legal context. The study
highlights the impact which GATT/WTO had on the domestic cases of Japan. The
GATT/WTO cases examined in Chapters 7 and 8 were carefully selected and ordered
chronologically to demonstrate the shift from a "power-oriented" or "bilateral" to a
"rule-oriented" or "multilateral"8 approach in Japan's policy towards DS under
GATT/WTO.
With regard to the structure of the dissertation, the dissertation is divided into two
parts. The first part consists of the first five chapters which deal with GATT and
WTO and their DS systems. The second part, which consists of the last three
chapters, examines Japan's developing experience of GATT/WTO DS based on case
studies.
7See, Chapter 2, Sections 2.4. and 2.5. of this thesis.
8Multilateralism is an approach to the conduct of international trade based on co-operation,
equal rights and obligations, non-discrimination and the participation as equals of many
countries regardless of their size or share of international trade, while Bilateralism is a
preference for conducting international trade policy making through direct bilateral
negotiations. The latter approach works more in favour of the strong (economically and
politically) and against the interests of small/medium-sized countries, (these definitions are
from Walter Goode, Dictionary of Trade Policy Terms. Second ed., The Centre for
International Economic Studies, University ofAdelaide, Australia, 1998 at 34,187).
Multilateralism is the foundation of rules and principles embodied in the Marrakesh
Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organisation and its components (i.e. "the WTO
Agreement"). In reality, however, bilateralism would be an easier and/or more effective
approach to obtain results because, in principle, it involves fewer diverting factors.
Nevertheless, this approach could introduce further conflicts or tensions with other parties
under the Multilateral System. Moreover, bilateralism could even undermine or damage the
whole WTO system including its DS system. In this thesis, "bilateralism" and
"power-oriented" are used synonymously, likewise "multilateralism" and "rule-oriented" in
describing member states1 approaches towards their DS. See, an explanation for the terms,
i.e. "rule-oriented" and "power-oriented" diplomacy in, supra note 5.
4
3
The study begins with an examination of the old GATT, which provides not only
overview of the GATT system but also identifies problems inherited from its
unfortunate start. Then the focus will be on the old DS system. This part seeks to
identify the main "defects" of the system and further endeavours to demonstrate the
evolutionary process of the DS system towards "judicialisation" based on the official
GATT documents on DS. Likewise, the investigation will continue with regards to
the new WTO system and its DS system to highlight the evolution in the two
different systems. Finally, the research leads to a case study in the second part of the
%
dissertation. The choice of Japan in this case study is not simply because of my
personal background (as a Japanese) but, more importantly, Japan's emerging use of
DS mechanisms under the GATT/WTO. This study is confined to examining
9
Japanese cases, and particularly, significant ones which are essential to demonstrate
Japan's transformation in its trade policy on DS. Furthermore, due to its importance
in highlighting a shift in the Japanese policy on DS, the study also includes a few
disputes which were eventually settled bilaterally or which were withdrawn for a
political reason. The cut-off date of the WTO case study applied in this thesis is 30 -
June 1998, however, those new cases whose reports have been issued after this date
are attached to the thesis as Appendix III. This Appendix does not intend to discuss
or examine those cases but simply to provide a summary respectively. In addition, to
grasp the Japanese history of DS under the GATT/WTO system, the Appendix IV
lists other disputes (i.e. some are active or pending, the others are settled bilaterally
or withdrawn) in which Japan has been involved (except those cases in which Japan
«
has participated as a third party).
4
PART ONE
INTERNATIONAL TRADE DISPUTE SETTLEMENT
MECHANISM
Chapter 1. AN INTRODUCTION TO THE OLD GATT LEGAL
SYSTEM
Introduction
This chapter offers a general introduction to the institutional structure aswell as main
principles of the old GATT. The GATT system is an evolutionary one, this system
and a number of features have survived after it has been superseded by the new
system ofWTO. It is therefore essential for us to understand the structures ofGATT
to begin with in order to understand the new WTO system which will be investigated
later in the Part One.
1.1. Institutional Structure1
The General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (hereinafter, the "1947 GATT"),
concluded in October 1947, was a multilateral trade agreement which provided for a
substantial reduction of tariffs among contracting parties, together with a code of
general rules to control a variety of other trade restrictions (e.g. non-tariff barriers
ft
including balance-of-payments restrictions). The fundamental intention of the GATT
was to provide "freer and fairer international trade" through the reduction of tariffs
and elimination of other trade barriers. In addition, the structure of GATT as an
organisation developed gradually because of its difficult start.
1 For the complete list ofGATT bodies, see, the Secretariat, GATT Directory; Long, Olivier.,
Law and its limitations in the GATT Multilateral Trade System [hereinafter, the "Law and
Limitations"], Martinus NijihoffPublishers, Dordrecht, the Netherlands, 1987.
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1.1.1. The Contracting Parties
The Charter of the International Trade Organisation ("ITO Charter" or "Havana
Charter"), which never entered into force because the United States Congress failed
to approve it, made provisions, for both the institutional and administrative structure
of GATT. The GATT was originally designed as a principal multilateral treaty of
international trade not as an organisation. The GATT, however, was set up with its
own institutions and defacto administrative staff.2 The Contracting Parties3 were the
only institutional body recognised when the General Agreement first became
«
effective on 1 January 1948 in accordance with the terms of the Protocol of
Provisional Application.4
The Contracting Partiess had power to legislate under GATT: for example, they
adopted Part IV (Trade and Development) of the General Agreement and they
modified certain articles, for example, GATT Article XVIII (Government Assistance
to Economic Development). The GATT conferred several powers upon the
Contracting Parties, such as the authority to hold consultations with respect to any
matter; the authority to put questions to the disputing parties as regards information,
reports, and consultations; the authority to investigate matters referred to them; the
authority to consult with the disputing parties, to make recommendations, and to
authorise the suspension of obligations and concessions; to waiver authority; to
authorise negotiations and renegotiations; the authority to specify that an amendment
2 See for a history of the Secretariat, Section 1.1.6. (The Secretariat) of this chapter.
3The term "Contracting Parties" was widely used in GATT communique and in literature on
the GATT.
"On 30 October 1947, twenty-three countries signed a Final Act authenticating the text of the
General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (55 UNTS 194). At the same time when countries
signed the GATT, the eight main participants in the negotiations concluded a Protocol of
Provisional Applications (PPA) in Geneva, 30 October 1947, and came into force as on 1
January 1948: 55 UNTS 308; reproduced in BISDIV/77.
*
5 In this thesis, when the expression "Contracting Parties" is used in the upper case
(CONTRACTING PARTIES) [hereinafter, the "CP" or "CPs"] it means that they are
considered to be acting jointly and in a formal manner in terms of the relevant articles of
GATT. On the other hand, the terms "Contracting Parties" in lower case (contracting parties)
means that a collection of individual countries who are the signatory to the General
Agreement are being referred to; cf. As defined in GATT Article XXV: 1, "Whenever
reference is made in this Agreement to the contracting parties acting jointly they are






was important enough to let non-signatories free to withdraw, or to enable
non-signatories to remain a contracting party with the consent of the
CONTRACTING PARTIES; and to authorise anti-dumping and countervailing
measures.
0
The powers conferred by GATT on its signatories were as follows: the authority to
co-operate with and to perform certain functions of the International Monetary Fund
0
(hereinafter, the "IMF"); the authority to review quantitative restrictions; the
authority .to request information regarding (as well as review of) domestic
#
administrative review relating to customs matters; the authority to look into
ft
non-tariff barriers, import restrictions for reasons of balance of payments and
»
regional integration; and the authority to enter into agreements for the accession of
0
new parties to the system.6
The Contracting Parties met from time to time for the purpose of giving effect to
4
those provisions of the GATT which involved joint action and, more generally, with <
a view to facilitating the operation and furthering of the objectives of the
Agreement.7 Such meetings were named "Sessions" and were usually held annually.
Sessions of the Contracting Parities were not open to the public, though, the public
. was kept informed by means of communiques and sometimes by inviting the media
to press conferences. Decisions were taken by a simple majority, except when it was
otherwise provided for in the GATT.8
P
ft
1.1.2. The Council ofRepresentatives
ft
The Council of Representatives (hereinafter, the "Council") was established by a
decision of the CPs on 4 June I960.9 Legally, it acted as the Contracting Parties'
intersessional body which replaced the Intersessional Committee. It was authorised
|
6 See Jackson, John. H., World Trade and the Law of GATT [hereinafter, the "Law of
GATT"], The Bobbs-Merril Company, Inc., Indianapolis,' 1969, pp. 128-132.
#
7GATT Article XXV: 1.
»








to take up all the questions with which the Contract Parties dealt at their sessions
including urgent matters, and it was also authorised to set up any necessary
#
subsidiary bodies as well as to prepare the sessions of the Contracting Parties. The
Council supervised the work of the committees, working parties, and other subsidiary
%
GATT bodies. In addition, it also examined reports of those subsidiary bodies and
made appropriate recommendations. Any representative of a contracting party could
be a member of the Council upon their request. The Chairman of the Council was
elected by the Contracting Parities for the period ofone year.
In terms of the procedures of dispute settlement, the Council or its Chairman was in
charge of appointing the panel members. The Council determined the terms and .
reference of the panel and adopted their reports. This meant that in some instances
the Council had a quasi-judicial responsibilities. Nonetheless, it was only when the
4
Contracting Parties adopted the annual report of the Council that any panel
interpretation of the GATT provisions referred to in that report became legally
authoritative.
The Council in its part was the intersessional body and the executive organ of the
Contracting Parties. It performed its role in the activities of GATT from 25 '
4
November 1968.10 The Council became the central body directing the activities of
GATT, holding an average of nine meetings a year. A meeting could be summoned
at short notice without any delay or difficulty, since the member countries had
permanent representatives in Geneva. This facilitated frequent communication
between the Council members and the Secretariat in preparing the work of the
Council.




1.1.3* Other Important Bodies of GATT - "Permanent/Non-Permanent"
There were also other essential bodies within the GATT, whether permanent" or
non-permanent, such as Committees, Working Parties, and Panels. This section will
examine them in turn.
1.1.3.1. Committees
i
The Committees were established to examine important questions in depth and
usually on a continuing basis. In general, committee membership was open to all
contracting parties. Some of those committees were standing committees such as the
Committee on Balance of Payments Restrictions, the Committee on Tariff
Concessions, the Committee on Safeguards, and the Budget Committee.
Membership to those committees was, however, limited and determined by the
Council. In addition to those Committees, there was the Committee on Trade and
Development, whose Chairman was elected by the Contracting Parties, and
traditionally appointed from a developing country. Chairmen of other committees,
on the other hand, were appointed by the Council. Furthermore, some committees
were not permanent, such as the Committee on Trade Negotiations. All committees
supervised the conduct of the multilateral negotiations undertaken by the Contracting
Parties. The Director-General (hereinafter, the "DG") of GATT chaired these
0
committees with the aim ofensuring their independence and impartiality according to
the wording of GATT. Finally, there were other types of committees and councils
which had not been established either by the Contracting Parties or by the Council
0
but established under the Tokyo Round agreements and the Multifiber Arrangement
(hereinafter, the "MFA").
0
11 Permanent bodies were, for example, Consultative Group ofEighteen, Committee ofBalance
of Payments Restrictions, Committee on Tariffs Concessions, Committee on Safeguards,
Committee on Budget Finance and Administration, and Joint Advisory Group on the




The Working Parties were temporary bodies which dealt with some important
questions including disputes which arose between contracting parties. The Council
established the Working Parties and provided them with the terms of reference for
their tasks. The Working Parties submitted reports and conclusions as advisory
»
opinions to the Council, which were normally adopted in the form they were made
available to the Council. It could be considered that as their conclusions were the
result of consensus achieved through negotiation or compromise, the Council was,
accordingly, in a position to adopt the recommendations of the Working Parties.
Any interested member country including those who were in dispute could become a
member of the Working Parties. At the Second Session in 1948 (Geneva), the first
Working Party was set up to comment upon a dispute between the U.S. and Cuba
concerning Cuba's textile regulations.12
1.1.3.3. Panels
The origin of the panel procedures goes back to the Seventh Session (1952) where it
was adopted.13 However, the practice of panel members' appointment in an
individual capacity commenced only at the Ninth Session (1955).14 The main
function of the panel was to prepare an independent assessment of the facts of the
case. A panel would normally try to promote conciliation between the parties to the
dispute with the goal of achieving the withdrawal of the action or measure subject to
complaint. The panel, unlike the members of Committees and Working Parties
(whose membership was open to any member who had an interest), was in principle
composed of persons in their individual capacities who did not represent their
governments.15 Panel members were usually appointed from the members ofnational
12 See, GATT/CP.2/SR.22(complaint); GATT/CP.2/SR.23(a request for a working party);
GATT/CP.2/43(settlement).
13 Seventh Session (2 Oct.-10 Nov. 1952), SR.7/1-17.
'"Ninth Session (28 Oct. 1954 - 8 Mar. 1955), SR.9/1-47.
.l5Cf. The panel consisted of three to five members (panellist) who should preferably be
governmental as stipulated in Understanding Regarding, Notification, Consultation,
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delegations to the GATT, but not from among the nationals of a country whose
government was one of the disputing parties.16 In this respect, the panel system
i
marked the beginning of the process of transformation of the GATT from a forum of
(political) negotiation to one providing impartial adjudication.
1.1.4. The Consultative Group ofEighteen
9
On 11 July 1975, the Council decided to establish the Consultative Group of
4
9
Eighteen (hereinafter, the "Group") on a temporary basis,17 which later became
permanent in 1979.18 The membership of the Group was restricted to eighteen
member countries. The DG ofGATT chaired the group if this was requested by the
participants. The members of the Group countries (those representatives were
4
usually senior civil servants of member countries of GATT) were responsible for
hearing cases of trade policy, and met three or four times a year to examine some of
%
4
the major commercial policy issues of the day. The Chairman of the Group
presented a report to the Council every year which was taken up in the Council's
report sent to the Contracting Parties. The Group was given the task of facilitating
the carrying out of the responsibilities of the Contracting Parties, particularly with
respect to the aspects: "(a) following international trade developments with a view to
the pursuit and maintenance of trade policies consistent with the objectives and
principles of the General Agreement; (b) the forestalling, whenever possible, of-
sudden disturbances that could represent a threat to the multilateral trading system
%
and to international trade relations generally; and action to deal with such
J
disturbances if they in fact occur; (c) the international adjustment process and
co-ordination, in this context, between the GATT and the IMF".19
Dispute Settlement and Surveillance adopted 28 November 1979, L/4907, BISD 26S/210.
16For the list of GATT panellists, see Pescatore Pierre, William J. Davey and Andreas F.
Lowenfeld, Handbook of GATT Dispute Settlement [hereinafter, the "Handbook"],




19For discussion on establishment of the Consultative Group of Eighteen (CG-18), C/M/107,
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The restricted membership of the Group allowed it to work more efficiently. It had a
consultative nature, and whenever a consensus emerged within the Group (which had
a balanced and representative membership as far as nationalities were concerned) this
consensus was likely to be repeated and find expression in the Council and at the
sessions of the Contracting Parties.
*
4
In the Forty-fifth Session in December 1990, the DG made a suggestion to the
Council that the Group be suspended and the CP so agreed. In fact, the Group was
not convened during the next two years.
1
1.1.5. The Director-General20
As defined in the provision of the Havana Charter, the DG was supposed to be the
chief administrative officer of the ITO. The title of the DG came into being by virtue
of the Decision of 23 March 1965.21 In 1957, the Executive Secretary took over the
functions of the Secretary-General of the United Nations, the institution which was
also the depository of GATT instruments as stated in the text of the General
Agreement. In practice, the Executive Secretary continued to have responsibility for
certain functions under the General Agreement, while the DG held the position of
¥
chief administrative officer of the Organisation. To put an end to such an awkward
situation, powers and duties were conferred on the Executive Secretary by the
General Agreement as provided in the Decision of 23 March 1965,22 which stated
that such powers and duties "shall be exercised by the person holding the position of
*
DG who shall for this purpose also hold the position of Executive Secretary" ,23 In
4
fact, there was no definition as to the powers and scope of the mandate of the DG in
BISD 22S/15-16; for revised mandate, BISD 26S/289-90. Reports made by the CG-18 can
be found at BISD 25S/37; BISD 26S/284 and others.
20There have been five different Director-General of GATT up to now: Sir Eric Wyndham
White (1948 - 1968); M. Olivier Long (1968 - 1980); M. Arthur Dunkel (1980 - 1993); Peter
Sutherland (1993 - April 1995); and Renato Ruggiero who currently takes the position (1





the General Agreement. His functions had developed empirically, influenced mainly
by the actions of the successive appointees to the post. The main duty of the DG was
to act as negotiator, and to chair the trade negotiation committees. The idea behind
this role was that the independent position of the DG guaranteed impartiality when
*
the parties were holding negotiations in which different national interests were at
issue. Furthermore, the DG held consultations and informal negotiations with the
objectives of the avoidance of trade disputes and the promotion ofpeaceful solutions
'
to differences existing between parties, and also in an attempt to reach consensus
*
among contracting parties on all matters. The DG, however, had no legal rights of




There was no reference to a GATT Secretariat in the General Agreement.24
Originally, the Interim Commission for the ITO (hereinafter, the "ICITO") provided
secretariat services for GATT.25 The function of the ICITO survived the failure of
9
the ITO, and developed empirically. The term "GATT Secretariat" appeared in the
multilateral trade agreements reached in the Tokyo Round. The Secretariat ofGATT
« t
was divided into three major departments as well as the Director's office and the
International Trade Centre. Those departments were: (1) the Department of
Conference Affairs, Liaison and Administration; (2) the Department ofTrade Policy;
and (3) the Department of Trade and Development. The Secretariat was presided
over by the DG.26 Furthermore, the role of the Secretariat was prescribed in the
following documents:
-paragraph 6 (iv) of the 1979 Understanding Annex;
-paragraph (iv) of the 1982 Ministerial Decisions;
*
24Cf. The Secretariat is defined formally under the Article VI of the Final Act Embodying the
Results of the Uruguay Round ofMultilateral Trade Negotiations; see, MTN/FAII, pp.
3-4.
25 See Jackson, J. H., The Law ofGATT. supra note 6, pp. 49-50 and 145-147.
26Until 1965, the Director-General was referred to as the "Executive Secretary", see, the
Decision of 23 March, 1965, BISD 13S/19, supra note 21; see also, Jackson, The Law of




-the reference in paragraph H. 1 of the 1989 Improvements; and
-provisions of technical assistance to developing contracting parties.
1.2. Objectives ofGATT
9
The aim ofGATT can be found in its Preamble:
[...] with a view to raising standards of living, ensuring full employment and a
large and steadily growing volume of real income and effective demand,
developing the full use of the resources of the world and expanding the
production and exchange ofgoods27
The founding contracting parties of the GATT committed themselves to the principle
of non-discrimination in their trade relations in order to ensure equal access to
markets and reciprocity in trade concessions. Again, in the Preamble to the General
Agreement, their commitment was stated as follows:
The contracting parties are desirous of contributing to these objectives by
entering into reciprocal and mutually advantageous arrangements directed to
the substantial reduction of tariffs and other barriers to trade and to the
elimination ofdiscriminatory treatment in international commerce.28
These objectives of the General Agreement were refined by the addition of GATT
Article XXXVI to Part IV of GATT which became effective on 27 June, 1966.29
*
This additional article came into being as a result ofnew circumstances that emerged
in the developing countries, which could not be satisfied by the original provisions,
for instance, GATT Article XVIII (Government Assistance to Economic
0
Development). According to GATT Article XXXVI, the contracting parties
recognised that the basic objectives of GATT included the raising of standards of
living and the progressive development of the economies of all the contracting
parties and considered that the attainment of these objectives was particularly urgent
for the less-developed member states. The contracting parties noted that there was a
considerable gap between the standards of living in less-developed countries and
"GATT, the Preamble to the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT 1947).
28 Ibid.
*
29The Protocol Amending the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade to Introduce a Part IV
titled Trade and Development, which was done on 8 February 1965 and entered into force on
27 June 1966, BISD 13S/2.
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those in other countries. To bridge this gap, the contracting parties recognised that
individual and joint action was essential to further the development of the economies
of less-developed countries and they acknowledged the need for affirmative
discrimination in favour of less-developed countries.
1.3. The Structure of the Agreement
The GATT text consisted of four parts:
-The first part (Article I and II): dealt with the general treatment of
Most-Favoured-Nation (MFN) and its consequences or of concessions
provided for in GATT;
-The second part (Article III to XXIII): spelled out the substantive rights and
obligations of the contracting parties under GATT;
-The third part (Article XXIV to XXVIII): defined what was to be understood
as implementation and procedures; and
-The fourth part (Article XXXVI to XXXVIII): dealt with the special position
of those less-developed countries under the system.
In addition, nine annexes alphabetised (A to I) had been attached to the GATT text:
Annex A to G covered the issue relating to Article I; Annex H dealt with the issue
relating to Article XXVI; Annex I was titled Notes and Supplementary Provisions.
They formed an integral part ofGATT, as did the Schedules.30 In practice, a number
of separate agreements had been concluded under GATT and those agreements were





1.4. Main Legal Principles31
Although the GATT and its associated agreements contained a number of
complicated rules, these were all, however, based on a set of relatively few principles
and objectives. Furthermore, in fact, those main legal principles ofGATT have been
carried on to the WTO system. Major principles are briefly demonstrated in turn.
1.4.1. The Principle ofReciprocity32
Reciprocity can be defined as the maintenance ofbalance in any trading relationship,
where access to the domestic market of one country is exchanged for access to the
other and mutually agreeable rules of fair trade are established.33 When the GATT
was established in 1948, the concept of reciprocity was included in the GATT
because of U. S. pressure. Accordingly, the GATT embodied the principle of
reciprocity in the form of a mutually beneficial clause, where signatory countries
were to expect equal treatment abroad for their producers in exchange for what they
could offer to the producers of other nations. In addition, the principle of reciprocity
also existed as a means of enforcing a fair treatment and mutual benefit, i. e., if a
country fails to observe the trade rules stipulated in the GATT, any other country
adversely affected by that behaviourmay retaliate to restore the balance in their trade
relationship.34
Reciprocity, for instance, was an important instrument in the reduction of tariff
barriers. Reciprocity as a legal concept had not been defined by the Contracting
31 See, supra note 1; Supervisory Mechanisms in International Economic Organisations.
Kluwer Law and Taxation Publisher, Deventer, The Netherlands, 1984, pp. 58 ff.
32 See, generally, Jackson, J. H.. The World Trading System Thereinafter, the "World System"],
2nd ed., The MIT Press, Cambridge, Massachusetts 1997; GATT, Analytical Index: Guide to
GATT Law and Practice [hereinafter, the "Analytical Index"], 6th ed., 1994; and Rhodes,
Carolvn.. Reciprocity. U.S. Trade Policy, and the GATT Regime [hereinafter, the
"Reciprocity"], Cornell University Press, Ithaca, U. S., 1993, especially Chapter 1 and 4.
33Keohane notes that "reciprocity refers to exchanges of roughly equivalent values in which
the actions ofeach party are contingent on theprior actions ofthe others in such a way that
good is returned for good and bad for bad", see Keohane, Robert O., "Reciprocity in




Parties, but was nevertheless a fundamental principle in the General Agreement
whose importance was stated clearly in the Preamble.35 Pursuant to GATT Article
XXVIII: 2, the negotiations on tariffs were to be held on a reciprocal and also
mutually advantageous basis in order to attain a substantial reduction in the general
level of tariffs. This objective, unfortunately, could not always be achieved. For
example, the value of whatever concessions were made was not always easy to
quantify, particularly when non-tariff concessions were part of the equation. The
concessions set by socialist countries, for example, usually consisted ofcommitments
to increase imports. Nonetheless, these were hardly comparable with tariff
concessions provided for by western countries. Moreover, countries with a high
tariff rate, had a more advantageous position than those with low tariffs.36 This
illustrates the fact that developing countries, with their low national income, and
therefore low imports,37 could afford to offer little, if anything, in exchange for
concessions from other countries. Accordingly, developing countries needed
concessions from bigger trading partners in order to increase their exports which
were essential for their economic development. In addition to those difficulties,
developing countries were not always able to offer concessions because of the
unfavourable situation of their balance-of-payments and the necessity to protect
newly established (or infant) industries. Accordingly, this principle was difficult to
apply and what in theory appeared to be fair, in practice, could be unjust since the
lack of real equality between countries hindered its use in the bargaining process.38
Therefore, to overcome those difficulties, the General Agreement offered a number
ofmeans by which to secure real reciprocity between trading partners, for example,
anti-dumping duties, the compensation, suspension of concessions or other
obligations provided for in GATT Article XXIII, nullification and impairment and
c
others. To that end, contracting parties were supposed to use those provisions to
35 See, supra note 27.
36 See, K. W. Dam, The GATT Law and International Economic Organisation Chicago Univ.
Press, 1970, p. 59.
37According to the general macro-economic theories, imports are mainly a function of the
national income.
38 See, Jackson, J. H., The Law ofGATT. supra note 6, pp. 242-245. .
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secure compensation or apply retaliatory actions to' restore balance to their trade
relationships. Nevertheless, those actions might be in violation of the principle of
MFN treatment."




Most-Favoured-Nation treatment was one of two aspects of the principle of
non-discrimination provided for in GATT Article I. The article prescribed the use of
the MFN in trade relations between the contracting parties:
[...] any advantage, favour, privilege or immunity granted by any contracting
party to any product originating in or destined for any other country shall be
accorded immediately and unconditionally to the like product originating in
or destined for the territories ofall contracting parties.40
The principle meant that ifone country granted to another country MFN treatment, it
P
must immediately and unconditionally extend the same treatment to the rest of the
member countries. However, the MFN treatment embodied in GATT was subject to
a number ofexceptions. For example:
-Regional integration agreements were exceptions to the MFN clause, (e.g.
GATT Article XXIV which dealt with the creation of customs unions and
free-trade areas.)
-Exceptions or waivers approved by the CONTRACTING PARTIES on an ad
hoc basis, (e.g. GATT Article XXV:5 which stated the Contracting Parties
could authorise non-compliance with a GATT obligation by amember state.)
-General exceptions and/or security exceptions were also available, for
example, GATT Article XX which mentioned the aspects ofpublic policy, and
under GATT Article XXI which covered security aspects.41
0
39 See, GATT, The Analytical Index, supra note 32; Jackson, J, H., The World System, supra
note 32.
40GATT Article I, para. 1.
4
41 See e.g., In 1982, member countries imposed an embargo on Argentine imports at the time of




-The historical preference, also known as the "grandfather clause" in
preferential arrangements was exempted, (e.g. GATT Article 1:2, 3 and 4 which
maintain preferences between former colonies and its sovereign countries. This




1.4.3. The Principle of Non-Discrimination: The National Treatment42
As already mentioned, the MFN principle of GATT required countries not to
discriminate among GATT contracting parties. The principle ofnational treatment of
GATT was the other aspect of the principle of non-discrimination and also
complementary to the MFN principle. According to GATT Article III in which
national treatment was stipulated, the products of any member country imported into
any other member were treated, as far as any internal tax, charges or regulation were
concerned, on the same condition as like domestic products. GATT Article III
0




regulations and requirements that affected the internal sales, purchase, transportation,
4
distribution or use of products available on the domestic market. In other words, the
principle of national treatment required countries not to discriminate between
domestic products and imported products by giving less-favourable treatment to the
latter. Hence, national treatment granted to imported products in this way provided a
defence against protectionism resulting from internal administrative and legislative
measures. Nevertheless, as for customs duties and other border measures (e.g.
inspections of health safety standards, etc.), these were outside the scope of these
provisions.
1.4.4. Other Principles
Apart from the essential principles indicated above, there were other principles which
provided for procedures to enhance the liberalisation of trade, fair competition, and
A
42 See, GATT. The Analytical Index, supra note 32; Jackson, J. H., The World System, supra
note 32;
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developing world trade based on multilateral negotiation. To that end, the GATT
opposed, for instance, tariff restrictions (e.g. customs duties), quantitative restrictions
(e.g. export licence, quotas) and the rest of the Non-Tariff Barriers (NTBs) (e.g. a
number ofprotective measures43).
1.5. Preference44
A contracting party had to give preference, which meant giving exemptions to the
GATT rule, to developing countries in a number of cases. On the face of it, this
practice was in conflict with the principle of reciprocity and with that of MFN
treatment. In 1958, Article XXVIII bis: 3(b) was added to the GATT. That article
required the contracting parties to take due consideration of the needs of
less-developed countries, and to apply favourable treatment as regards tariff
protection so as to assist in their economic development and also to cater for their
special needs to maintain tariffs for revenue purposes. In addition, since the
introduction of GATT Article XXXVT.8 in 1966, developed contracting parties
should no longer expect reciprocity for commitments made by them in trade
negotiations to reduce or remove tariffs and other barriers to the trade with
less-developed contracting parties. Pursuant to GATT Article XXXVII: 1(a),
developed contracting parties had to accord a high priority to the reduction and
elimination ofbarriers to trade with less-developed contracting parties. Moreover, on
0
28 November 1979, the GATT member states adopted an agreement entitled
"Differential and more favourable treatment, reciprocity and fuller participation of
developing countries",45 also referred to as the "Enabling Clause".46 This agreement
43 See, Jackson, J.H., The World System, supra note 32, pp. 154-155; see also Jackson, J.H.
and William J. Davey, International Economic Relations. 3rd ed., West Publishing Co., St.
Paul, 1995, pp. 377-378.
44GATT, The Analytical Index., supra note 32.
45BISD 26S/203-205 (1980); for the "Enabling Clause", see The Analytical Index, supra note
32; The background of the enabling clause is follows: the General System of Preference
(GSP) programme is to provide less developed countries with a certain trade favour (in the
form of special and differential treatment), which was operated under the benefit of a waiver
from GATT MFN Principle from 1971 through to 1981, see Decision of 25 June 1971,
L/3545 in BISD 18S/24-26 (1972). In addition, this programme was amended and
authorised by the "enabling clause" under the Tokyo Round Understanding (1979) [officially
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continued the tradition of providing developing country members with more
favourable treatment. Furthermore, under this agreement, the least developed
countries were given special treatment in spite of the MFN provisions of GATT
Article I under the non-discrimination principle. In this respect, adoption of the
Enabling Clause could be seen as legalisation of the philosophy of preferential
treatment in trade relations among contracting parties with different economic levels.
named "Differential and More Favourable Treatment, Reciprocity, and Fuller Participation of
Developing Countries", see Decision of 28 November 1979, L/4903 in BISD 26S/203-205
(1980)]; see in general Yusuf, "Differential and More Favourable Treatment: The GATT
Enabling Clause", 14 J.W.T.L. (1980), pp. 488-507; also see Balassa, " The Tokyo Round
and the Developing Countries", 14 J.W.T.L. (1980), pp. 93-118; and for an overview of the
history of developing countries under GATT up to WTO, see Hoekman, Bernard., and
Michel Kostecki, The Political Economy of the World Trading System: From GATT to
WTO. Oxford University Press, Oxford, 1995 at pp. 323-245.
46 See, supra note 1.
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Chapter 2. GATT DISPUTE SETTLEMENT MECHANISM1
"GATTmembers have the dispute settlementprocess they deserve. It works surprisingly well in most
places where they want it to work - and does not work where they do not want it to
Introduction
In the previous chapter, we dealt with the GATT and its legal order. This chapter
analyses, the dispute settlement system ofGATT, one of the most important as well
as controversial issues of the GATT. A large number of defects in the system
ft
became urgent issues requiring to be improved and overcome from the early 1950's
until the recent establishment ofWTO. Furthermore, perceptions of the effectiveness
and even the usefulness of the system have varied over the years, which, for instance,
depended on the economic performance of each contracting party.
This chapter will first look at the "old" dispute settlement system under the GATT
legal order, then identify problematic issues within this dispute settlement system
and, in the end, examine a number of changes and/or developments introduced to it
in order to resolve the outstanding defects in the dispute settlement system and
further improve the system.
1 See, Pescatore, Pierre., "The GATT Dispute Settlement Mechanism - Its Present Situation
and its Prospects", 27 J. W. T. (1993), pp. 5-20.
2Plank, Rosine., "An Unofficial Description ofHow a GATT Panel Works and Does Not", 29
Swiss Rev. Int'l Competition L. (1987) at 123.
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2.1. Outline of the GATT Dispute Settlement History3
2.1.1. The First Decade (1950s)
During the initial decade from 1948 to 1959, the GATT dispute settlement system
was quite successful, and functioned relatively well. This can be attributed to a
number of factors. First, the General Agreement had only recently been negotiated at
that stage and there was a general consensus on what it meant and how it should be
interpreted.4 Second, the number ofGATT members was rather limited, starting with
23 countries in 1948, and their backgrounds and trade policies aiming at lowering
barriers (i.e. tariffs, non-tariff barriers) to international trade were relatively similar.5
Furthermore, many of the GATT diplomats dealing with GATT matters during this
period had participated, in person, in the creation of the system and probably had a
greater stake in contributing to its success.6 In this period, 53 disputes between
member states were brought to GATT. Meanwhile, GATT introduced a new system
called "panel proceedings" for adjudicating legal disputes.7 This mechanism was an
informal process and more diplomats than lawyers were engaged as judges who were
3For a useful chronological study on GATT dispute settlement conducted by Professor Hudec
and this section is partly based on his survey, see Hudec, Robert £., Enforcing International
Trade Law: The Evolution of the Modern GATT Legal System [hereinafter, the "Enforcing
Trade Law]. Butterworths Legal Publisher, New Hampshire, U. S., 1993.
4 See, Hudec, R. E.. Adjudication of International Trade Disputes (Thames Essay No. 16).
Trade Policy Research Institute, London, 1978, pp. 14-21.
'Ibid., at 14,21-23.
6 See, Hudec, R. E., The GATT Legal System and World Trade Diplomacy. Praeger
Publishers, New York, 1975.
7With respect to this change, from working parties to panels, can be found at Sections 1.1.3.2.
and 1.1.3.3. in Chapter 1 of this thesis; The panel procedure was adopted at the Seventh
Session in 1952. In general, this procedure was almost the same as the present one.
However, unlike the present panel, the representatives of disputing parties could also be a
member of the working party in which a disputing issue is ruled; cf. "the Committee
[Australia, Belgium, Brazil, Canada, Chile, Cuba, Denmark, France, Germany, India, Italy,
Pakistan, the Union of South Africa, the United Kingdom and the United States] may
establish a working party consisting of some or all of its members, together with the
countries directly concerned, any countries which claim a substantial interest in the matter
and which wish to be represented on the working party, and any other countries which the
Committee may consider it necessary to invite and which are willing to serve" in BISD IS/7
(1953); In addition, the first appearance of the term, "panel", was at the Ninth Session in
1955; cf. "(...) the appointment of qualified panels to assist in carrying out consultations (...)




called "panellists". The legal rulings were drafted with a diplomatic approach; in
other words, it was based on a "pragmatic" or "power-oriented" (i.e., more
politically-oriented) approach.8 During this period, Japan became a GATT
contracting party acquiring full membership when it joined on 10 September 1955.
4
*
2.1.2. The Second Decade (1960s)
During the 1960s, the membership of GATT increased and the world economy
expanded rapidly. In particular, the developing countries' membership increased to a
numerical majority which enabled them to act en bloc on several occasions. On the
other hand, with respect to the developed countries, membership was radically
altered by the formation and subsequent enlargement of the EEC, what is now
generally referred to as the European Community (hereinafter, the "EC") along with
the emergence of Japan as a major economic power. Thus, whatever "easy"
consensus was available in the previous decade, it collapsed in the 1960s due to an •
increase in the complexity of the conflicts within the GATT and the emergence of
two "new" members, that is, the European Community and developing countries
bloc. In this period, the dispute settlement system ofGATT was still based more on
a "power-oriented" approach than on a "rule-oriented" one.
There were two major factors for the decline of the previous "consensus". First, the
creation of the EC caused a change as regards the European countries. The original
six states of the EC (i.e. France, West Germany, Italy, the Netherlands, Belgium and
Luxembourg) were the founding members (23 countries) of the GATT. In the 1960s,
the EC no longer relied on the dispute settlement system ofGATT. The EC acted as
one body in dealing with international trade issues and relevant negotiations instead
of dealing with them individually (relatively smaller member states).9 The second
reason was the expansion of the number of members from the developing countries
8 See, Jackson, J. H.. The World Trading System. 2nd ed. The MIT Press, Cambridge,
Massachusetts, 1997, pp. 109-111.
4
9 See, for the Common Commercial Policy Swann, Dennis., The Economics of the Common
Market. 6th ed., Penguin Books, London, 1988 (reprinted in 1990) at 298.
CHAPTER 2
as contracting parties. Incidentally, the balance of membership of the contracting
parties between developed and developing countries shifted from 21:16 (1960) to
25:52 (1970).10 In the meantime, the developed country members achieved their
main goals of tariff reduction and removal of their own balance-of-payments
restrictions during this decade.
The EC claimed the right to be exempt from the GATT provisions in the areas of
agriculture11 and in other aspects, for example, those involving their commercial
relations with former colonies in Africa, the Caribbean and the Pacific (hereinafter,
the "ACP")'2. During this period, EC policy was based more on the "diplomatic"
approach to dispute settlement instead of the "rule-oriented" (i.e., the use of the
GATT law including its dispute settlement mechanism). Likewise, the United States
followed a similar attitude of "anti-legalism", at least during the period from 1963 to
1970. Those two leading economies regarded formal claims by other GATT
members as "legalistic", accompanied by the introduction of the notion that such
legal claims were seen as "unfriendly actions".
Accordingly, an anti-legalist position prevailed during this period, and eventually the
GATT system was suspended and undermined. Both the U.S. and the EC did not
seem comfortable with the possibility of submitting themselves to an adjudicatory
("rule-oriented") system which became gradually more explicit in GATT. Ironically,
their preference for a non-judicial approach was motivated by their concern over
losing their "political" control or influence over the system which they had created.
f
2.1.3. The Third Decade (1970s)
*
This period stretches from 1970 to the 1979, being notable as the period in which the
4
Tokyo Round of negotiations took place. This was also the period when GATT
began to rebuild its legal system. The need for rebuilding the GATT system was
10 See, BISD 8S/99 (1960); BISD 17S/ vii (1970).
"See, for the Common Agricultural Policy [hereinafter, the "CAP"], supra note 9, pp.
205-231.
12 See, for the ACP countries, supra note 9, pp. 301-304.
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initiated by the United States because domestic political developments created a
demand for stronger enforcement ofU. S. trade agreement rights. The main point in
the legal rebuilding of the system was the negotiation of several new "MTN Codes"
covering Non-Tariff Barriers (hereinafter, the "NTBs").13 With respect to the dispute
settlement, the new code rules required a strong dispute settlement procedure to make
them reliable, and each code contained its own dispute settlement procedure. The
number of disputes during this period was 32 even before the 1979 reforms were
adopted. Thus, by the end of the period, dispute settlement had recovered its legal
orientation. In short, the popular approach to resolving disputes became more
rule-oriented.
2.1.4. The Fourth Decade (1980s)
In the 1980s, the GATT legal system became increasingly complex but, at the same
time, it was often referred to when disputes arose between contracting parties. The
governments of the GATT members filed 115 legal complaints in this period, of
which 47 (40%) were finalised by panels. These figures should be seen as the
landmark of the new era. Indeed, the tremendous increase of cases brought to the
GATT forced the GATT Secretariat to create a legal office which was finally set up
in 1983.14 There were, however, unsuccessful cases due to the excessive political
pressure or demands placed by member state governments. In short, the "political"
approach was very much alive. One of the main causes ofmal-function of the GATT
system was that contracting parties tended to use their veto power under consensus in
13 The NTBs are government measures other than tariffs that restrict trade flows. For example,
quantitative restrictions, import licensing, voluntary restraint arrangements and variable
levies. They generally now contravene the WTO rules (this definition is from Goode,
Walter., Dictionary of Trade Policy Terms. Centre for International Economic Studies,
University ofAdelaide, Australia, 1998 at pp. 199-200); see also, Jackson, J. H., supra note 8
pp. 75-78.
14Moreover, the creation of the Legal Affairs Office at the GATT Secretariat was also
propelled by the lesson learnt from the DISC case in which the EC claimed the U.S.
concerning its 1971 Income Tax Legislations (DISC), for this case L/4422 (2 November
1976), BISD 23S/98-114 (1977), for a problem and contribution from the DISC case, see
Hudec, Robert. E., Enforcing International Trade Law: The Evolution of the Modem GATT




the decision-making practice of blocking the creation of panels or the adoption of
adverse panel reports.
In the meantime, an anti-legalistic hostility to the policy of the GATT was once again
growing in the United States; certain groups in the United States claimed that GATT
• #
law was not effective enough to protect U. S. national interests.15 Furthermore, the
trade deficit of the U. S. during the mid-1980s strengthened the GATT sceptics in the
United States even more. A very important American development of the period was
the emergence of what is called "unilateralism", which appeared in the form of
Section 301 of the Trade Act 1974.16 This questionable policy imposed demands,
unilaterally, on governments which allowed room for illegal or "unreasonable"
restrictions. It then demanded correction under the threat of trade retaliation, which
was frequently illegal under the GATT. Paradoxical though it might seem, one of the
initial promoters of strengthening GATT law, the United States, yielded to domestic
pressures and introduced legislation which clearly undermined the law of GATT.
The U. S. appeared to be willing to turn the clock back so as to halt the process of
GATT legal reform.
2.1.5. The Fifth Decade (Until 1994)
9
In general, this period can be characterised as the period of "inactivity" or "wait and
see". This paralysation of the system happened mainly because of the then ongoing
Uruguay Round (hereinafter, the "UR") negotiations. The contracting parties were
concerned about the outcomes of the negotiations. Due to such uncertainty over the
future of the GATT system, the contracting parties deferred filing reports until they
learned about the outcome of the negotiations. Even the GATT panel which was
established to deal with certain disputes delayed in making decisions. In addition,
lsHudec, R.E.. The Enforcing Trade Law, supra note 3, at pp. 107-111.
16 See, Jackson, J. H.. Restructuring of the GATT System. Royal Institute of International
Affairs, London, 1990, pp. 69-73; Jackson, J. H. , & William. J. Davev. Legal Problems of
International Economic Relations: cases, materials and text [hereinafter, the "Int'l Econ.
Relations'!. 3rd ed., West Publishing Company, St. Paul, Minnesota, 1995.; Bhagwati,
Jagdish. and Hugh T. Patrick (eds.), Aggressive Unilateralism - America's 301 Trade Policy
and the Trading System. HaversterWheatsheaf, U.K., 1991.
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the Contracting Parties also put off voting on the adoption of the panel reports. In
fact, this unfortunate trend was noted by the Mr. Peter Sutherland, the DG at that
time, in his report to the Council on 10 November 1994.17 To sum up, none of the
functions of the dispute settlement mechanism were in order during this period.
i
2.2. The Old Procedure ofGATT Dispute Settlement
The old GATT dispute settlement procedure lacked uniformity. On one hand, there
was a general system of conciliation and dispute settlement based on Articles XXII
and XXIII of the General Agreement. These two articles emphasised bilateral
consultation as a first step in settling disputes. On the other hand, a variety of
specific dispute settlement procedures were provided for in different codes in most of
the Tokyo Round agreements.18 Each Tokyo Round agreement, with the exception of
"Import Licensing", had its own mechanism for dispute settlement which was
separate from the "general" dispute settlement procedure of the General Agreement.
In addition to those various dispute settlement procedures, developing countries were
also entitled to special rules ofprocedure.19
The general dispute settlement procedure ofGATT, provided for in Article XXII and
XXIII, had three aims: the realisation of GATT's purposes, the protection of the
benefits accruing under the General Agreement, and dispute settlement. Actions
9
could be taken in cases where the purpose of GATT was violated even when no
formal GATT provisions have been contravened (i.e. a non-violation claim under
Article XXIII: 1(b)). Moreover, violations could be legalised if necessary by means
"During the past 12 months compared with the previous 12- month period: the number (no.)
of consultations (from 31 to 15); the no. of panels established (from 7 to 4); the no. ofpanel
reports adopted (from 4 to 3); and the no. of disputes in which implementation issues were
raised (from 10 to 2), for the status of active dispute settlement in GATT, see GATT Focus
No. 112 (November 1994) at 4-5.
18 See, Jackson, J. H. & W. J. Davey, supra note 16, pp. 379-391; also for general information,
see, BISD S26 (1980).
"See, for instance, the 1979 Understanding (dealt in Section 2.4.1.5.), paras. 5, 6(ii), 8, 21 and
23; the 1966 Procedures (dealt in Section 2.4.1.3.); the 1989 Improvements (dealt in Section




of a waiver by the CPs (i.e. Article XXV:5), which permitted deviation from GATT
obligations.
2.2.1. The Dispute Settlement Process Set Out in Article XXII and XXIII
GATT Article XXII: 1, required consultation with respect to "any matter affecting
the operation" of the General Agreement. If such bilateral consultations were
unsuccessful, Article XXII: 2 of GATT, provided for the possibility of setting up a
Working Party or Panel,20 open to all GATT members, including of course disputing
f
parties.
Article XXIII: 1, provided for bilateral consultations whenever a "nullification or
impairment" of a GATT benefit or an impediment to attaining a GATT "objective"
was alleged. If no mutually satisfactory solution was reached, Article XXIII: 2,
provided for the matter to be investigated by the CP, who could make
recommendations or give a ruling. It was in this context that the practice had
developed of setting up a panel to assist the CP. On the other hand, however, the
substantial function of Article XXIII: 2 procedures had been to provide an incentive
to settle disputes by mutual agreement.
Although no provisions for panels were made in Article XXIII: 2, the practice of
creating panels had grown through customary practice in connection with the
4
continued implementation of the Article. The practice of creating panels was finally
codified at the Tokyo Round under the "Understanding Regarding Notification,
Consultation, Dispute Settlement and Surveillance", adopted on 28 November,
1979.21 In addition, a postscript was.attached named "Agreed Description of the
4
20For more information, see at Sections 2.1.3.2. and 2.1.3.3. in Chapter 2 of this thesis; see also
supra note 7.
21 Understanding Regarding Notification, Consultation, Dispute Settlement and
Surveillance, Document L/4907, BISD S26/210 (1980), [hereinafter referred to as the
"1979 Understanding"]. The 1979 Understanding mainly summarised the procedures of
dispute settlement that had been used in GATT and indicated that they would continue to be
used. The 1979 Understanding, however, made no significant changes in GATT dispute
settlement procedures except for specifying certain limits in which various actions ought to
be taken. It was noteworthy because it indicated that cps were willing to maintain the system
they had developed.
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Customary Practice of the GATT in the Field of Dispute Settlement (Article
XXIII:2)" to the 1979 Understanding.22 In fact, there was no transparent and detailed
procedures for dispute settlement until the installation of the 1979 Understanding
despite the general procedures provided for in Article XXII and Article XXIII of
4
GATT. The purpose of this Understanding was to support the parties in settling their
disputes. It illustrated the combination of law and diplomacy which co-existed in the
dispute settlement system, as was the case of the GATT system itself. In general, it
has been observed by the majority of contracting parties that this was the secret of
reasonable success which had been achieved during the era ofGATT.
Pursuant to Article XXIII: 2, if bilateral consultations failed to resolve the matter in
dispute regarding the practice concerned, the complainant was to notify the CP that it
wished to bring the issue in dispute before them. A request for a panel of
independent experts was always granted although there was no provision for the
automatic setting up ofpanels.
The composition and terms of reference for a panel was, in principle, to be
determined within 30 days following the decision of its establishment. In practice,
however, it took much longer. This was partly because the panel members, usually 3
or 5, had to be agreed on by the parties to the dispute. In addition, these panel
%
members were selected from members of the delegation in Geneva, and as a result
there were more civil servants than lawyers.23
The task of a panel was to prepare a report to the CP "to assist" them "to deal with
the matter".24 This report was required to include "an objective assessment of the
matter before it, including an objective assessment of the facts of the case and
applicability of and conformity with the General Agreement."25
22 See, ibid., Annex, supra note 21, especially paras. 3 and 6.
23 See, Plank, Rosine., "An Unofficial Description of How a GATT Panel Works and Does
Not", 29 Swiss Rev. of Int'l Competition Law (1987), p. 81, 91-97.
24 Ibid., supra note 21, para. 10.
25Ibid., supra note 21, para. 16.
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Once a panel was appointed, its task was normally to examine the dispute and make
such findings as would assist the CP in making recommendations or rulings as
provided for in Article XXIII.26 The panel received written and/or oral submissions
%
from the CP and might also receive submissions from other interested parties. The
panel might request from the CP any information which it deemed "necessary and
appropriate" and answers should come "promptly and fully" from any cp. In
addition, the panel might seek information and technical advice from any individual
or body within the jurisdiction of a State, after informing the Government of that
State.27
The panel was assisted by the GATT Secretariat which provided the secretary to the
panel. The secretary provided by the Secretariat not only prepared the summary of
the proceedings, but also engaged in research and drafted the panel report. Before
releasing its final report to the CP, the panel had to submit the descriptive parts of its
report to the parties concerned together with the panel's conclusions and
recommendations. The purpose of this exercise was to encourage a development of
mutually satisfactory solutions between the parties to a dispute as well as obtaining
their comments (as we shall see in Chapter 5, this practice still exists under the new
rules of WTO, i.e. DSU 15). The parties were given a reasonable time, normally
from one to two months, to examine the report and discuss the possibility of settling
their dispute. If it was not resolved before such a deadline, the panel circulated its
report to all cps as a GATT document, which would then be included in the agenda
of the following Council meeting.
The panel report, however, had no legal force and had merely the status of an
"advisory opinion".28 It had to be adopted first by the Council on behalf of the CP.
The Council usually adopted the report as it was. This adoption was decided on the
basis of consensus. There was always the possibility that the losing party could
26Panel procedures are summarised in, supra note 21.
21 Supra note 21, para. 15.




prevent adoption of the report in the Council.29
During the period from 1948 to 1986, 100 complaints were brought under Article
XXIII: 2; out of those complaints, 52 led to the submission of a report by a panel.
The others were settled without a report; of the 52 reports, 50 (96%) were adopted or
led to a mutually satisfactory solution and a withdrawal of the complaint, and were
implemented without adoption; the reports of the remaining two cases have not
resulted in either of the disputes being settled.30
As to compliance with the recommendations adopted by the Council, the 1979
Understanding provided that the CP would keep under surveillance any matter on
which they had made recommendations or given rulings. If the CP's
recommendations were not complied with within a reasonable period of time, the
successful petitioner might ask the CP to make suitable efforts with a view to finding
an appropriate solution.31
4
In the event of non-implementation, provided for in Article XXHI: 2 of GATT, the
CP might authorise the injured party to suspend the application of concessions or
other obligations under the General Agreement to the party which had failed to
comply (i.e. in fact, this meant "retaliation" but expressed in a diplomatic manner).32
There was only one case in which this right to retaliate had been invoked and
authorised.33
*
29The 1982 Ministerial Declaration stated, "The Contracting Parties reaffirmed that consensus
will continue to be the traditional method of resolving disputes; however, they agreed that
obstruction in the process ofdispute settlement shall be avoided "> see the 1982 Declaration,
infra note 39, para. 10.
*
30See, GATT, GATT Focus, No. 46 (May 1987) at 2.
31 Supra note 21, para. 22. (cf. Under the DSU of the WTO, "Surveillance" is defined under
Article 21).
32Annex, supra note 21, para. 4. (cf. DSU 22)




2.3. The Main Defects of the GATT Dispute Settlement System
2.3.1. Access to the Procedure
The right to file a complaint was restricted to a cp who had a direct and substantial
interest in the matter. Nonetheless, in the case of a small country (in economic
terms), it sometimes took them some time to decide to initiate action against a large
and economically powerful country due to the limitation in its economic and political
*
bargaining power.
2.3.2. The Panel Process
There were a number of specific problems concerning the operation, status and
circumstances of panels. In particular, those problems could arise from factors such
as lack of expertise, neutrality, and even quality in panel reports. First of all, panels
were usually composed of persons with no previous panel experience, and many had
none of the expected expertise to discharge the function as a panellist. This problem
became more serious when the dispute involved the major influential countries such
as the U.S. and the EC because more experts were from those countries. When
panellists were selected from smaller countries, another problem appeared; the
country from where those panellists were selected often heavily relied on the major
economies. Second, there was the problem of the neutrality of panellists.34 In order
to have a functional panel, panellists should ideally have had some knowledge of
GATT. In truth, however, since governmental panellists were preferred,35 panels
consisted of government officials who had knowledge or had been involved in the
9
government in the area of trade. Thus, in spite of the efforts of such panellists to act
impartially, there was always the possibility that they would be influenced in their
decisions by considerations of how it might affect their career and prospects in their
wheat flour from the U. S., following their dispute concerning U. S. quotas on diary
products. For details, see GATT, Netherlands Measures of Suspension of Obligations to the
United States, BISD Sl/32 (1953); see also, ibid, at 62.
34 See, Jackson, J. H. "Governmental disputes in International Trade Relations: A Proposal in
the Context ofGATT", 13 J. W. T. L. (1979) at 1.
35GATT, Decision on Dispute Settlement Procedures, BISD S31/9 (1984).
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countries' diplomatic service.36 Third, with respect to the work by the panel, they
t
often (especially those who were government officials dealing with the area of trade)
did not make clear-cut decisions, namely, they were often reluctant to make a
landmark decision which might affect not only following panel decisions but also
their professional (or diplomatic) carrier back in home.37
2.3.3. Delays
One of the primary complaints about the GATT dispute settlement system concerned
delay, including the delays that occurred in the setting up of a panel, in the
consideration of a case by a panel, and in the adoption the report of a panel by the
Council.38 Such delays, however, were reduced in the 1979 Understanding and also
the 1982 Ministerial Declaration.39 If one looks at the record over the past five years
from 1987, more than a year would elapse between the Council's decision to appoint
4
a panel and its decision to adopt the panel's report.40
36Davey, William J., "Dispute Settlement in GATT", 11 Fordham Int'l L.J. (April 1987) at 89.
31 Ibid., at 88-89.
38 The DISC case is a good example. It took almost three years to agree on the setting up a
panel and further, it took another five years for the Council to adopt the panel's report. In
addition, this case was the first case which outside experts were involved in a panel and it
involved a kind of counterclaim to the initial complaint, which the United States insisted
should be considered by the same panel as the EC complaint; see Davey, William. J.,
"Dispute Settlement in GATT", 11 Fordham Int'l L. J. (No. 1) Fall 1987 at 84; for the United
States Tax Legislation (the DISC case), BISD S23/98 (1977); For further analysis on this
case, Jackson, J. H., "The Jurisprudence of International Trade: The DISC Case in GATT",
72 Am. J. Int'l L. (1978), pp. 747-781.
39The 1982 Ministerial Declaration on Dispute Settlement, BISD S29/13 to 16 (1983)
[hereinafter referred to as the "1982 Declaration"], see Section 2.4.1.6. of this thesis. The
1982 Declaration stressed the need to follow the aims of the 1979 Understanding on Dispute
Settlement, which stated that panels should normally be sit within thirty days of the decision
to establish them and that the panel should normally report without undue delay and within
three months in urgent cases.; for the 1979 Understanding, see also, supra note 21, para 11,
20.






Some of the cps complained about the release without authorisation of the
information obtained from files which had been submitted to a panel. In addition,
there were some complaints concerning the early disclosure ofpanel reports prior to
Council consideration of the matter.41
2.3.5. Consensus System
The contracting parties, including the disputing parties, were able to block the
adoption of the Panel report. This was considered as a negative aspect of the
previous consensus rule and the major cause of delay. Its weakness was particularly
obvious, for example, in those cases concerning agricultural subsidies42 or foreign
policy43 in which the United States and the EC were involved. Since those cases
involved areas of vital interest to the major economies, such countries had difficulty
in accepting any solution.
41 Bael, Ivo Van, "The GATT Dispute Settlement Procedure", 22 J.W.T. No. 4 (1988) at 72;
See provisions concerning protection of confidential information, paragraph 15 of the 1979
Understanding provided "...Confidential information which is provided should not be
revealed withoutformal authorisation from the contractingpartyproviding the information
paragraph 6 (iv) of the 1979 Understanding Annex on the Customary Practice of the GATT
in the Field of Dispute Settlement (Article XXIII:2) stipulating that "...Written memoranda
submitted to the panel have been considered confidential but are made available to the
parties the dispute..."; and the provisions concerning the protection of confidential
information in the Tokyo Round agreements ( i.e., Annex 3, para. 2 of Agreement on
Technical Barriers to Trade, Article VII:9 of Agreement on Government Procurement,
Annex III, para. 3 of Agreement on Implementation of Article VII, and Article 15:6 of
Agreement on Implementation ofArticle VI).
42The U. S. complaints against the EEC regarding wheat flour and pasta. In contrast, EEC
complaints against the U. S. on a definition of "industry" concerning wine and grape
products in the US Trade and TariffAct of 1984.
43This type of "political" cases (i.e. a high-profile case) demonstrated a weakness or limit of
GATT rules. In other words, it damaged or undermined the GATT system. Those cases
were: the EC (along with Canada and Australia) embargo against Argentina during the
Falklands War with the UK (30 August 1982); the US withdrawal ofMFN treatment due to
the treatment of democracy movement in Poland (1 November 1982); the US trade embargo
against Nicaragua's policies for the Central America (5 August 1985). Recently, the WTO
has received such "high-profile" complaints brought by the EC concerning the Cuban Liberty
and Democratic Solidarity (LIBERTAD) Act of 1996 and other legislation enacted by the US
Congress with respect to trade sanctions against Cuba. The panel has suspended its
procedure at the request of the EC on 25 April 1997.
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2.3.6. Fragmentation ofRules
The GATT system was complex. The co-existence of various codes caused
confusion to member states.44 The specific rules of dispute settlement procedure
under the various MTN Codes in addition to the GATT general system of dispute
settlement (i.e. Article XXII and XXIII), were subsumed at the Tokyo Round.45 As a
result, this multiple-choice of rules has brought an issue of "rule-shopping" or
"forum-shopping" which allowed countries to a dispute to choose whichever rule was
more favourable to them.
+
*
2.4. Evolution ofGATT Dispute Settlement Mechanism
As mentioned, there were a number of defects in the GATT dispute settlement
system. To overcome or eliminate those weaknesses or problems, the dispute
settlement system has evolved via rules adopted in various meetings and rounds of
negotiations, which will be examined next to demonstrate the evolutional history of
the GATT dispute settlement system.
2.4.1. Chronological Overview of Documents Relating to GATT Dispute
Settlement Procedure
ft
2.4.1.1.195S Report on Organisational and Functional Questions (BISD 3S/231)
(Proposal Relating to Various Articles and Legal Questions)
This Report was based on proposals prepared by the Governments of Denmark,
Norway and Sweden to add interpretative comments to paragraph 2 ofArticle XXIII
of GATT. The main point concerned procedural matters, namely, that the dispute
settlement rules had to be clarified to enable them to be used effectively.
44 See, Jackson, J. H., "The Birth of the GATT-MTN System: A Constitutional Appraisal",
12:21 Law & Policy in Int'l Business (1980), at p. 42; Jackson, J. H., supra note 8, pp. 55-57.
ft
0
45For these rules, see Jackson, J.H.. The World Trading System. The MIT Press, Cambridge,
Massachusetts, 1992, pp. 97-98.
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These countries emphasised that action by the CONTRACTING PARTIES under
Article XXIII should be directed towards the maintenance of a general level of
reciprocal and mutually advantageous concessions not less favourable to trade than
provided for originally; in other words, it demanded that resort to retaliatory action
should only arise when all other possibilities had been examined.46
Among other proposals, the Danish delegation brought the idea of the appointment of
qualified "panels" to assist in considering complaints under Article XXIII.47 The
term "panel" appeared in the GATT dispute settlement for the first time. However, at
this meeting, the above idea was not discussed further. Instead, the CPs agreed to
give the Executive Secretary time to consider the issue.
Nonetheless, the Danish proposal should be taken as an important turning point as
well as providing a distinct contribution in term of the evolutionary history of the
GATT dispute settlement system because, as will be explained later, the emergence
of a panel (instead of a Working Party) marked a significant shift as regards the
judicial nature of the system. In other words, unlike the Working Party, the panel
system introduced impartiality by excluding the parties to a dispute from the dispute
settlement process.
*
2.4.1.2. 1958 Procedures under ARTICLE XXII on Questions Affecting the
Interests of a Number ofContracting Parties (BISD 7S/24)
This document dealt with the request of the Contracting Parties which sought the
0
widening of the degree ofparticipation in consultations under Article XXII ofGATT.
In fact, this tendency was initiated in the discussions with respect to the application
of the General Agreement to the EC. The procedures adopted were as follows:
"-any contracting party seeking a bilateral consultation under Article XXII shall
notify to the Executive Secretary;
46 See, BISD 3S/2S0, para. 62.




-any other contracting party asserting a substantial trade interest in the matter
should notify its desire to join the bilateral consultation to the consulting
counties and the Executive Secretary;
♦ •
- if the requested party agreed that a substantial trade interest existed, the
contracting party who desired to join the bilateral consultations should be
entitled to participate in;
-the applicant was free to refer its claim to the CONTRACTING PARTIES if
0
the request was not accepted;
0
-the consulting countries should notify the outcome of consultation to the
Executive Secretary; and,
*
-the Executive Secretary should provide such assistance (the adopted
procedures defined the involvement of the Executive Secretary) in the
consultation if the parties so requested."48
.To sum up, this document was important in that it opened up access to third parties
(who were indirectly affected) in order to protect their interests. In this respect, the
contribution of this document was to mark the introduction of "multilateralism"
under the GATT.
2.4.1.3.1966 Report on Trade and Development (BISD 14S/139)
During the 60's, one of the major events in terms of GATT membership was the
emergence of the developing countries. As a consequence, a committee was
established to deal with issues relating to the amendment of the General Agreement
to meet the special trade and development needs of less-developed countries which
was not completed by the former Committee on Legal and Institutional Framework.
The Ad Hoc Working Group on Legal Amendments, established by the Committee
in 1965 to deal with these matters, had submitted an interim report.49 The Committee
48Procedures under Article XXII on Questioning Affecting the Interests of Number of




discussed further the various proposals in the light of the findings of the Group and it
reported to Contracting Parties on the following two subjects:
a) amendment of Article XXIII to take into account difficulties experienced
by less-developed countries in using that Article, and
b) amendment of Article XVIII to authorise the use of surcharges by
less-developed countries for balance-of-payment reasons50
A proposal introduced by the Brazilian and Uruguayan delegations in 1965 for
amending Article XXIII initiated the work so as to benefit the developing countries.51
Their proposal contained four elements:
"(i) the present arrangement for action under paragraph 2 of Article XXIII
should be elaborated in a way which would give less-developed countries
invoking the Article the option of employing certain additional measures;
0
(ii) where it had been established that measures complained ofhave adversely
►
affected the trade and economic prospects of less-developed countries and it
had not been possible to eliminate the measure or obtain adequate commercial
remedy, compensation in the form of an indemnity of a financial character
would be in order;
(iii) in cases where the import capacity of a less-developed country had been
impaired by the maintenance ofmeasures by a developed country contrary to
the provisions of the General Agreement, the less-developed country
concerned should be automatically released from its obligations under the
General Agreement towards the developed country complained of, pending
examination of the matter in GATT; and
(iv) in the event that a recommendation by the CONTRACTING PARTIES to
a developed country was not carried out within a given time-limit, the
CONTRACTING PARTIES should consider what collective action they
50 See, BISD 14S/139, para. 40.
51 Dam, Kenneth W., The GATT Law and International Economic Organisation. The




could take to obtain compliance with their recommendation".52
The intention behind the proposal was to streamline and to set out the procedures
clearly so as to speed up action under Article XXIII and go some way towards
redressing the unequal bargaining position of less-developed countries vis-a-vis
developed countries in proceedings under Article XXIII.53
0
On the basis of the discussions in the Ad Hoc Group, the Committee had drawn up a
revised draft decision which embodied the agreement reached in the Committee on
procedures for more speedy and efficient use of the provisions Article XXIII by
less-developed contracting parties, and this revised text was contained in Annex I to
the report.54
Since the fundamental concerns of less-developed countries had not been met,
Brazilian and Uruguayan delegations, in particular, stated that, while they would
accept the compromise reached on points (iv) as reflected in paragraph 10 of the draft
decision, .they could agree to a proposed draft decision only on the understanding that
0
A
further work would be done with a view to resolving the two issues mentioned above
0
*
as (ii) and (iii). The developed contracting parties had no objection to these issues:
*
being given further consideration in the Ad Hoc Group, but were unable to accept the
proposed texts in question for various reasons which had been stated in the report of
the Ad Hoc Group.55 1
In agreeing that the annexed draft decision should be presented to the
CONTRACTING PARTIES for adoption, the Committee also agreed that further
work with regard to the two outstanding issues dealt with in the text of the two
0
paragraphs reproduced in Annex II of the present report should be continued in the
Ad Hoc Group on Legal Amendments.56
51 Ibid., supra note 50, para. 41.
S3 Ibid., para. 43.
S4Ibid., para. 44; the Decision was adopted by the CONTRACTING PARTIES on April 5,




The Committee agreed that the phrase "shall consider what measures" in paragraph
10 of the draft decision was intended to mean that the CONTRACTING PARTIES
should consider the matter with a view to finding appropriate solutions.57
2.4.1.4.1966 Decision on Procedures under ARTICLE XXIII (BISD 14S/18)58
These two articles, Article XXII (Consultation) and Article XXIII (Nullification and
Impairment) ofGATT, played an essential role in the dispute settlement mechanism
of GATT. In addition to these two articles underpinning the dispute settlement
system of GATT, there was the benefit of GATT practice and of decisions taken by
the CONTRACTING PARTIES. One of the examples was the adoption of the 1966
Decision on Procedures under Article XXIII (hereinafter, the "1966 Decision"),
which contributed special dispute settlement procedures between developing and
•i
S6Ibid.9 para. 46.
57 Ibid., para. 47.; the Chairman of the Committee on Trade and Development, in presenting the '
draft decision to the CONTRACTING PARTIES for adoption, asked to be placed on record
the following understanding regarding its provisions:
(1) If consultations to be carried out by the Director-General under paragraph 3 of
the draft decision, the Director General would, in addition to the entities mentioned
in that paragraph, be free to consult such experts as he considered would assist him
in studying the facts and in finding solutions.
(2) With respect to paragraph 6 of the draft decision, the CONTRACTING
PARTIES may provide more particular terms of reference for any such panel in
order to assist them to assess the relative impact of the measures complained of on
the economics of the contracting parties concerned and to consider the adequacy of
any measures which those contracting parties would be prepared to take remedy the
situation. In establishing such particular terms and reference, the CONTRACTING
PARTIES or the Council should bear in mind the desirability of having such panels
appraise, in particular, the following elements:
(a) the damage incurred through the incidence of the measures complained
of upon the export earnings and economic effort of the less-developed
contracting party;
(b) the compensatory or remedial measures which the contracting party
whose measures are complained of would be prepared to take to make
good damage inflicted by their application;
(c) the effects of such measures as the injured contracting party would be
prepared to take in relation to the contracting party whose measures have
nullified or impaired the benefits deriving from the General Agreement
which the former contracting party is entitled to expect.




developed countries. In addition, this document extensively dealt with a dispute
involving a developed county and developing country (a new member) so that the
dispute settlement system would be open and easily accessible for those new member
countries. In fact, this special procedure included the Brazilian and Uruguayan plans
above mentioned with the exception of some radical proposals. The main goal of
%
these new rules were to achieve a prompt settlement of disputes filed under Article
XXIII by the less-developed contracting parties.
The essential innovations introduced by the new rules, which only applied to
complaints filed by less-developed contracting countries against developed
contracting parties were:
(i) the formal introduction of the DG (the utilisation of DG's good offices
acting as an ex officio capacity) into the consultation procedures;59
59 If consultations between a less-developed cp and a developed cp with regard to any matter
falling under para. 1 of Article XXIII did not lead to a satisfactory settlement, the
less-developed cp complaining of the measure might refer the matter which was the subject
of consultations to the DG so that, acting in an ex officio capacity, he may use his good
offices with a view to facilitating a solution (see, BISD 14S/18 at para.l). To this effect the
cp concerned shall, at the request of the DG, promptly furnish all relevant information (Ibid.,
para.2). The DG had to consult with the contracting parties concerned and with such other
cps or inter-governmental organisations as he considered appropriate with a view to
promoting a mutually acceptable solution (Ibid., para.3). After a period of two months from
the commencement of the consultations (para. 3 of the 1966 Decision), if no mutually
satisfactory solution was reached, the DG had to, at the request of one of the cps concerned,
bring the matter to the attention of the CPs or the Council, to whom he had to submit a report
on the action taken by him, together with all background information (Ibid., para. 4). The
CPs or the Council had to immediately appoint a panel of experts to examine the matter with
a view to recommending appropriate solutions. The members of the panel had to act in a
personal capacity and had to be appointed in consultation with, and with the approval of, the
cps concerned (Ibid., para. S). The panel had to, within a period of sixty days from the date
when the matter was referred to it, submit its findings and recommendations to the CPs or the
Council, for consideration and decision. Where the matter was referred to the Council, it
might, in accordance with Rule 8 of the Intersessional Procedures adopted by the CPs at their
thirteenth session (BISD 7S/7), address its recommendations directly to the interested cps
and concurrently report to the CPs (Ibid., para. 7). Within a period of ninety days from the
date of the decision of the CPs or the Council, the cp to which a recommendation was
directed had to report to the CPs or the Council on the action taken by it according to the
decision (Ibid., para. 8). If on examination of this report it was found that a cp to which a
recommendation had been directed had not complied in full with die relevant
recommendation of the CPs or the Council, and that any benefit accruing directly or
indirectly under the General Agreement continued in consequence to be nullified or
impaired, and that the circumstances were serious enough to justify such action, the CPs
might authorise the affected cp or parties to suspend, in regard to the cp causing the damage,
application of any concession or any other obligation under the General Agreement whose
suspension was considered warranted, taking account of the circumstances (Ibid., para. 9).
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(ii) strict deadlines (to be fulfilled by the GATT organs in considering
complaints filed by less developed contracting parties and requests for
authorisation to retaliate) at some stage in the dispute settlement process.
In short, the main contribution of this decision was "velocity" which was brought
about by the defining of a specific period of time in the dispute settlement procedures
in respect of a case between a developed country and a developing country.
*
2.4.1.5. Understanding Regarding Notification, Consultation, Dispute
Settlement and Surveillance (BISD 26S/210)
This document was very influential and unique in the evolutionary development of
the GATT dispute settlement system, since it consisted of a detailed description of
dispute settlement processes along with its Annex entitled "Agreed Description of the
Customary Practice of the GATT in Dispute Settlement" (Article XXIII:2 of
GATT).60 In other words, it formed a kind of "constitutional framework", for the first
time, for the GATT dispute settlement procedure. There was some initiative taken,
during the Tokyo Round (1973-79), to develop the dispute settlement procedure.
4
This task was carried out by the body called the "Group Framework Committee".
9
This development plan, however, did not achieve much partly because of the EC's
objection to any changes in the existing procedures.
The result of the negotiations became a document entitled "Understanding Regarding
Notification, Consultation, Dispute Settlement and Surveillance (hereinafter, the
"1979 Understanding")," which was adopted by the CONTRACTING PARTIES at
their 35th Session in Geneva, 23-25 November 1979.61 Nonetheless, like the other
"understandings" resulting from the Tokyo Round, the precise legal status of this
In the event that a recommendation to a developed country by the CPs is not applied within
the time-limit prescribed in paragraph 8 of the 1966 Decision, the CPs had to consider what
measures, further to those undertaken under paragraph 9, were to be taken to resolve the
matter (Ibid., para. 10). (emphases added)
""Hudec, R. E., "GATT Dispute Settlement after the Tokyo Round: an Unfinished Business",
13 Cornell Int'l L. J. (1980), pp. 145-203.




understanding was unclear. In fact, unlike the Tokyo Round codes and other
ft
agreements, it was not a stand-alone treaty, nor a waiver under Article.XXV of
GATT. It was, however, presumably adopted under the general power of Article
XXV to "facilitate the operation and further the objectives"62 ofGATT.
The most noteworthy features of the 1979 Understanding were: the explicit provision
ft
for a conciliatory role for the DG; the provisions for panels; the reinforcement of the
prima facie nullification or impairment concepts; the outline of the work of a panel
including oral and written advocacy; language that permitted the use of
non-governmental persons for the panels (while stating a preference for government
persons); recognition of the practice of a panel report with statement of facts and
rationale; and the understanding that the report was then submitted to the
CONTRACTING PARTIES for a final approval.
• ft
The title of the 1979 Understanding contained the following essential elements in the
GATT dispute settlement process:
4
. "a) a knowledge, through notifications by governments, ofmeasures that might
in the event of lead to disputes;
b) recourse to bilateral andmultilateral consultations in order, as a first priority,
to reach an amicable settlement;
c) settlement of disputes, not as a result of a quasi-judicial decision, but
through recommendations conductive to re-establishment of a balance of
concessions and advantage between the parties to the dispute; and,
d) confirmation ofmonitoring by the Contracting Parties, thus at the same time
underlining the importance of collective moral pressure in dispute settlement".
*
*
A. Notification (paras. 2-3)
With respect to notifications referred to in the 1979 Understanding, it was clear that
the effective supervision of the operation of a multilateral trade treaty i.e. GATT




required transparency in the trade regulation and measures adopted by the contracting
parties. A note, dealing with the notifications which member countries were required
to submit, was set up by the GATT Secretariat.63 According to the 1979
Understanding, contracting parties undertook, to the maximum extent possible, to
notify the CONTRACTING PARTIES of their adoption of trade measures affecting
the operation of the General Agreement. It was necessary to improve notifications
and the exchange of information. For this reason, the 1979 Understanding provided
that, if a member country had a reason to believe that trade measures conducted by
another member country were liable to upset the balance of advantage under the
General Agreement, it might seek further information regarding measures at issue
directly from the contracting parties concerned. Information of this kind could also
be made available by the Secretariat, following a Council decision adopted after the
Ministerial session in November 1982s4, which we shall see in the following section.
B. Consultation (paras. 4-6)
Consultation played a main role in the dispute settlement procedure ofGATT (which,
it still does under the new dispute settlement system of WTO). The General
Agreement provided as follows: "each contracting party shall accord sympathetic
consideration to, and shall afford adequate opportunityfor consultations regarding,
such representations as shall be made to it by another contractingparty ..." (Article
XXII: 1). If no result was arrived at through consultation, either party might request
the CONTRACTING PARTIES to search for an alternative solution, usually through
the establishment of a working party (later, a panel)65 (Article XXII:2). Furthermore,
if no solution was found in this multilateral consultation procedure, a contracting
party might refer the matter to the CONTRACTING PARTIES under the dispute
settlement procedure set out in Article XXIII:2.
63MTN/FR/W/l7,1 August 1978.
64 The 1982 Ministerial Declaration adopted on 29 November 1982, supra note 39.
65For the Working Party and Panel, see at Sections 1.1.3.2. and 1.1.3.3. respectively in Chapter
1 of the thesis.
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Before recourse to Article XXIII:2, a preliminary phase of consultation was
available either in Article XXII, or Article XXimi66, or Article XXXVII:267. Unlike
Article XXIII: 1 it required written representations or one's proposals to the other
contracting party or parties, and sympathetic consideration to the representations or
proposals made to it had to be given under Article XXII: 1. If no positive result was
reached, the matter could be referred to the CONTRACTING PARTIES under
Article XXIII:2. The importance of the role played by consultation could be far
greater than played by procedural rules and practices. As a matter of fact, far more
disputes were settled through bilateral consultation between the contracting parties in
question than were dealt with by the CONTRACTING PARTIES pursuant to Article
XXIII:2.68 Accordingly, there was often no necessity to refer the matter in contention
to the Council.
C. Settlement ofDisputes (paras. 7-23)
GATT practice was mentioned in paragraph 5 of the Annex to the 1979
Understanding as follows: "contracting parties have had recourse to Article XXIII
only when in their view a benefit accruing to them under the GeneralAgreement was
being nullified or impaired''. If there is an infringement of obligation, normally a
presumption, that a breach of the rules (under the General Agreement) had an adverse
effect on other contracting parties, in such cases, it was up to the contracting parties
against whom the complaint had been brought to rebut the charge. Whereas, "if a
contractingparty bringing an Article XXIII case claims that measures which do not
conflict with the provisions of the General Agreement have nullified or impaired
$
benefits accruing to it under the General Agreement, it would be called upon to
provide a detailed justification"69 (i.e. non-violation claim). This means that the
66BISD 9S/19.
67BISD 14S/20.
48 Long, Olivier., Law and Limitation. Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, the Netherlands, 1987, at
75.
4
69Para. 5, Annex to the 1979 Understanding, supra note 21.
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burden of proof was on the complainant if the claim made was based on
non-violation of the rules.
According to Article XXIII, a breach of the rules did not, in itself, give sufficient
grounds for a dispute where there had been no nullification or impairment of a
benefit under GATT. There was, however, a presumption that the incidence of a
breach of the rules was unfavourable to other member countries. It was sufficient for
a contracting party bringing a complaint to demonstrate that there was such a breach,
9
and that a benefit accruing to it under the GATT was nullified and impaired, for such
complaint to be considered. Nonetheless, in fact, once under way, the procedure was
more concerned with a breach of the rules than with 'injury'.
*
The main objective of the dispute settlement was to develop an understanding
between the parties in conflict, and ultimately to reach a mutually acceptable
solution. The main goal was not to impose a penalty for being in breach of the
GATT rules but to secure the withdrawal of the measures at issue immediately.70
The issue of compensation only arose if the immediate withdrawal of the measures
was impracticable.
Article XXIII:2 provided a contracting party with the possibility of a final course of
action, namely, the suspension of the application of concession which in fact meant
retaliation.71 This however needed authorisation from the CONTRACTING
PARTIES.
Regarding a complaint set by a developing country against a developed country, the
complainants could seek the good office of the DG.72 The DG might, in considering
the case, consult with the Chairman of the CONTRACTING PARTIES and
70Cf. In this regards, the same rank of remedies can be found in the DSU, see Article 3: (i)
withdrawal of inconsistent measures; (ii) compensation; (iii) retaliation.
71 See, for Netherlands Measures of Suspension of Obligations to the United States, BISD
IS/32 (1953).
72 See, supra note 59; see also Section 2.4.1.4. of this chapter.
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Chairman of the Council. Since the Ministerial Declaration of November 1982, the
good offices of the DG became available to any party in dispute subject to an
agreement of the other party.73
*
According to Article XXIII:2, "the CONTRACTING PARTIES shall promptly
investigate any matter ... referred to them". In practice, this task was entrusted to
working parties or panels ofexperts.
0
The function of panels was to assist the CONTRACTING PARTIES in examining
matters brought before them under Article XXIII:2. The creation of the panel was
indeed the most original feature as well as the most useful element of the GATT
dispute settlement procedure, (para. 16)
*
0
In the event that there was a bilateral (or mutually satisfactory) settlement between
. the parties to the dispute, the panel simply reported that a solution has been reached
between them (normally a brief description of the case and a report that a solution
had been arrived at). No further information was given. Nonetheless, a contracting '
party with an interest had a right to make enquiries, as far as trade matters were
0
concerned, and to be given information about the resolution of the matter. In fact, as
mentioned earlier, mutually acceptable solutions were the most popular pattern of
settlement ofdisputes, (para. 19)
0
If no bilateral settlement had been reached, the panel submitted its findings and
recommendations to the Council in written form, which usually included findings,
observations on the applicability of relevant provisions of the General Agreement,
and the main reasons for the findings and recommendations that had been made,
(para. 17)
9




As soon as a panel report was adopted by the Council, rulings and recommendations
set out in the report were thereby given legal force pursuant to Article XXIII:2,
which provided for the CONTRACTING PARTIES "to make appropriate
recommendations to the contracting parties which considered to be concerned, or
give a ruling on the matter, as appropriate". In fact, no panel report or report of
working party was ever turned down by the Council.
The CONTRACTING PARTIES had to maintain under surveillance any matter on
9
V
which they had made recommendations or given rulings and also had to carry out a
regular and systematic review of developments taken in accordance with its
recommendations, (para. 22)
In case recommendations were not complied with within a reasonable period of time,
further legal action provided for in Article XXIII:2 could be taken. Retaliatory
measures against the party in question might be authorised. If such measures were
taken that party had the option of withdrawing from the General Agreement sixty
days after notifying an intention to do so.
D. Surveillance (para. 24)
The CONTRACTING PARTIES were to keep under surveillance any matter on
which they had made recommendations or given rulings. If their recommendations
were not implemented within a reasonable period of time, the contracting party
bringing the case might ask them to intervene to find an appropriate solution. Such a
request could result in a resumption of consultations and negotiations, in which case
if the country's complaint were found to be justified, it would end up in a
strengthened position.
The continuing surveillance by the CONTRACTING PARTIES relied for its
effectiveness upon moral and political pressure. Its main goal was to secure the
%
withdrawal of the measures concerned if they were found to be inconsistent with
rules contained in the General Agreement.
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To sum up, the 1979 Understanding marked a significant improvement in the dispute
settlement system of GATT. As shown above, the Understanding, for the first time,
accumulated and codified a large number of customary practices of dispute
settlement procedures (including a special rule for a panel involving a developing
country), and contributed to remove ambiguity from the dispute settlement rules. In
addition, the evolution of the dispute settlement system towards "judicialisation"
became even more obvious.
2.4.1.6.1982 Ministerial Declaration on Dispute Settlement (BISD 29S/13)
0
In spite of the great achievements of the 1979 Understanding, there was considerable
dissatisfaction with the dispute settlement procedure in GATT. A new attempt to
improve the situation was made at the 1982 Ministerial meeting which was held in
November 1982 in Geneva. To alleviate such dissatisfaction, the 1982 Ministerial
Declaration established guidelines and commitments covering seventeen issues74 and
also reaffirmed the 1979 Understanding. As already explained, the 1979
Understanding provided the vital framework underpinning the dispute settlement
procedures among contracting parties, and accordingly no major procedural
amendment was required in the 1982 Ministerial meeting. Nonetheless, there was a
scope for more effective use of the existing mechanism and for specific procedural
improvements.75 The dispute settlement mechanism was still being undermined by
*
some among the contracting parties, therefore in 1982 Ministerial meeting, it was
agreed that "obstruction in the process of dispute settlement shall be avoided".76 In
the end, the 1982 Ministerial Declaration made a commitment to agree on several
issues to be worked upon in order to expedite the dispute settlement process. Such
provisions were:
"a. Strengthening and broadening the opportunity for conciliation;
74 See, file 1982 Ministerial Declaration, supra note 39, pp. 13-14.
15 Ibid., at 16.
76 See, GATT, GATT Activities 1984 (1985), p. 16.
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b. Enforcing compliance with established time-limits by both the panels and
the CONTRACTING PARTIES;
c. Reinforcing the CONTRACTING PARTIES' commitment to make experts
available to participate on panels, and providing assistance to panels from the
Secretariat;77
d. Encouraging clarity and responsiveness ofpanel decisions;
e. Requiring panels to recommend specific causes of action and insuring that
panels are responsive to the issues in their reports;
*
f. Tailoring recommendations and rulings of the CONTRACTING PARTIES
0
to achieving satisfactory settlements, ensuring follow-up of actions, and
involving the parties to a dispute in the formulation of recommendations and
rulings by the CONTRACTING PARTIES; and
g. Attempting to dissuade parties from taking advantage of the consensus
requirement to obstruct the dispute settlement process".78
As stated, the 1982 Ministerial Declaration considered the issue of consensus of the
CONTRACTING PARTIES in the dispute settlement system which needed to be
improved in contentious areas such as consultations; the panel process; and,
enforcement of panel reports and recommendations. Moreover, an innovative
concept was proposed by the U.S., i.e. a "consensus-minus two" principle which
aimed at avoiding blockage by the parties to the dispute at the stage of adoption of a
panel report. Nonetheless, a large number of member governments rejected this
proposal.
The 1982 Ministerial meeting, in general, had not achieved much progress in terms
ofdispute settlement procedures.
"See, the 1982 Ministerial Declaration, supra note 39, pp. 13-16.
"Minutes ofMeeting held on 26 January 1983, C/M/165 (Feb. 14,1983), at 3-4
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2.4.1.7.1984 Action on Dispute Settlement (BISD31S/9)79
The 1982 Ministerial Declaration reaffirmed that the Dispute Settlement of the 1979
%
Understanding had provided the necessary framework of procedures for the
settlement ofdisputes among contracting parties.
For achieving improvements in the whole dispute settlement system, it was necessary
not only to make specific procedural improvements, but also to obtain a clear-cut
understanding and commitment from CONTRACTING PARTIES (or Signatories to
the Codes) concerning aspects both of the nature and time-frame in: (a) the panel
0
*
process; (b) the decision on the matter in dispute to be taken by the CONTRACTING
PARTIES (or the Code Committee) on the basis of the panel's report; and (c) the
follow-up to be given to that decision by the parties.
%
A number of procedural deficiencies in the panel process were encountered which
could be approached within the existing framework. Such problems were, for
.instance, the punctual formation of panels, and the timely completion of panel
reports. In spite of the guidelines for those procedures (thirty days for the formation
of a panel and three to nine months to complete the panel proceedings) as stipulated
in paragraph 11 and footnote 11 respectively of the 1979 Understandings, these
targets were rarely met. Improvements in those aspect would not solve the
$
shortcomings of the mechanism in their entirety. The CONTRACTING PARTIES,
therefore, agreed that the following approach should be adopted to that end, on a trial
basis, for a period ofone year in order to continue the process of improving operation
of the system. The approach taken on a trial basis could be summarised as follows:
(i) The CPs compiled a short roster of non-governmental experts qualified to
%
serve as panellists;80 and
#
79From the text Action taken on 30 November 1984 on Dispute Settlement Procedures
(L/5752) in BISD 31S/9 (1985).
80Formation of Panels: "Contracting parties should indicate to the Director-General that the
names of the persons they think qualified to serve as panellists, who are not presently
affiliated with national administrations but who have a high degree of knowledge of
international trade and experience of the GATT. These names should be used to develop a
short roster of non-governmental panellists to be agreed upon the CONTRACTING
s
PARTIES in consultation with the Director-General. The roster should be as representative
as possible of contracting parties", (para. 1)
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(ii) In the event that the disputing parties could not agree on members of
panellists within thirty days after the panel was requested, either party could
ask the DG to appoint persons from the roster.81
9
Thus, the 1984 Action introduced a procedure, on a trial basis for one year, in order
ft
to reduce delay and to further raise the level ofexpertise ofpanellists.82
0
0
2.4.2. "Trade Policies for a Better Future : The Leutwiler Report, the GATT
and the Uruguay Round (1985)"
The Leutwiler Report was published in March 1985. The then DG, Arthur Dunkel,
initiated the formation of an independent study group consisting of seven experts
with wide experience in various fields, for instance, banking, economics, industry,
and law and politics.83 The main task given to this study group was to identify the
fundamental factors disturbing the international trading system, and to consider a
solution for the 80's. The group undertook research on problems existing in the
international trading system, and finally presented fifteen recommendations in
9
Chapter three of the Report for specific and immediate action to satisfy the crisis in
the world trade order.
81 Under the same title: "In the event that panel composition cannot be agreed within thirty
days after a matter is referred by the CONTRACTING PARTIES, the Director-General shall,
at the request of either party and in consultation with the Chairman of the Council,
completed the panel by appointing persons from the roster ofnon-governmental panellists to
resolve the deadlock, after consulting both parties", (para. 3)
82Completion of Panel Work: "Panels should continue to set their own working procedures
• 0
and, where possible, panels should provide the parties to the dispute at the outset with a
proposed calendar for the panel's work", (para. 1); "Where written submissions are requested
from the parties, panels should set precise deadlines, and the parties to a dispute should
respect those deadlines", (para. 2)
83The members of the independent study group were: Dr. Fritz Leutwiler (Chairman)
(Chairman of Swiss National Bank and President of Bank for International Settlements), B ,
Senator Bill Bradley (US Senator, member Senate Finance Committee), Dr. Pehr
Gyllenhammar (Chairman of AB Volvo), Dr. Guy Ladreit de Lacharriere (Vice President of
International Court of Justice), Dr. I.G. Patel (Director of London School of Economics and
former Governor of Reserve Bank of India), Professor Mario Henrique Simonsen (Getulio
Vargas Foundation and former Minister of Finance of Brazil), and Dr. Sumitro
Djojohadikusumo (former Minister of Trade and Industry and Minister of Finance of
Indonesia).
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Regarding dispute settlement, the Leutwiler Report identified procedural problems as
an area of weakness in the mechanism. Other weaknesses were also recognised in
the disputes settlement process. The Report stated that "sometimes panels have had
to base their findings on rules that have been superseded by tacit or informal
understandings (which could be described as "ambiguity" or "art" ofGATT rules)."84
Accordingly, the following improvements to the dispute settlement procedure were
recommended in the Report:
9
panels should be set up and should complete their work more expeditiously
r
than in some past instances;
- panels should always clearly indicate the rationale for their findings to
provide the GATT Council with a firm foundation for making its decision;
- panels should be composed of experts fully familiar with the GATT legal
system; such panels could be filled from a small permanent roster of
non-governmental experts; such a list would facilitate the selection of
panellists; frequent service by the same experts would lead to an
accumulation of expertise and experience which eventually would ensure the
development ofconsistency in the making awards building up a "case law";
- insuring enforcement of GATT obligations by allowing third party
complaints when actions, such as bilateral agreements, impede the objectives
of the GATT but cause no direct trade injury;
- the GATT should grant the DG power to initiate mediation and conciliation
at an early stage ofdispute; and
9
- greater and more systematic implementation ofpanel reports i.e. fixing dates
for the carrying out of recommendations with subsequent reviews by the
Council".85
9
To sum up, the report may be considered to be one of the essential documents in the
study of the evolution of the dispute settlement system of GATT because it put





forward a number of detailed proposals, some of which have subsequently become
negotiating issues in the UR negotiations. Although the report was unofficial, it
expressed straightforward opinions which required for preparing the ground for the
forthcoming new round.
2.5. Development of Dispute Settlement Mechanism through the Uruguay
Round
2.5.1. Perspectives of the GATT Dispute Settlement System - Proposal for
Improvement of GATT Dispute Settlement Procedure
The principal goal of improving the GATT dispute settlement system was to ensure
overall compliance with GATT rules. The Negotiating Group on Dispute Settlement
(hereinafter, the "NG13") at the UR, dealing with the dispute settlement aspects of




-the encouragement of complaints by third parties concerning "grey area
measures"86;
-enhancement of the consultation process (for a settlement at an early stage,
making more efforts for a settlement bilaterally before reaching a panel
stage);
-increased mediation role for the DG;
-possibility to resort to binding arbitration on factual matters, provided the
interests of third parties were safeguarded;
-increased use ofnon-governmental experts as panellists (for enhancement of
the quality of legal elements of a panel and its report);
86E.g., "Voluntary Restraint Agreements" (VRAs), "Voluntary Export Restrictions" (VER),
"Orderly Market Arrangements" (OMA), etc.; see Jackson, J.H. and W. Davev. Int'l Econ.
Relations. 2nd ed., West Publishing Company, St. Paul, Minnesota, 1991, pp. 609-622; see
also Section 2.4.1.6. in this Chapter of the thesis.
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-acceleration of the establishment of panels and imposition of time-limits on
their work (for avoiding delays);
t
-increased use of standard terms of reference and increased standardisation of
the working procedures for panels (for avoiding delays);
-definition of specific criteria for qualifying as an interested third party,
allowed to make representations to a panel;
-tighter rules on confidentiality (for termination of leakage);
0
-codification in a single instrument of the various texts currently governing
the dispute settlement process, as amended through negotiations (for avoiding
"fragmentation" ofdispute settlement rules);
-requirement that parties objecting to panel rulings state their reasons in a
written submission to the CP (for a prevention of easy-blockage in adopting a
panel decision);
-continuing surveillance of compliance which adopted panel
recommendations, for example, by scheduling regular dispute settlement
meetings of the GATT Council (for encouraging an implementation ofpanels'
ruling or recommendation, and in the event of not being implemented,
maintaining supervisory political pressure on the party to whom the panel's
decision to be applied until its implementation).
Several of the above suggestions were already referred to in the Leutwiler Report.
Although the suggestions were adopted by the GATT system, the other proposals
were excluded as part of the ongoing debate on the GATT dispute settlement system.
The proposals excluded would involve a major overhaul of some of the underlying
principles on which the GATT was based. For instance, a reform that had been
proposed was to recognise the direct effect of GATT into national law in order to
encourage private party enforcement. Another point was that the panels should be
0
turned into permanent tribunals consisting ofGATT experts. In addition, it had also
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been suggested that all panel reports should be adopted by the Council and therefore,
automatically become GATT law with immediate effect, or that at least the two
parties to the dispute should be excluded from the consensus procedure.87
2.5.2. 1989 Dispute Settlement Procedures Improvements: Decision Adopted at
the Mid-Term Review of the Uruguay Round (April 1989) (BISD 36S/61)
Following the proposal made in the Leutwiler Report, the Ministerial Declaration on
20 September 1986 launching the UR88 referred to negotiating goals with respect to
dispute settlement mechanism: strengthening the rules and procedures of the dispute
settlement mechanism; and, inventing effective measures to improve surveillance so
as to achieve better compliance.
The NG 13 had already made a substantial progress in refining and improving the
dispute settlement mechanism, which defined implementation on a trial basis to
operate to the end of the UR.89 In December 1988, the Trade Negotiations
■ Committee convened in Montreal for the Mid-term Review of the UR negotiations.90
At the April 1989 Mid-term Meeting where the trade Ministers gathered at the
Ministerial level, they adopted the text agreed upon during the December 1988
meeting; it was decided that the procedural reforms would be implemented on a trial
basis commencing from 1 May, 1989 until the end of the Round.91 They also agreed
P
87What was known as the "consensus-minus-two" system which was proposed by the United
States at the 1982 Ministerial Resolution, which however had not been adopted in the end;
for further explanation on "consensus-minus-two", see Hudec, Robert. E., The Enforcing
Trade Law, supra note 3, pp. 232-245.
88Ministerial Declaration on the Uruguay Round, MIN(86)/6 (Sept. 20 1986).
89The CONTRACTING PARTIES later reconsidered this decision (regarding the application
of the GATT dispute settlement rules and procedures on a trial basis) (BISD36S/61 on 12
April 1989) and decided as follows: "to keep the ... improvements [the 1989 Decision] in
effect until the entry into force the Understanding on Rules and Procedures Governing the
Settlement of Dispute contained Annex 2 of the Agreement Establishing the World Trade
Organisation (MTN/FA,II); for the decision, see Decision of 22 February 1994 on Extension
of the April 1989 Decision on Improvements to the GATT Dispute Settlement Rules and
Procedures (L/7416).
90 See, Trade Negotiations Committee Meeting at Ministerial Level, Montreal, December 1988,
MTN. TNC/7(MIN) (Dec. 9,1988) [hereinafter, the "1988 Mid-term Review"] at 26.
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that the NG13 should continue its work in order to achieve the negotiating objective
of the Ministerial Declaration.92
*
The Contracting Parties adopted the Mid-term Agreement concerning dispute
settlement during its forty-fifth session.93 They further decided that the
implementation of the reforms would remain under review, a decision on their formal
adoption to be made at the end of the Round.94 Moreover, the NG13 agreed that it
would continue negotiations with the aim of further improving and strengthening the
GATT dispute settlement system taking into account the experience obtained in
applying these improvements.95
The 1989 Improvements played a significant role as the basis for the new dispute
settlement rules which as a result became the Understanding on Rules and
Procedures Governing the Settlement ofDisputes (hereinafter, the "DSU").
The general provisions of the improvements to the GATT dispute settlement
mechanisms which were adopted by the NG13, stated that the dispute settlement
|
system of GATT was "a central element in providing security andpredictability to
the multilateral trading system."96 It further stated that "all solutions to matters
formally raised under the GATT dispute settlement system under Article XXII, XXIII
9
and arbitration awards shall be consistent with the General Agreement...', ...the
improvements set out in this document, which aim to ensure prompt and effective
resolution ofdisputes to the benefit ofall contracting parties, shall be applied on a
trial basisfrom 1 May 1989 to the end ofthe Uruguay Round... "91
"See, Mid-term Meeting, MTN. TNC/11 (April 21, 1989) [hereinafter the "April 1989
Mid-term Meeting"] at 24.
92 Ibid.
93 See, Improvements to the GATT Dispute Settlement Rules and Procedures [hereinafter,
the "1989 Improvements"], Decision of 12 April 1989, L/6489, reprinted in BISD 36S/61
(1990).







The DSU (which covers almost all issues presented in the text of the 1989
Improvements), will be analysed in Chapter 5. The following simply spells out the
differences between the rules of the 1989 Improvements and the rules of the DSU of
the WTO. The 1989 Improvements set out improvements in nine matters concerning
the GATT dispute settlement rules and procedures: A. General Provisions; B.
Notification; C. Consultations; D. Good Offices, Conciliation, Mediation; E.
Arbitration; F. Panel and Working Party Procedures; G. Adoption of Panel Reports;
H. Technical Assistance; I. Surveillance of Implementation ofRecommendations and
Rulings [cf. those items can be found in the provisions of the DSU respectively: A.
(DSU 3); B. (DSU 3.6; 25.3); C. (DSU 3); D. (DSU 5); E. (DSU 25); F. (DSU 12);
G. (DSU 16); H. (DSU 27; 17.7); I. (DSU 21)].
*
9
Major differences between the 1989 Improvements and the DSU are:
I. The time period for consideration of reports.
The period was 30 days in the 1989 Improvements (para. 1 of Section G), but is 20
days in the DSU (DSU 16.1).
2. The rule concerning the adoption ofpanel reports.
For adoption of panel reports, the practice of "consensus" was to be continued in the
1989 Improvements (para. 3 of Section G), whereas the DSU provides for an
automatic adoption (through negative consensus rules) (DSU 16.4).
3. The time frame of the dispute settlement proceedings (there is a slight difference in
*
the method of measuring the period the dispute settlement process is to take, in
particular, its starting point).
The 1989 Improvements (the period from the request for Consultation until the
Council takes a decision on the panel report) stated "shall not, ... , exceed fifteen
months" (para. 4 ofSection G).
*
Whereas, the DSU (the period from the date of establishment of the panel by the




stipulates that "shall as a general rule not exceed nine months where the panel is not
appealed or 12 months where the report is appealed" (DSU 20). In advance of those
time periods, the DSU stipulates that the party to which the request is made must
enter into consultation "... within a period of no more than 30 days after the date of
receipt of the request,..." (DSU 4.3); that if the consultations fail to settle a dispute,
"... within 60 days after the date of receipt of the request for consultations,..." (DSU
4.7).
The provisional dispute settlement rules (on a trial base) ensured promptness and
effectiveness by virtue of the 1989 Improvements. Although some matters were left
out of discussion for the Brussels meeting in December 1990, the 1989
Improvements has indeed contributed to shaping the provisional rules into the draft
version which later became the final dispute settlement rules (DSU).
2.5.3. The Brussels Ministerial Meeting: Draft Final Act Embodying the Result
of the Uruguay Round ofMultilateral Trade Negotiations (December 1990)
-The Brussels Ministerial Meeting was held during 3-7 December 1990. At this
meeting, the massive consolidated documentation was released. Those documents
were, "Draft Final Act Embodying the Result of the Uruguay Round ofMultilateral
Trade Negotiations" (hereinafter, the "Brussels Draft Final Act")98; and, the revised
edition of the Brussels Draft Final Act including minor revisions as "corrigendum".99
The Brussels Draft Final Act was a first approximation of the Final Act Embodying
the Result of the Uruguay Round of Multilateral Trade Negotiations (the final
version) which was finally signed on 15 April 1994 at Marrakesh, Morocco.
Accordingly, the Brussels Draft Final Act included a draft of "Understanding on the
Interpretation and Application ofArticle XXII and XXIII of the General Agreement
98Draft Final Act Embodying the Result of the Uruguay Round of Multilateral Trade
Negotiations, MTN.TNC/W/35 (26 November 1990).
99MTN.TNCAV/35/Rev. 1 (3 December 1990).
60
CHAPTER 2
on Tariffs and Trade" (hereinafter, the "Draft Understanding")100, which included the
Commentary101 which listed three main issues remaining to be resolved. These issues
were:
-The procedure for Council decisions concerning: the establishment of
4
panels;102 the adoption of panel reports;103 the adoption of appellate reports;104
and, authorisation of retaliation.105
-The non-resort to unilateral measures.106
-Procedures for non-violation complaints.107
In addition, the Draft Understanding noted two points in its footnote at the beginning
of this document and those were:
-A determination has to be made with respect to the entry into force and
*
application of this Understanding, and to the continuation of the tentative108
dispute settlement procedures as decided by the Council on 12 April 1989109
until the date of its Understanding's application.
-Existing dispute settlement procedures have not been recorded where
bracketed alternatives proposed by negotiating parties appear, though, there
were some delegations who preferred the maintenance of these present ones.110
100Ibid., MTN.TNC/W/35, supra note 98, pp. 288-305.
101 Ibid, at 288.
102 See, para. 1(a) ofSection D in the 1989 Improvements, supra note 93. In this document, the
"consensus" rule was maintained, (cf. DSU 6.1)
103 Ibid., para. 4 of Section G. (cf. DSU 16.4)
104 Ibid., para. 3 of Section H. (cf. DSU 17.14)
105 Ibid., para. 3 ofSection L. (cf. DSU 22.7)
106Ibid., SectionM. (cf. DSU 3.1; 23)
107Ibid., Section P. (cf. DSU 26)
108 See, Footnote 1 in the Draft Understanding, supra note 98 at 289.
109 See at Section 2.5.2. in Chapter 2 of the thesis; see also BISD 36S/61, supra note 93.
1,0Ibid., Footnote 2 in the Draft Understanding, supra note 98 at 289.
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At the Brussels Ministerial meeting, nothing much happened regarding the issue of
institutions to which dispute settlement matter belonged.111 The two major
outstanding issues listed above (i.e. the question of decision-making of the Council;
and the'proposed non-resort to unilateral action) were not discussed. Instead, the
main focus was placed upon non-violation complaints. Accordingly, the rest of the
W
outstanding issues were carried over to the following negotiations.
In short, despite its importance, little progress was achieved on dispute settlement
mainly due to a lack ofpolitical commitment. Nonetheless, the overall structure and
0
♦ i
contents of the Draft Understanding were, in essence, almost identical to the text of
the final version of the present DSU.
2.5.4. Draft Final Act Embodying the Results of the Uruguay Round of
Multilateral Trade Negotiations (MTN.TNCAV/FA) (20 December 1991)
On 20 December 1991, the then Chairman, Arthur Dunkel, released the "Draft Final
Act Embodying the Results of the Uruguay Round of Multilateral Trade
0
Negotiations".112 This Dunkel Draft stressed the need for further effort to conclude
the negotiations. This section presents a brief outline of the Dunkel Draft, while its
detail being more accessible in the guide of the last version entitled "The Final Act
0
Embodying the Results of the Uruguay Round of Multilateral Trade Negotiation"
(hereinafter, the "Final Act") as discussed in Chapter 5 of this thesis. The Dunkel
Draft dealt with the issue of dispute settlement in two draft agreements:
"Understanding on Rules and Procedures on Dispute Settlement"; and, "Elements of
an Integrated Dispute Settlement System".
"'Under the "Institution", there were also issues on Final Act and FOGS (Functioning of the
GATT System).




2.5.4.1. Understanding on Rules and Procedures on Dispute Settlement
(MTN.TNC/W/FA S. 1-S. 23) (20 December 1991)"3
The Dunkel Draft included an exhaustive presentation of the results reached at
negotiations in almost all the negotiating groups. It was further emphasised that the
Dunkel Draft would not be deemed a final agreement114 until ongoing negotiations
were completed as a whole package, which should include pending areas such as
#
market access and trade in services. The Dunkel Draft Understanding integrated the
interim procedures adopted after the Mid-term Review115 (functioned as a trial basis
since then), the Brussels Draft Understanding,116 and the October 1991 revisions to
the Brussels Draft.117 The unified text covered issues regarding procedures for
Council decisions (e.g. automaticity in the establishing of panels, adopting panel
reports and authorising retaliation), political commitment to refrain from unilateral
action, non-violation complaints, and treatment of developing countries.
Furthermore, the Dunkel Draft Understanding reiterated that existing rules of the
GATT concerning dispute settlement (i.e. Article XXII and XXIII) would remain in
effect until the date of entry into force of the Understanding.118 It further expressed
that new requests under Article XXII :1 and XXIII: 1 of GATT had to be conducted
according to the Understanding when it became effective. In addition, it was also
agreed that a full review ofGATT dispute settlement rule and procedures, had to be
. completed within four years of their effective date when the trade ministers would
make a decision whether to continue, modify, or terminate relevant procedures'19 at
the first meeting at Ministerial level after completion of the review.
113This document was a part of the Dunkel Draft and dealt with dispute settlement rules;
MTM.TNC/W/FA S.1-S.23 [hereinafter, the "Dunkel Draft Understanding"].
w Ibid..
113 See at Section 2.5.2. in Chapter 2 of the thesis.
116See, ibid., Section 2.5.3.
l"lbid., at S. 1.
mIbid.






2.5.4.2. Elements of an Integrated Dispute Settlement System (MTN.TNC/W/FA
T.1-T.6)
The Elements of an Integrated Dispute Settlement System120 set out objectives to
harmonise and conform the various procedures of dispute settlement, which were to
deal with the GATT and its associated Agreements, the Tokyo Round Codes, the
GATS agreements, the TRIPs agreements and the PTAs. The idea was to terminate
the possibility of "forum-shopping" or "rule-shopping" which had appeared
especially after the introduction of the Code signed at the Tokyo Round. The new
idea of "integrated" dispute settlement system was meant to wipe out that problem as
well as to eliminate the complexity of the rules ofdispute settlement as a whole.
The main issues covered in this agreement were: Dispute Settlement Body;
Establishment of Panels; Composition of Panels; Terms and Reference of Panels;
Conflict of Substantive Provision; Compensation and Suspension of Concessions;
Non-violation Complains; and, Suspension of Concessions. The analysis of this
0
document has been left to the following chapters where the new dispute settlement
system ofWTO as a final product of the document are dealt with.
4
120Like dispute settlement rules mentioned above as the "Dunkel Draft Understanding",
(MTM.TNC/W/FA S.1-S.23), supra note 113, this document is also a part of the Dunkel
Draft, MTN.TNC/W/FA T.1-T.6.
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The dispute settlement negotiations of the UR were investigated by the member
|
states' recognition of the urgent necessity, owing to the defective GATT system, to
establish an effective mechanism to resolve international trade disputes. To achieve
that end, the members agreed to tighten up rules and procedures of the dispute
settlement mechanism, and to enhance surveillance of implementation in order to
%
strengthen enforcement of panel decisions. However, there were two distinctive
views on the role ofGATT dispute settlement. One group, led by the U.S. with some
support from Canada and other countries including developing countries, regarded
the role of dispute settlement system as means of arriving at a judgement in a
quasi-judicial manner. The other group, supported by the EC and Japan, considered
ft
that the panel procedure of dispute settlement should be understood to be a
continuation ofconciliation.
%
The aim of this chapter is to describe the position of the major negotiating parties
(i.e. EC, Japan, U.S. and the developing countries) and to highlight disagreements
between those who viewed the dispute settlement mechanism as being judicial in
character and those with a contrary opinion as to its characters. In order to carry out
4
this enquiry, this chapter mainly examines the working papers of the dispute
settlement mechanism submitted to the NG13 during the early period of the UR.
Furthermore, in this chapter, working papers are presented and examined in
chronological order. The negotiation period covered in this chapterwill be limited to
the period up to 1988 just before the Montreal Ministerial meeting (5-7 December
1988) because most of the key issues in the negotiations were raised and discussed
extensively before this meeting. In fact, this draft was reviewed by the trade
Ministers during the meeting and was formulated in a text consisting of initial rules
and procedures of dispute settlement. In April 1989, the Contracting Parties adopted
. CHAPTER 3
the text as a tentative rule on a trial basis until the finalisation of the then ongoing
UR negotiations.
►
3.1. Initial Proposals by Member Countries
The NG13 held its first meeting on 6 April 1987.1 At the first meeting, participants
placed emphasis on a means of securing compliance with GATT. The participants
also made proposals of a preliminary nature in respect of specific issues to be
considered in the forthcoming negotiations. Those issues raised were: the nature of
dispute settlement; the establishment of panels; the work of panels; the role of the
GATT Council; implementation of panel reports; equal access to the GATT dispute
settlement system; and strengthening of the GATT dispute settlement system through
' %




Subsequent to the initial meeting, the negotiating group convened its second meeting
on 25 June 1987.2 The United States put forward suggestions in a discussion paper,3
and made the following points:4
(1) It is necessary to enhance the mediation role of the GATT DG or his
designee.5
(2) The necessity to establish a binding arbitration process (involving no need
for GATT Council or Code Committee approval) as an alternative means of
dispute settlement for defined classes of cases, or by prior agreement of the
disputing parties on an ad hoc basis.6
'MTN.GNG/NG13/1 (10 April 1987).
2See, Meeting of 25 June 1987. Note bv the Secretariat [hereinafter, the "June 1987
Meeting"!. MTN. GNG/NG13/2 (15 July 1987).
'See, Improved Dispute Settlement: Elements for Consideration. Discussion Paper Prepared
bv United States Delegation Thereinafter. the "U.S. Discussion Paper"!.
MTN.GNG/NG13/W/6 (25 June 1987).
4See, ibid.
5Cf. ibid., Article 5:6 of the DSU.
6Cf. ibid., Article 25.
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(3) The requirement to lay down binding and enforceable timetables for the
process in its various stages.7
*
(4) That non-governmental experts could be appointed as panellists, and this
would be to everyone's advantage.8
(5) The benefits to be derived from the use of the same terms of reference by
all panels as standard in order to prevent delays caused by negotiating terms
which differ in accordance with those who are the parties to the dispute.9
(6) A procedure to deal with the problem of blocking the adoption of panel
reports10; and/or
(7) As an alternative to the ideas in item (6), it was suggested that the parties
should seek to implement the recommendations resulting from a settlement to
a dispute, and recognise that failure to do so gives rise to a right to
compensation or retaliation.11
Many of the proposals of the U.S., towards judicialisation, have been adopted in the
new dispute settlement rules in the DSU.
|
Japan's Position:
Subsequent to the U.S. proposal, Japan in its Communication at the second meeting
of the NG13 noted that "existing dispute settlement of the GATT has been functioning
by and large well"}2 Japan further stated in this communication that "the task ...in
the Uruguay Round is to materialise the collective political commitments on
strengthening the dispute settlement mechanism"}2
According to Japan's written communication, the predominant reasons for the system
being cumbersome and slow resided in the panel proceedings and included: the
tendency to resort to panel procedures without sufficient bilateral consultations in
7Cf. ibid., Article 20 and para. 12 in Appendix 3 to the DSU.
8Cf. ibid., Article 8:1, 4; see for a short roster of non-government panellist in L/5752 in
BISD 31S/9 (1985).
9Cf. ibid., Article 7.'
,0Cf. ibid., Article 16:4; the U.S. Discussion Paper, supra note 3.
"Cf. ibid., Article 22.





advance;14 insufficient relevant GATT articles and/or the lack of uniformity in
ft
interpretation of those articles.15 Japan therefore indicated what in its view the
ft
necessary improvements were:16
"(1) Clarification is necessary regarding the relationship between
*
consultations under Article XXII and XXIII: 1, or good offices of the DG and
the recourse to a panel;
(2) The mechanism for using good offices of an appropriate body for
conciliation (paragraph 8 of the 1979 Understanding) must be improved;
(3) Regarding the selection of panel members, review and enlargement of the
indicative list of qualified persons in the roster (paragraph 13 of the 1979
Understanding), and more frequent use of non-governmental persons in the
roster to be invited to serve as panellists;
(4) For the sake of speedy procedures in the setting up of a panel, procedures
in the Council to decide on the setting-up a panel should be modified in order
to facilitate more expeditious decisions. (For example, one of the guide lines
should be to clarify the maximum period allowed to the panel proceedings,
%
the meaning of the terms "cases of urgency" in paragraph 20 of the 1979
Understanding must be clarified, and the procedures under paragraph 16 of
f
the 1979 Understanding, "adequate opportunity to be given by panels to
develop a mutually satisfactory solution," must be also clarified); and,
(5) Concerning the procedural improvements for the adoption of panel
reports, for the implementation of the panel recommendation (for instance,
the explicit indication of the reasonable period for the implementation of a
panel recommendation, the necessary measures must be taken by the Council
in case of non-compliance by the end of the said period). In extreme cases,
"Regarding this aspect, one example should be mentioned here, i.e. Japan Alcoholic
Beverages Case, L/6216 (13 October 1987) in BISD 34S/83 (1988): The case was initiated
by the EC's request for a consultation with Japan as provided for in GATT Article XXII: 1 in
1985. After two sessions of consultations had failed, the EC requested to set up a panel as
provided in GATT Article XXIII:2. Japan, however, did not agree with the establishment of
the panel on the ground that consultations had not been exhausted as defined in GATT
Article XXII: 1. (emphases added); see for the reasons given by the Government of Japan in
C/M/205 (12 December 1986) at 8.





compensation and retaliatory measures must be taken. The existing provision
which states that the Council's (or the CONTRACTING PARTIES')
authorisation is necessary prior to such actions should be retained, as it may
be useful for in revisal of domestic legislation and the enforcement and
implementation ofGATT obligations".17
Japan further submitted a subsequent communication with suggestions for further
4
development, in which it suggested that "the CONTRACTING PARTIES should not
accept the request ofa complaining party to refer a matter to it, unless the parties
concerned go through bilateral consultations under Article XXIII:I."1* In other
S
words, bilateral consultations must be strengthened and the concomitant procedures
*
should also be clarified further.
It should be noted here was another significant contribution, during the UR
negotiation, made by Japan to the dispute settlement system, i.e. its insistence on the
inclusion of a provision regarding prohibition of unilateralism [now in Article 23 of
the DSU].19 Interestingly, in fact, this Japanese contribution is clearly reflected on its
attitude towards DS in actual cases, which will be examined in Chapters 7 and 8
■ (case studies).
In addition to the Japanese insistence on the prohibition of unilateral actions, the
proposal made by the Nordic countries also sought to tackle the same issue. In their
view, the U.S. had justified its recourse to the unilateral measures under the Section
301 by criticising the limitation of the GATT jurisdiction. The disputes brought to
the GATT were diverse and often referred to issues that had not been dealt with in
the past and for which there were no previous experience. Thus, the dispute
l7See, ibid., supra note 13, pp. 2-3; The U.S. strongly opposed this point until the end of the
round negotiations and eventually, it succeeded in maintaining its position. Instead, the U.S.
agreed to compromise with another point which can be seen, as a final agreement, in Article
23 of the DSU which narrowed the possibility ofunilateral actions.
"Communication from Japan [hereinafter, the "Japan Proposal September 1987"!.
MTN.GNG/NG13/W/9 (18 September 1987).
19Unfortunately, not much of these Japanese efforts are documented. For this reason, this
information was given through the interview with an ex-government official of Japanese
government in June 1998, Geneva.
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settlement system needed to be improved so as to make it more flexible and efficient
%
to cope with a diversity ofnew problems.20
EC's Position:
The EEC(EC) proposed in its communication that the Community recognised the
importance for the credibility of the GATT system of speedy and efficient settlement
$
of disputes in order to bring benefits to all contracting parties.21 In addition, the
Community supported the negotiating objectives, that is, to improve and strengthen
the rules and procedures for the dispute settlement. The Community indicated its
position in the communication as follows:
(1) Analysis of the nature and functioning of the machinery22
The main objective of the GATT dispute settlement machinery is to reach
mutually satisfactory solutions to the disputes within the context of a
p
multilateral framework, and to restore the balance of economic and trade
|
advantages that have been nullified or impaired. The Community was of
9
j
the opinion that a satisfactory solution to disputes should be sought in
conciliation, negotiation, and consensus.23
(2) The practice of consensus24
Consensus rule remained the traditional method of settling disputes as it
0
had been adopted in November 1982 at the Ministerial Declaration.25
Any new procedure providing for an automaticity in the process to adopt
panel reports and to implement recommendations would bring a great
change in the GATT dispute settlement system.
(3) Specific improvements to be made to the existing procedures26
The Community agreed to the view that the functions of conciliation and
mediation should be strengthened, and the arbitration procedure could be
20See, Communication from the Nordic Countries. MTN.GNG/NG13/W/10 (18 September
1987).
"See, Communication from the EEC. MTN.GNG/NG13/W/12 (24 September 1987).
22Cf. Article 5:1 of the DSU.
23Ibid, supra note 21, para. 1 at 1.
2*Ibid., para. 2 at 2.
"Section (x) in L/5424, BISD 29S/13 (1983) at 16.





With respect to panel procedures (e.g. right to the establishment of a
panel, terms of reference of panels, composition of panels, fixing of
0
time-limits in panel procedure), however, no major proposal was made
and its views on panel procedure followed the existing method in general.
(4) Adoption ofpanel reports and the implementation of recommendations28
The Community stated that the practice of the method of consensus
should remain within the Council's decision making process as
mentioned above. The question, however, was how to reconcile the
requirement of maintaining this practice with the other requirement of
avoiding situations that weakened the credibility and effectiveness of the
dispute resolution system. One answer to this could be that an
improvement in the quality of the panel reports and the provision ofmore
details as to the reasoning behind the findings. The other improvement
should be that parties raising objections to a panel finding should submit
a written opinion to the CONTRACTING PARTIES in order to give
reasons for their action.
In addition, reasonable time-limits for implementation of
recommendations adopted by the Council could be clarified.29 Finally,
the Community expressed that the idea of strengthening the Council's
monitoring of the implementation of recommendation should be agreed
upon.30
0
The Community, in its final remarks of the communication, called for the
codification of the various existing texts on dispute settlement (Article
XXm of GATT) so as to produce a single consolidated text.31 The
*
intention behind this request brought by the EC was to eliminate the
27Cf. Article 5:5 and Article 25 of the DSU.
ZiIbid.9 supra note 21, Section (d), para. 3 at 4.
29Cf. Article 21:3,4 of the DSU.
30See (iv) Transparency at Section 5.3. in Chapter 5 of this thesis; cf. ibid., Article 21.
MIbid\ for the list of a single "consolidated" text (including Annex 1A; B; C, Annex 2 and




fragmentation of dispute settlement arrangements under GATT that had
*
arisen due to the variety of scattered procedures established under a
number ofTokyo Round codes.32
3.2. Responses from Negotiating Countries
This section examines the responses of the negotiating countries to the suggestion
made at the initial stage ofnegotiations, mainly with regard to the following aspects:
nature of the dispute settlement system, the panel process, adoption and
implementation ofpanel decisions, and other procedural rules.
Japan's Position:
Japan disagreed with the proposal of the establishment of a binding arbitration
procedure supported by the United States, the E.C., and other negotiating countries.
The reason was that this procedure "could undermine the competence of the
CONTRACTING PARTIES under Article XXIII:2 to examine and authorise
counter-measures.11,33
. Japan also disagreed with the binding enforceable timetables which were proposed
for the panel process. The reason for the disagreement was that it "could result in the •
abuse andproliferation ofcounter-measures."34
Japan further expressed some doubt concerning the idea of selecting
non-governmental experts as panellists "exclusively" with more frequency.35
Concerning other procedural aspects, Japan put forward the view that the danger of
abusive usage of a panel by third countries may cause an indirect negative effect on
the GATT system.36
In addition, the Japanese delegation also disagreed with the Australian proposal that a
panel might also recommend that compensation be extended to any interested third
r
nIbid., supra note 21 at 5.
"Meeting of 21 and 24 September 1987. Note bv the Secretariat [hereinafter, the "21/24 of
September 1987 Meeting"]- MTN.GNG/NG13/3 (12 October 1987) at 4.
34Ibid, at 5.
"See, The Japan Proposal September 1987, supra note 18 at 5.
36Cf. Article 4:11 and Article 10 of the DSU.
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parties, because the Australian proposal "could cause an unwarranted spillover of
bilateral disputes" ."
Finally, the Japanese representative proposed the strengthening of the confidentiality
ofpanel proceedings.38
0
The United States was quite satisfied with the proposals submitted in the NG13
because the U.S. proposals (e.g. the shortening of the timetable for panel
consideration, the stipulation of standard terms of reference, and the expansion of the
role of the DG to set down terms of reference and panel composition in case the
parties to the dispute were unable to reach an agreement within a limited period of
time) which would clarify and expedite the existing dispute settlement process were
all covered.
Furthermore, the U.S. had received support from a number of negotiating members
with regard to the following matters: the expansion of the roster of
0
non-governmental panellists; the increase of surveillance control over panel reports
*
in the process of being implemented; and the consolidation of all GATT texts on
dispute settlement procedures.
As for other proposals, the U.S. commented on the need to amend procedures in
order to allow for the adoption of panel reports excluding disputing parties. On this
matter, the EC made an objection to the U.S. view.39 The U.S. noted that this idea
was in need of further examination because there was still the possibility of panel
reports being blocked by "surrogated" parties. In this regard, one could notice a clear
difference in the opinions between the EC and the U.S. Namely, the EC supported
the conventional consensus requirement, whereas the US was ready to exclude
«
disputing parties from the strict consensus requirement (including those parties in
dispute), which implied a U.S. preference of a judicial approach to this issue.
"See, Meeting of 9 November 1987. Note by the Secretariat [hereinafter, the "9 November
1987 Meeting"]. MTN. GNG/NG13/4 (18 November 1987) at 4.; the United States also
expressed its accord, stating that the necessity of clarification for the third party rights, to the
Japanese position.
"The EC's view on this respect was expressed in its additional communication in 1988, see




The U. S. delegation also questioned how the term "a material interest" was to be
<
defined,40 which related to proposals to exclude parties with "a material interest" in a
dispute stemming from Council decision on panel reports.
The U.S. further concerned itselfwith the positions of the EC and Japan regarding
blockage of a report, and wondered whether the requirement of written justification
for blocking reports would be enough to prevent the granting of approval for a
"bad-intent" one.41 The U.S. again expressed its preference for the judicial approach,
i.e. once a panel report was ready, no party could block its adoption (i.e. automatic
procedure). Meanwhile, the Australian delegation raised the issue that disputing
parties and third parties with a material interest in a dispute should not participate in
Council decisions on the adoption of the panel report42 In this respect, the Australian
position seemed to support that of the U.S.
The EC delegation replied to many questions raised regarding the inability of
bilateral arbitration to reduce the competence of the CONTRACTING PARTIES to
interpret the General Agreement and to protect the rights of third parties.
The developing country group proposed several points in the early negotiations. For
instance, Brazil advocated special treatment for less-developed contracting parties.43
Its delegation made a proposal stating that a developing contracting party must be
given differential and more favourable treatment in cases of disputes arising between
developing contracting parties with limited retaliatory power and a developed *
contracting party.44
40See, The 9 November 1987 Meeting, supra note 37 at 3.
"Ibid.
42See, ibid, at 4.
43Cf. Article 24 of the DSU; other provisions related to this issue can be found in Article 3.
12; Article 4. 10; Article 8. 10; Article 12.10, 11; Article 21. 2, 7 and 8.
44See, The 21/24 ofSeptember 1987 Meeting, supra note 37 at 6; a special attention for those
developing countries can be seen in the WTO Agreement, particularly in the DSU, after the
Uruguay Round negotiation, for example, Article 3:12 (General provisions), Article 4:10
(Consultation), Article 8:10 (Composition of panel), Article 12:10, 11 (Panel procedure),
Article 21:2, 7, 8 (Surveillance of Implementation of Recommendations and Rules), Article
24 (Special Procedures Involving Last-Developed Country Members), and Article 27:2





The Korean delegation supported the idea submitted by the United States, Japan, and
9
the EEC (EC), which was to enhance the dispute settlement mechanism by means of
*
consultations, conciliation, and mediation.45 The idea of binding arbitration should
be limited to cases where disputing parties had agreed to refer the dispute to
arbitration. Korea supported the automatic panel establishment after consultations
4
and an appropriate examination of the issues in the Council had taken place. Korea
«
also agreed to the use of the standard terms of reference, a proposal made by the
Japanese delegation. Regarding the period of the completion of a panel process, the
Korean delegation proposed nine months from the establishment of the panel as an
<
acceptable maximum, and three months in urgent cases. The delegation also noted
that the Council should decide by consensus on the adoption ofpanel reports, within
>
f
sixty days and thirty days in urgent cases, from the date of the submission of the
report. Any objecting party should make written submissions explaining its position
during this period.46
The delegation ofHong Kong explained the objectives of the negotiations as follows:
"negotiations shall include the development ofadequate arrangementsfor overseeing
and monitoring the procedures that would facilitate compliance with adopted
. recommendationsH.47 Hong Kong supported the proposal submitted by Australia and
. the EEC (EC) to strengthen the surveillance function of the Council on matters
arising from disputes in the GATT. Hong Kong also proposed the possibility of
setting up a separate GATT body to decide on dispute settlement. This body would
report to the Council and could perform its functions regarding dispute settlement.
«
The body would meet at regular intervals to keep any existing disputes under review
b
and also examine the functioning of the dispute settlement mechanism.
Alternatively, as an alternative to such an additional new body, the Council should
meet regularly in a "dispute settlement mode" and examine and monitor dispute
settlement matters.48 In addition, the chairman of the Council meetings should be
*
45See, ibid., supra note 3,12,18 and 21 for MTN.GNG/NG13/W 6, 7, 9, and 12.
46See, ibid.
47See, The 21/24 ofSeptember 1987 Meeting, supra note 33 at 6.
48This proposal became a model of the present system, namely, the General Council of the




A joint communique submitted by the delegations ofArgentina, Canada, Hong Kong,
Hungary, Mexico and Uruguay expressed concern regarding the Dispute Settlement
Council, particularly since the majority of GATT dispute settlement proceedings
involved the participation of developed countries and this, in turn, might make the
agenda of the Council meetings in a "dispute settlement mode" reflect too much the
view of the developed countries.50 The developing countries, therefore, felt isolated
from the dispute settlement system and this, for them, was an unsatisfactory
situation.51 Accordingly, one delegation suggested that the regular Council meetings
could be extended to deal with dispute settlement instead of creating a special session
for that purpose.52
The other delegations noted that the establishment of a new body, the GATT Dispute
Settlement Council, could dilute the competence and importance of the regular
GATT Council, and worse, weaken the GATT dispute settlement process itself.53
The delegations also explained that the new body would not prevent the
less-developed countries from exercising their rights under the process.54
3.3. Further Negotiation on the Dispute Settlement Mechanism
By the early 1988, it became clear to all participants in the negotiation on dispute
settlement that the proposals put forward fell into two distinct categories: (1) those
DSU; and Trade Policy Review Body (TPRB) as provided for in the TPRM (Trade Policy
Review Mechanism), see Article IV, para. 3 and 4 of the WTO Agreement respectively.
49See, ibid.
50See, Meeting of 20 November 1987. Note bv the Secretariat [hereinafter, the "20
November 1987 Meeting"]- MTN.GNG/NG13/5 (7 December 1987) at 3.
5l"For a long time, the GATT was basically a club that was primarily ofrelevance to OECD
countries. Developing countries did notparticipatefully" in Hoekman, Bernard, and Michel
Kostecki, The Political Economy of the World Trading System - from GATT to WTO.
Oxford University Press, Oxford, 1995, at 235; By contrast, under the new WTO system,
developing countries have begun to use multilateral procedures for resolving disputes much
more than they did in the past., for cases to prove such trend, see GATT, GATT Focus No.
112, November 1994.
52Ibid., supra note 55 at 3; No detail was given for the "delegation" in the document.





for essentially procedural improvements to the existing arrangements, and (2) those
which would involve fundamental change.
Japan's Position:
Japan submitted a supplementary proposal based on the 1987 discussions.55 The
*
purpose of this proposal was to facilitate discussions in the NG13. This proposal
9
mainly stressed two issues: the problem of undue obstruction to the adoption of a
final report, and arbitration.
With respect to the issue of adoption of a final report, Japan supported the rule of
adoption by consensus because of the following two reasons: First, the practice of
consensus ensured the effective implementation of the decisions of the panel by
simultaneously establishing the wishes of the CONTRACTING PARTIES and that
of the disputing parties. Second, the effective functioning of the GATT dispute
settlement procedures in the past with respect to the implementation of the panel
decisions was partly attributable to the merit of the consensus practice.
Japan, however, disagreed with the proposal of a "consensus-minus-two" which
consists of excluding the parties to a dispute from the decision-making process of the '
m
panel report. In addition, the idea of "consensus-minus-two" would, in its view,
create more difficulties in settling a dispute in accordance with the panel decision
considering the different views held by different countries on the legal binding nature
of the panel decision. Japan thought that the undue obstruction to its adoption was a
result of either the flaws in a panel report or the complexity of the disputes
themselves.56 Japan considered the following two approaches were necessary to
overcome the situation of "obstruction of adoption":
(1) To improve the quality of the panels by ensuring that proper legal or
factual judgements are taken; and
(2) To endorse the Council's decision to grant a disputing party an
9
opportunity to raise an objection to the panel report, as suggested in the
Korean Proposal57 and to review the panel report within a specified period of
55See, Communication from Japan [hereinafter, the "Japan Proposal 1988"].




time prior to the adoption ofpanel report in case ofobjection.58
Judging from those points raised by Japan, it seems that Japan indicated its
preference for dispute settlement rules with a more judicial nature (though, along
with the EC, Japan was believed to be in favour ofnon-judicial one at the beginning)
I
and taking into account the approaches indicated above, made a counter-proposal
against suggestions made by a number ofdelegations as follows:
(1) Improvement of the quality of the panels
-It could be improved by appointing persons to the panels, as panellists,
who have the necessary expertise in the GATT provisions, international
trade, and the industries involved.
-It is also important to expand and improve the function of the
Secretariat in general, for example, that the number of the Secretariat
legal staff59 should be expanded so as to facilitate the rendering of
adequate technical assistance or service to panel proceedings.
(2) Procedures to raise an objection to a panel report60
-It is necessary to avoid undue delay in the dispute settlement
procedures and for this purpose, an explicit procedure to have an
opportunity for raising a formal objection to the panel report should be
instituted. The procedure would be as follows:
57See, 2 (e) of the Communication from Korea. MTN.GNG/NG13/W/19 (20 November
1987) at 5.
58See, The Japan Proposal 1988, supra note 55
at 4.
59As ofMay 1999, there are ten legal officers excluding the Director who normally directly
involved in some high-profile/big cases, in the Legal Affairs Division of the WTO
Secretariat. My personal impression after my internship (April-June 1997) at the division is
that the division is understaffed in general, inter alia, if they receive a number of big cases at
the same period of time, then it would be very difficult to keep and manage those cases
running within the strict time-frame designated in the DSU. Nonetheless, the possibility of
increasing the staff number seems, in general, rather low due to the budgetary requirements
of the WTO Secretariat. In practice, normally the director appoints two officers to be in
charge of each panel as a panel secretary and/or legal officer (sometimes, one more officer as
an assistant).
^Cf. Article 16:4 of the DSU; also for appeal, ibid., Article 17.
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"-The objecting party should submit a written explanation of
objections to the CONTRACTING PARTIES (i.e. the Council)
specifying the compelling reasons;
-the CONTRACTING PARTIES should give sufficient
consideration to reviewing the communication and could use it in
deliberating the panel report; and
-the review should be completed within thirty days"61.
In the meantime, with respect to arbitration as a formal means of GATT dispute
• 9
settlement procedures, Japan considered that it should be made available only if the
following conditions were met: i) neutrality of an arbitral body; ii) consistency and
transparency of the enforcement; and iii) discrete nature (i.e. limited applicability) of
findings. The details for each of those conditions are as follows:.
i) Neutrality of an Arbitral Body:62
Japan thought it essential that an arbitrator be neutral in order to avoid the
situation where one disputing party takes advantage of political or economic
0
leverage to impose unfair arbitrators or awards on another party. Japan also
proposed that, with a view to achieving neutrality in arbitration, an arbitral
body established by the CONTRACTING PARTIES in Geneva would be ideal.
Concerning the selection of arbitrators, Japan suggested that the qualifications
f
and nomination procedures of panellists should be clearly laid out and applied
in order to ensure the neutrality ofarbitrators.
ii) Consistency and Transparency of the Enforcement:63
Japan also made proposals promoting consistency and transparency in the
arbitration proceedings. According to the opinion of Japan, the mandate of an
arbitral body must be limited to fact-finding, and any interested third party
"See, Section (d) in the Japan Proposal 1988, supra note 55 at 6. It states that "Such a
reviewing procedure should be invoked to ensure an objective assessment of the matter and
prompt settlement of the dispute with due respect for the purposes of the GATT dispute
settlement procedures. It shall not be intended or considered as a device to bring about
delay ofthe settlement ofthe dispute"
62Ibid., Section 2, para (1) at 7.










should have an opportunity to raise objections to the arbitral awards.
Moreover, any disputing party should have the right to consult with the
CONTRACTING PARTIES in the event of an arbitration award adding to or
diminishing the rights and obligations provided in GATT.
iii) Discrete Nature (or Limited Applicability) ofFindings:64
Japan proposed that the findings of an arbitration awards be effective only as
regards the specific matter referred to in the arbitration, and that, in any case,
the awards bind only the parties to the arbitration.
0
Japan's 1988 proposal on dispute settlement was reviewed at the NG 13 meeting in
1988.65 With respect to the supplementary proposal of Japan, one delegation
supported the opinion expressed by Japan, i.e. doubt over the "consensus-minus-two"
idea, and also backed the introduction of a written submission to justify an objection
to the adoption of a panel report,66 but proposed that the review procedure be
conducted in a separate forum from the contentious arguments regarding the dispute.
Furthermore, the NG 13 welcomed the idea of the introduction of a voluntarily
agreed arbitration as proposed by Japan.67 In addition, the Group also supported
Japan's suggestion for the need for a degree of control by the Council over the
object-matter of the arbitration.68 It was suggested, however, that the Council's
control over third party objections to an arbitration award could limit the right to a
panel by making that right conditional upon a Council's prima facie case of
nullification or impairment.69
Another delegation proposed that a modified consensus (i.e. consensus minus the
parties to a dispute and, possibly, interested third parties) could be applied without
MIbid., para. (3) at 9.
"See, The Meeting of 2 and 3 March 1988, Note bv Secretariat [hereinafter, the "March
1988 Meeting"!. MTN.GNG/NG13/6 (31 March 1988).
"No identity for the "delegation" was given in this document.; ibid. Section 7 at 3.
67Cf. ibid., Article 25, para. 2 of the DSU.




weakening the effectiveness of the consensus principle.70 In fact, this was the veto
power, given to individual contracting parties based on the consensus principles,
which had caused unwarranted delay on many occasions in the past, and furthermore
this power had indeed weakened the credibility of the GATT system as a whole.71
Accordingly, the modified consensus could improve the existing situation with
»
•
reference to the resolution of disputes. Furthermore, the modified consensus would
reinforce the GATT rules to the benefit of all contracting parties and facilitate to
restore balance between parties.72 This delegation explained that the exclusion of the
disputing parties was not based on bad faith but on the knowledge that the
persuasiveness of one's own arguments and the merits of one's own case row so








Another delegation supported the proposals of Japan suggesting the need for
expansion in the following areas: improvement of the panellists' roster, increase of
secretariat resources, and submission of a written reasoning when objecting to a
panel report.74 With respect to the last point, the proposed procedure for raising
objections, this delegation noted that such procedure could be a repeat of the
arguments presented before a panel.75
The delegation also expressed its concern about the proposal that one arbitral body
$
serve for all arbitration, and further questioned whether the same individuals should
serve as arbitrators in every cases.76 What would happen if a dispute involved a
national of one of the disputing parties as an arbitrator?77 The delegation further
|
questioned the validity of the suggested direct Council consideration of third party
objections consequent to binding arbitration without referring to Article XXIII: 1
which provides for objecting parties wishing to hold bilateral consultations.78












Commenting on the various responses to its proposals, Japan reiterated the merits of
the consensus practice which contains "the key to theproperfunctioning of the GATT
dispute settlement mechanism and to the effective implementation of dispute
settlementfindings ofthe Council."19
4
Japan also noted that the review of written objections to a panel report must be
conducted within a limited period of time.80 The Japanese delegation further
mentioned that in order to avoid a repetition of arguments, the Council should decide
which issues of a panel report should be examined.81 Regarding the proposed
i
arbitration procedure, Japan supported the opinion that the right of the third parties to
raise objections and to invoke Article XXIII should not be limited.82 The mandate of
the Arbitration however, should be limited to fact-finding unless the
*
CONTRACTING PARTIES had specifically authorised in advance a broader
arbitration mandate beforehand.83
EC's Position:
The previous communique of the European Community84 referred to an analysis of
the nature and functioning of the GATT dispute settlement mechanism and its views
on specific improvements to be achieved in existing procedures. In 1988, the EC
i submitted additional views on some elements and defined its position regarding
issues which arose in the 1987 negotiations.85 This communication dealt with (1)
adoption of panel reports, (2) conciliation/mediation procedures, (3) arbitration
procedure, (4) deadlines concerning panel procedures, and (5) surveillance. With this
9
proposal, the EC intended to stimulate the stagnating situation and to achieve
progress in the negotiation. The details ofeach issue were:
nIbid.





MSee, MTN/GNG/NG/13/W/12, supra note 21.
8SSee, Communication from the EEC. MTN.GNG/NG13/W/22 (2 March 1988).
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(1) Adoption of Panel Reports
First of all, the EC had not taken a definitive position on the issue of the
adoption of panel reports and on the making of recommendations. Although a
number of suggestions had been made, these tended to make non-adoption
more difficult by requiring written reasons to justify objections to a panel
report, by limiting the opportunities for rejecting a panel report by excluding
the disputing parties from the adoption of a decision, or by circumventing the
problem by making panel reports binding unless there was no consensus
against the adoption of a panel report (what is known now as the "negative
consensus" rules).86 The EC indicated that the problem would arise because of
competing views about the essential purpose of the dispute settlement process:
"...from the angle of a trade dispute, it may seem illogical that one of the
parties could become,..., both judge and jury in its own case; and
...from the angle of interpreting GATT rules, it would seem equally
illogical that a Contracting Party should be excluded from the process of
interpretation which belongs to the Contracting Parties as a whole."87
The EC noted that three possibilities seem to be worthy of consideration in
order attempt to reconcile these problems:
"i) To keep the existing practice of adoption by consensus, but to make it
more difficult to obstruct a consensus for adoption for political reasons.
A
This might be resolved by providing a better structured mechanism in
order to justify such oppositions (e.g. written submissions to the GATT
Council or Code Committees);
ii) the consideration of panel reports could facilitate adoption.
Concerning a legal finding, the existing consensus of all Contracting
Parties would be required. With respect to decisions made on the
recommendations, these should be taken in a more flexible manner, (e.g.
a consensus would be considered to exist even if one of the parties to the
|
dispute has difficulties in accepting that recommendations); and,
*
MIbidSection 1 at 1-2.
*7Ibid, at 2; see the U.S. view on this issue: "...the adoption of panel reports without the
participation ofdisputing parties." at Section 3.2. in this chapter.
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iii) in the event consensus was impossible to arrive at, the Council would
take note of the panel report. Nonetheless, the Council would seek a




In the light of past GATT practise, neither conciliation nor mediation was
favoured. This situation can be explained by the fact that "the parties
0
concerned prefer to insist on their rights on a multilateral level instead of
accepting conciliation/mediation on an ad-hoc basis".19 Therefore, these
additional procedures, which if used by the parties in the event of their bilateral
consultations failing, proved unpopular. In any event, the EC disagreed with
any structured or compulsory conciliation/mediation procedure since it was
likely to prolong the proceedings, although it accepted that
conciliation/mediation should remain as an option.90
t •
(3) Arbitration Procedure
The EC proposed that an arbitration system as a supplementary technique of
dispute settlement be added to the existing system. The EC stressed the
following points in the light of the idea of setting up an arbitration system:
"-the institutionalisation of a rapid arbitration procedure would facilitate
the resolution of certain disputes, specially, those factual questions;
-arbitration as a supplementary technique would be made available
9
dependent upon the mutual agreement of the parties involved;
-decisions of the arbitral tribunal would be binding for the parties
involved in it but should not interfere with the GATT rights of third
parties; and
-the GATT Council would be informed of the arbitration result and could
*







(4) Deadlines Concerning Panel Procedures
The EC argued that it is important to set deadlines for the process in order to
expedite the process of the examination of disputes and also avoid delays in
any of procedures which usually follow. Panels, however, should stay free to
establish their own flexible timetable. The EC suggestions were:
the Council should decide to establish a panel, normally at the first
meeting, or at the latest, by its second meeting following the one where
the request was made;92
- standard terms of reference should be used, unless the disputing party,
within 10 working days, agrees to alternative terms of reference;93
- if there is no agreement between the parties involved within 10 working
days, the DG, in consultation with the Chairman of the Council, should
determine the composition of the panel;
- the standard working procedure of the panel should be determined by
the panel and could be formally adopted by the CONTRACTING
PARTIES, and it should not exceed nine months (3 months in case of
urgency) for the presentation of the panel report to the Council;94
- the Council must examine the report within 30 days from the date of
their presentation;95 and
- parties to whom recommendations are addressed should agree on a




The EC also stressed the importance of having a strengthened and regular
procedure of surveillance and a controlled dispute settlement procedure. The
"See, ibid, at 4.
"Cf. Article 6:1 of the DSU.
"The EC view on this point share with that ofJapan and the US; cf. Article 7 of the DSU.
94Cf. Article 12: 8 of the DSU.
95Cf. Article 16: 4 of the DSU.
"Communication from the EEC. MTN.GNG/NG13/W/22, supra note 85, Section 4 at 4-5;
cf. Article 21:3 of the DSU.
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EC, however, noted that the Council's surveillance only covers dispute matters
arising from Article XXIII, thereby excluding dispute matters brought under
the MTN Codes, i.e. the Tokyo Round Codes, where competence for
surveillance should be limited to the Signatories' Committees.97 The EC stated
4
that, instead of establishing a new ad hoc mechanism, the Council should
continue functioning as it does now.98
At a meeting in March 1988, one delegation commented on the EC's proposal and
found that the EC's submission did not mention the situation where disputing parties
♦
blocked the adoption of panel reports even though the panel had reached a
consensus.99 This delegation expressed its interest in the EC proposal on adoption of
reports, i.e. "the consideration of the general conclusions as regards GATT
conformity separatelyfrom the specific recommendationsfor remedy."10°
With respect to arbitration, the delegation felt that arbitration would not redress the
P
existing differences over the adoption and the implementation of panel reports.101
The delegation, more generally, supported the proposed deadlines to be applied to the
panel process.102
Another delegation expressed their agreement with the proposed optional conciliation .
and mediation, the submission ofwritten objections to explain reasons, and also with
the proposed deadline.103 In addition, the delegation also supported an enhanced
surveillance procedure which contained positive elements in it (e.g. helps in
l •
identifying a violator of rules as well as facilitates the implementation of a ruling
made by a Panel (or Appellate Body).104 On the other hand, the delegation regarded
97See, ibid, at 5.
"Ibid.
"See, The March 1988 Meeting, supra note 64 at 5; no identity for the "delegation" was
given in this document; this EC's stance for the issue could be explained by the fact that the
EC was one ofmost popular contracting parties along with the U.S. which often had blocked




103No identity for the "delegation" was given in this document; see, ibid, at 6.
1mIbid.; cf. Art. 21.6; 22.8 of the DSU.
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the blocking of the adoption of panel reports as one of the serious matters to be
tackled in the dispute settlement mechanism.105
Regarding the establishment of a panel, the delegation thought that one Council
meeting should be sufficient to decide on a panel establishment.106 The delegation,
furthermore, questioned the necessity of limiting arbitration to fact-finding and noted





Chapter 4. THE SYSTEM OF WORLD TRADE ORGANISATION
fWTOJ
Introduction
The WTO1 was set up pn 1 January 1995 as a result of the UR negotiations which
were concluded on 15 December 1993.2 The Ministers of member governments
supported its results by signing the Final Act at the MarrakeshMeeting ofApril 1994
in Morocco. In the Marrakesh Declaration of 15 April 1994, the Ministers affirmed
that the conclusion of the UR negotiation would "strengthen the world trade
*
economy and lead to more trade, investment, employment and income growth
throughout the world'.3 The Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade
Organisation (hereinafter, the "WTO Agreement"), therefore, the successor to the
General Agreement, could be described as the embodiment of the ideas discussed at
the UR. In fact, the agreement makes provisions as regards the principal contractual-
obligations that determine how the governments of the members frame and
implement domestic trade legislation and regulations. Moreover, the WTO has now.
become the "forum" where trade relations among countries evolve through collective
debate, negotiation, and adjudication.
4
This chapter provides a brief description of the institutional and constitutional
structure of the WTO and further demonstrates the evolutionary (i.e. judicial)
character of the new system in comparison with the previous GATT system. An
investigation of its dispute settlement mechanism which will be conducted in the next
chapter.
'For an overview of the World Trade Organisation in general, see McGovern, Edmond.,
International Trade Regulation. Globefield Press, Exeter, 1995; Stewart, Terence P. (ed.),
The World Trade Organisation. American Bar Association, Section of Int'l Law Practice,
Washington D.C., 1996; Qureshi, Asif H., The World Trade Organisation. Manchester
University Press, Manchester, 1996.
2Final Act Embodying the Result of the Uruguay Round of Multilateral Trade
Negotiations,MTN/FA (15 December 1993) [hereinafter, the "Final Act"].
3For the Marrakesh Declaration of 15 April 1994 in the GATT Secretariat, The Results of




4.1. Objectives of theWTO4
4
The World Trade Organisation is an international organisation. In the Preamble to
the WTO Agreement, the drafters basically reiterated the objectives of the old
GATT: the primary purposes are: the substantial reduction of tariffs and other
barriers to trade and the elimination ofdiscriminatory treatment in international trade
relations; while the supplementary purposes are: the raising of standards of living and
incomes, sustainable development and the preservation of the environment, the
ensuring of full employment, expanding production and trade, and the optimal use of
the world's resources, while at the same time extending these aspirations to services.
I|
%
Over and above these considerations, the underlying objective of the WTO is to
create a comprehensive framework of rules capable of governing the world trading
system in its widest sense, including, as stated in the WTO Agreement, the objective
ofmaking provisions to enable the conditions which are necessary for a "sustainable
. development". The idea of a "sustainable development" in relation to "the optimal
use of the World's resources"5, comes hand in hand with the need to protect and
. preserve the environment in a manner consistent with the various levels of national > ■
economic development.
Elaborating on the ideals of the institution, the WTO Agreement recognises that
"there is need for positive efforts designed to ensure that developing countries, and
especially the least developed among them, secure a share in the growth in
international trade with needs of their economic development,"6 Accordingly, the
WTO Agreement stresses once again the necessity of special support for the
4For the text of Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organisation,
[hereinafter, the "WTO Agreement"], ibid; and for the table of the Agreement's structure, see
Appendix I to this thesis.
5Although the Preamble to the WTO Agreement is mainly based on that of the GATT, there is
a slight difference between them, i.e., "the optimal use of the world's resources" of the
former has been altered from full use of the resources of the world" of the latter, (emphases
added) The term "optimal" being used in the former Preamble seems to have more flexible
and wider definition than the term "full" as used previously in the latter. Thus, it seems that
perhaps the WTO intended to enlarge the meaning of this phrase in order to prepare for its
future or potential issues.
*
6 See, the Preamble to theWTO Agreement.
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developing countries in order that the multilateral trade system can come into full
effect both fairly and effectively.
To contribute to the achievement of these objectives, the Members of WTO have
9
agreed to enter into "reciprocal and mutually advantageous arrangements directed to
the substantial reduction of tariffs and other barriers to trade and to the elimination
of discriminatory treatment in international trade relations"7 and moreover
t
determined "to develop an integrated more viable and durable multilateral trading
system
As showed above, the aim of WTO is based on that of GATT but moreover it
emphasises the multilateral trading system along with a wider scope and fairer and
more effective elements.
4.2. Legal Structure of theWTO Agreement9
< »
It seems rather daunting to comprehend the structure of the WTO Agreement since it
is so wide reaching and comprises voluminous texts. To ease such obstacles, this
section offers a guide to theWTO Agreement.
To begin with, the WTO Agreement consists of two major parts: (1) the WTO
9
Charter which defines the institutional measures of the WTO; and, (2) the Annex
which contains four Annexes prescribing substantive rules. As each one of them has
different objectives it may therefore have different legal consequences in its




9For the structure of the WTO Agreement, see Appendix 1 to this thesis; for a general
summary of the background and the system of the WTO, see, Evans, Phillip and James
Walsh, The EIU Guide to the New GATT. The Economist Intelligence Unit, London, 1994;
4
Hoekman, Bernard., and Michel Kostecki, The Political Economy of the World Trading
System: From GATT to WTO ^hereinafter, referred to as the "Political Economy"], Oxford
University Press, Oxford, 1995, Chapter 2, pp. 36-55; for a discussion on the WTO system,
see, Jackson, J.H., "The World Trade Organisation, Dispute Settlement, and Codes of
Conduct", in Collins, Susan M., and Barry P. Bosworth (eds.), The New GATT: Implications
for the United States (Brookings Occasional Papers). The Brookings Institution, Washington




First, the WTO Charter is laid out in sixteen articles that furnish the definitions of the
fundamental aspects of the WTO under the title of "a single institutional framework".
Although the most important structural aspects of the institution will be dealt with in
other sections of this chapter, the present section will focus on the four principle
Annexes, i.e., Annex 1,2,3, and 4.10
(1) Annex 1: Annex 1 is subdivided into three Annexes, namely, Annex 1A, IB, and
1C. Annex 1 deals with the "multilateral agreements", all of which are of the
0
"mandatory" kind. All WTO member states have, therefore, entered into a number of
binding obligations that result from those agreements, and which are:
-Annex 1A: This Annex includes the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade
1994 (hereinafter, the "GATT 1994") consisting of six understandings and the
Marrakesh Protocol to the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade 1994
(hereinafter, the "Protocol to the GATT 1994") which in turn contains twelve
agreements;
-Annex IB: This Annex deals with the General Agreement on Trade in
Services (hereinafter, the "GATS") which was not included under the GATT
1947 and also covers the schedules dealing with tariff concessions; and,
-Annex 1C: This Annex concerns the Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of
Intellectual Property Rights (hereinafter, the "TRIPs") which was not referred
to in the GATT 1947.
0
(2) Annex 2: The Annex 2 exclusively defines the dispute settlement rules. It is
entitled "Understanding on Rules and Procedures Governing the Settlement of
Disputes" (hereinafter, the "DSU"). These rules are mandatory for all WTO
members. More importantly, this dispute settlement system could be called an
"integrated" one because it allows all of the WTO members to base their claims or
complaints on any of the multilateral trade agreement clauses incorporated in the
Annexes to the WTO Agreement. As Annex 2 deals with the main issue of my
•
«
10 See, in general, Appendix I to this thesis.
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dissertation, i.e., the rules of dispute settlement, this topic will be analysed
exhaustively in the next chapter. As we will see next, however, the procedures set
out in Annex 3 (TPRM) were excluded from this dispute settlement mechanism.
(3) Annex 3: This Annex describes the Trade Policy Review Mechanism
(hereinafter, the "TPRM") which enables the WTO to review regularly and to make
>
reports on the trade policies and practices of the WTO Member states as a matter of
course." The mechanism, however, is not intended to become a legal basis, either
for enforcement of the obligations under the WTO Agreement or for the dispute
settlement procedure.12 The main concern of the Trade Policy Review Body
(hereinafter, the "TPRB"), the organs in charge ofTPRM, is to examine the impact of
the trade policies and practices of the member states on the multilateral trading
system as a whole, and to produce reports about their findings. Nevertheless, we
may safely assume that the TPRM could function as a sort of "stopper" for the WTO
Members in order to avoid generating trade disputes among them. In fact, so far, it is
operating well as regards fulfilling that expectation. Because Members are requested
to submit a regular report describing their trade policy, which can be regarded as a
"disclosure" of strategy or policy, there is less possibility for a trade dispute to break
out among them.13
11 See Annex 3, C (Procedures for review) of the WTO Agreement; each Member of WTO is
requested to submit periodic reports, explaining its trade policies, and whose frequency of
reviews depends on a function of a Member's share of world trade. In other words, the
burden of issuing a report is determined based on the economic size of each member state.
For example, the four largest world economies, known as the "Quad", (i.e. the U. S., the E.
U, Japan, and Canada) are be required to undergo a review by the WTO General Council
every two years. The next sixteen economies will be reviewed every four years. The rest of
WTO Members will be reviewed every six years. Nonetheless, there is an exception for
least-developed country Members to which a longer period may be applied, and this could be
regarded as a special consideration for those countries to achieve a balanced trading
relationship under the philosophy of true "multilateralism".
12As Hoekman noted, "...the TPRM suffers from important limitations - e.g. reports are not
analytical enough to provide an evaluation of the economic effects of various national
policies and cannot serve as a basis for dispute settlement..." in Hoekman, B., The Political
Economy, supra note 9 at 45, whose comments are from Curzon-Price, V., "GATT's New
Trade Policy Review Mechanism", 14 World Economy (1991), pp. 227-38, and also from
Mavroidis, Petros C., "Surveillance Schemes: The GATT's New Trade Policy Review
Mechanism", 13 Mich. J. Int'l L. (1992), pp. 374-414.
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(4) Annex 4: Originally, this Annex included four "plurilateral agreements", though
only two of them currently remain,14 which are "optional". In other words, the
agreements are binding only on those countries who have signed one of those
agreements.
One concern is the non-compulsory nature of those agreements which seems contrary
to the main concept of a "single-undertaking" (i.e. all the round agreements applying
to all GATT contracting parties) underlying the WTO Agreement. Nevertheless, this
non-compulsory nature provided this Annex withmuch room for further possibilities.
In other words, the WTO is able to continue the development of its areas of concern
or ofnew subjects, as the WTO evolves and tries to keep pace with the fast-changing
world of trade. In addition, the WTO has readied itself for the incorporation of new




To sum up, the WTO Agreement is not only more detailed but also anticipates future
. development ofworld trade, which should help in avoiding a major amendments to
the present system. These precautions must have been taken because of experience
of GATT. In short, unlike the old GATT, the WTO Agreement contains a certain
flexibility based on stringent and firm legal foundations.
4.3. Scope of theWTO15
. Let us now turn to the scope of theWTO which is stipulated in Article II of theWTO
Agreement.
13Professor Petersmann described this notion as "preventive policy" and "conflict avoidance
strategy", which support the WTO rules for the mandatory settlement of disputes, see
Petersmann, E.-U.. The GATT/WTO Dispute Settlement System.' Kluwer Law International
Ltd., London, 1997 at 57.
14
Among the original four plurilateral agreements, International Diary Agreement and
International Bovine Meat Agreement were terminated from the Annex 4 of the WTO
Agreement at the end of 1997; see Press/78 (30 September 1997), Deletion of the
International Diary Agreement from the Annex 4, Decision of 10 December 1997,
WT/L/251 (17 December 1997), Deletion of the International Bovine Meat Agreement from
Annex 4, Decision of 10 December 1997, WT/L/252 (16 December 1997).




First of all, the WTO provides the common institutional framework for the conduct
of trade relations between its Members in matters concerning the agreements and
associated legal instruments as it appears in the Annexes to this Agreement (para. 1);
There are agreements and relevant legal documents in Annex 1, 2 and 3, i.e., the
Multilateral Trade Agreements (hereinafter, the "MTAs") which are integral parts of
this Agreement and which are binding on all Members (para. 2);
In addition, as already mentioned, the agreements and associated legal documents of
Annex 4, i.e., the Plurilateral Trade Agreements (hereinafter, the "PTAs") are also
part of this Agreement, though, only for those members that have accepted the PTAs.
The PTAs are, therefore, "stand-alone agreements", in other words, and their binding
capacity concerns only those members who have signed one of those agreements
(para. 3); and,
Finally, the GATT 1994 is legally separate from the General Agreement on Tariffs
%
and Trade signed on 30 October 1947 (hereinafter, the "GATT 1947"), which was
4
annexed to the Final Act Adopted at the Conclusion of the Second Session of the
Preparatory Committee of the United Nations Conference on Trade and Employment,
t
as subsequently rectified, amended ormodified (para. 4).
4.4. Functions of the WTO16
The WTO performs five functions which are set out in Article III of the WTO
Agreement and those are:
1) Administering and implementing the multilateral and plurilateral trade agreements
which togethermake up the WTO:
The WTO facilitates the implementation, administration and operation, and
9
promotion of the objectives of the WTO Agreement and the MTAs. Furthermore, it
provides the framework for the implementation, administration and operation of the
PTAs.






2) Playing the role of forum for multilateral trade negotiations:
The second paragraph ofArticle in states that the WTO will make available a forum
for negotiations between its Members concerning matters of multilateral trade
relations. This is achieved under the agreements set out in the Annexes to the WTO
Agreement. In addition, the WTO makes available to its members a forum for
further negotiations within the framework of the multilateral trade negotiations as
well as a framework for the implementation of the results of such negotiations.
Decisions concerning implementation may be made by the Ministerial Conference
which will be held at least once every two years.
3) Seeking to resolve trade disputes:
The third paragraph in Article III states that the WTO administers the DSU as
stipulated in Annex 2 to this Agreement. Since it is one of the most important
functions of WTO and furthermore the main topic of the thesis, this particular
function will be analysed extensively in the next chapter.
4) Overseeing national trade policies:
The fourth paragraph of Article III states that the WTO also administers the TPRM
as stipulated in Annex 3 to this Agreement. Although there was a long-established
practice of trade policy review during the GATT period, the separate agreement
relating to TPRM was annexed to the WTO Agreement. The decision to establish a
TPRM was made on 12 April 1989 in "Functioning of the GATT System (FOGS)".17
17 See L/6490, BISD 36S/403, section D at 405.
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5) Co-operating with other international institutions involved in global economic
policy-making:
The last paragraph in Article III states that the WTO co-operates with the
International Monetary Fund (IMF) and with the International Bank for
Reconstruction and Development (hereinafter, the "IBRD") and its affiliated agencies
in order to achieve greater coherence in global economic policy-making.18 Whereas,
pursuant to the purpose of the Bretton Woods system which had been created after
World War II, the GATT provided for, in Article XV, co-operation with the IMF.
The GATT had already practised co-operation with the IMF and the World Bank and
therefore there was a GATT precedent in this regard.
4.5. Institutional Structure of the WTO19
The arrangements concerning the institutional structure of the WTO are provided for
in Article IV of the WTO Agreement, as follows:
(1) The highest organ ofWTO is theMinisterial Conference,20 which is composed of
representatives of all the Members and is convened, at least, once every two years.
The Conference accomplishes the functions of the WTO and takes the necessary
4
actions to this effect. The Conference has the authority on the request of a Member
state to take decisions on all matters under any of the MTAs subject to and in
accordance with the specific requirements for decision making set out in this
Agreement and in the relevant MTA (para. 1).
"Ibid.
19 See the WTO Agreement, Article IV; for a diagram of the WTO institutional structure, see,
WTO, WTO Focus, No. 1 (January-February 1995) at 5.
20The first WTO Ministerial Conference was held in Singapore between 9-13 December 1996.
The second WTO Ministerial meeting was held in Geneva between 18-20 May 1998, which
was combined with a celebration of the 50th anniversary of the multilateral trading system.
The third one is scheduled in Seattle, U.S., for 30 November - 3 December 1999.
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(2) In addition, all the Member states send representatives to a General Council. The
Council takes the place of the Ministerial Conference in the intervals between its
meetings and it is assigned the functions carried out by the Conference when it is in
session. The Council sets up its rules of procedure and approves rules for the
Committees as set out in paragraph 7 (para. 2);
the General Council meets to discharge the responsibilities of the DSB as is required
%
by the DSU (Annex 2); the DSB has its own chairman and makes provisions for the
setting out of the rules of procedure necessary for the fulfilment of those
%
responsibilities (para. 3);
the General Council also convenes to discharge the responsibilities of the TPRB as
laid out in the TPRM (Annex 3); the TPRB has its own chairman and sets out the
rules ofprocedure for the fulfilment of those responsibilities (para. 4).
9
(3) The complexity of the institutional structure seems to stem from the numbers of
organs which perform a variety of duties. Among them, for example, there is a
Council for Trade in Goods, a Council for Trade in Services, and a Council for
Trade-Related Aspects ofIntellectual Property Rights (hereinafter, the "Council for
TRIPs"), which perform their respective functions under the general guidance of the
General Council (para. S); the Council for Trade in Goods supervises the functioning
of the MTAs provided for in Annex 1A; the Council for Trade in Services supervises
the functioning of the GATS; the Council for TRIPs supervises the functioning of
the TRIPs; these Councils perform the functions allocated to them by their
respective agreements and also by the General Council; subject to the approval of
the General Council, these Council establish their own rules of procedure;
representatives of all Member are able to have memberships in these Councils; these
Councils convene when it is necessary to perform their functions (para. 5); each of
these Councils sets up subsidiary bodies on their request; such subsidiary bodies
provide for their respective rules of procedures subject to the approval of their
respective Councils (para. 6).
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(4) The Ministerial Conference establishes a Committee on Trade and Environment,
a Committee on Trade and Development, a Committee on Balance-of-Payments
Restrictions, and a Committee on Budget, Finance and Administration, which
perform functions allotted to them by the WTO Agreement and by the MTAs, and
. any additional functions allocated to them by the General Council, and may establish
such additional Committees with such functions as may be deemed appropriate; as
part of its functions, the Committee on Trade and Development occasionally reviews
the special provisions in the MTAs to assist the least-developed country Members
and reports to the General Council for appropriate action; any representatives of any
members are able to be members of these Committees (para. 7).
(5) The bodies provided for under the PTAs, i.e., a Committee on Civil Aircraft, a
0
Committee on Government Procurement, (an International Dairy Council, an
International Meat Council),21 carry out the functions allocated to them under those
Agreements and operate within the institutional framework of the WTO; these
bodies keep the General Council informed of their activities (para. 8).
(6) The structure of the Secretariat is stipulated in Article VI. The head of the
Secretariat is the Director General (DG), as defined in Article VI (1), who is
appointed by the member countries at the Ministerial Conference. The staffmembers
of the Secretariat are appointed by the DG and are exclusively independent and
international in character, and in charge of all the secretarial works ofWTO under the
0
supervision of the DG. While, the responsibility of the Secretariat concerning
dispute settlement is specially stipulated for in Article 27 of the DSU. In addition,
there are a number of provisions providing for the further functions of the
Secretariat.22
21 See, supra note 14.
0








4.6. How Different is theWTO from GATT?23
m
The World Trade Organisation is not a mere extension of GATT. WTO, as an
institution, has indeed replaced GATT and, in the process, has acquired quite a
different character. The most important differences are:
(1) TheWTO is an international institution in its own right:
The WTO is a permanent institution with its own Secretariat.24 Conversely, GATT
was originally initiated as amultilateral agreement and which could be described as a
*
set of rules albeit that GATT was arguably recognised as a de facto international
organisation.25 In fact, the GATT had no institutional foundation, although there was
a small associated ad hoc Secretariat26 whose origins can be traced to the failed
attempt in the 1940's to establish an organisation expected to become the
International Trade Organisation.
The commitments of the WTO are full and permanent, whereas the GATT was
applied only on a "provisional" basis even though the member countries, termed
"Contracting Parties" treated it almost as a permanent organisation.27
(2) The trade area covered byWTO is considerably wider than that of the old GATT:'
Apart from the coverage of trade in goods as it was in GATT, the WTO covers new
0
sectors of trade such as Trade in Services, Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual
23 See in general, WTO Focus, No. 1, supra note 19 at 4.
24The WTO Agreement sets out a provision concerning "the Secretariat" in Article VI and
"Status of the Secretariat" in Article VIII, whereas no provision was provided in the General
Agreement (i.e. the GATT 1947) as such.
2SSee, in general, Henry G. Schermers. International Institutional Law. 3rd ed., Sijthoff &
Noordhoff, the Netherlands, 1994 at pp. 5-10; Dijk, P. van., G.J.H. van Hoof and K. de Vey
Mestdagy, Supervisory Mechanisms in International Economic Organisations. Kluwer Law
and Taxation Publisher, Deventer, the Netherlands, 1984 at 56.
26The Secretariat ofGATT, in fact, was consisted of a handful of staff who actually belonged
to the Interim Commission for the ITO [hereinafter referred to as "ICITO"]. Cf. supra note
24.
<
27Cf. Section 2(a) of the GATT 1994, which demonstrates the proper status of WTO that is




Property. The WTO also provides coverage in Agriculture and in Environment and
Sanitary and Phytosanitary measures.28
ft
(3) Unlike GATT, WTO is established firmly on the path towards multilateralism:
The agreements which constitute the WTO are almost all multilateral except, of
course, for the "plurilateral agreements" set out in the Annex 4 in the WTO
*
Agreement such as the Codes on government procurement and civil aircraft
(formerly also on bovine meat; dairy products).29 WTO involves a series of
commitments for all of the signatories. In contrast, the GATT started as a
multilateral instrument but then gradually a large number of new agreements which
were "plurilateral", were added through various negotiating rounds up to the 1980's.
The GATT, therefore, became a "selective" agreement which caused the problem of
fragmentation of GATT rules and eventually and paradoxically, ended up
ft
undermining the foundations of the GATT.30
4
(4) In accordance with the new rules and conditions, WTO comes across as a much
more sophisticated mechanism than its predecessor GATT:
|
The WTO dispute settlement system has reputedly gained speed, automaticity,
transparency, and a more legalistic approach (rule-oriented) for the solution of
problems, as well as a higher degree of effectiveness. The system lays out in much
greater detail the procedures to be adopted in the event of a dispute between WTO
members; it also sets strict time-scales for the entire dispute settlement procedure31
28For the study on agriculture under GATT, see in general Josling, Timothy E., Tangermann
and T.K. Warley, Agriculture in the GATT. Macmillan Press Ltd., London, 1996; see for the
SPS measures, see ibid, at pp. 208-213.
29 See for more information, supra note 14.
30Under the GATT, there appeared to be a problem of complexity because of the
interrelationship between the GATT (GATT 1947) and a number of Codes. The Tokyo
Round results, for instance, illustrates the point at issue, i.e. as Professor Jackson called, the
fragmentation (or "balkanisation") of dispute settlement rules under the various Agreements;
for further study in this regard, see Jackson, J.H., "The Birth of the GATT-MTN System: A
Constitutional Appraisal", 12 L. Pofy in Int'l Bus. (1980) at 21, 44.
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and establishes an automatic process for dispute settlement although that process may
yet be intercepted by the consensus decision ofWTO members, nonetheless, not a
consensus in a conventional sense;32 it establishes an Appellate Body (i.e. a second
forum) composed of seven persons33 with demonstrated experience in law,
international trade, and the subject matter covered by the agreements in general.
In the meantime, the GATT 1947 remained in force until it expired at the end of
1995.34 This overlap was allowed in order to facilitate the accession to the WTO of
all GATT member countries and also to permit the continuation of activities in
certain areas, for example, dispute settlement. Furthermore, the GATT 1947 has
been amended and up-dated as the "GATT 1994", and as such it has become an
integral part of the WTO Agreement.
31 The proposed timetable for the working procedures of the panel can be seen in Appendix 3
to the Understanding on Rules and Procedures Governing the Settlement ofDisputes (DSU).
32This new consensus is called the "negative consensus" which means that the consensus of
objection, namely, a "no" is sought. Further details of the "negative consensus" will be given
in the next chapter.
33On 29 November 1995, the first appointment of the seven members of the WTO Appellate
Body was announced by the WTO Dispute Settlement Body (DSB) and those appointees are
as follows: Mr. James Bacchus of the United States; Mr. Christopher Beeby ofNew Zealand;
Professor Claus-Dieter Ehlermann of Germany; Dr. Said El-Naggar of Egypt; Justice
Florentino Feliciano of Philippines; Mr. Julio Lacarte-Muro of Uruguay (Chairman); and
ProfessorMitsuo Matsushita of Japan; a detailed profile of appointees can be found inWTO,
WTO Focus, No. 6 (October-November 1995) at 8; recently, Mr. C. Beeby has been elected
to be the next chairman of the Appellate Body and the term is from 7 February 1998 to 6
February 1999, which was circulated in WT/DSB/11 (5 December 1997), also see Rule 5 of
theWorking Procedures of Appellate Review, WT/AB/WP/3 (28 February 1997).
34For the transitional co-existence of the GATT 1947 and the WTO Agreement, see Section 3
of Decision of 8 December 1994 adopted by the Preparatory Committee for the WTO
and the CONTRACTING PARTIES to GATT 1947, which states that "The legal
instruments through which the contracting parties apply the GATT 1947 are herewith
terminated one year after the date ofentry into force ofthe WTO Agreement. In the light of
unforeseen circumstances, the CONTRACTING PARTIES may decide to postpone the date of
termination by no more than one year"; read in general for the study on transitional period,
Marceau, Gabrielle, "Transition from GATT to WTO - A Most Pragmatic Operation", 29




Chapter 5. THE DISPUTE SETTLEMENT MECHANISM TN
WTO (WORLD TRADE ORGANISATION^
I
ft
"The end ofthe law is, not to abolish or restrain, but to preserve and enlargefreedom. For in all the
states ofcreated beings capable oflaws, where there is no law there is nofreedom"}
$
Introduction
As discussed in Chapters 2 and 3, the "old" dispute settlement mechanism of GATT
had defects both in terms of procedure and substance. Therefore, many contracting
parties made repeated calls and proposals for improving the mechanism, in particular,
at the Uruguay Round of Multilateral Trade Negotiations. Thus, we now turn our
attention to the "new" dispute settlement system under WTO, which came into
operation on 1 January 1995.2 The "new" mechanism brought with it a more
legalistic approach to the whole of the procedures and it is based on notions of
"effectiveness", "automaticity", and "transparency" in order to eliminate the defects
in the dispute settlement mechanism of GATT and ultimately to bring fairness to the
world trade system.
Since the new dispute settlement system has come into effect fairly recently, it may
be hasty at this stage to assess whether this new dispute settlement system will
*
succeed in bringing about the goals ofGATT/WTO. Nonetheless, oyer one hundred
and fifty complaints have already been brought to the WTO since the establishment
of the WTO in January 1995.3 This figure is more than half of the total cases which
were brought to the GATT Contracting Parties during its life time.4 Note that the
ft
1 Locke, John.. Two Treatises of Government. Peter Laslett (ed.), Cambridge University Press,
first published 1960, student edition: reprinted 1996, pp. 305-6.
2 See for the charts of conflicts brought to WTO, The Financial Times, "Antagonists queue for
WTO judgement", 8 August 1996 at 6.
3169 requests for consultation were recorded (as of 19 April 1999) (the updated data is
available from the WTO homepage on the World Wide Web at
[http://www.wto.org/wto/dispute/bulletin/htm]; see also for the list of the first 100 disputes
brought to the WTO, WTO Focus No. 21 (August 1997).
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popularity of the new system is even spreading to the Members of developing
countries who were reluctant to have recourse to the dispute settlement system of the
old GATT. For instance, the first dispute brought to the new dispute settlement
system of WTO was between two developing countries, Singapore and Malaysia,
over the latter's prohibition of imports ofpolyethylene and polypropylene.5 This case
became a landmark which established a participation of developing country members
✓
in the new dispute settlement mechanism because, as already mentioned, disputes
involving only developing countries were very rare under the previous system of
GATT. Thus, participation of the developing countries is one of the phenomena of
the new dispute settlement system ofWTO.
This chapter provides an overview of the WTO dispute settlement mechanism to
begin with, then it identifies and compares the "new" dispute settlement procedures
ofWTO and the "old" system under GATT examined in Chapter 2. This comparison
is essential in order to find out whether the defects in the GATT system have been
ameliorated under the newWTO system, and if so, in what way.
This chapter therefore will conduct an essential investigation into the new WTO
dispute settlement system, which eventually will assist in carrying out case studies in
Chapter 7 and 8.
4
0
4During this period, there were 195 disputes referred to the Contracting Parties, see for the
table of those disputes, GATT, Analytical Index: Guide to GATT Law and Practice. Geneva,
6th ed. (1994), at pp. 718-734.
✓
5This test case, however, did not reach the "judicial" stage (i.e. panel) of the new procedures.
In other words, the disputes was resolved bilaterally through consultation; see The Financial
Times, "Neighbours' tiffbecomes firstWTO case", 23 February 1995 at 4.
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5.1. A Beginning of theMultilateral Trade Negotiations: The Uruguay Round6
ft
The U.S. idea of a new round of multilateral trade negotiations (i.e. the Uruguay
Round) was initially proposed at the Ministerial Conference held in November 1982.7
#
Other governments, however, were reluctant to accept the U.S. proposal. The EC,
for instance, showed little enthusiasm for that proposal. The main reason behind its
reaction could be explained by the fact a recession was attacking the EC at that time,
9
which further triggered 'Euro-pessimism'. The EC was therefore reluctant to
contemplate measures of international trade liberalisation, especially since
ft
agriculture and high technology (apart from another important matters such as
dispute settlement) were all among the priority issues on the U. S. agenda.
Meanwhile, developing countries objected to the arrangements for a major
ft
negotiation just after the Tokyo Round, which was just signed in 1979. They were
also opposed to discussing the new trade areas such as services, intellectual property
rights, and investment. The inclusion of those areas to GATT deprived the
developing countries of the argument that such areas were outside the GATT system.
Consequently, the developing countries challenged the legal competence ofGATT to
handle those new areas, arguing that the original scope of GATT was merely
concerned with trade in goods.
In addition to such opposition, there were a number of unaccomplished working
programmes which had been made at the Tokyo Round. The EC had proposed to
hold a high-level official meeting to plan out the new round, but developing countries
blocked a consensus to accept the proposal. The U.S. finally invoked its right to call
a Special Session for September 1985.8 A number of developing countries such as
a
6 See generally, Hudec, R.H., Enforcing International Trade Law: the Evolution of the Modern
GATT Legal System [hereinafter, the "Enforcing"]. Butterworths Legal Publishers, U.S.,
1993; Pescatore, P., Davey, W. J., Lowenfeld, A.F., Handbook of GATT Dispute Settlement
(the new title is: Handbook of WTO/GATT Dispute Settlement [hereinafter, the "Handbook
ofWTO/GATT"]. Transnational Juris Publications, Inc., New York, First released in 1991/
the latest print (Release 8) in June 1997; for the Uruguay Round negotiation history, see in
general, Croome, John., Reshaping the World Trade System - A history of the Uruguay
Round. World Trade Organisation, Geneva, 1995.
7Ministerial Declaration of 29 November 1982, L/5424, BISD 29S/9 (1983).
8Action taken on 26 November 1985, BISD 32S/12 (1986).
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Brazil and India, which had opposed the U.S. action at the beginning, changed their
stance by the time the Special Session was held. In any case, the Special Session
reached an agreement to create a Senior Official Group to organise the preparatory
work necessary for the new round, and the Contracting Parties formally set up a
Preparatory Committee to formulate the negotiating agenda.9 The Ministers reached
a final agreement on the agenda and the UR was finally launched on 20 September
1986 at Punta del Este, Uruguay.10
The UR was an extremely broad undertaking and wide ranging in the number of
subjects it dealt with. The subjects covered thirteen topics including tariffs,
non-tariff measures, tropical products, natural resource-based products, textiles and
P
clothing, agriculture, GATT articles, safeguards, MTN Agreements and
Arrangements, subsidies and countervailing measures, dispute settlement, TRIPs, and
TRIMs." Among those subjects listed, particularly the objectives for negotiation
0
with regards to the settlement ofdisputes were as follows:
0
In order to ensure prompt and effective resolution of disputes to the benefit of
all contracting parties, negotiations shall aim to improve and strengthen the
rules and procedures of the dispute settlement process, while recognising the
contribution that would be made by more effective and enforceable GATT
♦
rules and disciplines. Negotiations shall include the development of adequate
arrangements for overseeing and monitoring of the procedures that would
facilitate compliance with adopted recommendations.12
The NG13 held its first meeting on 6 April 1987. At this meeting, Mr. Lacarte-Muro
(Uruguay) and Mr. Katz (United States) were appointed Chairman respectively of the
Negotiating Groups on Dispute Settlement and on Functioning of the GATT
System.13 A number of delegations regarded the dispute settlement mechanism as a
'BISD 32S/9 (1986).
10See, Ministerial Declaration on the Uruguay Round, BISD 33S/19-30 (1987).
'1 Ibid.
12 See, ibid, at 25; also in GATT, GATT Focus, No. 43, January - February 1987, at 6.
13Meeting of 6 April 1987. Note bv the Secretariat [hereinafter, the "April 1987 Meeting"].




means of securing the fulfilment of GATT obligations. Many delegations, therefore,
4
attached considerable importance to the negotiations in this particular Group. The
participants acknowledged that "prompt and effective resolution of disputes was of
vital importance for the entire GATT system and to the benefit of all contracting
parties."14 Although the old dispute settlement mechanism functioned reasonably in
*
a number of cases, it had, nevertheless, a number of serious shortcomings or defects
since its beginning. Such defectsls brought a measure of discredit and mistrust with
regard to the institutions of the GATT. The participants, therefore, made preliminary
proposals for specific subjects to be included in the negotiations such as the
following issues:16





-the role of the GATT Council;
-the implementation ofpanel reports;
-equal access to the GATT dispute settlement system; and
-the involvement of third interested parties.
The Chairman, at the end of the discussion on this agenda, insisted on the need for
the member states to see the new obligations as beneficial to all:
... the political will necessary for a stricter fulfilment of GATT obligations
was unlikely to come about by mere exhortation. There was a need for
developing additional incentives and institutional mechanisms encouraging
compliance by contracting parties with their GATT obligations which they
had voluntarily undertaken in their own national self-interest.17
14 Ibid.
15For the defects in the dispute settlement system in GATT, see at Section 2.3. in Chapter 2 of
this thesis.





This is how the improvement of dispute settlement mechanism became one of the
high priority issues for the UR negotiations.
4
5.2. Dispute SettlementMechanism ofWTO
After the UR negotiations which took over four years for preparation and another
seven more years for completion, the UR agreements were finally signed. This
section analyses the new dispute settlement mechanism under WTO and further
examines the new elements of the new mechanism.
5.2.1. Final Act Embodying the Results of the Uruguay Round of Multilateral '
Trade Negotiation
0
"The Final Act Embodying the Results of the Uruguay Round of Multilateral Trade
Negotiations" (the Final Act), is a lengthy document running to over 550 pages
which contains legal texts explaining the results of the negotiations since the
$
beginning of the negotiations which took place at Punta del Este, Uruguay, in
September 1986. In addition to the full texts of the agreements, the Final Act also
includes the texts of Ministerial Decisions and Declarations which were issued in
order to clarify certain provisions ofsome of the agreements.18
In the Final Act, the WTO members have pledged themselves to seek recourse to the
new dispute settlement system to settle disputes, and to abide by its rules and
procedures19 instead of taking unilateral actions against perceived violations of trade
rules as used to be the case during the period of the GATT system. In addition, the
Q
Final Act refers to all but two of the negotiating areas cited in the Punta del Este
Declaration; the first exception was the result of the "market access negotiations" in
which each country has made binding commitments to reduce or eliminate specific
18For the chart of theWTO Agreement, see Appendix I to this thesis.
19Infra note 20, Article 23, para. 1.
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tariff and non-tariff barriers to merchandise trade; and the second one being the
"initial commitments" on liberalisation of trade in services.
5.2.2. Understanding on Rules and Procedures Governing the Settlement of
Disputes (DSU)20
Background:
The Understanding on Rules and Procedures Governing the Settlement of Disputes
(DSU) stipulated in Annex 2 to the WTO Agreement emphasises that the prompt and
effective settlement of disputes is essential to the effective functioning of the WTO.
It sets out in 27 articles totalling 143 paragraphs and four appendices, and a variety
of rules intended to achieve a speedy settlement of disputes. In addition, the
operation of the DSU is strengthened by rules of conduct designed to maintain the
integrity, transparency and confidentiality ofproceedings.21
9
. In contrast, the dispute settlement provisions of the old GATT were provided for in
just two Articles, i.e. XXII and XXIII, though, in an ambiguous expression (the
words "dispute settlement" was not explicitly used at all). Hence, the GATT dispute
settlement procedures have been built up over the years through the evolution of
. customary practice, which were later codified in decisions by the contracting parties
of GATT - notably the 1979 Understanding and a provisional system, which
. functioned as interim rules through the end of the UR, and also allowed the 1989
%
Improvements following the Mid-Term Review of the UR.22 Furthermore, as
stipulated in its Preamble, the WTO Agreement clearly stated its intention "to
20 See, Annex 2 "Understanding on Rules and Procedures Governing the Settlement of
Disputes" (DSU) in Final Act Embodying the Results of the Uruguay Round of
Multilateral Trade Negotiations (Marrakesh, 15 April 1994); for the negotiation history of
the DSU, see Chapter 3 of the present thesis; see in general, Jackson, J.H., The World Trade
Organisation: Constitution and Jurisprudence. Royal Institute of International Affairs,
London, 1998, Chapter 4, pp. 59-100.
21 See, for Rules of Conduct for the Understanding on Rules and Procedures Governing
the Settlement ofDisputes, WT/DSB/RC/1 (11 December 1996); for Communication from
the Appellate Body concerning the document mentioned, WT/DSB/RC/2 (22 January 1997).
22For the analysis on the development of the GATT dispute settlement procedures, see at




maintain full continuity with the attainments of the old GATT".23 Thus, the new
WTO system maintained as its source and interpretation of law, those ofGATT. In
addition, this will of the WTO was also expressed in two operative provisions,
namely, Article XVI: 1 of the WTO Agreement and Article 3, para. 1 of the DSU
respectively.24
9
The GATT dispute settlement mechanism is considered to be one of the cornerstones
4
of the multilateral world trade order. In fact, although this system had already been
strengthened through a number ofUnderstandings and decisions,25 the DSU includes
greater automaticity in decisions with respect to the establishment, terms of
reference, and composition ofpanels. "Automaticity" means that decisions no longer
require the consent of all member states including the parties to a dispute in order to
come into effect. Moreover, the DSU strengthens the existing system significantly,
by means of extending the automaticity agreed in the Mid-Term Review to the
adoption of the findings of both the panels and Appellate Body. The DSU,
moreover, establishes an integrated dispute settlement mechanism which enables
WTO members to base their claims on any of the multilateral trade agreements
included in the Annexes to the WTO Agreement.26
23Pescatore, P., " Drafting and Analysing Decisions on Dispute Settlement", in Pescatore, P.,
W. J. Davey and A. F. Lawenfeld, Handbook ofWTQ/GATT Dispute Settlement, supra note
6, Release 8, June 1997 at 13; see the Preamble to the WTO Agreement which stated "...to
develop an integrated, more viable and durable multilateral trading system encompassing
the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, the results ofpast trade liberalisation efforts,
and all ofthe results ofthe Uruguay RoundMultilateral Trade Negotiations,
I
24 See, para. 1, Article XVI of theWTO Agreement states that"..., the WTO shall guided by the
decisions, procedures and customary practicesfollowed by the CONTRACTING PARTIES to
GATT 1947 and the bodies established in the framework of GATT 1947"; for the same
policy in terms of dispute settlement rules, see para. 1, Article 3 of the DSU which defines
that "Members affirm their adherence to the principles for the management of disputes
heretofore applied under Articles XXII and XXIII of GATT 1947, and the rules and
procedures as further elaborated and modified herein"; this section does not handle with
this issue extensively but for further reading, see in general, Kuyper, P. J., "The Law of
GATT as a special field of International Law - Ignorance, further refinement or
self-contained system of international law?", XXV Netherlands Y. B. Infl L (1994), pp.
227-257.
25For instance, see at Sections 2.4.1.3.; 2.4.1.5.; 2.4.1.6.; 2.4.1.7. and 2.5.2. in Chapter 2 of this
thesis.
26 See, the DSU, supra note 20, Article 1, para. 1.
CHAPTER 5
Provisions:
Like the General Agreement, the DSU stresses the importance of consultation
(prevention of real disputes) in securing the resolution of disputes at an earlier stage
of dispute settlement procedures. It requires a member to enter into consultation
procedures within 30 days of a request for consultations from another Member being
made.27 If there is no settlement after 60 days from the moment the request for -
*
consultations is made, then the complaining party may ask for the establishment of a
panel.28 Incidentally, the parties to a dispute may voluntarily agree to undertake
alternative means of dispute settlement (i.e. the "diplomatic" means of dispute
settlement) such as good offices, conciliation, mediation29 and arbitration.30
If a dispute is not settled through consultations, the parties to the disputes will require
the establishment of a panel under the DSU, at the latest, at the meeting of the
4
Dispute Settlement Body (DSB)31 following that at which the request first appears as
an item on the agenda of the DSB, unless the DSB decides by consensus not to
establish a panel (i.e., the "negative consensus" rule)32 at that meeting. This means
that a party concerned can refuse once at the first meeting to set up the panel.
<
The DSU also provides specific rules and deadlines for deciding the terms of
reference and the composition ofpanels. The standard terms of reference33 will apply
S
11 Ibid., Article 4, para. 3.
2% Ibid., para. 7.
29 Ibid., Article 5, para. 1; cf. see GATT, para. 1 to 3 of the 1966 Procedures in BISD 14S/18,
para. 2 and 8 of the Annex to the 1979 Understanding in BISD 26S/210, para (1) of the 1982
Ministerial Decision in BISD 29S/13, Section D of the 1989 Improvements BISD 36S/61.
30Ibid., Article 25; cf. Arbitration in GATT appeared in Section E, Part I (Negotiations on
Trade in Goods) the 1989 Improvements, L/6489 in BISD36S/61 at 63.
31 "The DSB shall meet as often as necessary to carry out its functions within the time-frames
provided in [the DSU]" stipulated in ibid., Article 2, para. 3; in fact, the DSB normally
convenes its meeting once a month unless there is an urgent issue to be discussed.
nIbid., Article 6, para. 1.
p
33The standard terms of reference ofpanel is, defined in ibid., Article 7, para. 1, as follows:
"To examine, in the light of the relevant provisions in (name of the covered




unless the parties to the dispute agree to special terms within 20 days of the
establishment of the panel.34 In case the parties to the dispute cannot reach an
*
agreement on the panellist (the composition of the panel)35 within the same 20 days,
P
at the request of either party, the DG, in consultation with the Chairman of the DSB
and the Chairman of the relevant Council or Committee, shall decide instead.36
Panels normally consist of three persons37 (so far many of the panellist have, in fact,
been experienced GATT panels),38 who are independent of the Members, having an
appropriate background, normally with wide experience and selected from countries
other than from parties to the dispute.39 For that purpose, the Secretariat will
maintain an indicative list40 of experts of governmental or non-governmental
individuals satisfying the criteria41
(name ofparty) in document... and to make such findings as will assist the DSB in




35According to the Legal Affairs Division of the WTO Secretariat, the time between the
establishment ofPanel and the composition ofPanel is, in average, 5.5 weeks (the interview
was carried out in June 1997, at the WTO Secretariat, Geneva).
36 Ibid., Article 8, para. 7.
37Cf. There were five panel members including two tax experts in one GATT case; see DISC
case raised between the EC and the U.S., L/4422 (2 November 1976) in BISD 23S/98-114
(1997).
33Ibid., para. 5; according to the information from the WTO Legal Affairs Division, the most
popular countries which produce a panellist are mainly small countries such as Hong Kong,
New Zealand and Switzerland. This is because feat many ofdisputes involves fee Quad and
also other big countries, therefore they are eliminated from choice. The most popular person
has already been nominated for a panellist for nine time (as of June 1997).
39Ibid., para. 2 and 3.
40This list includes fee roster of non-governmental panellists, which was introduced on 30
November 1984, L/5752 in BISD 31S/9.
41 Ibid., supra note 20, Article 8, para. 4; ten people were nominated by fee government of
Japan as a candidate for a panellist and all of them were accepted by fee Secretariat ofWTO,
see for fee list of those panellists, Nihon Kanzei Kyoukai, Boueki to Kanzei (Trade and




The details of the panel procedures including a proposed timetable are set out in the
Appendix 3 to the DSU.42 It states that a panel will normally complete its tasks
within six months or, in cases of urgency (not explicitly defined) within three
months.43 The period from the establishment of the panel to the circulation of the
I
panel report to the Members shouldnot exceed nine months.44 The panel reports
shall not be considered for adoption by the DSB until 20 days4S after the DSB has
issued the reports to the Members.46 The panel reports will be adopted within 60
days of their issuance (i.e. the date of circulation of a panel report to the Members),
unless the DSB decides by consensus not to adopt the report (i.e., the "negative
consensus" rule)47 or in the case where one of the disputing parties formally notifies
the DSB of its intention to file an appeal.48
I
The concept of appellate review is an important new feature of the DSU. Appeals are
dealt with by the Appellate Body composed of seven members, three ofwhom shall
serve on any one case.49 There are limitations which must be observed, and those
*
are, for example, an appeal must be limited to issues of law covered in the panel
report and the legal interpretations made by the panel.50 In other words, the facts of
- the panel report will not be considered at an appeal. Proceedings of an appellate
review, as a general rule, shall not exceed 60 days from the date a party formally
I*
42 Ibid., Article 12 ; for a proposed timetable, see the Appendix 3 (Working Procedres) to the
DSU.
43 Ibid., para. 8.
44 Ibid., para. 9; cf. The time period of the Appellate Review proceedings, "in no case shall...
exceed 90 days" (emphasis added), in ibid., Article 17, para. 5.
4SCf. para. 1 of Section G in the 1989 Dispute Settlement Procedures Improvements, which
stated 30 days instead.
46Ibid., Article 16, para. 1.
47Cf. During the GATT time, there was a serious problem at the stage of adoption of panel
report. The 1989 Dispute Settlement Procedures Improvements maintained the consensus
rule (para. 3 of Section G), see at Section 2.5.2. of this thesis. Though, this rule became a
"negative consensus" (rather radical) rule in the DSU at the end of the Uruguay Round.
48 Ibid., para. 4.





notifies its decision to appeal to the date of the circulation of the Appellate Body
report.51 In the event of delay, the proceedings of any case shall not exceed 90
days.52 Regarding its competence, the Appellate Body may uphold, modify or
reverse the legal findings and conclusions made by the panel.53 The Appellate Body
report shall be adopted by the DSB and be unconditionally accepted by the parties to
the dispute within 30 days following its circulation to the Members, unless the DSB
decides by consensus against its adoption (i.e., the "negative consensus" rule).54
Where the panel or the Appellate Body report is adopted by the DSB, the party
concerned (the party to the dispute to which the panel or Appellate Body
recommendations are directed) shall conform to measures which are inconsistent
with the "covered agreements" (i.e. the agreements listed in Appendix 1 to the DSU
under Article 1.1 of the DSU) to that recommendation adopted.55 If it is
impracticable to comply immediately with the recommendations and rulings, the
party concerned should be given a reasonable period of time to do so,56 the latter to
be decided either by an agreement of the parties and an approval by the DSB,57
within 45 days of adoption of the report58 or through binding arbitration within 90
days after the date of adoption of recommendations and rulings.59 In any event, the
Ibid., para. 5, cf. ibid., Article 12, para. 8 and 9; see also supra note 44.
52 Ibid.
51 Ibid., para. 13.
**Ibid., para. 14.
ss Ibid., Article 19, para. 1; for the meaning of "covered agreements" in the DSU defined in
Article 1.1 of the DSU as "...the agreements limited in Appendix 1 to this Understanding
[DSU] (referred to in this Understanding as the "covered agreements")".
56Ibid., Article 21, para. 3; the definition of a "reasonable period of time" is not clear, rather
loosely defined.
57 Ibid., Article 21, para. 3 (a).
szIbid., (b).
59Ibid., (c); see also Footnote 12 in ibid., which said that in case the parties cannot reach an
agreement on arbitrator within ten days of reference the matter to the arbitration, the
Director-General, within ten days after consulting the parties, shall appoint the arbitrator; the
first case which referred to the binding arbitration was Japan Alcoholic Beverages case and
in this report, the arbitrator (Mr. Julio Lacarte-Muro) finally concluded that a "reasonable
period of time" within the meaning of Article 21(3)(c) of the DSU for Japan to implement
the recommendations and ruling of the DSU (1 November 1996) is 15 months"; see for the





DSB shall retain control over the implementation of recommendations or rulings
under regular surveillance until the issue is resolved.60
Further provisions of the DSU set out rules for remedies, i.e. compensation or the
suspension of concessions, in case of non-implementation. Within a specified
time-frame ("a reasonable period of time") determined pursuant to paragraph 3 of
Article 21, the party concerned who fails to comply with the panel's decision can
enter into negotiations with any party having invoked the dispute settlement
procedures, so as to arrive at a mutually acceptable compensation.61 If this has not
been the case, then, a party to the dispute may request authorisation from the DSB to
suspend concessions or other obligations (i.e. retaliation) provided for in the covered
agreements.62 The DSB shall grant such authorisation to suspend concessions or
»
other obligations within 30 days of the expiry of the agreed time-frame for the
implementation unless the DSB decides by consensus to reject the request (i.e., the
4
"negative consensus" rule).63 Disagreements over the level of proposed suspension
will be referred to arbitration.64 As a general principle,65 concessions should be
suspended, to begin with, in the same sector as that in issue in the panel case (where
the panel or Appellate Body has found a violation or other nullification or
impairment).66 Second, if this is not practicable or effective, the suspension can be
made in a different sector under the same agreement.67 Third, if this is not
, practicable or effective and if the circumstances are serious enough, the suspension
of concessions may be made under another covered agreement.68
60Ibid., para. 6.
61 Ibid., Article 22, para. 2.
62 Ibid.
"ibid., para. 6.
64Ibid., see Recourse to Arbitration by the European Communities Under Article 22.6 of the
DSU (Decision by the Arbitrators), WT/DS/ARB (9 April 1999).
45The new principles for suspension of obligation, called "cross-sectoral-retaliation" is defined
in ibid., Article 22, para. 3 (a), (b) and (c).





Furthermore, the DSU contains a number of special provisions devised for cases
which involve the developing and the least-developed countries.69 For example, with
respect to dispute settlement cases in which a least-developed country member is
involved, if no satisfactory solution is found during consultations, the DG or the
Chairman of the DSB will, upon request by the less-developed country member,




The DSU further stipulated certain issues which were not stated in detail under the
old GATT rules. For example, a set of special rules for the resolution of disputes
which involve non-violation complaints are set out in Paragraph 1(b) of Article
XXIII of GATT 1994.71 In addition to that provision, the DSU provides for a
separate article particularly dealing with non-violation complaints in paragraph 1 of
Article 26 of the DSU.72
First of all, regarding the issue of burden of proof, in contrast to violation cases
where the respondent shall rebut the accusation,73 the complainant shall present a
69For details for special procedures involving Least-Developed Country Members, ibid., supra
note 20, Article 24; these for involving Developing Country, ibid., Article 3:12; 4:10; 8:10;
12:10 and 11; 21:2,7, and 8; and 27:2; see also the Decision of 5 April 1986 (BISD14S/18).
70Ibid., para. 2.
71 For details, see ibid., Article 26.
72During the past GATT time, a non-violation was unpopular partly due to its strict legal
burden of proof which was bom by the claimant. The claimant therefore raised this type of
claim as a secondary (or alternative to a violation claim) claim. Furthermore, in practice, the
panel did not examine such claim because it normally found a violation in the principle claim
(violation claim). Accordingly, based on the GATT customary practice of the panel, the
secondary claim (non-violation claim) was not examined. Nonetheless, there are three cases
adopted (or settled) panel decision based on a non-violation claim: (i) Australian Subsidy on
Ammonium Sulphate (adopted 3 March 19SS) (BISD H/188-196), settled bilaterally between
the parties concerned and notified the CPs on 6 Nov. 1950 (GATT/CP.5/SR.6); (ii)
Treatment by German Import of Sardines (BISD IS/53-59), the report was adopted on 31
Oct. 1952 (SR.7/12); and (iii) EEC - Payments and Subsidies Paid to Processors and
Producers of Oilseeds and Related Animal-Feed Proteins (BISD 37S/86-132), the report was
adopted on 25 January 1990 (C/M/238). Cf. This article also extensively defines cases
involving a complaints of the type described in para. 1(c) ofArticle XXIII of GATT 1994,
known as "situation complaints".
73 Ibid., Article 3, para. 8.
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detailed argument to support a case ofnon-violation complaint.74
Second, since no violation ofWTO rules has been established, there is no obligation
to withdraw the measure challenged due to nullification or impairment ofbenefits, or
impediment to the attainment of objectives75 as opposed to violation cases where the
first objective is usually to secure the withdrawal of the inconsistent measures at
issue.76
9
Accordingly, in non-violation cases, the party concerned moves onto to the second
alternative, that is, compensation (which is usually available in violation cases).77
Nonetheless, the coverage of compensation in non-violation cases is broader than
basic compensation. In other words, the Member concerned make a "mutually
satisfactory adjustment"78 which could be equated with a "solution mutually
acceptable"79 defined as the ultimate aim, namely, securing a positive solution, of
dispute settlement mechanism taking into account the findings by the panel or
Appellate Body. In addition, that "adjustment" could includes a withdrawal of the
offencing measures, though not obligatory in non-violation claims, and which also
may be in final settlement of the dispute.80
On the other hand, the DSU explicitly states in Article 26:1(d) that compensation,
though temporary and voluntary,81 "may be a part of a mutually satisfactory
- adjustment" as a final settlement of dispute. Whatever a settlement is drawn within
the sense of "mutually satisfactory adjustment",82 this settlement must be accepted by
both parties.
74 Ibid., Article 26, para. 1 (a).
75 Ibid., para. 1 (b).
76 See for the general principle of remedies (in hierarchical order, ibid., Article 3, para. 7: (i)
Withdrawal of measures concerned; (ii) Compensation (as a temporary measure); (iii)
Retaliation (as the last resort).
'"Ibid.
™ Ibid., Article 26, para. 1 (b).
79Ibid., supra note 76.
S0Ibid., Article 26, para. 1 (d).
81 Ibid., Article 22.
82An additional important point in connection with "mutually satisfactory adjustment" in
116
CHAPTER 5
Arbitration may offer suggestions, though non-binding, with respect to the level of
benefits nullified or impaired, and also ways and means of reaching a mutually
satisfactory adjustment.83 In case the disputing parties cannot reach any agreement
upon such adjustment, retaliation (i.e. suspending the application of concessions or
the other obligations) remains available as a last resort.
m
The last point to be pointed out is that regarding the enforcement procedures for
panel and Appellate Body reports in the case of non-violation claims, there is no
difference between violation and non-violation cases, except two points in respect of
the latter, that is, (i) no obligation is required to withdraw the measures at issue;84 and
(ii) arbitration, as an additional means to arrive at a settlement, is available.85
I
Finally, as briefly mentioned earlier, the special procedures for a dispute which
involves least-developed country members is stipulated in Article 24 of the DSU.
Furthermore, in the light of the special forum available to those members,86 the WTO
Secretariat is required, for instance to assist panels (on the legal; historical and
procedural aspect of the matters at issue), and provide secretarial and technical
9
support. In addition, the Secretariat, at the parties request, may provide additional
legal advice and assistance regarding dispute settlement to developing country
Article 26:1 (b) should be mentioned, which is that the idea of this phrase could not be
considered separately from "consultation" (non-judicial approach and an initial means of
settlement in the whole dispute settlement system) once all judicial procedures have been
exhausted. In short, even though disputes are reached to the judicial settlement (i.e. panel)
stage of the system, an option of non-judicial settlement still co-exists, in other words,
always available without intermission. This situation demonstrates a key feature, that is,
continuity of non-judicial character of the new dispute settlement mechanism of WTO,
which has been inherited from the former GATT system (cf. Article 3.1 of the DSU; Article
XVI: 1 and the Preamble to the WTO Agreement), i.e. a clear preference of non-judicial
settlement of disputes concurrent with panel proceedings (judicial means of dispute
settlement). In other words, despite the progressive rules are provided in the new dispute
settlement system ofWTO, the spirit of the old GATT dispute settlement system still lies at
the core as a fundamental element in WTO. This fact may give us a clue in understanding
the new dispute settlement mechanism





Members. For those purposes, the Secretariat shall offer a qualified legal expert87
(with impartial capacity) from the technical co-operation services of the WTO.
Furthermore, the Secretariat shall run special training courses88 for Members who are
interested in procedures and practices of dispute settlement mechanism.
P
5.3. Major Technical Innovations in the New Dispute Settlement Mechanism
*
This section will highlight the major technical innovations in the DSU. Although the
procedures are, in principle, based on the old dispute settlement mechanism ofGATT
(including its drafting history, customary practice, and old decisions),89 they brought
a number of new elements into the system, such as: (i) Automaticity, (ii) the
Appellate Body, (iii) Cross (Sectoral) Retaliation, (iv) Transparency, (v) Restriction
against Unilateral Measures. Each of these elements are examined in turn.
(i) Automaticity
' The DSU states that "The dispute settlement system of the WTO is a central element1
in providing security and predictability to the multilateral trading system".90
Furthermore, the DSU emphasises that prompt settlement of disputes is essential to
the effective functioning of the WTO.91 In this regard, the new procedures
establishes a new body, what is called the Dispute Settlement Body (DSB) which is
convened by the General Council92 and deals with all disputes arising from any
87The Secretariat of WTO provides two legal advisors for this purpose set out in Article 27,
para. 2 of the DSU, and those are, as ofAugust 1997: Professor Emst-Ulrich Petersmann and
Professor Petros C. Mavroidis. Both are ex-Secretariat official ofGATT/WTO.
»
88For example, the Legal Affairs Division of the WTO Secretariat offers courses on dispute
settlement mechanism for the Members upon their request. There are two different length of
course: a short course (for a few days) and a long course (for several days).
89Cf. ibid., supra note 20, Article 3, para. 1 "adherence to the principles ... under Articles XXII
and XXIII of GATT 1947"; also see, Article XVI. 1 of the WTO Agreement and the
Preamble to the WTO Agreement.
90Ibid., supra note 20, Article 3, para. 2.
91 See, ibid., para. 3.
92Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organisation (the WTO
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agreement contained in the Final Act. The DSB replaces the General Council in
making decisions on the establishment ofpanels, the adoption of panel and appellate
body reports and authorises suspension of concessions and other obligations provided
for in the covered agreements.93
r
Two main devices strengthen the automaticity element of the panel procedures.
0
First, the "Negative Consensus" rule which means that the panel procedures will
proceed if, at least, one country approves of a decision. Accordingly, parties to the
dispute in the new system can no longer block the establishment of panels or the
adoption of panel reports as used to be the case under the old system under GATT.
This new rule is applied to several stages of the procedures: (a) establishment of
panels;94 (b) adoption of panel reports;95 (c) adoption ofAppellate Body report;96 (d)
the DSB's authorisation of retaliatory measures for failure to implement
0
recommendations within 30 days of the expiry of the reasonable period of time;97 and
(e) the DSB's authorisation of retaliatory measures (i.e. suspension of concessions or
other obligations).98
Second, detailed and strict time frames for each stage of procedure have been
incorporated.99 For example, the establishment of a panel is almost automatic.
Agreement, Appendix 2 of this thesis, Article IV, para. 3; cf. the original proposal of the
DSB was made by the Hong Kong delegation, see at Section 3.2 in Chapter 3 of this thesis at
11.
93Ibid., supra note 20, Article 2, para. 1.
94 Ibid., Article 6, para. 1.
95 Ibid., Article 16, para. 4; cf. para. 3 of Section G in the 1989 Dispute Settlement Procedures
Improvements (served tentatively through the Uruguay Round), which states "The practice of
adopting panel reports by consensus shall be continued...".
96Ibid., Article 17, para. 14.
97Ibid., Article 22, para. 6.
98 Ibid., para. 7.
"The time period can be found in various numbers of provisions in the DSU, for instance;
Consultation: DSU (Article/paragraph) 4.3, 4.7, 4.8, 4.11, 12.10; Conciliation: DSU 5;
Developing Countries: DSU 3.12, 12.10; Duration - Appellate Body Process: DSU 17.5, 20,
21.4, and Panel Process: DSU 12.8, 12.9, 12.10, 20, 21.4; Extension of Time Limit -
Appellate Body: DSU 17.5, 20, 21.4, and Panel: DSU 12.9, 12.10, 20, 21.4; Frequent
Meetings of the DSB: DSU 2.3; Implementation: DSU 21.3, 21.4; Multiple Complaints:
DSU 9.3; Non-Violation Complaints: DSU 26.2 [also in Montreal Decision Section G(4)];
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Under the new system, if the countries involved do not respond to a request for
consultations within 10 days after the date of receipt of the request for
consultations,100 or do not enter into consultation within a period of no more than 30
days,101 or if the consultations fail to reach a solution within 60 days after the date of
receipt of the request for consultation,102 the complainant may ask the DSB to
establish a panel. In addition, panel reports must be adopted, as a general rule, within
nine months, or twelve months in the case of an appeal.103
(ii) Appellate Body104
The establishment of the Appellate Body is also one of the most notable innovations
introduced by the Final Act. This new attribute of the WTO dispute settlement
mechanism provides all the parties to a dispute with the opportunity to appeal against
a panel proceeding.105 The Appellate Body, as a tribunal of second instance,
examines only the legal aspects of the panel report whenever one of the parties to the
disputes is dissatisfied with its findings. Any appeal, however, must be limited to
*
Panel Procedures: DSU 12.2, 12.3, 12.4, 12.6, Appendix 3.12; Reasonable Period of Time f
for Implementation: DSU 21.3, 23.2(c); Suspension of Procedures: DSU 12.12; Urgency -
Consultations: DSU 4.8 and Generally: DSU 4.9 and Panel Process of Duration: DSU 12.8
and Production ofPanel Reports: DSU 12.8,12.9.




mIbid.t Article 17. *
105A first Notice of Appeal made by the United States, see WTO, WTO Focus, No. 8
(January-February 1996) pp. 1-3; for the Appellate Body's Working Procedures for
Appellate Review which came into effect on 15 February 1996, see WT/AB/WP1 (15
February 1996), which was later replaced by WT/AB/WP/3 (27 February 1997); the first
appeal under this new system was made by the United Sates over the Panel Report, the
United States - Standards for reformulated and Conventional Gasoline, WT/DS2/R (29
January 1996). In this appeal, the United States (appellant), Brazil and Venezuela
(appellees), and the European Communities and Norway (third participants) were involved.
For the official report of the Appellate Body of this first appeal, see WT/DS2/AB/R (29
April 1996). According to the data prepared by the WTO Secretaria, eighteen cases were
brought to the AB so far (as of 18 April 1999); for the Dispute Settlement Overview (which
includes the latest summary ofWTO dispute settlement activities and all panel and appellate
reports of the WTO) can be found on the WTO's homepage on the World Wide Web at
[http://www.wto.org/wto/dispute/bulletin.htm] (available since 26 September 1995).
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issues of law covered in the panel report and the legal interpretation developed by the
panel.106
The Appellate Body consists of seven persons who are appointed107 for four-year
terms renewable once.108 Three of them will serve on any one case by rotation. They
must be persons recognised as authorities in the field and independent of any
government.109 The total work period of the Appellate Bodymust be completed in 60
days, or exceptionally 90 days after the notification of the intention of appeal to the
Appellate Body.110 In addition, all proceedings of the Appellate Body must be
confidential.111 The Appellate Body, in consultation with the Chairman of the DSB
and the DG of the WTO, must draw up working procedures.112 Finally, the Appellate
0
Body may uphold, modify or reverse the legal findings and conclusions of the
Panel.113
(iii) Cross (Sectoral) Retaliation114
106 Ibid., supra note 104, para. 6.
107 See for the list of the first seven'members for the appellate body, Footnote 33 in Chapter 4 of
this thesis.
108Recently, pursuant to the provisions of Article 17.2 of the DSU, three appellate body
members were reappointed for a final term of four years. Those three members selected by
lot were: Mr. Claus-Dieter Ehlermann, Mr. Florentino P. Feliciano and Mr. Julio
Lacarte-Muro, see WT/DSB/M/35 (18 July 1997) at 7. Accordingly, the term of those three
members will be until December 2001, and which is unrenewable.
109 Ibid., supra note 104, para. 3.
110Ibid., para. 5.
Ullbid., para. 10.
}}2Ibid., para. 9; also see Working Procedures of Appellate Body Review, WT/AB/WP/3 (28
February 1997) which is a consolidated version of the Working Procedures for Appellate
Review, and replacedWT/AB/WP/1 (15 February 1996).
1,3Ibid., para. 13; no case has been yet reversed as of December 1997; the first case in which
the AB has totally revered the conclusion of Panel was the EC - Customs Classification of
Certain Computer Equipment (LAN) case (brought by the US), WT/DS 62, 67, 68/AB (5
June 1998).
,,4Cf. Brazil v United States: Import Restrictions on Certain Products from Brazil
["Pharmaceuticals" Retaliation] (24 August 1988) for further information Hudec, R, E., The




Unlike the previous mechanism under GATT, the new dispute settlement mechanism
is an integrated one which means that the DSU applies to disputes arising from: (a)
the WTO Agreement (the Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organisation);
(b) the MTAs (Multilateral Trade Agreements) such as: Annex 1A: Multilateral
Agreements on Trade in Goods (GATT 1994); Annex IB: GATS (General
Agreement on Trade in Services); Annex 1C: TRIPs (Agreement on Trade-Related
Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights); and, Annex 2: DSU (Understanding on
Rules and Procedures Governing the Settlement of Disputes); (c) the PTAs (the
Plurilateral Trade Agreements) (each of the agreements applies only to signatories)
such as: Annex 4: Agreement on Trade in Civil Aircraft; Agreement on Government
Procurement; International Dairy Agreement;115 and, International Bovine Meat
• «
Agreement.116 Retaliation, in principle, shall be initiated in the same sector in which
the dispute occurs.117 If this retaliation is considered impracticable or ineffective,
retaliation shall take place in other sectors under the same agreement.118 If this turns
out to be impracticable or ineffective also, retaliation could take place in another
covered agreementmentioned earlier on.119
. If a country concerned disagrees with the level of suspension proposed, or claims that
the principles and procedures stipulated in Article 22, para. 3 (b) or (c) of the DSU
0




The new dispute settlement mechanism contains a number of rules intended to bring
more transparency to its procedures.121 For instance, a party to a dispute is not
,,5This agreement was terminated at the end of 1997; see Press/78 (30 September 1997).
mThis agreement was also terminated at the same time, see ibid.
117 Ibid., Article 22, para. 3(a).
mIbid., para. 3(b).
1,9 See, Appendix 1 to the DSU; also, ibid, para. 3(c).
120 Ibid., para. 6.
♦ *
nx Ibid., Appendix 3, para. 10 which states that "In the interest offull transparencyt the




prevented from disclosing statements of its own positions to the public.122 Moreover,
9
a party to a dispute, upon a request of other members, may disclose to the public a
non-confidential summary of the opinion papers submitted during the panel
9
proceedings.123 Another example is found in one of the tasks of WTO, namely, the
task of surveillance in relation to implementation of recommendations and rulings,124
and to compensation and the suspension of concessions.123
Furthermore, the WTO's TPRM (Annex 3 to the WTO Agreement), basing itself
upon the 1979 Understanding, can also be regarded as an indication of the WTO
procedure achieving greater transparency.126 The objectives of this mechanism are:
to examine the impact of each Member state's trade policy and practice on the
multilateral trading system; and to contribute to improve adherence by all Member
states to WTO rules (i.e. rules, disciplines, and commitments made under the MTAs
9
and, where applicable, the PTAs) by accomplishing greater transparency. While this
mechanism functions effectively in preventing potential disputes concerning trade
policies or practices of Member states by requirements, such as submission of
periodic reports on their trade policies.127
V
m
Finally, one more feature relating to the new WTO dispute settlement system, which
demonstrates greater transparency, should be pointed out. This is derestriction of
panel reports under the WTO system. As discussed in the earlier chapter, under the
old GATT practice, panel reports were classified as restricted documents and only
became available to the public after acquiring the consensus to adopt them, by the
4
4
made in the presence of the parties. Moreover, each party's written submissions, including
any comments on the descriptive part of the report and responses to questions put by the
panel, shall be made available to the otherparty orparties
4
m Ibid., Article 18, para. 2.
mIbid.
m Ibid., Article 21, para. 6.
125 Ibid., Article 22, para. 8.
126Annex 3 (Trade Policy Review Mechanism) to the WTO Agreement.




GATT Council. It, however, often took some time before the reports were circulated
to the public, i.e. printed in the BISD under the subject heading of "Conciliation".
Furthermore, in the event of a panel report being unadopted by the Council, that
report remained as a restricted document and, in principle, never became available to
the public. The General Council of WTO decided to treat panel reports as
derestricted documents but providing that a party can request restricted status for up
to ten days.128 In addition, the rest of the documents issued as the "WT/DS/..." series
will be derestricted documents unless a party concerned requests a restricted status.
In the meantime, however, the minutes of DSB meeting will remains restricted for
six months.129
(v) Restrictions Against Unilateral Measures
The issue of unilateral measures was one of the most contentious issues throughout
. the UR negotiations. It has been a central issue especially between the U.S., the EC
and Japan among others. In fact, it was the EC which had originally brought the
issue to the negotiations round. Moreover, it must be noted that, as touched upon in
Chapter 3, Japan was also one of the initiators regarding the prohibition of unilateral
4
. : actions, particularly targeting that of the U.S. under the Section 301. Japan made this
point on various occasions. What happened was that, up until the end of the
negotiations in the UR, the U.S. had opposed a particular proposal which was
referred to in Chairman's (Mr. Lacarte) proposal to the DG, Mr. Dunkel: that all
0
Members should undertake to refrain from using unilateral measures to settle
*
disputes;130 and should bring their legislations into conformity with the dispute
9
settlement procedures of GATT. Finally, the U.S. managed to maintain its position
,28This WTO General Council decision was made on 18 July 1996, seeWT/L/160.
129 See at para, (c) of the Appendix inWT/L/160/Rev. 1 (26 July 1996) at 3.
130Article 23, para. 1 of the DSU states that the Members shall have recourse to, and abide by,
the rules and procedures of the DSU; ibid., para. 2 also provides that the Members shall not




that each member's legislations are not required to conform to the GATT dispute
9
settlement procedures.
As mentioned earlier, the multilateral dispute settlement system has been undermined
partly because of unilateral measures, namely, the controversial Section 301 ofU. S.
9
trade law. The United States tends to rely upon unilateral measures as an instrument
in resolving trade disputes with other Member states in spite of some doubt over
compatibility with the multilateral approach under the new system ofWTO.131
U.S. behaviour was partly propelled because of the vacuum that then existed under
the old GATT system (e.g. the limits of jurisdiction under GATT). The old system
did indeed furnish the U. S. with a number of opportunities to disguise their
unilateral policies. First, for example, unlike the WTO Agreement, the GATT rule
did not cover certain areas (presently known as a "new area" which are covered by
the WTO Agreement) such as services and intellectual property. Nonetheless, the
importance of services and intellectual property lies as an ever-increasing part of the
industrialised countries' trade.132 Accordingly, the conflict between the industrialised
and industrialising countries over the new area (e.g., high-technology industries) has
intensified. Another reason for the U. S. policy of unilateral measures could be
explained by the fact that there were systemic defects of the GATT system due to its
unfortunate defacto origin. For instance, "consensus" (including parties to a dispute)
requirement which had been used over decades under the GATT system, was
necessary for the adoption of panel reports or for approval of retaliation. Such
traditional and stringent requirements, however, often caused delay in dispute
131 "...the United States often threatens sanctions and actually takes retaliatory actions to coerce
the target country into changing the trade law or practice at issue", see Industrial Structure
Council, 1994 Report on Unfair Trade Policies - bv Major Trading Parties. Research Institute
of International Trade and Industry Publication Department, Tokyo, Japan, 1994 at 236.
132 "By the late 1970s, services in the United States accounted for two-thirds of the GNP and for
more than 50 percent of the GNPs in twelve other developed countries" and "By 1986, for
example U.S. exports of services amounted to $148.4 billion, equivalent to 39.8 percent of
U.S. exports" in Spero, Joan Edelman., The Politics of International Economic Relations. 4th
ed., Routledge, U.K., 1990 (Reprinted in 1992 and 1993), at 90; see in general for the issue
of services and intellectual property, ibid., 90-91 and Gilpin, Robert.. The Political Economy





settlement procedures. In fact, that rule was even misused by some countries (mainly
by the U.S. and the EC).
After such experiences during the GATT period, the new dispute settlement
procedures have installed "automaticity" in the procedures by introducing the
negative consensus rule.133 In addition, the new procedures considerably restrain
such unilateral measures by explicitly stating that WTO dispute settlement
procedures must be used in order to recover damages caused by violations prohibited
in the WTO Agreement.134 According to the WTO, the use of "Section 301" is now
closely tied to multilateral dispute settlement, at least for WTO members and in areas
subject to WTO rules and disciplines.135 Nevertheless, there still exists a certain
possibility for the U. S. to use unilateral action as long as such action meets with the
requirements defined in the WTO Agreement including the DSU.136 This issue is
examined in the following section.
5.4. Emerging Issues in the New Dispute Settlement Mechanism
This section raises several issues which one should be aware of under the
evolutionary dispute settlement system ofWTO.
133For provisions which apply a negative consensus rule, see under (i) Automaticity in Section
S.3. (Major Technical Innovations in the New Dispute Settlement Mechanism) of this
chapter.
134 See, ibid., supra note 20, Article 23, para. 1 which aims at strengthening the Multilateral
System and therefore defined an obligation to have recourse to and abide by, the rules and
procedures provided for in the DSU when Members seek to redress a violations or other
nullification or impairment of benefits under the covered agreements (listed under Appendix
1 to the DSU) or an impediment to the attainment of any objectives of those agreements.
135 See, PRESS/TPRB/46 (31 October 1996) at 7.
0
9
136Professor Jackson argued in his article that "There may need to be some alterations to some
time limits, or transition measures, but the basic structure of 301 is not necessarily
inconsistent with the Uruguay Round results. Section 301 when appropriately used in its
current statutory form can be a constructive measure for U. S. trade policy and for world
trade policy". Possible cases where the U. S. may resort to such measures will be mentioned
in Section 5.2.4. of this chapter, see Jackson, John H., "The World Trade Organisation,
Dispute Settlement, and Codes of Conduct", in Collins, Susan M., and Barry P. Bosworth
(eds.), The New GATT: Implications for the United States. The Brookings Institution,




The WTO Agreement states that the Members have agreed to use the rules and
procedure of the multilateral system ofWTO. Furthermore, the DSU stipulates that
the WTO member shall use the rules and procedures set forth in the DSU when a
WTO member seeks a redress for a breach of obligations in covered agreements, or
of an impediment to the attaining of any objective under the covered agreements.137
In that sense, the WTO helps to narrow down the scope of unilateral actions by any
Member state than used to be the case.138
Nonetheless, even with the strengthened and wider-scope coverage of the WTO
system, the U. S. might still have some possibility of exercising its unilateral
measures, i.e. Section 301 of the Trade Act of 1974, amended by the Omnibus Trade
and Competitiveness Act of 1988. How could the U. S. recourse to its unilateral
measures be confirmed within the new WTO system? The U. S. may have access to
the measures within the framework of the new rules. In principle, the following
would be the case:
-the U. S. may take unilateral measures based on Section 301 because no
provision of the WTO Agreement refers to the abolishment of the U.S.
Section 301;
137Ibid., Appendix 1, supra note 119.
138 In fact, there are a few countries which have unilateral measures. Nonetheless, the U.S. is
the only country which often recourse to such actions. In the meantime, while the E.C. also
has such measures, i.e. (Regulation 2461/84 OJ L2S2, 20.9.84) which is better known as the
"new instruments" and the EC's main purpose is not for a regular usage but for
countermeasure to the unilateral actions by the other state, most likely the U.S. In addition,
their measures are narrower in scope than the U.S. Section 301; EC producers made six
complaints until 1993 under the instruments brought. For a further study on the relationship
between the instruments and the use of the GATT dispute settlement system, see Petersmann,
E.-U., "The GATT Dispute Settlement System as an Instrument of the Foreign Trade Policy
of the EC", in Emiliou, Nicholas, and David O'Keeffe (ed.V The European Union and World
Trade Law: After the GATT Uruguay Round. John Wiley & Sons, Chichester, England,
1996 at 269-272; for an overview of the EC regulation, see Schoneveld, Frank., "The
European Community Reaction to the "Illicit" Commercial Trade Practices of Other
Countries", 26 J. W. T., No. 2 (April 1992), pp. 17-34; see for the current development of the
instruments and the new EC regulation, Bronkers, Marco.C.E.J., "Private Participation in the
Enforcement ofWTO Law: The New EC Trade Barriers Regulation", 33 C.M.L.Rev. (1996),
pp. 299-318.
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-under WTO, the U. S. is still free to have recourse to unilateral actions based
on Section 301 against non-members ofWTO; and,
-regarding an infringement of bilateral agreements, if the alleged violation
takes place outside of the WTO agreement, and as long as retaliatory actions
taken under Section 301 do not violate any rights of the opposing party
protected under the WTO agreement, then the U. S. would be free to take
action.
*
As stated in the DSU,139 it applies to disputes which fall within the scope of the
covered Agreement.140 Although unilateral action remains available in some cases,
*
as explained above, it is true that an initial step toward an ending of any unilateral
action is, at least, discernible.
(ii) Negative Consensus Rule
This new consensus principle requires, at least, one member's agreement to a
decision. As explained earlier, the negative consensus method will be used at
different phases in the settlement process of dispute.141 In one sense, it seems that
this rule could be considerably useful and effective to speed up the dispute settlement
process. On the other hand, however, it could be a quite hazardous rule at the same
time. For example, the negative consensus means that just one member state agrees
to the adoption of a panel report, then it will simply be adopted. Namely, a winning
party, in all likelihood, will approve of the adoption of a panel report. In this respect,
a crucial element is the selection of panellists who drafted a panel report in the
139Article 1, para. 1 of the DSU.
140Appendix 1 to the DSU.
141 See, (i) Automaticity in Section 5.3. of this chapter and those stages are: (1) the
establishment ofpanels in DSU Article 6.1, (2) the adoption of a panel report in DSU Article
16.4, (3) the adoption of an appellate report in DSU Article 17.14, (4) the DSB authorisation
of retaliation (to suspend concessions or other obligations) in case the member in breach has
failed to implement the relevant rulings and recommendations within 30 days of the expiry
of the reasonable period of time in DSU Article 22.6, (5) the DSB authorisation to suspend
concessions or other obligations where the request is consistent with the arbitrator's decision
in DSU Article 22.
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dispute settlement process since they could influence a filial decision when they draft
a report of each case. Notwithstanding, despite its unacceptable behaviour in terms
4
of smooth operation of the procedure, a defeated county could impede the adoption
of a panel report under the previous GATT system. What a party in dispute should
4
be concerned with is the quality of individual panellist under the new system since a
panellist reserves the right to make recommendations or rulings over an issue in
dispute. In short, extra attention is necessary at the early stage of the panel
proceedings.
(iii) The Appellate Body
As mentioned, the Appellate Body is a new creation ofWTO.142 The Appellate Body
report is to be almost automatically adopted by the DSB and unconditionally
0
accepted by the parties to the dispute unless there is a consensus against its adoption.
Therefore, issues concerning the individual quality of panellists and also the
background of the each member of the Appellate Body will be crucial factors in the
new system.
The background of appellate judges varies from diplomatic experience, academic
4
carreer, to a judicial background. The diverse background of the judges may bear
upon his or her opinion in an appeal. Furthermore, due to the various backgrounds of
members of the Appellate Body, the way of drafting a report differs.143 In practice,
therefore, in order to maintain uniformity of reports, once three appellate judges
0
appointed (in an action) complete their draft of an appellate report, all seven appellate
judges make a practice of convening at the WTO Secretariat in Geneva to have
further discussions about the arguments presented in the draft report and to exchange
individual opinions taking into account extensive and often exhaustive group analysis
to produce a final draft as an appellate report.144
142For the Appellate Body, see at Section S.3. (ii) of this thesis; ibid., Article 17, supra note
104; WT/AB/WP/3, supra note 105.
143This information was given during the interview with a member of the Appellate Body ( May
1997, Geneva); see Pescatore, P., "Drafting and Analysing Decisions on Dispute Settlement",




One may argue that the disputing parties are frequently likely to appeal the panel
decision simply because of the availability of the second forum. Furthermore, if
appeals happen frequently, this may create the situation where the authority of the
panel and its report will be undermined. On the other hand, the frequency of appeals
may also bring up another issue, namely the handling capacity of the Appellate Body
consisting of seven members on a part-time basis. One possibility of remedying this
problem would be to increase the number ofmembers.14S
ft
In addition, the Appellate Body must refer to every single issues raised146 in
accordance with the "scope of appeal"147 during the appellate proceeding. One,
therefore, could envisage the Appellate Body being required to deal with a
considerable amount of work within the limited period of time.148 Thus the WTO,
soon or later, may have to consider increasing the number of Appellate Body
members and also to provide the members with full-time status, if a number of cases
are appealed at the same time in the near future.
Furthermore, the duties given to the members of Appellate Body may cause certain
problems. According to a member of the Appellate Body,149 so far, they normally
convene and spend sometime in Geneva almost once every month. Thus, if a
member has a full-time position in his home country, this situation creates timetable
and scheduling difficulties.
The last point to be covered'here is that since the DSU stipulated an obligation on the
Appellate Body to answer all the issues raised by the parties, the Appellate Body may
have to face even controversial issues which could possibly be avoided under the
ft
144 The information was also from the interview with a member of the Appellate Body (May
1997, Geneva).
145 In my view, for instance, adding two more members, which makes 9 members in total. This
number enables for the Appellate Body to handle three cases at the same time without having
the situation that any of the members sits in two cases.
146 Ibid., supra note 20, Article 17, para. 12.
141 Ibid., para. 6 of the DSU states that"...shall be limited to issues oflaw covered in thepanel
report and legal interpretations developed by thepanel".
ft
l4*Ibid. Article 17, para. 5. states 90 days as a maximum limit of time.
I49The interview was conducted, during my internship atWTO (May 1997, Geneva).
130
CHAPTER 5
practice of the old system of GATT, because it normally dealt only with one legal
ground and mentioned the rest of issues raised only briefly. Nonetheless, this
customary practice furthermore created unpersuasive panel decisions in some cases
during the time ofGATT.
(iv) Retaliation Measures
Retaliation measures (i.e. the suspension of concessions or other obligations) shall be
ft
authorised by the DSB through the new "negative consensus" requirement. It,
therefore, would be quite feasible for a country which is willing to obtain
authorisation for retaliation in comply with the rule.
A disagreement on the scale of retaliation is to be resolved by an arbitration
procedure:150 there would be a sort of "check-and-balance" mechanism available to
supervise the approved retaliation. In addition, under the new system,
*
"cross-retaliation" is available to the complaining party in the case of suspension of
obligations.151 Moreover, the necessity and degree of the cross-retaliation will also
♦
be determined through arbitration.152 Cross-retaliation thus will be regulated as to its
effectiveness against retaliation measures.
(v) Implementation of the DSB's Decision
*
There will be a problem in implementing recommendations or rulings of the DSB.
As stipulated in the DSU, the DSB shall keep under surveillance the implementation
of any adopted recommendations or rulings, and any outstanding case will remain on
the DSB agenda until the issue is resolved.153 This presumably aims at imposing
strong and persistent political pressure on the Member concerned. The Member
concerned will be politically embarrassed since it made a commitment in public to
agree with the WTO rules.
150Ibid., Article 22, para. 6, supra note 97.
151 Ibid., para. 3.
151 Ibid., supra note 97.
153 Ibid., Article 21, para. 6, supra note 124.
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Nonetheless, an issue of enforcement of the panel decision still remains unsolved.
This issue also leads us to the question whether the suspension of concessions is an
effective remedy. In this regard, for instance, we could possibly find an effective
remedy in the following cases, in which "big economy (for example, the Quad
members) wins against big economy", "big economy wins against small economy" or
"small economy wins against small economy" cases were involved. In short, a
remedy could be effective if there is great or fairly-balanced trade between the
Member states concerned. However, there will not be an effective remedy in a case
4
in which a small economy wins against a big economy because there is only a little
volume of trade (i.e. unbalanced trade) between them. In that case, one could only
expect a small scale of impact whoever wins, and therefore the impact of a remedy
would be considerably limited.
Meantime, although the DSU provides a solution to the problem ofblockage ofpanel
reports to be adopted, and also provides a framework to initiate discussion on
*
implementation, the real problem of the enforcement of the WTO rules will
substantially depend on the individual economic influence or impact of the parties to
the disputes. One may refer to the retaliation case under GATT cited earlier, i.e. the
1952 Netherlands retaliation case against the U. S. as a good example. Although the
. GATT contracting parties authorised the Netherlands to retaliate against the U. S.
(i.e., an imposition of a limit of 60,000 tons on wheat flour imported from the U. S.)
for failure to bring its practices into conformity with GATT obligations,154 the
Netherlands finally declined to exercise this authority. The reason for this lay in the
secondary effects which would had appeared in the Netherlands. In other words, that
action would have seriously affected the Dutch in general by causing higher prices
for essential products such as bread. In short, the case demonstrated that "generally
everyone loses when a nation takes retaliatory action".155
154 See, Hudec, R. H., The Enforcing, supra note 6, pp. 425-26.
l5SBello, Judith H. and Alan F. Holmer, "U. S. Trade Law and Policy Series No. 24: Dispute
Resolution in the New World Trade Organisation: Concerns and Net Benefits", 28 Int'l Law




Even under the newWTO system, this type ofproblem, i.e., "fairness of the rules and
those systemsper se" has not been removed. Perhaps, this could be considered as an
issue relating to the nature of GATT/WTO system itself. In practice, a
disadvantageous position of developing or least-developed countries is often the case
in such rules and systems even though various provisions grant special favours to
those members scattered over the whole system. After all, although WTO was set up
to solve a great number of problems and ambiguities inherited from the old GATT
system, perhaps the main goal of fair trade under the GATT/WTO system has not yet
been achieved, particularly when it comes to questions at enforcements and remedies.
(vi) The issuance of the descriptive part of the panel report
The panel is required to issue the descriptive part, consisting of fact and argument, of
the report in draft to the parties in dispute under Article 15: 1 of the DSU. However,
one may wonder whether the issuance of this part is a necessary phase in the new
>
dispute settlement procedure. From a historical point of view, the practice of the
descriptive section prepared by the panel was essential in the old dispute settlement
procedure of GATT where no other opportunity, such as the interim review in the
WTO procedure, was provided for the parties to check the panel report in draft. -The
interim review ofWTO offers the parties to the dispute an opportunity to check if the
panel understands the arguments delivered by the parties properly, in advance of the
issue of the final panel report. In addition, the disputing parties can predict, at this
stage, the future decision of the case to be made by the panel via the interim report.
The interim review stage therefore would be able to substitute for the issuance of the
descriptive part of the report. Moreover, in fact, the time spent on the descriptive
*
part of the review process is becoming short.156 This could be explained because the
review of the descriptive part is becoming a less confrontational process for the
parties to the dispute. Thus one may argue that the panel process may be able to save
156The paper by Davey, William J., "Issues of Dispute Settlement in the WTO System" at pp.
59-60, which was prepared for the forum "The EmergingWTO System and Perspective from




time at this stage and for such time to be used in another stage of the dispute
settlement procedure without changing the present time limit.
n %
(vii) Interim Review Stage
As briefly mentioned above, the interim review (Article 15 of the DSU) is one of the
new features of the WTO dispute settlement procedure. This article states that the
panel is required to issue an interim report (including the panel's findings and
conclusions) plus descriptive sections (fact and argument of parties) to the disputing
parties before the final report is circulated to the Members of the WTO. The main
purpose of an interim review is: to avoid any obvious factual mistake in the draft for
the final panel report; and to force the parties to reach a settlement. In addition, this
stage can be regarded as an additional safeguard against mis-judgement, aside from
the main safeguards provided by the Appellate Body. According to this provision, if
there are no comments on the report from the parties within the suggested time
limit,157 the report will automatically become the final report. One may argue that
there might be potential danger at this phase, that is, if the parties take advantage of
this phase as a pre-appeal before reaching to the real appeal as provided in Article 17
of the DSU, in spite of the original objective of this instrument. The panel should
maintain proper control over the parties not to do so.
5.5. Perspective of the New Dispute Settlement Mechanism
First of all, it is important to note that one of the central provisions of the DSU,
Article 23, states that Members shall not make determinations of violations or
suspended concessions, except through recourse to the dispute settlement rules and
procedures of the DSU. This provision would certainly assists in preventing recourse
to national rules for retaliation such as Section 301 of the Trade Act of 1974 ofU. S.,
though, it may still be used in some situations158 by private firms or industries to
157The time period of the interim review stage must be within the duration defined in para. 8
Article 12 of the DSU (6 months as a general rule and 3 months in case ofurgency).
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impel the U.S. Trade Representative (hereinafter, the "USTR") to take unilateral
action against an 'unfair trade practice'.
Whereas, the DSU makes it much easier to secure an approval, member states would
therefore find it much easier to invoke the legalised retaliatory measures under the
new WTO system. Namely, under the new rules, the Members would rely on the
WTO, in the event of a losing party not following the panel decision, by obtaining an
approval of their retaliatory action from the WTO.159 In this respect, one may argue
that the new system, in eliminating many opportunities for the respondent to delay
the proceedings, will be favoured by complainants (the "complainants-friendly"
9
system).
On the other hand, the new mechanism benefits those members who have been
threatened or suffered damage by unilateral retaliation taken beyond the scope of the -
GATT/WTO dispute settlement procedures, because there is now an effective means
standing up with unilateralism by bringing complaints against unilateral actions to
the WTO.160 However, the WTO has not yet eliminated unilateral measures itself
completely but has narrowed the possibility of its usage under the system.161
Nevertheless, the U. S. has resurrected the Super 301 of the Trade Act of 1988,162 and
specified a priority list of foreign practices at the end of September 1994 to be
158Further explanation on the possible situations is mentioned under (i) Unilateral Measures in
Section 5.4. ofdie present chapter.
159Under the GATT, only one retaliatory measures have been approved; see, for instance, the
United States v the Netherlands (1952) in BISD IS/32 (1953); in this case, however, in
reality, the retaliatory measures which were granted to the Netherlands exposed a defective
point of the GATT system, namely, the Netherlands* market was seriously affected due to the
suspension of imported raw material (i.e., wheat flour) from the United States. Eventually,
the Netherlands* retaliatory measures imposed on the imported wheat flour from the U. S.
reflected a high price of bread in domestic market of the Netherlands; cf. On 9 April 1999,
the U.S., pursuant to DSU 22.7, requuest that the DSB authorise suspension of concessions
to the EC equivalent to the level of nullification and impairment i.e. $191.4 miillion. On 19
April 1999, the DSB authorised the U.S. to suspend concessions to the EC as requested.
l60For a good example, Japan/US Automobile disputes. In this case, Japan claimed against the
U.S. for its unilateral measures and brought the dispute to theWTO. In fact, the dispute was
resolved bilaterally before reaching* to a panel stage. The relevant documents to this dispute
is identified underWT/DS6/...,; see Article 23 of the DSU.
161 See potential cases described in Section 5.4. of this chapter.




targeted for Super 301 investigation. This suggests that the U. S. is going to continue
to have recourse to unilateral retaliations to defend its trade interests despite the fact
>
that it could be in violation of the WTO Agreement. However, under the new
system, it is to be expected that Members will speedily inform the DSB of the matter.
The U.S. therefore will not be able to take unilateral action as freely as it used to
during the period of the GATT system. But, as mentioned earlier, the WTO has not
yet eliminated unilateral measures itself completely but has narrowed the possibility
of its usage under the system.163 Therefore, we still have a dispute which argues the
legality of unilateral measures, particularly the U. S. Section 301, under the WTO
system (e.g. the Banana case).
Second, even if a large number of trade issues are now covered by the new WTO
Agreement, once a dispute arises, it will be mainly decided on the judgements made
by the panellists. The WTO Agreement, therefore, requires that the panellists be
experts of international trade law or public officials who have previously served in
areas dealing with trade policy.164 As mentioned earlier, given the importance of the
panels themselves, special attention needs to be paid to the way in which panellists
are chosen.165 This is true, particularly as far as the Appellate Body members are
concerned, because of their longer period of service in office (once appointed as a
*
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member who will serve at least for four years, and can be reappointed only once),166
compared to ordinary panellists who will be appointed for each case (i.e. the period
163 See potential cases described in Section 5.4. of this chapter.
164Ibid., supra note 20, Article 8, para. 1.
165Normally, as soon as a panel is established, the panel secretary who is from the operational
division of the WTO Secretariat, suggest a list of suitable candidates for nomination to the
panel (as panellists) from the indicative list of governmental and non-governmental panellists
to the disputing parties. In practice, however, it is rare that the parties agree with the
candidates listed up first time, by the panel secretary. In an extreme case, the parties reached
an agreement on members of the panel after receiving the secretary's suggestion several
times (i.e., According to the WTO Secretariat, the time from the establishment of a panel to
the composition of a panel is, in average, 5.5 weeks according to the WTO Secretariat data of
1997). Thus, it could be quite a time consuming phase of the dispute settlement procedures,
though, have to be extremely careful in choosing panellists.
9
166 Ibid., supra note 20, Article 17.
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would be a matter of year or so). In addition, the decision made by the Appellate
Body shall be final, which therefore increases the importance of their decisions.
Lastly, the WTO members have made a commitment to use a multilateral approach
to settle their disputes (Article 23 of the DSU). Nonetheless, the economic blocs,
6
such as EC and NAFTA, are most likely to resolve disputes within their own systems
as long as disputes arise between their members. On the other hand, the economic
bloc might bring a claim to the new WTO system as regards any dispute involving
countries which are also members of the WTO. In other words, economic bloc could
differentiate between types ofdispute, namely, those disputes to be taken to the WTO
system (multilateral trading framework) on one hand, and those disputes to be settled
under the legal system of the economic bloc on the other. In that sense, for the time
being, the bloc would still maintain the possibility of "forum shopping" or
"rule-shopping" (which provides the members of economic blocs with more than one
court and also rule to choose between for resolving disputes, whichever rule brings
more favourable results), which was criticised during the GATT period. Perhaps, the
choice underlying such decisions will depend on the level of the political, social, and
economic priority of each individual case. Given this, it may be concluded that there
will be certain advantages for the members of certain economic blocs to resolve trade
disputes under their own bloc rule: the new dispute settlement mechanism of the
WTOwill leave the matter to amember's discretion just as GATT did in the past.
PART TWO
JAPAN: ITS EXPERIENCE OF INTERNATIONAL
TRADE DISPUTES UNDER THE GATT/WTO
Chapter 6. THE LEGAL SYSTEM OF JAPAN
9
Introduction
The main purpose of this chapter is to provide an overview of the legal system of c
Japan. The chapter also deals with the constitutional issues which arise as between
the domestic laws of Japan and international agreements, in particular, the position
ofGATT/WTO under the Japanese legal system. The chapter therefore will provide
us with a concise picture of Japan's legal structure and its understanding of '
GATT/WTO.
i «
6.1. An Overview of the Japanese Legal System'
6.1.1. A Legal History of Japan's Modernisation
In order to comprehend the present attitude towards international trade law in Japan,
f
it is necessary to make a brief reference to Japanese legal history, and in particular its
westernisation emerged at the end of the 19th century.
In a sense, setting the tone for the future, the turning point for modernisation in
Japan occurred in 1868, the year in which the goal: "overtake the West" was
# ♦
expressed. It is known by historians as the Meiji Restoration (or "Meiji Ishin" in
Japanese) and set the tone for the future. Until then, Japan was under a system close
to what in the.West is known as medieval feudalism. Indeed, the whole of the
country was divided into small principalities or clans called "Hans", each one of
them ruled by their own feudal lords. Among those "Han", the Tokugawa Clan, the
largest of them all, dominated the country and exercised control over the rest of the
'See Matsushita, Mitsuo., International Trade and Competition Law in Japan, [hereinafter,
the "Int'l Trade and Competition Law]. Oxford University Press, Oxford, 1993.
138
CHAPTER 6
clans for over 250 years.2 A historical event took place in 1853, when the American
fleet, the "Black Ships" under Commodore Matthew Calbraith Perry, called at one of
|
the Japanese ports, the port of "Uraga". Perry presented a letter from President
Fillmore to the Tokugawa Government ("the Bakufu"), addressed to the Japanese
ft
Emperor. The letter was a petition from the United States demanding that Japan
open up for tradewith the rest of the world. Japan took the request made byWestern
countries as a threat, but, in any event, the Tokugawa Government finally decided to
P
re-establish relations with the world.3 In 1858, Japan concluded commercial treaties
with the United States.4 It was followed by similar agreements with England,
France, Russia and the Netherlands. The treaties which Japan accepted, however,
contained unfavourable conditions for the country. This situation is unsurprising, as
it clearly reflects the Japanese history of the period, known in history as the period of
"national isolation", the imposition ofunfavourable conditions being compounded by
Japan's inexperience of the rules and practice of international law in general.
*
Accordingly, these events had a profound impact on the country. Nationalistic
sentiment grew among the ruling class ("Samurai") specially as the international
situation had brought Western countries together, and it was perceived in Japan that
it was urgent for the country to be unified under one Emperor so as to deal more
effectively with attempts of domination by foreign powers. As a result of this, the
alliance, composed of southern clans such as the "Satsuma" and "Choshu",
succeeded in bringing about the collapse of the rule of the Tokugawa Clan and with
its demise, the feudal system was abolished and replaced by a new regime. Under
the restoration programme, new organs were created, i.e. a central government and
prefectures (administrative subdivisions of the country) and the Emperor became a
centre for the unity of the nation as a divine appointee. This unified "modem" state
was thus established and Japan entered the 20th century.
*
2For description of this period, see Sansom., George. A History of Japan (1615-1867). Vol.
3, Wm Dawson & Sons Ltd., Kent, rep. 1978 at pp. 228-242.
3The period of national isolation or exclusion policy (known as "sakoku seisaku" in
Japanese) was introduced in 1625, which was an order to close Japan to foreign trade and
travel with a few strictly limited exceptions came in at the early seventeenth century (e.g. the
orders of 1633,1635 and 1639 are described as the three Exclusion Decrees).
"The treaty is called "Nichibei shuukou tsuushoujyoyaku" (in Japanese).
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6.1.2. A Glance at Modern Japanese Laws5
This rapid shift from one system to another is also reflected in the reforms made to
the legal system of the country. The Japanese legal system is composed of codes and
statutes, which were imported at different times from Europe and the United States.
The backbone of this system is a collection of six basic codes ("Roppou" in
Japanese): (1) the Constitution6; (2) the Civil Code7; (3) the Commercial Code8; (4)
the Code ofCivil Procedure9; (5) the Criminal Code10; and (6) the Code ofCriminal
Procedure11. In addition to these six basic codes, there are several important areas of
the law such as administrative law, tax law, labour and employment law, social
security law, public international law, law on conflict of laws, i.e., international
private law, and economic law which regulates such matters as Antidumping Law, a
number of laws regulating foreign trade and investment, and laws governing
industrial policy.12 The basis for those bodies of written law was the law of
5See, in general, for Japan's legal system, Dean, Meryll., Japanese Legal System: Text and
Materials [hereinafter, the "Japanese Legal System"]. Cavendish Publishing Limited,
London, 1997.
6The Constitution, enacted in 1946, defines the basic framework of the government by
• providing for die Emperor (Chapter I), the renunciation of war (Chapter II), the rights and
duties of the people (Chapter III), the Diet (Chapter IV), the Cabinet (Chapter V), the
Judiciary (Chapter VI), the Finance (Chapter VII), the local self-government (Chapter VIII),
the amendments (Chapter IX), the supreme law (Chapter X), the supplementary provisions '
(Chapter XI). Pursuant to the Constitution, the basic organs of the state are the Diet,
"Kokkai" (the legislature), the Cabinet, "Naikaku" (the administration or executive), and the
Judiciary, "Saibansho" (the Supreme Court and lower courts).
7The Civil Code, enacted in 1S96, was modelled on the French Napoleonic Code and later
influenced by the German Civil Code. The Code defines the basic law for private rights and
relationship between private entities. The Code consists of five books: the general part, real
rights, obligations, family law, and succession.
8The Commercial Code was enacted in 1899. Hie Code, however, has been amended many
times due to the necessity of Japan, as a country which decided to modernise only a century
ago based on the model of the Western countries, to catch up with the economic and social
changes. Although the Code was modelled after German commercial law system, the
present Commercial Code is a mixture of German, American, and traditional Japanese rules.
Moreover, the Code is supplemented by a number of special laws like the Law on Bills and
Notes and the Law on Limited Liability Companies.
'The Civil Procedure Code, enacted in 1890, was based almost entirely on the German civil
procedure law. The Code defines rules for civil litigation and related matters such as
jurisdiction of the courts, parties, oral arguments, evidence, and appeals.
"The Criminal Code, enacted in 1908, defines the general rules governing crime and
punishment like the interpretation of crime, self-defence, emergency, and various forms of
crimes and the punishment.
nThe Criminal Procedure Code, originally enacted in 1891, was modified after the Second
World War. The Code provides for the provisions governing the trial of crimes under the
Criminal Code and also supplementary laws.
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continental Europe. Under the Meiji Restoration, the Japanese codes were primarily
modelled on German and French examples. Although the main puipose of this
chapter is not to analyse the Japanese legal system, it is however useful to have a
general view of the major areas of the law in Japan in order to understand the
relationship between GATT/WTO and the relevant domestic law of Japan.
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6.1.3. The Structure of the Japanese Government
In a study such as this, reference to Japanese Public Law is essential. According to
Article 41 of the Constitution of Japan (hereinafter, the "Constitution"), the National
Diet is the highest and the sole legislative organ of the state. The Cabinet is the
executive organ (Article 65 of the Constitution). The Supreme Court and lower
courts are the judicial organ (Article 76 of the Constitution). These three branches
are separate. According to Article 98 of the Constitution, the Constitution is the
• supreme law of the nation, therefore none of the legislative, executive or judicial
,. branches may violate its provisions. In the following sections, further details of each
will be given.
6.1.3.1 The Legislative Branch (Chapter IV. of the Constitution: The Diet)
Article 41 of the Constitution states that the Diet is the highest organ of state power,
and is the sole law-making organ of the State. The National Diet is composed of two
Houses, namely the House of Representatives (the lower house or "Shuugiin" in
Japanese) and the House of Councillors (the upper house or "Sangiin" in Japanese)
(Article 42). Although a bill can be introduced either by members ofboth houses or
by the Cabinet, in fact, in line with the situation in many other liberal democracies,
the majority ofbills that are passed and become law are introduced by the Cabinet.13
l2See generally, Noda, Yoshiyuki., Introduction to Japanese Law , University of Tokyo
Press, Tokyo, 1976; for further descriptions on the six basic codes of Japan, see ibid, at pp.
187-215.
13"From 1947 to 1983, out of 6,225 bills submitted to the Diet, 67% of them were submitted
by the Cabinet while the rest were submitted by the members of the Diet. Of the bills
actually passed by the Diet, 85 % were submitted by the Cabinet." (these data are from Oda,
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Nonetheless, there is no explicit provision in the Constitution which empowers the
Cabinet to submit a bill but there are legal provisions concerning the Cabinet. A bill
becomes law after a majority vote in both houses is taken and an approval of both
houses is obtained; in the event that a bill which is passed by the House of
Representatives, and upon which the House of Councillors makes a decision
different from that of the House of Representatives becomes law when passed a
second time the House ofRepresentatives by a majority of two-thirds or more of the
members present. The provision of the proceeding paragraph does not preclude the
House of Representatives from calling for the meeting of a joint committee of both
Houses; if the House ofCouncillors fails to take final action within 60 days after the
receipt of a bill passed by the House of Representatives - time in recess excepted -
the House of Representatives may decide to reject the bill introduced by the House
of Councillors (Article 59). Concerning a budgetary matter, the recognition of the
supremacy of the House of Representatives is clear (Article 60). In addition to
budgetary matters, this supremacy mentioned above applies also to the approval of
the Diet for the conclusion of treaties (Article 61).
One point concerning the legislative procedure should be mentioned.14 Although a
legislative bill can be introduced into the National Diet either by members of either
of the two Houses or by the Cabinet, bills passed by both houses are, in most cases,
prepared by Ministries in charge of the particular matters addressed in the bill and
introduced by the Cabinet.15 For example, trade policies are formulated and
implemented through close co-operation between the Cabinet and the National Diet,
and also as is common with other democracies, the ruling political party or parties
have considerable say. Moreover, conflicts between the legislative branch (the
National Diet) and the executive branch (the Cabinet) over the policies are rare
because of the parliamentary cabinet system.16 Although the principle of "separation
Hiroshi.. Japanese Law. Butterworths, London, 1992 at 46).
14For further details on the legislative procedure in Japan, see, ibid., pp. 46-49; cf. For
comparison to the legislation procedure of the United Kingdom, see Loveland, Ian.,
Constitutional Law. Butterworths, London, 1996 at pp. 152.
l5For further description on this matter, Matsushita, M.. Int'l Trade and Competition Law.




of powers" exists in Japanese constitutional law, the executive could be a part of the
legislative power. In other words, it seems that there is already a high degree of
consensus achieved through negotiation and compromise to obtain approval of a bill
when the bill is at the preparation stage. On the other hand, the executive branch
maintains a high degree of discretionary power, on its own, in formulating and
implementing trade policies of the Japanese government due to the supremacy of the
Cabinet.
A
6.1.3.2 The Executive Branch (Chapter V. of the Constitution: The Cabinet)
With respect to the structure of the executive branch, it is the National Government
Organisation Law17 which defines its organisation. According to this law, the
executive branch consists of the Prime Minister's Office ("Fu"), the Ministry
("Shou"), the Commission ("Iinkai"), and the Agency ("Chou"). There is one Prime
.. Minister's Office and twelve Ministries in the executive branch. Among those
Ministries, one which is particularly relevant in this study is the Ministry of
International Trade and Industry (MITI), which is responsible for the formulation of
trade policies and co-ordination of their implementation, and holds the legal power
to control exports and imports.18 For example, the MITI is responsible for promoting
and supervising industrial policy, granting industrial property rights through the
Patent Office, licensing and regulating public utilities through relevant laws, and
enforcing foreign trade policy through the Foreign Exchange and Foreign Trade
Control Law. All of these areas touch upon important matters which concern
GATT/WTO.
0
According to Article 65 of the Constitution, the executive powers are vested in the
Cabinet. The Cabinet comprises the Prime Minister as its head, and other Ministers
16Jackson, John H., William J. Davey and Alan O. Sykes Jr.. International Economic
Regulations. 3rd ed., West Publishing Co., St. Paul, Minn. 1995 at 217.
llKokka Gyosei Soshiki ho> Law 120, 1947, see Matsushita, M., Int1! Trade and Competition
Law, supra note 1, footnote 6 at 7.
l8For the structure of Japanese trade policy formation, see The GATT Secretariat, Trade
Policy Review - Japan 1992. Vol. I, GATT, Geneva, January 1993, 33 etseq.
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of State; all of the Cabinet members must be civilians; and in exercising executive
power, the Cabinet must be collectively accountable to the National Diet (Article
66). The Prime Minister is designated from among the members of the Diet by a
resolution of the Diet although, in practice, the head of the ruling political party in
the National Diet is nominated as the Prime Minister (Article 67). The Prime
Minister, representing the Cabinet, submits bills, reports to the National Diet
important matters concerning domestic affairs and international relations and
supervises the various administrative agencies (Article 72). In addition to general
administrative functions, the Cabinet is also responsible for carrying out the
4
following functions: to administer the laiw faithfully and perform affairs of state; to
manage foreign affairs; to conclude treaties (for that, it is necessary to obtain a prior
consent from the National Diet but if the Cabinet fails to do so, a subsequent consent
from the National Diet is required.)19; to manage the civil service in accordance with
standards established by law; to prepare the budget and submit it to the National
Diet; to enact cabinet orders to execute the provisions of the Constitution and laws;
and so on (Article 73). All laws and cabinet decrees must be signed by the relevant
Ministers and countersigned by the Prime Minister (Article 74). !
k
«
6.1.3.3 The Judicial Branch (Chapter VI. of the Constitution: Judiciary)20
Japan has had a unitary court system since 1947, therefore, the whole judicial system
*
including civil, criminal, and administrative matters comprises a single hierarchy of
courts. All courts are called "saibansho" in Japanese. In Japan, two classes of
courts, i.e., the Supreme Court and the subordinate or lower courts, are distinguished
according to the Law on Courts of 16 April 1947.21 According to Article 76 of the
Constitution, the whole judicial power is vested in the Supreme Court and lower
courts as established by law; the judiciary is independent from the other branches of
"This particular function of the Cabinet will be dealt with later in Section 6.2. (The Status of
International Trade Agreements in Japan) of this chapter.
20See generally, Noda, Y.. Introduction to Japanese Law, supra note 12, pp. 119-138; also
see, Japanese Legal System, supra note 5, pp. 391-401 and 405-417.
2lIn accordance with Article 76 of the Constitution ofJapan.
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government, all judges must exercise their powers independently and are bound only
to the Constitution and laws. The Supreme Court is authorised to enact rules
concerning the procedure and practice of trials, the discipline of lawyers, the internal
discipline of the courts, and the administration of judicial affairs; Public prosecutors
are subject to the rules imposed by the Supreme Court. The Supreme Court may
delegate the power to establish rules for lower courts to those courts (Article 77).
Article 78 of the Constitution guarantees the security of the judiciary. The Supreme
Court consists of a Chief Justice and other justices whose number is determined by
law; the justices of the Supreme Court, with the exception of the Chief Justice, are
appointed by the Cabinet (Article 79). According to Article 6 of the Constitution,
the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court is appointed by the Emperor on the advice of
the Cabinet. The Supreme Court is the authority of last resort in determining the
constitutionality of any law, order, regulation or official act (Article 81).
The Supreme Court ("Saikou saibansho"), located in Tokyo (Article 6 of the Law on
. Courts), gives judgement only on questions of law. The Supreme Court is obliged to
accept the findings of fact of the lower court against whose decision an appeal has 1
been filed. According to Article 9 of the Law on Courts, the Supreme Court sits
either as a full court (i.e. Grand Bench or "Daihoutei" in Japanese) or in divisions
depending on the importance of the case in question; the full court consists of all the
15 justices along with the presiding Chief Justice; a quorum, the minimum number
which is necessary to make a formal decision, is nine justices. A division (i.e. Petty
Bench or "Shohoutei" in Japanese) is composed of at least five justices; a quorum
being three.
The second level of jurisdiction comprises eight superior courts, called 'high courts'
("Koutou saibansho") and they are located in places such as Tokyo, Osaka, Nagoya,
Hiroshima, Fukuoka, Sendai, Sapporo, and Takamatsu. There are divisions in each
high court and each one has three or five judges. Appeal cases from the decision of




The district court ("Chihou saibansho") is the court of first instance under the current
judicial system. District courts are located in each prefecture (though, four in
Hokkaido), accordingly their total number is 50. A district court hears both civil and
criminal cases except certain cases heard at first instance by the superior courts or by
summary courts ("Kani saibansho")22. The Supreme Court appoints the judges and
assistant judges of the district court, which is usually composed of one judge except
in important cases, which require a bench of three judges.
6.2. The Status of International Trade Agreements in Japan
In this section the status of international trade agreements in the context of the
Japanese legal system will be discussed. Among international trade agreements,
those to which Japan is a party, especially the General Agreement on Tariffs and
Trade (GATT 1947) and the WTO Agreement,23 will be examined here.
There are a number of different forms of international agreements in which the
, Japanese government may be involved as a party. In Japanese legal terminology,
. those agreements are, for example, treaty (''jouyaku"); convention ("kyouyaku");
agreement ("kyoutei")\ arrangement ("torikime")\ declaration ("sengen"); protocol
("giteisho"); act ("ketteisho");. exchange of notes ("koukanbunsho"), and
memorandum ("oboegaki").24 According to the Constitution of Japan, "treaties" are
regarded as the most formal style of international agreements. If the Japanese
"The "summary" courts {"Kani saibansho") are placed at the lowest hierarchical level in the
whole judicial system. Their decisions can be taken on appeal to the district court. The
summary courts have jurisdiction in matters ofwhich the value does not exceed 900,000 yen
and criminal cases of minor offences. There are 448 summary courts and each of them is
composed of one or more judges who are normally lawyers but lay persons may be
appointed as well because a special knowledge of law is not essential to be the judge of a
summary court. In the summary courts, cases are heard by only one judge, and of course,
_ »
there are no divisions. The procedure of the summary court is quick and simple in order to
make justice more accessible.
Although it is not important for the main focus in my thesis, there is another kind of court on
the same hierarchical level as district courts, known as the family courts ("Katei saibansho").
Their jurisdiction is limited to cases of domestic matters and juvenile delinquency. The
number of family courts is 50, which is the same as district courts and it is composed of a
number ofjudges and assistant judges as appointed by the Supreme Court.
23See Saito, Aki., "The WTO Agreement and the Relevant Japanese Domestic Laws", 30
J.W.T., No. 3 (June 1996), pp. 87-108.
24See Matsushita, M., Int1! Trade and Competition Law, supra note 1 at 28.
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government signs an international treaty which shall be faithfully observed as stated
in Article 98(2) of the Constitution, it implies that treaties prevail over any other law
in Japan.
With respect to the process of approval of treaties in Japan, Article 73(3) of the
Constitution states that the Cabinet has the authority to conclude treaties with foreign
nations. The Cabinet, however, must obtain prior or, depending on the
*
circumstances, subsequent approval by the National Diet. The procedure of approval
of treaties by the National Diet, according to Article 61 of the Constitution of Japan,
requires that the House of Representatives makes a decision first, and, according to
Article 60(2) of the Constitution in the event of disagreement with the House of
Councillors, then the decision of the House ofRepresentatives shall prevail.
Since the War, there have been a number of times where the Cabinet has sought
subsequent approval of the National Diet in exceptional circumstances.25 The
Protocol of Terms of Accession of Japan to the GATT, by which Japan acceded to
the GATT,26 is one of those exceptional cases: five cases out of eleven exceptional
cases related to the General Agreement.27
^There are eleven cases (this data is from Orita, Masaki., "Practices in Japan Concerning the
Conclusion of Treaties," [hereinafter, the "Practices in Japan"], 27 Japan. Ann. Int'l L.
(1984) at 61 in footnote 19).
26The National Diet approved the Protocol on 29 July 1955 subsequent to the signature ofdie
Japanese government on 7 June 1955. There were two conditions to be met in order to make
the Protocol effective: first, the signature of Japan, which met on 7 June 1955; second,
according to Article 10 of the Protocol, a decision of two-thirds of the Contracting Parties'
approval for Japan's accession, which met on 11 August 1955.
27Those five cases are: (1) Declaration Regulating the Commercial Relations between
■ Certain Contracting Parties to the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade and Japan
(obtained a subsequent approval from the National Diet in 1953); (2) Process-verbal
Extending the Validity of the Declaration of 24 October 1953 Regulating the Commercial
Relations between Certain Contracting Parties to the General Agreement on Tariffs and
Trade and Japan (obtained a subsequent approval from the National Diet in 1953); (3)
Protocol of Terms of Accession of Japan to the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade
(obtained a subsequent approval from die National Diet in 1955); (4) Document Relating to
the Results' of Negotiations with the Government of the United States of America for the
Modification or Withdrawal of Concessions in the Schedule XXXVIII/ Japan (obtained a
subsequent approval from the National Diet in 1961); (5) Document Relating to the Results
of Negotiations with the Government of die Federal Republic of Germany for the
Modification or Withdrawal of Concessions in the Schedule XXXVIII/ Japan (obtained a
subsequent approval from the National Diet hi 1961).
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Concerning the WTO Agreement, the Diet's approval was obtained before Japan's
ratification of that agreement. On 5 April 1994, the government of Japan signed the
Final Agreement of the Uruguay Round at a Meeting in Marrakesh, Morocco held on
15 April 1994 in order to confirm its acceptance of the results of the round. On 1
December 1994, the lower house approved the agreement, then the upper house did
so on 8 December. Thus, on 8 December 1994, the Japanese government obtained
formal consent from the National Diet to ratify the agreement.28 Finally, on 27
December 1994, the Government of Japan submitted an instrument for ratification of
the agreement.
♦ 0
6.2.1. The Question of Validity of Treaties ("Treaties'V'Executive
Agreements")29
There is no distinction between "treaties" and "executive agreements" in
international law, namely, both are considered to be treaties. In the domestic law of -
Japan, however, the Constitution makes a distinction between "treaties" and J
»
"executive agreements" which is somewhat confusing. First of all, the question of •'
the validity of treaties in Japan has to be distinguished from the question of their
direct applicability. The former question identifies whether treaties have the force of
law in Japan and are part of Japanese law. Is there any difference between those two
28See for Japanese translation of Manakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade
Organisation, Gaimusho [Ministry of Foreign Affairs] (ed.), Sekaibouekikikan wo
setsuritsusuru Marrakesh kvoutei - WTO. Kokusaimondai kenkyujo, Tokyo, 7 July 1995, pp.
334-351; for promulgation of treaties in Japan, Article 7 of the Constitution stated that the
Emperor, with the advice and approval of the Cabinet, shall perform promulgation of treaties
in matters of state on behalf of the people. In short, once the Cabinet conclude treaties
(nonetheless, it shall obtain prior, depending on circumstances, subsequent approval of the
Diet), the treaty is promulgated in the Official Gazette ("Kampou" in Japanese) under the
name of die Emperor and the Cabinet. By the act of promulgation ("KoufuM in Japanese), a
treaty is incorporated into Japanese law, in other words, gains the force of law and becomes
a part of law in Japan. Cf. Regarding executive agreements, they appear in the Official
Gazette as notifications ("Kokuji" in Japanese) under the name of die Ministry of Foreign
Affairs or any Ministry which is in charge of the agreement.
29For overview concerning legal systems of member states, U.S.; E.C. (E.U.); Japan, and
GATT are described in, Jackson, J.H.. Restructuring the GATT System. Royal Institute of
International Affairs, London, 1990 at pp. 30-35.
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types of agreement in their binding force? What is the impact of this domestic
categorisation of international agreements on GATTAVTO?
It is the government which decides whether an international agreement is to be
considered a "treaty" or an "executive agreement".30 As explained, "treaties" require
0
the approval of the National Diet, whereas "executive agreements" do not. Article
73(2) of the Constitution states that the government, under its authority to conduct
foreign affairs, can conclude international agreements without the approval of the
r
National Diet, and those international agreements are called "executive agreements".
It is true that there is no definition regarding the meaning of the term "treaties" in the
Constitution. Unsurprisingly, therefore, the National Diet has often challenged the
government on the issue of distinction between "treaties" and "executive
agreements". In 1974, for example, the government tried to distinguish between
"treaties" and "executive agreements". There were defined three categories which
required the National Diet's approval to be defined as a "treaty".31 These three
categories are as follows:32
Category 1: an international agreement which involves 'statutory matters';33
Category 2: an international agreement which deals with 'financial matters';34 -
and,
Category 3: an international agreement which seems to have 'political
importance'.35
The first category is based on the principle that the National Diet must be "the sole
law-making organ of the State" as stipulated in Article 41 of the Constitution. This
category, therefore, contains the following agreements:
30,Executive Agreement1 is also termed as 'Administrative Agreements'.
"The Japanese government view concerning this issue was expressed in a statement made by
the Foreign Minister M. Ohira which can be found in House of Representatives, Foreign
Affairs Comm., Feb. 20, 1974, 72nd Diet, 5 Gaimu iinkai giroku 2, 27 Japan. Ann. Int'l L.
(1984) at 102; see also, Orita, M., "Practices in Japan", supra note 25 at pp. 57-60.
"See Iwasawa, Yuji, "Implementation of International Trade Agreements in Japan"
[hereinafter, the "Implementation of Int'l Agmts in Japan"] at 305-306 in Meinhard Hilf and
Ernst-Ulrich Petersmann (eds.l. National Constitutions and International Economic Law.
Kluwer Law and Taxation Publishers, Deventer, 1993.
"Examples of the first category, see Orita, M., "Practices in Japan", supra note 25, in
footnote 12 at 58.
34Examples of the second category can be found, ibid., in footnote 13.





(i) an international agreement which needs the enactment ofnew statutes;
(ii) an international agreement which demands the maintenance of existing
statutes; and,
(iii) an international agreement which affects the sovereignty of the state and
modifies the power of the legislature as well, for example, a transfer of
territory.
On the other hand, other agreements do not require the approval of the National Diet
and thus are recognised as "executive agreements" and can be concluded by the
government itself.36 These include:
(1) an agreement concluded within the scope of a treaty already approved by
the National Diet;37
(2) an agreement concluded within the scope of domestic laws and
regulations;38 and,
(3) an agreement concluded within the scope ofbudgetary appropriations.39
As discussed earlier, the Protocol of Terms of Accession of Japan to the GATT40 is '
to be considered as a "treaty". Its approval was given subsequent to being signed by
the government.41 According to an official of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the
*
GATT needed an approval of the National Diet as a "treaty" because it was an
international agreement requiring the maintenance of existing legislation as indicated
above.42 In addition to the GATT, most of the Tokyo Round agreements were
36See ibid., at pp 59-60; also see Iwasawa, Y., "Implementation of Int'l Agmts in Japan",
supra note 32 at 306;
37For examples of such type of agreements, see Orita, M., "Practices in Japan", supra note
25, in footnote 16 at 60.
p
38For examples of such type of agreements, see ibid., in footnote 15.
39For examples of such type ofagreements, see ibid., in footnote 17.
40For Protocol of Terms of Accession of Japan to the General Agreement on Tariffs and
Trade, see BISD 4S/1.
4'Like other countries, Japan signed the Protocol provisionally (i.e. Protocol of Provisional
Application "PPA"). This should be counted as an exceptional case because of the link
between signature and effectuation of the Protocol, see ibid., para 10(a) at 10 (as for the
WTO Agreement, there is no such provision). Furthermore, in the case of multilateral
agreements in Japan, the ratification process happens in the following order: to sign an
agreement; to obtain the Diet's approval; to submit an instrument of ratification; to enter into
force.




concluded as "treaties" with the approval of the National Diet. Among those
agreements concluded as "treaties", there were the agreements on tariff reduction;
subsidies; antidumping; import licensing; and customs valuation. Furthermore, there






With regard to "executive agreements" which require no approval by the National
%
Diet, there are several multilateral trade agreements including some of the Tokyo
Round agreements, for instance, agreements on dairy products and bovine meat
which some makes this category. There are also bilateral agreements concluded as
"executive agreements". For example, the Voluntary Restraints Agreements
(hereinafter, the "VRAs"), including the 1972 Japan-U.S. Agreement on Textile
Trade; the 1987 Japan-U.S. Agreement on Textile Trade; the 1986 Japan-U.S.
Agreement on Steel Trade; the 1986 Japan -U.S. Agreement on Semiconductor
Trade, and the 1987 Japan-U.S. Agreement on Machine Tools, were all concluded as
"executive agreements" without the approval of the National Diet.
.. As can be observed, it seems that the distinction between "treaties" requiring the
approval of the National Diet and "executive agreements" which do not require its
approval is, in fact, necessary merely for the domestic procedures of Japan. In other
words, the distinction between those two types of international agreement is
maintained simply for Japan's constitutional purposes. Furthermore, in the Japanese
legal system, there is no difference as regards binding force as between the two
categories, namely "treaties" and "executive agreements". The government merely
maintains the position that "treaties" are valid and thus have force of law in Japan as
stated in Article 98 (2) of the Constitution. In addition, the courts also share the
same view as the government.43 Whereas, the "executive agreement", under the
auspices of Article 98(2) of the Constitution, is a part of Japanese law once it is
published in the Official Gazette.44 Thus, it can be concluded that international
43See, Iwasawa, Y., "Implementation of Int'l Agmts in Japan", supra note 32 at 311.
44Ibid.9 at 312.; there are commentators who deny the validity of executive agreements. For






agreements, whether "treaties" or "executive agreements", are valid and have force of
%
law in Japan once they are concluded properly and published in the Official
Gazette.45
6.2.2. The Question ofDirect Applicability ofTreaties
The question of the direct applicability of treaties in Japan should be distinguished
from the question of the validity of treaties in Japan. The former question examines
whether treaties are self-executing or not, i.e. whether they apply as law without the
need for implementing legislation in Japan. Even though treaties have validity (force
of law) in Japan, i.e. being part of Japanese law, this does not necessarily guarantee
their direct applicability. Therefore, for example, if there is any conflict with
domestic law, they might not apply directly in Japan. If they are not self-executing
(directly applicable), in such a case, they need to be implemented by domestic
legislation in order to be domestically applicable. According to Article 98(2) of the
Constitution, it can be inferred that treaties are applicable as law in Japan. In fact,
the Japanese courts have tended to accept that treaties were directly applicable once
the courts confirmed their validity (force of law) in Japan under the auspices of
Article 98(2).46 Nonetheless, courts made some important judgements with regard to
the question of direct applicability. The crucial issue in those judgements was
"accuracy" of a treaty provision which was regarded as an essential criterion in
4
determining its direct applicability. Bearing this point in mind, there is the Shiomi
case to be examined here among other cases.47
(No. 7) Jichi Kenkyu (1968) at 37,46.
45In the case of GATT, in 1955, the Japanese government promulgated the Protocol of
Accession of Japan to the GATT and the schedules of concessions annexed to the Protocol
in the Official Gazette. However, in fact, the GATT was finally published in 1966. Despite
that, it is regarded that the GATT had acquired the force of law in 1955 through the due
publication of the Protocol of Accession. It is noteworthy that a Japanese court recognised
the validity of the GATT in 1961, in the Kobe Jewellery case (which will be dealt with later
in this chapter), in advance of the formal publication of the GATT text in the Official
Gazette. See, Iwasawa, Y., "Implementation of Int'l Agmts in Japan", supra note 32 at pp.
312-313.
46Ibid., at 315




This case was concluded by the decision of the Supreme Court, which was handed
down on 2 March 1989.48 In the judgement, the court found Article 9 of the
International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (hereinafter, the
"ICESCR"), to which Japan was a party to be not directly applicable.
The petitioner was bom in 1934 to Korean parents in Osaka. As Korea had been
annexed to Japan since 1910, she was considered to be a Japanese citizen. In 1936,
she became blind. In 1951, the time when Japan signed the Peace Treaty with the
Allies and renounced all rights to Korea, she lost her Japanese nationality. Then, she
was naturalised in 1970 after her marriage to a Japanese. After her naturalisation,
she applied for a welfare pension under the Welfare Pension Law which came into
force on 1 November 1959. However, her application was turned down in 1972 on
the grounds that a pension could only be granted to a Japanese citizen and when this
law came into effect she was not a Japanese citizen. She maintained that the
rejection of her application for the pension was not in line with the ICESCR which
stated in Article 9 "The State Parties [...] recognise the right of everyone to social
security": this required the Japanese government to grant her pension rights.
Nonetheless, the Supreme Court rejected the petitioner's argument. The Supreme
Court denied the direct applicability of Article 9 on the grounds that Article 2(1) of
ICESCR states that the member states "take steps with a view to achieving
progressively the full realisation of the rights recognised in the present Government
[...]". According to this clause, it indicated that the Convention did not give a right
on individuals but simply to imposed an obligation on the member states gradually to
take steps to realise the rights given in the Convention. As explained, there were
clauses which explicitly stated the obligation ofmember states but the wording used
in such clauses was unclear. In this case, it seemed that the "accuracy" of a treaty
provision was considered as an important criterion in determining its direct
applicability. To sum up, one may assume that if an international agreement is not
drafted in sufficiently explicit wording, Japanese courts may rule that such an
international agreement is not directly applicable and not self-executing.49




Meanwhile, regarding the question of direct applicability of the "executive
agreement", scholarly opinion is divided. One side states categorically that the
"executive agreement" cannot be directly applicable. The other claims that the direct
applicability of the "executive agreement" should not be denied due to categorical
reasons.50 In any case, it would be very difficult for the government of Japan to deal
with the ever more demanding and increasing influences of foreign affairs in this
modem society if the direct applicability of "executive agreements" were denied.51
In practice, the merits of an executive agreement is that the government can conclude
an international agreement without the approval of the National Diet, which means
an "executive agreement" is speedier and easier to conclude.
6.3. The Application of International Trade Agreements
6.3.1. The GATT and the National Laws ofJapan
In this section, we will focus on how the GATT was implemented into the Japanese
legal system and also how effective it is vis-a-vis the national law of Japan. As
discussed earlier, the General Agreement, including other international agreements
such as the IMF Treaty and OECD, enjoy the status of a "treaty" in Japan pursuant to
Article 98(2) of the Constitution. Nonetheless, in fact, there is no court decision as
■
yet in the case as to whether a Japanese domestic law in conflict with an obligation
of a treaty would be ruled invalid based on the provisions of Article 98(2). In this "
section, two major cases involving the GATT 1947 are analysed with respect to this
issue.
W
First, the Kobe Jewellery case52 may illustrate the situation in point. A person had
tried to smuggle jewellery into Japan with a declaration that the jewels were only
49However, the factors for determining whether treaties are "directly applicable" in Japan can
be found in the words used in it, the contracting parties1 intention, and the circumstances in
which treaties came into force. See, Matsushita, M., Int'l Trade and Competition Law, supra
note 1 at 31.
50Iwasawa, Y., "Implementation of Int'l Agmts in Japan", supra note 32, at 317.
51Ibid.
"Judgement of the Kobe District Court, 30 May 1961, Kakyu Saibansho Kiji Saiban Reishu
(Lower Court Criminal Cases Reporter), [hereinafter referred to as the "Kakyu Keishu"]
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"personal belongings" when, in fact, they were for sale. The Kobe District Court
therefore gave a ruling that the person was guilty of breach of the Customs Law.
The defendant's argument, though rejected by the court, was based on Article VIII:3
ofGATT, which stated that a contracting party shall not impose substantial penalties
for minor breaches of customs regulations or procedural requirements. The
defendant therefore argued that the Japanese government could not impose any
b
%
penalty due to this provision. The District Court, however, held that the defendant
was guilty on the grounds that his conduct was beyond the "minor offence"
9
requirement stipulated in GATT Article VIII:3. The District Court referred to
Article 98(2) of the Constitution and stated that "the principle of faithful observance
of treaties [...] is understood to proclaim the superiority of treaties [over the domestic
law of Japan]." Although the Court appeared to support the principle of the
supremacy of treaties over the domestic laws of Japan, the judgement effectively
. overruled such principle in the end. The judgement was contradictory to the legal
doctrine. Japanese law does not yet seem clear on this point, which is particularly
relevant to the GATT position in domestic law.
Second, the decision in the Kyoto Necktie case, probably the most important decision
concerning the relationship between treaties and domestic law in Japan,53 is explored
below. Three courts heard this case: the Kyoto District Court,54 the Osaka High
court,55 and finally the Supreme Court.56
3/5-6 (1961), 519 ff.
53Two cases are noteworthy regarding the issue, those cases are: (1) the COCOM Case of
1969, and (2) the Japan - US Textile Agreement Litigation of 1971. The case (1) can be
found in Gyosai Reisyu (Administrative Cases Reporter), Vol. 20, p. 842 (1969), and see for
a comment on this case, Matsushita, M., "Export Control and Export Cartels in Japan", 20
Harv. Int'l L. J. (1979) at pp. 103 ff., 106-108; and also in Matsushita, M.. Int'l Trade and
Competition Law, supra note 1 at pp. 14-18. The case (2) has raised a legal issue, for the
Erst time, with regard to the relationship between a government restriction of international
trade and the GATT. In the end, the suit was withdrawn due to political reasons, and thus no
court decision was handed down. In addition, the short explanation on those two cases also
can be seen in Iwasawa, Y., "Implementation of Int'l Agmts in Japan", supra note 32 at pp.
318-320.
'"Judgement of the Kyoto District Court, 29 June 1984, 31 Shomu Geppo 207; also in 530
Hanrei Taimuzu (1984), 265 ff.
"Judgement of the Osaka High Court, 25 November 1986, 634 Hanrei Taimuzu (1986), 186
ff.
"Judgement of the Supreme Court, 2 February 1990, Sosho Geppo, 36/12 (1990), 242 ff.
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The Decision of the Kyoto District Court:
With respect to the first decision, the Kyoto District Court dismissed the claim which
%
was that the interests of the tie producers in the region of Kyoto (hereinafter, the
J
"plaintiff') were adversely affected by restrictions on the imports and the high price
of raw silk in 1984, and the court refused to apply the GATT as proposed by the
plaintiff. In short, therefore, it denied the "direct-applicability" of the GATT rule at
issue. The background to this case was quite complex, and thus further explanations
are required.
Although Japan used to be the major exporter of raw silk, since the mid-70's its
position had been overtaken by competitive neighbouring countries, especially Korea
and the People's Republic of China. Japan, therefore, passed the Silk Price
Stabilisation Law (hereinafter, the "Law") in an attempt to cope with the
competition. In short, the Law guaranteed a minimum price for raw silk and created
a government agency named the "Silk Business Agency" (or "Sanshi Jigyodan" in
Japanese).57 The government set regulated price limits for the product, both at the
upper and lower ends of the scale. The system, under the Law and its regulation,
functioned as follows: when the market price reached beyond the top limit, the
*
Agency sold raw silk from its stockpile in order to lower the price and keep it within
the price zone determined by the government [i.e. the Minister of Agriculture,
Forestry, and Fisheries (hereinafter, the "MAFF")] in advance; whereas, if the market
*
price dropped below the bottom limit, then the Agency would buy raw silk up to the
price settled within the set price range. In theory, therefore, the price of raw silk
could be maintained within the price zone targeted by the government. Ironically,
however, this mechanism brought about overproduction of silk, with the correlative
result of falling prices. The price stabilisation mechanism would have collapsed if
lower-priced foreign raw silk had been imported without restrictions in the Agency's
attempt to regulate the market. Moreover, even if the Agency had purchased all of
the available domestic raw silk, the supply of the imported silk would have kept
57When an amendment was made to die Silk Price Stabilisation Law in April 1981, die name
of the agency was changed into "Sanshisatorui Kakakuantei JigyodanUnder this new
regime, no one was allowed to import raw silk form abroad, other than the government
agency above mentioned and other consigned person or entity.
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pushing the domestic price down beyond the lower limit set by Law. Thus, it
became imperative to amend the Silk Price Stabilisation Law to the effect that the
Agency was vested with the exclusive right to import raw silk. The Agency would
then sell the imported silk on the domestic market at a price within the price zone
decided by the MAFF. As a result, this price stabilisation mechanism generated
higher prices in the Japanese market than the international standard price. Indeed,
the silk price soared in Japan to almost twice the world price.
Against this complex regulatory background, the necktie makers in the region of
Kyoto (the plaintiff) had no alternative other than to use the over-priced raw
materials of silk for their products. European necktie makers, however, could use
inexpensive silk and then export their finished products to Japan. The European
*
makers took full advantage of the import of cheap raw silk available (from Korea and
the People's Republic ofChina). The Japanese government stepped in and imposed a
17 percent ad valorem tariff on imported ties in Japan. Nevertheless, domestic tie
makers still could not compete with the Europeans.
Eventually, the necktie producers of Kyoto region brought a lawsuit in the Kyoto
9
District Court against the Japanese government. The plaintiff claimed compensation
for the losses caused by the price stabilisation programme. The plaintiffmaintained
that the government measure over-protected silk growers at the expense of tie
makers, and that the government was unreasonable in restricting the right of tie
makers to import silk freely, an action which in turn constituted violation of the
"freedom of business" protected by Article 22(1) of the Constitution. The plaintiff
further alleged that the government was in breach ofArticle 11:4 and Article XVII of
the General Agreement. Article 11:4 prescribed that whenever a tariff concession
under the GATT was made for a commodity for the purpose of state trading, a
contracting party could not sell the commodity in the domestic market at a price
higher than the real price plus tariff; while, Article XVII stipulated that state trading
agencies were required to cany on their business merely in accordance with
157
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commercial considerations of price, quality, availability, marketability,
transportation and other conditions under the general principles of
#
non-discriminatory treatment prescribed in the GATT. The plaintiff argued that the
#
Silk Business Agency was selling imported raw silk at a price determined artificially
by the government, which established a breach of the GATT.
The Kyoto District Court held that the freedom of business activities assured under
the stipulation of Article 22(1) of the Constitution was subject to the protection of
public welfare and that, in addition, courts should avoid passing judgement regarding
the wisdom of legislation intended to accomplish an aim of socio-economic policy.58
The court, furthermore, held that domestic ties were protected by the tariff imposed -
on imported ties, that the government would be able to exercise rights under GATT
Article XIX for taking safeguarding measures if the situation of local tie makers
deteriorated seriously, and that therefore the plaintiffs had not been disproportionally •
disadvantaged by the governmental measures ofprotection ofsilk growers. •
There are a few more issues worthy of consideration concerning this case. First,
with respect to the compatibility with the GATT rules of the exclusive import system
provided for by the Law, the court rejected the plaintiffs argument and then
supported the validity of the Law and the measures taken for its implementation.
The court stated that the exclusive import right and the price stabilisation mechanism
were, in this case, designed to protect raw silk producers from the pressure of
imports "for some time". Apparently, the idea was to give the measure the same
effects as the "emergency measures" accepted under Article XIX.
The court also stated that the period for the exclusive right to import silk should be
decided flexibly on a case by case basis, though, there should be a time limit taking
into consideration that an "emergency measure" under the GATT rules is for a short
58According to Professor Iwasawa, "Japanese courts follow a 'double standard* in reviewing
the constitutionality of statutes", which means as follows: if the case relates to infringement
of spiritual liberties, for instance, a freedom of expression, a strict scrutiny standard is
required; whereas, in the case of the infringement of economic liberties, less rigorous
scrutiny is enough, (emphases added), see Iwasawa, Y., "Implementation of Int'l Agmts in
Japan", supra note 32 at 321.
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time. The court further found that the provisions of the Law relating to the right of
exclusive import could not be regarded as "unreasonable". Limits to the period for
the exercise of the right should be determined in relation to the duration of the
pressure on imports. Accordingly, with regard to the issue of emergency measures,
the court agreed that the exclusive import right was not incompatible with Article
XIX of the GATT which would permit such a measure. In the end, it became
unnecessary for the court to tackle the issue of the effectiveness of the Law and the
exclusive right to import raw silk as a domestic law vis-a-vis the GATT.
Disappointingly, the court stated its stance in the form of obiter dicta, which carries
therefore little precedential value. The court stated that, in cases of a violation of the
GATT, the GATT system would put pressure on the authorities to correct the
violation at issue, by way of example, by issuing a request for consultation and
taking retaliatory measures put forward by other member countries. Therefore, the
court added that the GATT would have no more legal effectiveness in the country
P
other than that resulting from those indirect influences. The court explained that
even if a domestic law was inconsistent with the GATT, the domestic law would not
be nullified simply for that reason. The court therefore implied in its stance that the
%
s
domestic law prevails over the GATT.59
The Decision of the Osaka High Court:
Following the first claim to the District Court of Kyoto, the necktie makers took the
case on appeal to the Osaka High Court, where it was dismissed on 25 November
198660. With respect to the issue involving Article 22(1) of the Constitution, i.e.
whether the exclusive right to import was contrary to the freedom of business
activities as guaranteed under the Constitution, the court said that it compatible on
the basis of its reasoning on the doctrine contained in previous cases.61 The
59With respect to the position of treaties in the legal system of Japan, i.e., the ranking
between treaties and statute; treaties and the Constitution, see, ibid, at pp. 328-331.
mIbid., at 336.
61For cases, see "Kourishijyou jiken hanketsu", Keishu, Vol. 26, no. 9 at 586; "Yakujihou iken
hanketsu", Minshu, Vol. 29, no. 4 at 572; the doctrine followed in those case are as follows:
The national control/regulation over the freedom of business activities by law can be
categorised into two groups, i.e. (1) the Positive one (which is, for example, a market control




appellants, in this appeal, also argued another issue, i.e. the compatibility of the
exclusive right to import with the GATT and the validity of this law. Answering
those points, the court somewhat twisted the issue by stating that the appellants
ft
|
argued that the sale price of imported silk was inconsistent with Article 11:4 and
Article XVII of the GATT and that the Silk Business Agency determined the sale
price on the basis of the standard price set by the MAFF. Thereby, the court
dismissed the argument made by the appellants on the grounds that it referred to
nothing else but the action of the Silk Price Agency as the basis for the illegality of
the legislation. In short, the argument made by the appellants was lacking in
relevance.
The Decision of the Supreme Court:
The necktie producers appealed against the judgement to the Supreme Court and
argued that according to Article 11:4 of the GATT, a state agency shall not sell
imported products in the domestic market at a price higher than the actual import
ft
price plus tariff, because the agency would obtain extra benefit if the imported
0
products at issue were subject to a tariff concession stipulated in the GATT.' In
addition, the petitioners argued that pursuant to GATT Article XVII: 1, each
Contracting Party was supposed to guarantee that its state trading agency functioned
merely for commercial considerations. The exclusive right to import is established
pursuant to Articles, 12.13.2 and 12.13.3, of the Silk Price Stabilisation Law.
b
However, these provisions of the Law are in contravention to Articles 11:4 and
industry.)* and (2) the Negative one (which is, for instance, a control for the purpose of
providing health/ security for the national citizen.
With respect to the group (2), examine whether the control is within a minimum extent
through a strict judicial investigation. Regarding the group (1), in principle, the decision by
the legislature shall be respected concerning a regulation at issue. In short, the legislature
regard a control as constitutional in general unless (i) the control (legislation) exceeds the
discretion of the legislature, or (ii) the way of enforcement of the control is considerably
unreasonable.
As the Silk Price Stabilisation Law (the Law) whose main purpose is to protect the silk
producers, thus it belongs to the group (1) control. Accordingly, the test for constitutionality
with regard to the exclusive import rights of the products provided for in the Law, in
principle, should be decided by the legislature instead of the judiciary. Therefore, the
decisions made by the three different courts over the constitutionality for the exclusive
import rights were "yes", in short, "valid" with one accord.
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XVII: 1. Thus, the enactment of the provisions under the Law was allegedly
unlawful under the GATT, and in their view the National Diet had approved
provisions of law which infringe on the GATT. The petitioners did not make a
constitutional challenge based on the fact that the actions of the Silk Business
*
Agency were inconsistent with the GATT, but claimed damages allegedly caused by
this unlawful legislation.
On 6 February 1990, the Supreme Court dismissed the arguments of the petitioners.
This decision was very short, though, controversial. The Supreme Court upheld the
decisions given by the lower courts. The reason for doing so lay in the
0
constitutionality of the exclusive right of the Agency to import raw silk under the
Stabilisation Law. The court cited previous decisions passed by the Supreme Court,
and noted that by taking precedents into consideration, the question whether
domestic silk producers should be protected or not was simply a matter ofpolicy and '
discretion, and therefore beyond any interference by the judiciary. The Court also
noted that the decision made by the National Diet to protect domestic silk producers
. through the policy of the price stabilisation programme and exclusive rights to
import, could not be legally challenged in court except in cases, for example, where
. the law provided protection for one party at immoderate expense to other parties, to
society, or where the manner of achieving the legislative objective was not
reasonable.
0
Nevertheless, the petitioner maintained that the exclusive right to import under the
price stabilisation programme contravened articles of the GATT, and therefore they
were invalid. Whether this reason given by the petitioner could be considered
logical or not depends on the position of international treaties in the domestic legal
order. It seems that the petitioner's argument was based on the notion of "treaty
supremacy theory", (which means that in case of conflict between treaties and
domestic law, the former prevails) subject to the direct applicability of the GATT in
the Japanese legal system.62 Nonetheless, the issue (a domestic law based on its
"See in general, Iwasawa, Y., "Implementation of Int'l Agmts in Japan", supra note 32 at
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alleged incompatibility with an international treaty) was not introduced as a
constitutional challenge. Although the opinion over the relationship between treaties
and the Constitution is divided, that is, between the "treaty supremacy theory" and
the "constitutional supremacy theory", treaties concluded by Japanmust be faithfully
observed as stated in Article 98(2), but the challenge was not introduced as such. In
the end, the Supreme Court simply stated that the judgement of the original court
could be approved in the light of the reasoning given by the court, and thus, there
was no illegality involved in this case.63
Remarks on the judgements:
As we have observed, it is quite obvious that the Osaka High Court was mistaken in
its understanding of the legal issue of the case, which was the illegality of the
*
exclusive import right of the products provided for by the Law (the Silk Price
Stabilisation Law) under the GATT rules, and reached a decision on the somewhat
imprecise basis of the separation between law and policy.
First of all, if the arguments given by the petitioners in the court were not clear
P
. enough, the Osaka High Court should have exercised its power to request further
explanations concerning the arguments of the petitioners in order to interpret the
issue correctly and precisely. Furthermore, the Osaka High Court did not refer to the
question of whether the exclusive right to import and the price stabilisation
programme violated Article 11:4 and Article XVII: 1 of the GATT; or whether the
measures taken pursuant to those provisions of the GATT could be considered to be
a safeguard measure as granted under Article XIX of the GATT. According to
Article XIX, a safeguard measure shall apply "if, as a result of unforeseen
A
developments, any product is being imported into the territory of that contracting
party in such increased quantities and under such conditions as to cause or threaten
serious injury to domestic producers in that territory of like or directly competitive
9
328 etseq.
"Professor Matsushita explained the judgement by stating that the Supreme Court might had
been influenced by an "invisible" political pressure. See the conference paper by
Matsushita, M., "State Trading in Japan", which was presented at The World Trade Forum
(Trade Liberalisation and Property Ownership: State-Trading in the 21st Century) held in
Gerzensee, Switzerland, 12-13 September 1997.
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products". In this case, however, an increase in the importation of a product, i.e.,
raw silk, was likely to be anticipated due to its competitive price. In addition, it was
not proved that serious damage had been caused to domestic producers, because of
imports of raw silk. Moreover, regardless of the limits of extent and time, as a
matter of fact, the exclusive right to import provided excessive protection to
domestic producers of raw silk, and consequently it became a permanent means of
controlling imports. As shown, the measures clearly did not fulfil the requirements
obliged by Article XIX. For this reason, the exclusive imports system provided for
by the Law is unjustifiable under Article XIX of the GATT.
0
Now, ifwe look at the case from the point ofview taken by the Kyoto District Court,
the effect of a violation of a provision of GATT merely carries effects in
international law. A violating country will be invited for consultation pursuant to
Article XXIII of the GATT or will be made the subject of retaliation, but there will
. be no further legal effect apart from this. The necktie makers, however, expressed
the opinion that the issue ofmeasures intended to ensure the effectiveness of treaty
obedience were totally different from the issue of the validity of a domestic statute '
infringing the GATT. This point brings a controversial issue to the fore, that is, the
question of the "direct applicability" and "validity of a treaty" in the Japanese legal
system.64 With respect to the decision of the Kyoto District Court, there are a few
other issues which merit further consideration. These concern the domestic validity
of the Silk Price Stabilisation Law and of the exclusive right to import raw silk from
$
abroad.
Let us look at the views of some Japanese scholars on this point. Professor Taira, for
example, is of the view that Articles 11:4 and XVII: 1(a) of the GATT lack direct
applicability because these articles are merely addressed, in a literal sense, to nations
instead of individuals, and accordingly he agrees with the treatment of international
MFor an extensive study on this issue, see Iwasawa, Yuji., Jvouvaku no Kokunai Tekivou
Kanousei - Iwavuru "Self-Executing" na Jvouvaku ni kansuru Ichi Kousatsu. (in Japanese)




law in judgement of the Kyoto District Court.65 Those articles are, therefore, beyond
the reach of individuals to utilise in a claim before a domestic court. Taking the
contrary view, Professor Shimizu argued that Article 11:4 was sufficiently clear and
precise to be directly applied in this case and therefore, he criticised the opinion of
the Kyoto District Court.66 In his view, individuals were perfectly entitled to claim
the applicability of those articles in a municipal court. Professor Matsushita follows
in the line of Professor Shimizu's arguments, but he also believes that the National
Diet should legislate in line with the requirements of Article 98(2) of the
Constitution67 which states that "treaties concluded by Japan and established laws of
nations shall be faithfully observed". In that sense, Article 98(2) of the Constitution
contains a very specific provision for the "supremacy of treaties" over any
conflicting domestic laws. Furthermore, as argued above, it is generally recognised
that the National Diet is duty bound not to legislate in breach of treaties. Therefore,
0
it follows necessarily that a domestic law which violates a treaty should be invalid.
In the meantime, with regard to the issue of the direct applicability of the GATT, one
4
may have noticed that the Japanese courts made two conflicting patterns'of
judgement. On the one hand, the courts found that the substantive provisions of the
GATT were directly applicable as in the Kobe Jewellery case. While, on the other
hand, the courts denied the direct applicability of the GATT in the Kyoto Necktie
case, by passing a judgement which could be considered ill-judged, ambiguous, and
based on questionable reasoning.68 It is therefore unsurprising that the Kyoto Necktie *
case was strongly criticised by scholarly writings.69 Moreover, these two cases might
65Taira, Satoru., "Waga kuni ni okeru GATTO no Houteki Chii: GATTO no Chokusetsu
Tekiyo Kanousei wo Chushin to shite [Legal Status of the GATT in Japan: Its Direct
Applicability]" (in Japanese), 39 Kobe Shoka Daigaku Shodai Ronshu, No. 4, (1988), p432,
at pp. 383-7.
"Shimizu, Akio., "GATTO Ruru ni yoru Eigyo no Jiyu oyobi Zaisanken Koshi no Jiyu
Hosho: Nishijin Nekutai Sosho Dai Isshin Hanketsu wo megutte [The Guarantee of the
Freedom ofBusiness and the Free Exercise ofProperty Rights by GATT Rules: The District
Court Decision in the Nishijin Necktie Litigation ]" (in Japanese), in Kokusai KeizaiMasatsu
to Waga Kuni no Sanevo Seisaku [International Economic Friction and Japan's Industrial
Policy], 1987, p. 37 atp 43.
67Takano, Yuichi., Kempo to Jvovaku [Constitutions and Treaties] (in Japanese), University
ofTokyo Press, Tokyo, 1960 at 209.
"Iwasawa, Y., "Implementation of Int'l Agmts in Japan", supra note 32 at 344.
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be regarded as a reflection of the lack of concern of the Japanese courts towards the
arguments supportive of a mutually beneficial relationship between treaties and the
domestic laws of Japan. Accordingly, it seems that it is essential for the Japanese
courts to clarify their legal interpretation of issues involving international trading
matters which are looming large in this fast-changing global trade environment
especially after the establishment ofWTO which included new areas such as services
and intellectual property rights. Furthermore, the relevance of effective methods for
resolving trading conflicts continues to grow, and thus the Japanese legal system
*
should prepare itself to cope with future cases involving international trade. In
addition, perhaps one would agree with the suggestion made by Professor Matsushita
in his article, that it is our pressing need to produce judges who are well acquainted
with international trade matters and furthermore, this need should also be addressed
by the legal education system in Japan.70
6.3.2. The Impact of GATT/WTO Panel/AB Reports And the National Laws of
Japan
■ Let us move on to another important point of this section. This point concerns the
effect of the resolutions/decision of international organisation, more specifically,
recommendations or rulings of the CPs/DSB in the GATT/WTO panel/AB reports
♦
on domestic laws in Japan. No provision explicitly defines the status of actions of
international institutions as such. This question has not as yet been resolved and still
needs to be clarified to enhance the credibility and consistency of the Japanese courts
and their view on this matter. Nonetheless, one may find that the extent to which
Japan has approached this question so far is unsatisfactory. How did/does Japan
react to the adopted GATT/WTO panel/AB reports? In Japan, GATT panel reports
have generally been considered as "non-binding" by Japanese scholars.71 Although
69For scholarly writings with a critical view, for instance, see Matsushita, M., "Nishijin
Necktie Soshou Saikousaihanketsu", Jurist (in Japanese), No. 956 (1990.6.1), pp. 76-80;
Iwasawa, Y., "Implementation of Int'l Agmts in Japan", supra note 32.




such scholarly opinions are not regarded as a source of law in Japan, the courts often
accept them and they influence judgements.72
According to Article XXIII:2 of GATT 1947, "The CONTRACTING PARTIES
shall promptly investigate any matter so referred [...] and shall make appropriate
recommendations to the contracting party [...], or giving a ruling on the matter, as
J
appropriate." Furthermore, panel reports need to be authorised in order to acquire
the authority (i.e. a "binding" nature) through their adoption by the CONTRACTING
PARTIES.73 In addition, the Contracting Parties make findings which are merely a
declaration of existing rights and obligations under the binding treaty.74 The power
of the Contracting Parties, i.e., authorisation of interpretations of the GATT may be
deduced from both Article XXV of the General Agreement and Article 31:3 of the
Vienna Convention on the Law ofTreaties. That is, according to Article XXV, "[...]
giving effect to those provisions of this Agreement which involve joint action and,
[...] facilitating the operation and furthering the objectives of this Agreement". ' In
addition, Article 31:3(b) ofthe Vienna Convention refers to "any subsequent practice
in the application of the treaty which establishes the agreement of the parties
regarding its interpretation". >
9
The status of panel reports was dealt with under the WTO in both the reports of the
panel and of the Appellate Body, which demonstrated a difference of opinion. The
Panel concluded that:
4
...panel reports adopted by the GATT CONTRACTING PARTIES and the
WTO Dispute Settlement Body constitute subsequent practice75 in a specific
7lIwasawa, Y., "Implementation of International Agmts in Japan", supra note 32 at 336.
720da, H., Japanese Law, supra note 13 at pp. 63-64.
73Now, it is replaced by the DSB under the new WTO system; European Economic
Community - Restrictions on Imports ofDessert Apples, BISD 36S/93, para. 12.1.
74Iwasawa, Y., "The Relationship Between International Law and National Law: Japanese
Experiences", 64 Brit. Y. B. Int'l. L. (1993) at 386.
"See the report of the Appellate Body, WT/DS8/AB/R, WT/DS10/AB/R, WT/DS11/AB/R
(4 October 1996), Section E, where it cited Article 31(3)(b) of the Vienna Convention and
stated that "any subsequent practice in the application of the treaty which establishes the
agreement of the parties regarding its interpretation" is to be "taken into account together
with the context" in interpreting the terms of the treaty. It continued that, in international




case by virtue of the decision to adopt them. Article 1 (b)(iv) of GATT 1994
provides institutional recognition that adopted panel reports constitute
subsequent practice. Such reports are an integral part of GATT 1994, since
they constitute "other decisions of the CONTRACTING PARTIES to GATT
1947"76
The general view under GATT 1947 was that the conclusions and recommendations
made in an adopted panel report bound the disputing parties in that particular case,
but subsequent panels were not legally bound by the details and reasoning of
previous panel reports.77 The Appellate Body of WTO stated in its report that the
CONTRACTING PARTIES, in deciding to adopt a panel report, did not intend that
their decision would constitute a definitive interpretation of the relevant provisions
of GATT 1947 (neither in GATT 1994).78 Furthermore, Article IX:2 of the WTO
Agreement provides that the Ministerial Conference and the General Council shall
have the exclusive authority to adopt interpretations of the Agreement and of the
MTAs.79 The WTO Agreement also defines the continuing relevance of the legal
history and experience under the GATT 1947 to the new system ofWTO.80 Finally,
the Appellate Body disagreed with the Panel's understanding indicated above.81
The effect of panel/AB reports of the WTO in Japan's domestic law remains
ambiguous. Although Article 98(2) of the Constitution provides for the supremacy
of treaties in Japan, Japanese courts so far denied the direct applicability ofGATT.82
as a "concordant, common and consistent" sequence of acts or pronouncements which is
sufficient to establish a discernible pattern implying the agreement of the parties regarding
interpretation.
76Panel Report of Japan's Taxes on Alcoholic Beverages, WT/DS8/R, WT/DS10/R,
WT/DS11/R (11 July 1996), para. 6.10.
71Ibid.t supra note 75.
nIbid.
79Article IX:2 of the WTO Agreement; this article also provides that such decisions shall be
taken by a three-fourthsmajority of Members.
80Article XVI: 1 of the WTO Agreement; para.l(b)(iv) of the language of Annex 1A
incorporating the GATT 1994.
81Panel reports adopted by the GATT CONTRACTING PARTIES and the DSB of the WTO
constitute subsequent practice in a specific case as that phrase used in Article 31 of the
Vienna Convention, and adopted panel reports in themselves constitute other decisions of
the CONTRACTING PARTIES to GATT 1947 (for the purpose of para. l(b)(iv) of the
Annex 1A incorporating the GATT 1994 into the WTO Agreement), see supra note 75.




If, however, the GATT/WTO Agreement is held to be directly applicable, Japanese
courts are more likely to rely on the panel/AB reports as authoritative aid of





Chapter 7. CASE STUDIES: JAPANESE TRADE DISPUTES
UNDER GATT - A TRANSFORMATION IN JAPAN'S POLICY
ON DISPUTE SETTLEMENTS
Introduction
The aim of this and the next chapter is to examine key cases in which Japan has been
involved under the GATT/WTO system.1 This examination attempt to demonstrate a
significant transformation in Japan's policy on trade dispute settlement. To begin
with, this chapter will analyse the GATT panel reports, while the next chapter will
examine those ofWTO. The main conclusion is to be drawn from this case study is
that there is a marked degree of change in Japan's attitude towards dispute settlement
3
under those systems.
An attempt has been made to find out whether any change can be discerned in Japan's
attitude towards trade dispute settlement, for example, a preference for a particular
means of settlement (e.g. bilateral or multilateral; political/pragmatic or legalistic)
under the GATT/WTO system. Another no less important concern of this analysis is
to examine how GATT/WTO panels and appellate bodies handled those cases under
the respective dispute settlement mechanism, i.e. the "old" GATT and the "new"
WTO (under which "judicialisation" had emerged both constitutionally and
institutionally as discussed in Part I of the thesis).
If one looks at those cases in which Japan was involved, one may notice a number of
interesting indication reflecting a transformation of Japanese policy regarding trade
disputes. For example, one may recall two disputes which were originally initiated
by the U.S. Section 301 investigation (or its "threat"): the dispute over
semiconductors ('85) whose bilateral settlement propelled another dispute brought by
the EC on the same products, and the "Japan Auto" dispute ('95). In the former,
Japan did not take the U.S. claim, which was under the investigation of Section 301,
to the GATT panel where a multilateral solution was available. In other words,
3
'For the purpose of this study, only those cases which, I believe, are important in Japanese
GATT/WTO dispute settlement history have been selected for examination. Nonetheless,
other Japanese disputes under GATT/WTO, are exhibited in Appendix IV at the end of the
thesis, and will be referred to whenever necessary.
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Japan yielded to U.S. unilateral measures under Section 301. Like other disputes
with the U.S. which were initiated with Section 301 investigation, Japan eventually
signed to a bilateral arrangement concerning the trade at issue. Japanese behaviour
in this case could be regarded as "conventional". Whereas, in the latter case, Japan
did take action against the U.S. demand under the "threat" of Section 301. In other
words, without yielding in obedience, Japan brought the U.S. claim to the
multilateral table, i.e. the WTO dispute settlement system. Japan, therefore, marked
a new approach to dispute settlements under the WTO. What were the reasons or
factors behind this new progressive attitude taken by Japan? To answer this
question, in this and the next chapters, the key cases and disputes selected will be
scrutinised for the purpose of demonstrating how Japanese policy on dispute
settlement evolved. To make the case studies more comprehensible, it is essential for
*
us to widen our focus not only on those key disputes which produced a legal ruling
but also on those disputes which were settled bilaterally or conceded as well as
complaints withdrawn or abandoned. By touching upon those secondary or
peripheral disputes, which will help to fill in the gaps between the key cases, we shall





7.1. Japan's Experience ofGATT Disputes2
I
7.1.1. Japan as a "Respondent"
This type of cases/disputes in which Japan has been involved as a "respondent"
indicated that Japan preferred to reach a bilateral settlement especially during the
GATT period.3 This has been the typical pattern in Japan's attitude towards
international trade disputes. Nevertheless, this Japanese stance towards resolving
trade disputes often turned out to produce a negative result. One could look at this in
two different respects, political and economic. Japan has never attained the status of
a leading political power internationally, whereas it has obtained international
economic status during the 80's. Japan, however, was not even in the upper league in
the world economic scene before then. That being the case, one could imagine that
Japan might have had little negotiating power, either economically or politically
(when the dispute settlement rule was more "power-oriented"), to settle trade disputes
with other contracting parties until the establishment of its global economic status in
the 80's (when that system had been progressing towards a "rule-oriented" nature, i.e.
2For instance, GATT, Analytical Index. 5th ed., Geneva, 1989 (prepared by E.- U.
Petersmann); GATT. Analytical Index : Guide to GATT Law and Practice. 6th ed., Geneva,
1994 (prepared by Amelia Porges) at pp. 719-34; Hudec, Robert E, Enforcing International
Law - The Evolution of Modern GATT Legal System [hereinafter, the "Enforcing"].
Butterworths Legal Publishers, Salem, New Hampshire, 1993 at 367; R.E. Hudec. The
GATT Legal System and World Trade PiplomacyT 2nd ed., Salem. New Hampshire,.
Butterworth, 1990 (1st ed., New York, Praeger, 1975), at pp. 301-21; Hudec, "GATT
Dispute Settlement after Tokyo Round: A Unfinished Business", 13 Cornell Int'l L. J. (1980)
at 145; R.E. Hudec, "Legal Issues in US-EC Trade Policy: GATT Litigation 1960-1985", in
Issues in R. E. Baldwin et al. eds, US-EC Trade Relations, 1988 at 17; J.H. Jackson, The
World Trading System - Law and Policy of International Economic Relations [hereinafter.
the "Trading System"], at pp. 98-103; Pescatore, Pierre, "Legal and Procedural Analysis" in
Pescatore, Pierre., Davey, William J., and Lowenfeld, Andreas F.. Handbook of GATT
Dispute Settlement [hereinafter, the "Handbook"]. Transnational Juris publications, Inc.,
New York, 1991 (the latest release is Release 8 in June 1997, ; Petersmann, P., Annex :
GATT Dispute Settlement Proceedings under Article XXIII 1948-1990, in Petersmann, P.,
and Dr. Giinther Jaenicke, Adjudication of International Trade Disputes in International and
National Economic Law. Univ. Press Fribourg, Switzerland, 1992 at 407; U. S. I. T. C., I,
5-28.
According to the WTO Secretariat statistics, there were 21 cases in which Japan had been
involved as a "Respondent" during the GATT period [cf. the Uruguayan recourse to Article
XXIII case is excluded in Japanese cases here] (The total number of disputes under GATT
1947 including Tokyo Round Code disputes: 312. This number excluded three cases which
were initiated in 1995 when the co-existing arrangement regarding the Anti-dumping Code
and the Subsidies Code). Among those 21 cases, Japan settled or conceded in 14 cases
(67%) which is slightly higher rate than the rate appeared in Professor Hudec's statistics
(65%). His statistics covered until the end of 1989, and total cases were 207, in ibid., The




depoliticised). This would be one of the factors which could explain why Japan did
not achieve good result in settling trade disputes particularly dining the GATT
9
period. Bearing such background in mind, we shall set out case studies.
7.1.1.1. The Leather Case - Japanese Measures on Imports of Leather (United
States v. Japan)4
S
Summary ofFacts and Procedure:
In 1952, Japan imposed a system of quantitative restrictions on the importation of
leather items. Until 1963, these restrictions had been justified and maintained as a
balance-of-payments measure stipulated in GATT Article XII. Although Japan had
acquired Article VIII status in the International Monetary Fund (IMF) in April 1984,5
and liberalised many leather items since that time, Japan continued to maintain
restrictions on the import of certain semi-processed and finished leather items due to
the small size and backward character of its enterprises (i.e. an economic reason) and,
„ above all, due to the "Dowa" issue6 (i.e. a socio-political reason). Before the date of
31 March 1983, the expiration of the three-year settlement agreement reached on 23
February 1979 in the 1978 U. S. complaint,7 Japan and the U. S. had been negotiating
4Panel on Japanese Measures on Imports of Leather, BISD 31S/94 (1985) L/5623; for the
summary of this case can be found in, R.E. Hudec, The Enforcing, supra note 2, pp.
508-509; Pescatore, P., et al.. The Handbook, pp. CS57/1-/2.
5Article VIII of the IMF defines general obligations ofmembers. After World War II, most
of member countries have been granted the status of Article XIV of the IMF (Transitional ""
Arrangements) due to the lack ofeconomic stability. Once a member recovered its economic
stability, the IMF General Council recommends the members to meet with the general
obligation ofmember under VIII. (The IMF was set up by the Bretton Woods Agreement of
1944 and came into operation in March 1947. The main objectives of the IMF is to
encourage international co-operation in the monetary field and the removal of foreign
exchange restrictions, to stabilise exchange rates and to facilitate a multilateral payments
system between members countries).
6The origin of the "Dowa" issue goes back to the Tokugawa period (1615-1867). "Dowa" is
a euphemism used for "Buraku" ("Burakumin", literally "village people", are people who
belong to this group). The "Burdkumin" are the descendants of people outside of the four
classes (i.e. warriers, farmers, artisans and merchants) of the Tokugawa society. They were
called "hinin" (no-mem) or "eta " (outcast, pariah) and engaged in certain occupations such as
flayers, tanners and curriers. Despite the abolishment of those two discriminatory terms
(hinin and eta) in August 1871 through a decree ("mibun kaihourei"- social position
emancipation order), the social discrimination remained; see further Herzog, Peter J.. Japan's
Pseudo-Democracv. Japan Library, Kent, 1993, pp. 72-76; see also for Japan's explanation
on "Dowa Problem", BISD 31S/94, supra note 4, para. 21.




the issue but the negotiations ended unsuccessfully. On 25 February 1983, the U. S.
requested the establishment of a panel on "Japanese Measures on Imports of
Leather".8 Other countries such as Australia, the EC, India, New Zealand and
Pakistan were also involved.
The U. S. legal claim was based on the following grounds: the quantitative
restrictions on leather imports were in violation of GATT Article XI: 1 (para. 15); the
*
failure to publish quantitative restriction amounts and license holders, violated the
"notice" requirements pursuant to GATT Article X:1 and XIII:3 (para. 16); the
«
awarding of quantitative restrictions licenses through associations of domestic
producers was in violation of the "reasonableness" requirement under GATT Article
0





The U. S. further argued that, not only did Japanese import restrictions on leather
0
constitute a prima facie case of nullification and impairment, they also represented
actual nullification and impairment of the tariff bindings on leather which were
stipulated in GATT Article II (para. 30). In addition, with respect to trade in leather,
the U.S. pointed out that the substantial growth of its leather exports to the Far East
market except Japan stood in contrast to the negligible rate in the growth' of U. S.
leather exports to Japan (para. 32).
Japan's arguments:
-A number of developed countries including Japan also maintained residual
import restrictions, and thus it did not seem appropriate to seek a judgement
%
on these issues simply from a legalistic point of view; In spite of the
extremely difficult conditions of the Japanese leather industry due to complex
domestic social problems and its low-level of competitiveness, Japan had
made its maximum efforts to liberalise the import restrictions, (para. 17)
complaint was triggered by the U.S. Section 301 which was filed by the Tanners Council of
America (TCA) in August 1977.
'Complaint was brought on 5 January 1983 (L/5440).




-No benefits accruing to the U. S. under the GATT has been nullified or
impaired by Japan; In fact, Japan had opened a large quota for the U. S. and
other countries, and furthermore it benefited them, which resulted in the
steady increase in U. S. leather exports to Japan, (para. 18)
<
-The aim of the GATT was to expand trade and therefore the panel should
have taken more substantive matters into account in its findings, (para. 19)
Japan claimed that the present case was deeply rooted in its history and thus
the Hong Kong/European Community case10 cited by the U. S. was irrelevant
to the present case. (para. 20)
-Except for the size of import quotas, the entire process of import quota
allocation was published in the MITI Gazette as required in Article X:l;
#
According to Article XIII:3(a), it did not require the name of import licence
holders to be published and therefore, there was no obligation for Japan to
publish the quantity of their import licences nor the size of unfilled import
quota balances, (para. 27)
*
|
-The present system of import quota allocation has not violated Article X:3;
Japan explained that " ...the fact that each tanner's demand was taken into
account, the Tanners' Council of Japan was in no way controlled by the
Government. Also tanners that were not members ofthe Council had actually
been allocated quotas through the CouncilJapan added that "Importers
wanted trade expansion and, once they had been allocated quotas, the
e>
Government had no intention of interfering with their transactions, nor did
have any administrative means to do so"12; Thus, Japan emphasised the
rationality of its system of the import quota allocation, (para. 29)
"Quantitative Restrictions against Imports of Certain Products form Hong Kong, Report
L/5511, adopted by the Council on 12 July 1983 (C/M/170) in BISD 30S/129 (1984).




-The restriction on certain types of sheep, lamb, goat and kid leather had
already been liberalised; the import quotas on sheep, lamb, goat and kid
leather, the tariffon which were not bound. In other words, these items in the
present case were not the object of tariff concessions; Japan, therefore,
neither nullified nor impaired the benefits of the U.S. under Article II in
connection with these items, (para. 31)
f
-Regardless of the different needs of the Japanese market, the concept of
regarding the Far East as one market was impractical, and which was one of
the reasons why U.S. leather was not imported in large quantities to Japan, in
comparison with the quantity imported to other countries such as the
Republic ofChina, the Republic ofKorea, Taiwan and Hong Kong. (para. 35)
Furthermore, Japan considered that the Japanese market was sufficiently open
to the U.S. For instance, Japan showed an increase of leather imports, i.e.
from US$2 million in 1978 to US$9 million in 1982 which means an increase
of 4.5-fold (c.f. U.S. leather during the same period: a 1.9-fold increase
world-wide; 3-fold increase to Italy; 3.5-fold increase to the Federal Republic
ofGermany); In fact, U.S. leather exports to France and the United Kingdom
has decreased during the same period. Moreover, a considerable portion of'
the quotas available to the U.S. was unused; The problem can be found in the •
U.S. suppliers who did not make efforts to meet the demands of Japanese
market, i.e. "they had not carried out appropriate research and development
and quality improvement efforts and had not, unlike European suppliers, met
0
detailed requirements concerning trading lot, delivery time, etc." (para. 36)
Summary ofFindings and Conclusions:
A panel made the following decisions:
-Japanese quantitative restrictions violated GATT Article XI: 1.
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-Japan did not invoke any justification recognised by the GATT rules so as to
maintain its quantitative restrictions, thereby the panel could not consider a
possible justification under GATT Article XIX. Furthermore, the special
4
historical, cultural, and socio-economic circumstances mentioned by Japan
were deemed to be insufficient justification for its measures in dispute.13
-According to the established GATT practice,14 Japanese restrictions were
found to be illegal and therefore constituted a prima facie case of
"nullification and impairment" of the U. S. benefits under the GATT.15
-The quantitative restrictions which caused a preventive effect as indicated by
market data analysis, made the U. S. unable to fill the quota allocated by
Japan. Japan, therefore, did not disapprove "nullification and impairment".16
-Even though there is no substantial evidence to prove the existence of an
actual trade restraint, the quantitative restrictions should be presumed to cause
"nullification and impairment" not only because of mandatory quantitative
restriction, affecting the volume of trade, but also for other reasons such as
increased transaction costs and growing uncertainties affecting investment.17
-It became unnecessary to rule on claims with respect to the administration of
quantitative restrictions, or on claims with regard to "nullification and
13Ibid., para. 44.
"Annex to Understanding Regarding Notification, Consultation, Dispute Settlement
and Surveillance (BISD 26S/215) [hereinafter, the "Annex to 1979 Understanding"], para.
5, which stated as follows:
"A prima facie case of nullification or impairment would ipso facto require
consideration of whether the circumstances are serious enough to justify the
authorisation of suspension of concessions or obligations, if the contracting party
bringing the complaint so requests. This means that there is normally a presumption
that a breach of the rules has an adverse impact on other contracting parties, and in
such cases, it is up to the contracting parties against whom the complaint has been
brought to rebut the charge"; cf. DSU 3.8.
"Ibid., supra note 8, para. 46.
16"..., it was up to Japan to rebut the presumption that nullification or impairment had actually




impairment" of tariff concessions because the panel had ruled that
quantitative restriction violated GATT Article XI: 1.
-The panel suggested that Japan should eliminate its quantitative import
restrictions and conform with the GATT provisions.18
-The panel recognised that Japan faced difficulties in eliminating its
quantitative restrictions on leather immediately, but noted that "the first
objective ... is to secure the withdrawal of the measures concerned if these
are found to be inconsistent with the General Agreement"}9 The panel left
the final decision to the Council whether or not Japan should be provided a
certain amount of time progressively to eliminate the restrictions in
4
question.20 The panel suggested that the GATT Council should consider
giving Japan extra time to comply with the panel decision because of a
. particular social problems.21 Subsequently, the GATT Council made a ruling
in May 1984.22 A Substantial number of delegations pronounced reservations
regarding granting extra time for compliance in favour of Japan.23
l*Ibid.9 para. 59.
19Ibid. para. 60 (this citation is originally from the Annex to 1979 Understanding, supra note
13, at para. 4.)
20Ibid., para. 60.
2,L/5623 (2 March 1984) in BISD 31S/94, supra note 4.
"Report was adopted on 15-16 May 1984 (C/M/178).
"Cf. For example, the WTO provided a strict time constraint for the implementation of
DSB's recommendations and rulings (WT/DSB/M/26). In Japan - Taxes on Alcoholic
Beverages case, Japan indicated that it would be able to implement within a "reasonable
period of time". Nonetheless, in the absence of an agreement under Article 21(3)(b) of the
DSU, the U.S. requested that the "reasonable period of time" should be determined through
binding arbitration as is provided by Article 21(3)(c). Finally, the Arbitrator (Julio
Lacarte-Muro) concluded that a "reasonable period of time" within the meaning of Article
21(3)(c) of the DSU for Japan to implement the recommendations and rulings of the DSB (1
Nov. 1996) in the present case is 15 months. (In almost all cases in which an arbitrator has
concluded the "reasonable period of time" to be "15 months". Those cases are, for instance,
the Canadian Periodical case (WT/DS31); strictly speaking, "15 months and one week" was
given in the EC Banana case (WT/DS27); India Patent case (WT/DS50); the EC Hormones
case (WT/DS26 and WT/DS48) (as of June 1998). Exceptionally, the arbitrator concluded
the "reasonable period of time" to be 12 months in the Indonesian National Car case, see
WT/DS54/15; WT/DS55/14; WT/DS59/13; WT/DS64/12 (7 December 1998).
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After the immediate removal of some quantitative restrictions, Japan proposed
withdrawal of tariff bindings and replacing quantitative restrictions with GATT
lawful tariff quotas. The parties agreed on a settlement: (instead of liberalising its
leather market) new tariff concessions by Japan on some U.S. exports as partial
compensations for withdrawal of tariffbindings, and other compensation in the form
of a discriminatory increase in the U.S. tariffagainst $24million ofJapanese exports.
On 1 April 1986, quantitative restrictions on leather products were replaced by tariff
quotas which were considered as GATT lawful.24 Later, Japan enquired about the
legality of an ongoing discriminatory tariff increase by the U. S. under the GATT,
but Japan stopped pursuing the matter further.25
Remarks on the case:
1. The Panel's stance - a more legalistic approach?:
The panel insisted on a strict legalistic approach throughout the proceedings to settle
the present case. As mentioned, however, the Japanese justification for its import
restriction was not based on a specific provision of the GATT but on a domestic
social problem. Although the panel took the argument into account, the panel also
noted a panel report which had been adopted by the CPs in 1983.26 In this panel
report, the panel had concluded "... that such matters [the social and economic
conditions] did not come within thepurview ofArticleXI andXIII ofthe-GATT, and
in this instance concluded that they lay outside its consideration."21 Accordingly,
based on that practice, the panel found that the import restrictions imposed by Japan
contravened Article XI: 1. Thus, the panel avoided taking into consideration each
contracting party's special circumstances. In the end, the panel followed its legalistic
approach to make a decision in this case.
2. Presumption of a Prima Facie Case of "Nullification or Impairment" and
Possibility ofRebuttal:
24C/M/191 (17-19 July 1985).
25L/5978 (11 April 1986).
"Panel report on Quantitative Restrictions against Imports of Certain Products from Hong





In the present case, the panel noted that, according to the established GATT
practice,28 it would be possible for Japan to rebut the presumption of a prima facie
case of "nullification or impairment" if Japan could provide a detailed justification to
prove the GATT legality of Japan's measures at issue. In this case, the panel stated,
however, that the Japanese arguments provided were insufficient to rebut the
presumption that the Japanese import restrictions on imports of leather had nullified
and impaired the U. S. benefits anticipated under Article XI.29 Therefore, it was
ft
understood that the panel had, at least, examined the justification made by Japan in
4
the present case although, as transpired, the result was unfavourable to Japan.
Was the panel reasonable in its consideration of the GATT rule regarding the
possibility of rebuttal concerning aprima facie case of "nullification or impairment"?
Here, there are a few points to be noted concerning this question. First of all, the
interpretation and application of prima facie nullification or impairment under
Article XXIII should be examined. The panel report on Uruguayan Recourse to
GATT Article XXIII30 (the "Uruguayan case") noted that "...in a case where there is
ft
a clear infringement oftheprovision ofthe General Agreement, ..., the action would, ■
prima facie, constitute a case ofnullification or impairment ...".31 Furthermore, the
Annex to Understanding Regarding Notification, Consultation, Dispute Settlement
and Surveillance32 (the Annex to 1979 Understanding) had confirmed. the
*
interpretation made in the Uruguayan case. In fact, in the present case, the panel
affirmed the possibility of rebuttal based on the Annex to 1979 Understanding. After
the Superfund Taxes case,33 however, the panel denied the interpretation that had
been supported in both the Uruguayan case and the Annex to 1979 Understanding.
ft
In short, the main point made in the Superfund Taxes case was laid in provision 4 of
the Annex to the 1979 Understanding which defined that "the first objective of the
|
2%Ibid., supra note 19.
29BISD 31S/94 (1985), supra note 4, para. 56.
""Uruguayan Recourse to Article XXffl" (L/1923) in BISD 11S/95 (1962).
Ibid., para. 15.
32Ibid., supra note 14.
""Mexico, Canada & European Community v. United States: Taxes on Petroleum and




CONTRACTING PARTIES is usually to secure the withdrawal of the measures
concerned ifthese arefound to be inconsistent with the GeneralAgreement"?A
9
Thus, this statement meant that in case of a GATT illegal act, such an act should be
amended without reference to any influence on trade. On the other hand, as
explained earlier, provision 5 of the Annex to the 1979 Understanding only defined
whether or not a party could claim compensational measures after finding
"nullification or impairment". In other words, compensational measures would not
be provided if a responding party could prove that a situation was not serious enough
as to justify seeking for compensation. To sum up, one may note that there seemed
to be an ambiguous terminology (i.e. "presumption of prima facie") which might
have caused confusion in applying the GATT rules in the present case. According to
the interpretation of the Annex to 1979 Understanding, the possibility of rebuttal for
prima facie nullification or impairment under Article XXIII would not be allowed
.(i.e. the interpretation made in the Superfund Tax case) though there seemed to be
room for rebutting. In practice, however, no rebuttal has ever been accepted.35
3. A few points to be noted concerning the report:
First, in the panel findings, the panel noted that "Japan had not invoked any
provision of the General Agreement to justify the maintenance of the import
restrictions on leather"?6 On one hand, the panel noted that "The Panel decided that
in such circumstances it was not for it to establish whether the present measures
would be justified under any GATTprovision or provisions"?1 The panel, however,
made a decision on the present measures that "... these provisions did not provide
such a justification for import restrictionsH.38 Japan did not simply rebut the U.S.
%
claim to justify its measures in dispute, which was perhaps because of domestic
*4Ibid., supra note 14, para. 4.
"According to Article 3.8 of the DSU, in the event that there is a presumption ofnullification
or impairment (a breach of the rules which has an adverse impact on other Member parties to
a covered agreement), it shall be up to the respondent to rebut the charge.







issues, i.e. to avoid a difficult social domestic problem by protecting the leather
industry (which led to losing this case) rather than economic losses.
Second, in spite of the fact that the panel acknowledged the growth ofU. S. leather
exports to Japan by presenting trade figures,39 the panel came to a conclusion by
noting that "However, the Panel could not escape the conclusion that the import
restrictions were maintained in order to restrict imports, including imports from the
United States".40 The panel further explained why it arrived at such a conclusion by
stating: "..., while the Japanese market was notfully comparable to other markets in
East Asia, the evidence relating to these markets still tended to support the view that
the Japanese restrictions limited United Sates' exports of leather to its market".4X
What relation did the U. S. trade export figures to East Asia, excluding Japan, have to
do with U. S. exports to Japan and the Japanese import restrictions? On this point, it
might be reasonable to state that the trade figures were not an important criterion in
explaining the impact ofU. S. exports to Japan which had allegedly been caused by
the Japanese import restrictions.
Third, the way in which the panel dealt with the Japanese arguments (i.e. that the
Japanese quota did not limit U. S. exports to Japan). The arguments were based on
the fact that the U. S. exporters had not fulfilled their large quota. Could Japan prove
that the Japanese import restriction did not affect U. S. exports? In the present case,
although the panel said that "these consisted ofcontradictory assertions by the two
parties that, by their nature, were difficult to evaluate"42 the panel however made a
judgement that the existence of the Japanese import restrictions had adversely
affected the exports of the U. S. based on two main facts: "(i) the U. S. was able to
export large quantities ofleather to other markets', (ii) other supplying countries had
supported the arguments of the United States".42 Nonetheless, one might query








'no'. With regard to fact (i), it is unfair to take a view which considered the Far East
to be one market. Each country has different preferences and demands regarding
leather products. In addition, some countries have a favourable trade relationship
with the U. S.44 While, concerning fact (ii), this fact should not be taken into
consideration as an important factor because, as noted in the panel report of the
present case (i.e. " ...since its terms of reference were to examine the matter 'in the
light of the relevant GATT provisions',,4S), the Panel was essentially supposed to
make a decision based on the consideration of the GATT provisions at issue.
*
Nonetheless, as for the present case, the Panel made a decision based on the fact that
one of the countries at issue shared assertions with other supplying countries. It
seemed that the use of criterion (ii) in the present case was unreasonable in ruling on
a case as stipulated in the GATT.
9
To conclude, the Japanese defence at the panel proceedings was unconvincing,
because it based its arguments on domestic problems which needed to be tackled,
whilst the Panel, for its part, manifested inconsistencies in its approach to arriving at
its ruling. In short, this panel exhibited, to some extent, certain characteristics of the
GATT cases, to some extent, such as the nature of old GATT dispute settlement
mechanism coupled with Japan's characteristic stance towards the dispute settlement.
The present issue was triggered by the threat ofU.S. Section 301, and it proceeded to
%
%
the GATT case. Unlike the first GATT claim by the U.S. on Japanese measures on
imports of leather,46 Japan did not accept the U.S. demand under the "threats" of
4
Section 301 in the present case. In fact, this was because Japan's strong desire was to
avoid a difficult social problem ("Dowa" issue) rather than economic losses, Japan
was, as a consequence, defeated at the present panel. Lastly, with respect to the
domestic situation, one might have imagined that the Japanese government intended
to take advantage of foreign or international pressure, i.e. the GATT panel decision,
**Ibid.9 para. 35.
4SIbid.9 para. 44.
46On 26 February 1979, the disputing parties notified the panel that a settlement had been
reached, which was adopted on 6 November 1979 (C/M/135). The settlement included a
three-year agreement granting larger quotas in some products and a commitment of progress
in others.
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in order to improve the problem both politically and socially at home (i.e.
protectionist movements) avoiding facing much domestic tension in the process, as
international pressures rather than the Japanese government could be blamed.
7.1.1.2. : The Alcoholic Beverage Case - Restrictions on Alcoholic Beverages
(European Community v. Japan)47.
Summary of Facts and Procedure:
In July 1986, the EC filed a claim against the Japanese government regarding its
practice of classifying alcoholic beverages into a number of categories and setting
substantially different tax rates according to each category.48 The EC argued that the
practice was discriminatory against foreign products, which contravened Article III: 1
and 2 of GATT. The parties to the dispute could not reach a settlement bilaterally,
thus on 4 February 1987, a panel was established.49
The present case dealt with the consistency of the Japanese liquor tax system50 with
the relevant GATT provisions. First of all, in this case, the panel clarified that the
"Japan - Customs Duties, Taxes and Labelling Practices on Imported Wines and Alcoholic
Beverages, BISD 34S/83-135 (1988) L/6216 (13 October 1987); for the summary of this
case can be found in, R. E. Hudec, The Enforcing, supra note 1 at 538; P. Pescatore, et al.,
The Handbook, supra note 2, pp. CS63/1-/6.
"Complaint was made on 5 November 1986 (L/6078).
49C/M/206, item 7.
S0Japanese Liquor Tax Law (hereinafter, the "Liquor Tax Law") or "Shuzeihou" in Japanese
classified liquors into 10 categories of which 6 categories were further classified into 13
sub-categories, and in the case of sake and whisky/brandy, into three extra grades (see, for
the classification of liquors in Japan, C/M/206, Annex I at 128). Furthermore, each category
was allocated a different tax rate subject to the Liquor Tax Law. In addition, the Liquor Tax
Law was an excise tax, whose imposition was mainly based on quantity (but partially based
on ad valorem tax).
According to the Liquor Tax Law, whiskies and brandies were automatically categorised into
three different grades: special, first and second grades, based on certain standards such as the
mixture ratio of ingredients (i.e. malt whisky, grain whisky, pure brandy, and alcohol content
of whisky and brandy). Whereas, with respect to the grading of sake, producers could
voluntarily selected its grading. In addition, the higher rates of specific tax were applied to
higher grades subject to the Liquor Tax Law. With respect to wines, spirits (such as vodka,
gin and rum) and liqueurs, according to the Liquor Tax Law, ad valorem taxes were applied
instead of specific tax where the prices exceeded a certain threshold set for each category of
alcoholic beverage (See, ibid., Annex IV at 134). In this case, the tax rates were set higher
under ad valorem taxes than specific taxes. Moreover, in case of the domestic products, the
domestic producers could choose one of two methods in computing the price of taxation.
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first and second sentences of GATT Article 111:2 were applicable to the
differentiation in internal tax among "like products" and also among "directly
competitive or substitutable products". Second, this case clarified in what
circumstances the differential taxation contravened the first and second sentences of
GATT Article 111:2.
4
The EC claimed that Japanese liquor tax system was inconsistent with GATT Article
*
III based on six violations:
-"Almost all whiskies and brandies imported from the EC were classified as a
special grade automatically and higher tax rates were applied, because these
imported alcoholic beverages were made of pure ingredients like pure malt
whiskies, pure grain whiskies and pure brandies. On the other hand, more
than half of domestic whiskies and brandies (in fact, most of them are
blended products) were classified as first or second grade and thus had
applied lower tax rates. Accordingly, such a grading system contravened the
first sentence ofArticle 111:2;
- In general, wines, spirits and liqueurs imported from the EC were subjected
to relatively higher ad valorem taxes in Japan than domestic like products,
because the prices of those imported alcoholic beverages included import
duties for the tax purpose. Therefore, such system in applying ad valorem
taxes was in violation of the first sentence ofArticle 111:2;
- There were different methods of calculating ad valorem tax for imported
and domestic products. With respect to the calculation of taxable value for ad
valorem tax, there was just one method of calculation available to imported
products, whereas there were two methods of calculation available to
On the other hand, in die case of imported products, that price consisted of the CIF (i.e. an
acronym ofa trade term for Cost, Insurance, and Freight, or Charged in full) cost plus import
duty. Furthermore, with respect to liqueurs and sparkling wines, higher tax rates were
applied to these products in cases where they contained more than a certain ration of extract
or non-volatile ingredient content. Nonetheless, specific tax rates were applied to shochu, of
which rates were considerably low in comparison with the other liquors such as
whiskies/brandies.
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domestic products. For this reason, in selecting the method, it could be
reasonably said that domestic producers could choose whichever was the
more favourable to them. Therefore, this discriminatory method of
calculation was in violation of Article 111:2 and the first sentence of Article
111:4;
- In most of cases, liqueurs and sparkling wines imported from the EC were
subject to higher specific tax, because these alcoholic beverages contained
higher extract or non-volatile ingredient content, while some of the domestic
products were subject to lower specific tax rates due to lower extract content.
Therefore, such system of taxation based on extract content constituted a
violation of Article 111:2;
- Shochu, whisky/brandy and spirits (such as vodka, gin and rum) belonged to
distilled liquors and, according to interpretative note to paragraph 2, second
sentence of Article 111:2, these alcoholic beverages were considered to be
"directly competitive or substitutable products". Accordingly, the imposition
of favourable specific tax rates to shochu was intended to provide protection
to the domestic production of shochu. For this reason, such system was in"
violation of the second sentence ofArticle 111:2; and,
*
%
- Sake and shochu (generalised as "Japanese traditional liquors") were not
subject to ad valorem taxes although there were few exceptions. Whilst,
wines and whiskies (i.e. "Western-style liquors"), which were above the
non-taxable threshold in value, bore heavy ad valorem taxes. As a result,
such a system constituted a violation of the second sentence ofArticle III:2.S1
«
In addition to the above six complaints, the EC also claimed against Japanese
labelling practices.52 According to the claim made by the EC, Japanese labelling




practices on domestic wines and alcoholic beverages using English or French names
contravened Article IX:6 which stipulated an obligation to co-operate in order to




Summary ofFindings and Conclusions:
The panel concluded as follows:53
- Violation of the first sentence of GATT Article 111:2: the grading system;
the application of ad valorem tax above the non-taxable threshold; and the
taxation system according to extract content;
- Violation of the second sentence of GATT Article 111:2: the application of
extremely low rate of specific tax to shochu compared with other distilled
liquors;
- Dismissal (rion-violation claim): the method of calculation for ad valorem
tax and the Japanese labelling practices; and
- The other issues claimed by the EC did not contravene the GATT.
The details of the decisions ofPanel:
-The following group ofproducts indicated were considered to be "like products": all
of gins, vodka (including Japanese "shochu"), whisky and spirits similar to it, grape
brandy, fruit brandy, classic liqueurs, unsweetened still wine, and sparkling wine;
-The first sentence ofArticle 111:2, providing equal tax treatment of "like products,"
did not exempt different tax treatment within the classification of "like products" as
regards the imposition ofhigher tax;






-Several imports were taxed heavier than "like" domestic products which violated the
first sentence ofArticle 111:2;
-According to the first sentence ofArticle 111:2, a different tax rate on "like products"
was not permitted if such taxes were based on an objective characteristic of the
product, such as its alcohol content. Furthermore, such rule could not justify
differences of tax rate caused by a tax scale based on "extract content" where the tax
was clearly not a tax on "extract" and where imports were disadvantaged by the
non-uniformed tax scale;
-Various methods to calculate value for ad valorem tax did not violate Article 111:2 of
%
the GATT with no evidence that differences created lower values for domestic
products;
-According to the second sentence of GATT Article 111:2, the following product
groups were "directly competitive" as defined in the Article: all distilled spirits, all
liqueurs, and all still wines;
0
4
-Certain variations in the taxation on products within the larger groups produced a
competitive disadvantage for imported products against "directly competitive"
domestic products, and as a result, domestic products were protected, which violated
the second sentence ofGATT Article 111:2;
-It is not required, under the second sentence of GATT Article 111:2, to establish
protective effect in order to prove influence on actual trade;
-Taxes inconsistent with criteria provided for in GATT Article 111:2 for the purpose
ofadjusting tax according to criteria of ability-to-pay are not justified;
187
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-Laws giving permission to apply Western words and images on labels were not
proved to constitute a violation of GATT Article IX:6, in the absence of showing
9
either harmful influence or non-co-operation by the government.
As a result, although Japan disagreed with the rulings concerning Article 111:2, it did
not block adoption.54 Japan amended its liquor tax so as to fulfil the
recommendations of the GATT Panel. For instance, by a law effective as at 1 April
1989, Japan abolished its ad valorem tax on the beverages affected by this
recommendation, its tax based on extract content, and its "grading system" used in
classification. Japan also reduced the tax differential, i.e. lowered the tax on
whiskies/brandies, while raising the tax on shochu.5S Nevertheless, in spite of the
Japanese acceptance of the GATT rulings,56 the EC was dissatisfied with the situation
because Japan's implementation of the panel's decision did not remedy all material
violations. In the meantime, Japan stated that the remaining issues were de
minimis.51
Remarks on the case:
i) The present and previous cases:
The main issue of the case under discussion was whether differential taxation among
various liquors under the Liquor Tax Law constituted a violation of GATT Article
111:2. In fact, there were other cases in which it was argued that differential tax or
differential treatment by internal regulation among "like" or "directly competitive or
substitutable" products were inconsistent with Article 111:2, 4 or 5.58 In those cases,
S4C/M/21S (10-11 November 1987).
ssL/6465 (2 February 1989).
"Japan disagreed with the Panel's decision on Article 111:2, nonetheless, did not block
adoption of the report itself. In fact, Japan never blocked adoption of panels' report when it
lost a panel (e.g., Leather case; Agriculture case; and Semiconductor case), which should be
worth noted.
"C/M/228, C/M/230 (Meetings of 8-9 February and 6 March 1989).
58See, for example, the U.S. v. France (Auto Taxes), 12 September 1956 (L/520), for
summary of this case see Hudec, The Enforcing, supra note 2, pp. 438-439; the U.S. v. the
EC (Measures on Animal Feed Proteins), 27 April 1976 (C/M/113) BISD 25S/49 (1979),
reported adopted on 14 March 1978 (C/M/124), also see ibid., pp. 466-467; and the U.S. v.
Spain (Measures concerning Domestic Sale ofSoybean Oil), 1 November 1979 (L/4859), the
ruling by Panel, L/5142 (17 June 1981) and L/5142/Corr.l (22 June 1981) but not
reproduced in BISD, namely, unadopted; also see ibid., pp. 479-481.
188
CHAPTER 7
however, the Panel did not make any significant statement regarding the issue of the
0
applicability of Article III to differential treatment among products. The present
case, however, was a case in which the Panel found violation of Article 111:1 and 2,
second sentence in respect ofdifferential tax treatment among products. In addition,
the approach taken by the Panel would also seem applicable to differential treatment
by internal regulation among products under Article 111:4. Hence, the Panel Report
of the present case can be considered to be as a leading case on differential treatment
among products by internal tax or internal regulation.
ii) Applicability of Article 111:2 to differential taxation among products ("Origin
Neutrality"):59
Japan argued that "since there existed a substantial domestic production of products
$
which were almost identical to the products of the EC, and both imported and
domestic products were subject to the same taxation, there was accordingly, no
discrimination in violation ofGATT Article 111:1 and 2."60 With respect to this point,
however, the Panel supported the EC's view.61 Namely, the Panel concluded that the
conformity of internal taxes with Article 111:2 required to be scrutinised closely
determine the following: first, whether the imported and domestic products are "like"
t
or "directly competitive or substitutable"; second, if the internal taxation was found
discriminatory among "like" products, it would constitute a violation of Article 111:2,
first sentence, and if the internal taxation was found protective among "directly
competitive or substitutable" products, it would constitute a violation ofArticle 111:2,
second sentence.
59BISD 34S/83, supra note 47, para. 5.5; see the Japan Alcohol-II for the "origin-neutral"
test, namely, all shochu is treated alike (domestically produced as well as imported, e.g. from
Korea) and also all whiskey is treated alike. In other words, it is treated on the basis ofthe
product specification not on the basis of origin; also see the Indonesian National Car case in
Appendix III to the thesis [WT/DS54/R; WT/DS55/R; WT/DS59/R; WT/DS64/R (2 July
1998)], for the examination of the issue under two pillars, i.e. first the "origin-neutral" basis
(focusing on whether cars "like") and second, the "origin-specific" basis (local content rules,







The Panel, furthermore, stated four grounds on which the above interpretation of
Article 111:2 was based. Those were: 1) the context of Article 111:2; 2) only literal
interpretation of Article 111:2 as prohibiting "internal tax specialisation"
$
discriminating against "like" products could ensure that reasonable expectation of
competitive benefits accruing under tariff concessions would not be nullified or
*
impaired by internal tax discrimination against like products; 3) as drafting history
confirmed, Article 111:2 was designed with the intention that internal taxes on goods
should not be used as a means ofprotection; and 4) GATT practice in the application
of Article III further indicated and also supported the interpretation of the present
case.62 The reasoning of the Panel would be convincing except for ground 1) above.
It is because ground 1) dealt with only Article 111:2, first sentence. Moreover, it was
not appropriate for the Panel to refer to the GATT precedents, because those cases
cited were only concerned with the examination of likeness, direct competitiveness
4
or substitutability of the products in question, only as the question of the order for
initiating an examination.63 Nonetheless, by and large, the Panel's interpretation of
Article 111:2 seemed to be reasonable.
*
iii) Range of "Like Products":
With regard to the issue of "like products", Japan contended that two other points to
be taken into consideration as criteria in determining "like product" were: i) minor
differences in taste, colour and other properties; and ii) price differentials ofproducts.
With respect to point i), the Panel concluded that "minor differences in taste, colour
and other properties did not prevent products qualifying as 'like products' ".64 In this
sense, the Panel agreed with the positions adopted in previous Panel reports.6S
Therefore, in the present case, the Panel did not take into account differences in
quality ofwhisky and liqueurs, on which Japan had insisted. In addition, the Panel
62Ibid., para. 5.5. a), b), c) and d).
"See BISD 25S/49 (1979), Mexico, Canada and the EC v. the U. S. - Taxes On Petroleum
And Certain Imported Substances ["Superfund" Taxes] in BISD 34S/136 (1988), see also
Hudec, The Enforcing, supra note 2, pp. 535-537.
"BISD 34S/83, supra note 47, para. 5.6; see also the finding of previous panel report




noted that a certain panel report had been criticised by contracting parties in that the
interpretation of "like products", defined as "more or less the same products" was too
strict. Accordingly, bearing such criticisms in mind, the Panel clarified the term "like
products" stipulated in Article III not only as "identical" or "equal" products, but also
as products sharing "similar" qualities.66
With regard to point ii), the Panel did not consider price differentials to be one factor
in examining "like products". It was because that "... such an interpretation would
run counter to the objective ofArticle 111:2 to avoid that discriminatory orprotective
internal taxation of imported products which would distort price competition with
domestic like or directly competitiveproducts, for instance by creating differentprice
and consumer categories and hardening consumer preferences for traditional home
products".61 Nonetheless, the Panel reasoning in the present case might be
■ unacceptable in cases where price differentials of products already exist. Even in
such cases, if a higher rate of internal tax applied to high-priced products, it is
reasonable to say that the more expensive imported products would be at a
disadvantage in comparison to the less expensive like domestic products. It,
therefore, seemed fair that the Panel did not considered price differential of the
products in question in determining "like products".
P
Nonetheless, it should be noted that the Panel referred to a "likeness" between Group
A shochu and vodka.68 The EC, however, asserted only that differential tax treatment
between shochu and other distilled liquor violated Article 111:2, second sentence. In
this sense, the Panel went beyond the claim made by the EC. In fact, this part of the
Panel report seems irrelevant to the Panel resolution of this dispute (i.e. beyond the
scope of panel terms of reference). As a result, with respect to the EC's allegation,
the Panel simply expressed its agreement with the argument made by the EC. One
might assume that such behaviour on the Panel's part was taken in order to avoid an
"Ibid.





assertive conclusion of the case. Accordingly, the panel investigation of this dispute
might have left uncertainty in this Panel report.
iv) Criteria for determining violation ofGATT Article 111:2, first sentence:
With respect to this point, the Panel insisted upon a literal interpretation of Article
111:2, first sentence. Being based on this approach, the Panel concluded that the
provision ofArticle 111:2, first sentence prohibited even different tax treatment of like
products through the classification of tax categories. Furthermore, the Panel also
referred to the fact that imported wines and other liquors being subject to ad valorem
tax, and liqueurs and sparkling wines bearing taxation according to extract content
were subjected to internal taxes in excess of those applied to domestic "like
products". The Panel thus concluded that this differential taxation between these
"like products" was inconsistent with Article 111:2, first sentence.
This differential taxation could not be justified under any of the exception clauses of
the GATT. It may be noted that the position taken by the Panel in determining
breach of Article 111:2, first sentence was because of the following reasons: Judging
from the Panel's conclusion of the present case, the Panel seemed to take the view
that in cases where some imported products exist in categories subject to higher tax
rates, while domestic "like products" exist in the lower taxed categories, such
differential treatment of internal taxes among "like products", regardless of a defacto
discriminatory effect, constitutes a breach of Article 111:2, first sentence, in the
absence of justification under any of the exception clauses under GATT; On the
other hand, with respect to whiskies/brandies were subject to the grading system, the
Panel referred to the fact that as a result of differential taxation, almost all
whiskies/brandies subject to higher tax rates, whereas more than half of these items
produced domestically enjoyed benefits through considerably lower tax rates. It
seemed that the Panel, therefore, could be inconsistent in deciding a breach ofArticle
111:2, first sentence.
Nevertheless, the Panel report discussed above could be interpreted as simply
referring to an unreasonable discriminatory effect on the products of the EC as a
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result of Japanese grading system. The Panel, therefore, did not state a necessary
condition for finding a violation of the GATT Article 111:2, first sentence.
Furthermore, according to two previous cases,69 it might be unnecessary to check the
position of imported products and domestic products in a question relating to a
finding of a contravention ofArticle 111:2, first sentence. Perhaps, it can be assumed
that the Panel has been aware of the precedents.
With respect to the general rule of different tax treatment of "like products", would
there be any circumstances in which such treatment was compatible with the GATT?
The Panel's reply to this question that there are such circumstances allowed under the
GATT and the Panel indicated the following exceptional circumstances: i) Article
11:2 permitted non-discriminatory taxation "of an article from which the imported
product has been manufactured or produced in whole or in part";70 ii) Article XX(b),
defining "general exceptions", could permit discriminatory taxation in cases where it
was "necessary to protect human, animal or plant life or health".71
With respect to these exceptions raised by the Panel, there would still be some doubt
as to the Panel's interpretation of them. For example, Article 11:2 indicates
exceptions to Article 11:1, but not to Article III. In addition, Article II:2(a) requires
the compliance of the internal tax at issue with Article 111:2. And thus in cases where
any internal taxes were contrary to Article 111:2 the requirements under Article 11:2
would not be fulfilled. Whereas, with respect to the other exception under Article
XX(b), one can note that the Panel has interpreted the requirements for application of
this Article quite narrowly in some Panel reports, and therefore only a few exceptions
have been permitted.72 As a result, judging from such a trend which strictly interprets
69France v. Brazil - Internal Taxes in BISD 2S/181 (1952) at para. 16; the Superfund Taxes
case, supra note 33.
70BISD 34S/83, supra note 47, paras 5.9. and 5.13.
71Ibid.; cf. Note that, unlike the Japan Alcohol-I case, no attempt was made to justify the
inconsistent measure under general exceptions ofArticle XX in the Alcohol-11 case; see also,
infra note 72.
72For an example, see the U. S. - Section 337 of the Tariff Act of 1930 in BISD 36S/345
(1989) which denied applicability of Article XX:(d) of the GATT; Thailand - Restriction on
Importation and Internal Taxes on Cigarettes in BISD 37S/200 (1990) which denied
applicability of Article XX:(b) of the GATT; and for study of recent panel reports involved
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Article XX, it is doubtful whether an exception under this Article is practical
possibility.
4
The Panel found that alcoholic beverages, (i.e. vodka; whisky; grape brandy; fruit
brandy; "classic" liqueurs; still wine; and sparkling wine), should be considered
respectively as "like products" in terms ofGATT Article 111:2 in view of their similar
properties, end-uses and usually uniform classification in tariff nomenclatures.73 In
addition, the Panel supported this finding by stating that such products were
*
recognised by consumers as constituting "... a well defined and single product
intended for drinking".74 It is true that the precedents have defined the range of the
"like products" on a case by case basis after examining a number of related factors.
Furthermore, the criteria for scrutinising "like products" mentioned in the 1970
Working Party Report on Border Tax Adjustments75 were as follows: "the product's
end-uses in a given market, consumers' tastes and habits, and the product's properties,
nature and quality".76 In the present case, the Panel considered all these three criteria
in defining "like products". In addition to them, the Panel also took tariff
nomenclatures, as another criterion, which was based on the previous report.77 To a
certain extent, giving consideration to classifications of tariff nomenclatures would
be effective in defining "like products" because such classifications in tariff
nomenclatures represent recognition of the range of "like products" by a government.
4
Nonetheless, it would be understandable that the Panel's conclusion referred to the
possibility of exceptional circumstances, i.e. different tax treatment of "like products"
as being permissible. For example, there are cases in which different tax treatment of
"like products" is necessary because of considerations of legitimate regulatory
control (i.e. a sovereign issue). In this case, such treatment had nothing to do with
Article XX of the GATT, see Klabbers, Jan., "Jurisprudence in International Law - Article
XX ofGATT - ", 26 J. W. T., No. 2 (1992) at 63.
"BISD 34S/83, supra note 47, para. 5.6.
74BISD 28S/102,112, supra note 64, para. 4.7.
"For "Working Party Report on Border Tax Adjustment" in BISD 18S/102 (1970).
16Ibid., para. 18.




the aim of protection to domestic production. Thus, if such treatment (the different
tax treatment among "like products") was found to constitute a violation of Article
111:2, in spite of necessity based on legitimate reasons (i.e. a non-trade policy), it
9
would amount to an undue interference with a domestic policy of each contract party.
Accordingly, it would be a better alternative to seek an exception under Article III
instead of referring to Article XX78 in order to avoid a charge ofviolation in the case
of different taxation among "like products" with no domestic protective effect and
with GATT lawful reason.
I
(v) Range of "Directly Competitive or Substitutable Products":
According to the interpretative note to Article 111:2, the expression "directly
competitive or substitutable products" is considered to have a wider range than that
of "like products". For instance, in a case in which direct competitiveness or
substitutability is found even among different products, the requirement that it
constitutes "directly competitive or substitutable products" is considered to be
9
fulfilled.79 As for the present case, the Panel concluded that alcoholic beverages,
such as distilled liquors, liqueurs, wines, and sparkling wines, could be considered to
be respectively "directly competitive or substitutable products" in terms of Article
111:2, second sentence. With respect to such a conclusion by the Panel, the legal
basis in which the Panel relied upon was implicit. Nonetheless, it could be assumed
that the Panel was deemed to have considered various consumer habits vis-a-vis •
these products, apart from the competitive inter-relationship and substitutability
respectively within these products.80 In this respect, one could evaluate the fact that




78For an example, see Canada v. the U. S. - Measures Affecting Alcoholic And Malt
Beverages in BISD 39S/206, and also in Pescatore, The Handbook, supra note 2, pp. 217-
223.
79BISD 25S/49, supra note 63, para. 4.3.; for another example, see the U. S. v. Spain:
Measures Concerning Domestic Sale Of Soybean Oil in L/5142 (17 June 1981) and
L/5142/Corr. (22 June 1981), which was not adopted, thus not printed in the BISD. In the
latter case, for instance, skimmed milk and vegetable protein products were considered
"directly competitive and substitutable products" because of substitutability from their end
use viewpoint.
80BISD 34S/83, supra note 47, para. 5.7.
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consideration, was to prevent the possibility of the range of "directly competitive and
substitutable products" growing infinitely.
(vi) Criteria for determining a violation ofGATT Article 111:2, second sentence:
The present case has clarified criteria for determining a violation of Article 111:2,
second sentence, since there had not been any previous cases where this Article
applied. In the present case, the Panel emphasised that Article 111:2, second sentence,
prohibited the application of internal tax to imported or domestic products "so as to
afford protection to domestic production", stipulated in the second sentence of
Article 111:2. Then, the Panel concluded that a violation of Article 111:2, second
sentence would be constituted only when the differential tax among "directly
competitive or substitutable products" was established to cause the effect ofaffording
protection to domestic production considering the particular circumstances of each
*
respective case. Nonetheless, it is noteworthy that the Panel added "if there could be
a fife minimis level below which a tax difference ceased to have the protective effect
. (prohibited by Article 111:2, second sentence".81 In other words, if the level of the tax
. difference was merely a fife minimis, this tax difference would not be deemed to
constitute a violation ofArticle 111:2, second sentence.
Furthermore, the criteria for determining inconsistency with Article 111:2, first
sentence could be more lenient than that for determining a violation ofArticle 111:2,
second sentence. This is simply because a violation of the first sentence of Article
111:2 could be constituted by the mere existence of tax differentials among "like
products" without a de minimis test. Whereas, the determination of a violation of the
second sentence ofArticle 111:2 would be more difficult because of, for instance, the
following reasons. The wording used in the first and the second sentence in this
Article is different. The concept of the phrase "directly competitive or substitutable
products" tended to be interpreted wider in its scope and more extensively than that
of "like products" in the first sentence of Article 111:2. Therefore, for those reasons,
the Panel may have narrowed and restricted cases in which different tax treatment




among "directly competitive or substitutable products" constituted a violation of the
second sentence of Article 111:2, in comparison with cases where different treatment
among "like products" breached the first sentence of Article 111:2. Such
interpretation ofArticle 111:2, second sentence seems to be inconsistent.
The Panel, on the basis of the above interpretation of the second sentence of Article
111:2, then turned to the application of considerable lower internal taxes imposed by
Japan upon shochu than other "directly competitive and substitutable" distilled
liquors, which had trade-distorting effects affording protection to domestic
production of shochu contrary to Article 111:2, second sentence. This conclusion was
based on the following grounds82: (i) the considerably lower specific tax rates on
shochu than on imported distilled liquors and spirits83; (ii) the imposition of high ad
valorem taxes on imported distilled liquors and other spirits, as opposed to the
non-existence of such taxes on shochu; (iii) the fact that shochu was almost
exclusively produced in Japan. Furthermore, the (i) and (ii) grounds are factors
which demonstrated a considerable difference in tax burden between shochu and
other distilled liquors, and (iii) indicated almost all shochu were exclusively domestic
products. Accordingly, it could be recognised that these factors afforded a protected
effect prohibited to domestic products.
In the meantime, however, some points remain to be clarified. For example, are there
any other factors to be considered apart from those two mentioned above, i.e. the
proportion of imported products which bear heavy tax; the existence of a proper
basis explaining differential tax treatment? Moreover, it should be noted that the
Panel did not consider it necessary to examine the quantitative trade effects of the
4
different taxation in order to answer the issue as to whether Japan afforded protection
to domestic products contrary to Article 111:2, second sentence.84
*lIbid.
83See Annex III, BISD 34S/83, supra note 47.
*4Ibid., supra note 82; the Panel, however, took an opposite position in the report of Spain -
Measures Concerning Domestic Sale of Soybean Oil (the U.S. v. Spain - Measures
Concerning Domestic Sale of Soybean Oil, supra note 79) in which the Panel concluded as
follows: it is necessary to consider the adverse trade effect of the regulatory measure on
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(vii) Justification - "Taxation according to tax-bearing ability": .
In the present case, with respect to different tax treatment under the grading system
of whiskies and brandies, and the different tax burden between shochu and other
distilled liquors, Japan argued that the existing tax rates were appropriate and
consistent in terms of the fundamental taxation principle of Japan, that is, "taxation
according to the tax bearing-ability" of the respective consumer.85 The Panel
examined whether these discriminatory or protective taxes were contrary to Article
111:2 or could be justified by Japan's taxation principle, and came to a conclusion that
the GATT did not provide for the possibility of justifying discriminatory or
protective taxes inconsistent with Article 111:2 on the grounds that they had been
introduced for the purpose of "taxation according to the tax-bearing ability" of
A
domestic consumers of imported and directly competitive domestic liquors.86
This Panel's conclusion was based on the following grounds87: (i) the GATT did not
include a provision for such a far-reaching exception, i.e. "taxation according to
tax-bearing ability", to Article 111:2; (ii) the tax differentiation based on "taxation
according to tax-bearing ability of respective consumers" with a view to maintaining
or promoting certain production and consumption patterns could easily distort
price-competition among "like" or "directly competitive" products by creating price
differences and price-related consumer preferences; (iii) a national policy of "taxation
according to tax-bearing ability" relied upon necessarily subjective assumptions
ft
about future competition and inevitably uncertain consumer responses, and did not
necessitate discriminatory or protective taxation of imported products. Furthermore,
"directly competitive or substitutable products" in order to establish a violation of GATT
Article 111:1; and furthermore, if the trade volume of such products concerned were found to
be increasing, in that case, no violation of GATT Article III would be established. In die
end, the interpretation ofArticle III presented in the Panel report on the Spanish case was not
adopted but was noted by the Council (L/5161, 26 June 1981). With regard to the Panel
report of the present case, the Panel seemed to have rejected the inteipretation ofArticle III
made in the Spanish Soybean case. Instead, the Panel clarified that the protective effect of
domestic production was presumed from the degree of tax difference and the proportion of
imported directly competitive products without giving any consideration to an adverse trade
effect in terms of trade volume.




it could be pursued in many other ways in compliance with Article 111:2. It should be
noted that the Panel seems to have prohibited an internal tax policy ("taxation
according to tax-bearing ability").88 Nonetheless, it would not be appropriate for the
Panel to make its own judgement on national tax policy or any kind of national
policy as a general rule because of the sensitivity of sovereignty of the Contracting
Parties. In this regards, it would have been reasonable enough for the Panel to have
referred to the other grounds (i) and (iii) described above. Thus, the Panel could
have avoided that criticism by simply giving those two reasonings.
In September 1995, once again, the EC accompanied by Canada and the U.S.
requested panel investigation under the new WTO concerning Japan's Liquor Taxes
Law ("Shuzihou").89 According to the claimants, Japan's Liquor Tax discriminated
against imports. This recent case will be analysed in the next chapter.
88 This concept is common under Japanese tax laws and therefore Japan repeated the same
argument (taxation according to tax bearing ability) even in the recent second panel on Japan
Alcoholic Beverages case under WTO, see para. 4.152 in WT/DS8/R; WT/DS10/R;
WT/DS11/R (11 July 1996), infra note 89.
89The EU lodged its first complaint with the WTO concerning the suspended case against
Japanese Liquor taxes in die week 18th June 1995; further information can be found in, the
Financial Times, "EU tackles Japan on liquor tax", 21 July 1995 at 4; "EU lodges Japanese
liquor taxes complaint", 26 June 1995 at 3; more articles concerning this issue are, die
Financial Times, "Tokyo under fire over tax rate on spirits", 1 February 1995 at 4; "Brittan to
seek ruling on Japan's spirit taxes", 4 April 1995 at 3; "Scotch whiskey producers take on
Tokyo", 18 May 1994 at 6, "WTO completes legal framework", 29 November 1995 at 5; for
status of trade disputes brought to the WTO (as on 5 October 1995) see, the WTO, WTO
Focus, No. 5, August-September 1995; a joint panel, as provided for in DSU 9,1, was
established at the DSB meeting on 27 September 1995, for the Panel Report of the present
case, WT/DS8/R (Complaints by EC); WT/DS10/R (Complaints by Canada); WT/DS11/R
(Complaints by the U.S.) (11 July 1996); Japan filed an appeal on 8 August 1996, for the




7.1.1.3. The Agriculture Case - Restrictions on Certain Agricultural Products
(United States v. Japan)90
It is necessary to comprehend the nature of agricultural trade under the GATT before
examining the case itself. The GATT provided an exceptional clause, Article
XI:2(c), for granting an exception to general elimination of quantitative restrictions
prescribed in Article XI: 1. Nevertheless, in reality, contracting parties did hot find
any necessity to utilise this exceptional provision. Regulation of the GATT on
agricultural trade, therefore, started losing not only its effectiveness but also its
raison d'etre.91 Bearing the circumstances in mind, this casewill be analysed next.
"Complaint was made on 15 July 1986 (C/M/201), however, under the auspices of GATT
Article XXUI, the initial consultations were held in 1983, three years in advance of the
complaint which was filed in 1986; Japan - Restrictions on Imports of Certain Agricultural
Products, BISD 35S/163-245 (1988) L/6253 (22 March 1988); for the summary of this case
can be found in, Hudec, The Enforcing, supra note 2, pp. 513-533, also in Pescatore, The
Handbook, supra note 2, pp. CS67/1-/6; for a commentary.
9ITo explain this situation, three points should be pointed out. First, with respect to most of
the contracting parties except the U. S., they used to enforce import restrictions (i.e. import
quota) for many agricultural products based on the reason of international payments under
GATT Article XII. Nonetheless, this reason could justify the import restrictions only during
a certain period (i.e., from just after the war until the beginning of the 1960's). With respect
to the case of Japan, it had been permitted to invoke Article XII from 1955, which is the year
when Japan became a contracting party to the GATT, up to 1963.* From the end of the
1950's, due to the sign of recovery of international payments of these contracting parties,
they were unable to invoke Article XII and obliged to abolish import restrictions subject to
Article XI: 1. Nonetheless, in fact, even after their recovery of international payments,
import restrictions remained on a number of agricultural products in those countries.
Furthermore, those import restrictions were enforced without invoking the provision of
exception for agricultural products defined in Article XI:2(c). As a result, these import
restrictions remained in spite of their inconsistency with Article XI: 1, and those restrictions
are named "residual import restrictions".** Moreover, no exporting country brought a case
involving these import restrictions to the GATT dispute settlement procedure despite a
violation of the GATT rules. Why did not exporting countries bring a case to the GATT
dispute settlement procedure for residual import restrictions?
One thing to be pointed out here is that it was unnecessary for the U. S. to invoke the
provision of exemption under Article XI:2(c), because the U.S. had obtained a waiver, in
1955, under the Article XXV with respect to import restrictions of their agricultural products.
Accordingly, the U.S. managed to acquire and protect its national interests. In the meantime,
the influence from the acquirement of a waiver by the U.S. appeared to be losing the
momentum for an elimination of the residual import restriction on agricultural products in
other contracting parties. Furthermore, the other significant factor to be spelled out for the
question was the introduction of a variable levy system by the EC. This system was
recognised as a "grey-area measure" under the GATT and which was introduced in 1962 as
part of Common Agricultural Policy (CAP) of the EC whose purpose was to administer
import restrictions on agricultural products in a different arrangement from import quotas.
Besides these import protections at the border ("Market Access" measures) on agricultural
products, there was a contentious issue between the U. S. and the EC in "export
subsidies"*** for agricultural products, which caused serious damage in the area of
agricultural trade within the framework of the GATT rules initially planned. Bearing these
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Summary ofFacts and Procedure:
In 1986, the United States claimed that import restrictions put into practice by Japan
on 12 agricultural products92 was in violation of GATT Article XI: 1. The violation
of Article XI: 1 can be reasonably alleged because each one of import restrictions
failed to observe, at least one or more of the seven criteria required for an exception
to quantitative restriction to be accepted, as stipulated in Article XI:2(c)(i).93
♦
Eventually, on 27 October 1986, a panel was established at the U.S. request.94 The
4
main issues in the present case were:
-Whether import quotas on certain agricultural products maintained by Japan
could be justified subject to Article XI:2(c)(i).
-Whether Article XI:1 could not be applied to the import monopolies
provided for in Articles XVII and 11:4.
-Whether import restrictions operated through import monopolies could be
justified under the general exceptional provision in Article XX:(d).
-Whether import quotas administrated by Japan where inconsistent with
Articles X and XIII.
circumstances in mind, this case will be analysed.
*For interesting research on the issue of the membership of Japan to the GATT, Akaneya,
Tatsuo., The Problem of Japanese Accession to the GATT - A Case Study in Regime Theory.
University ofTokyo Press, Tokyo, 1992.
**On 16 November 1960, the procedure was approved for dealing with "residual import
restrictions" in B1SD 9S/18-20, and according to this procedure, any contracting parties
maintaining "residual import restrictions" were required to notify lists of all items subject to
those restrictions which were applying contrary to the provisions of the GATT to the
Secretary-General of the GATT.
♦♦♦Regarding the "Export Subsidies", especially two aspects should be considered, which were
major issues of discussion with respect to agriculture at the Uruguay Round: (i) the amount of
money a government spent on export subsidies; and, (ii) the volume of subsidised products
(agricultural products in this particular case) that would be exported.
92The Foodstuffs Control Law ("Shokuryokanrihou") made import quotas of 12 agricultural
items effective in Japan. The twelve agricultural items are: (i) prepared and preserved milk
and cream; (ii) processed cheese; (iii) lactose; (iv) dairy products preparations; (v) starch and
inulin; (vi) glucose and other sugars, sugar products preparations; (vii) fruit puree and pastes,
fruit pulp and certain fruit juices; (viii) prepared and preserved pineapple; (ix) tomato juice,
tomato sauce and ketchup; (x) dried leguminous vegetable; (xi) groundnuts; and (xii)
prepared and preserved bovine meat.
93In advancing this case, there are four cases dealing with Article XI:2(c)(i) of the GATT,
and those cases are as follows: Canadian Import Quotas on Eggs in BISD 23S/91 (1977);
EEC's Programme of Minimum Import Prices, Licences and Surety Deposits for Certain
Processed Fruit and Vegetables in BISD 25S/68 (1979); EEC's Restrictions oh Imports of
Apples from Chile in BISD 27S/98 (1981); the United States' Prohibition of Imports ofTuna





-What are "all relevant elements" in terms of reference to be considered by
the Panel in this case?
Summary of Findings and Conclusions:
In 1988, Japan and the U.S. agreed on measures to implement the panel report.
Japan, therefore, agreed to expand the quotas regarding two products whose
restriction had been found unjustifiable for exemption under Article XI:2(c)(i). At
first, Japan offered to adopt the panel decision concerning ten of the twelve products
at issue excluding dairy products and starch, though, this offer was rejected.9S Japan,
furthermore, gaining support from several governments, disagreed with the decision
by the panel with respect to state trading96 and to perishability.97 In addition, Japan
also expressed the views that the compliance with the decisions on dairy products
and starch would need more time to be implemented.98 Concerning the two issues,
Japan was reluctant to accept the panel's decisions. Japan, after all, had agreed to
partly abolish quotas on dairy products. Nevertheless, in fact, Japan simply increased
quotas on other diary products. Japan took the same action as regards starch, that is,
lowering the tariffquota for com and othermaterials for producing starch.
0
To sum up, Japan merely reduced tariffs on agricultural products which were not in
question in order to make up for the refusal to abolish the quotas on dairy products
and starch." In October 1992, Japan finally agreed with the US that it would
increase the quotas of dairy products and starch for a period of three years. The
reason behind the period of transition of three years proposed by Japan may be found
in the fact that there was an ongoing UR negotiation at that time. A similar reaction
can also be found in the implementation of the panel report on "Parts and
95SR. 43/4 (Meeting of 2 Dec. 1987), SR. 43/6 (Meeting of 3 December 1987) respectively.
96Restrictions on trade imposed through state trading operations are prohibited by Article
XI: 1 and also by the Ad Article of the General Agreement.
97Exceptions of the Article XI :1 are provided in the second paragraph of the same article
(Article XI:2); for this particular case, the criterion of the exception is dealt in Article
XI:2.(c)(i) and the Ad Article on Paragraph 2(c).
98GATT, GATT Activities 199L Geneva, July 1992, at 67.
"Japan stated that complete fulfilment in respect to diary products and starch would have to
suspend until the completion or result of the ongoing Uruguay Round. C/M/247 (Meeting of
6 February 1991).
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Components" by the EC. In general, towards the end of the GATT system, a number
of contracting parties maintained applications of their complaints awaiting the
outcome of then ongoing UR negotiations.
Remarks on the case:
In this case, the GATT panel made an important contribution in its serious attempt to
interpret GATT Article XI:2(c)(i) systematically and furthermore, to identify the
invocation requirements for that exceptional provision. Furthermore, the panel also
made a significant step in the following: first, the present case showed the
«
effectiveness of the GATT substantial rules even as regards agricultural trade in
which the GATT had been undermined, by providing a detailed interpretation of the
exceptional clause under Article XI:2(c)(i);100 second, the case demonstrated that the
GATT dispute settlement procedure could function effectively in order to settle a
dispute even on agricultural products which concerned measures exerting a serious
influence on domestic politics.
. In actual fact, the Panel was able to expose problems and limitations in the provision.
The invocation requirements for the exceptional provision, i.e. Article XI:2(c)(i),
were impractical because any contracting party invoking the provision had to bear in
full the burden of proof for its fulfilment of all the requirements of the provision.101
The provision,. therefore, did not work well as the exceptional provision for
agricultural trade. For example, according to the panel in this case, Japanese import
#
restrictions on dried leguminous vegetable and groundnuts did not meet with the
above requirements.102
,00This case was followed by four similar cases whose issue was Article XI:2(c)(i) of the
GATT, and those cases are: EEC's Restriction on Imports of Dessert Apples (complained by
Chile) in BISD 36S/93 (1990); EEC's Restriction on Imports ofDessert Apples (complained
by the U.S.) in BISD 36S/135 (1990); Canadian Import Restrictions on Ice Cream and
Yoghurt in BISD 36S/68 (1990); Thailand's Restriction on Importation of and Internal Taxes
on Cigarettes in BISD 37S/200 (1991).
l01To illustrate the extreme difficulty anticipated. by contracting parties invoking this
provision, none of the four cases mentioned (see those cases, ibid.) has succeeded in
fulfilling of all those requirements.




In the meantime, the participants of the UR reached the Agricultural Agreement in
December 1993.103 With respect to agricultural products, since the attainment of the
Agricultural Agreement, it can be recognised that the exceptional provision ofGATT
Article XI:2(c)(i) loses its substance which eventually leads to a substantial solution
of the problematic issues of this provision.104 The case, therefore, was not only a
leading case involving agricultural trade but also an aid to the cohesion of the
principle of liberalisation in agricultural trade which was a product of the
Agricultural Agreement of the UR.
In addition, the following may also be noted:
1. With respect to Japan as a "Respondent"
i) Why did Japan insist on the same reason that had been made in the preceding case
between the EC and Hong Kong,105 as one of the arguments in justifying its import
restrictions? In this preceding case, the GATT panel clearly stated that "social and
policy considerations were irrelevant where they conflicted with GATT legal
provisions".106 Furthermore, having experienced the Leather case in 1983, for
example, one could speculate that Japan's argument in referring to "social and policy
considerations" in the present case was perhaps really because of other reasons,
namely, the domestic necessity to improve the national industry in question and/or
the lack of co-ordination among ministries in charge of the preceding and the present
cases.107
103Agreement on Agriculture, Final Act Embodying The Results Of The Uruguay Round
of Multilateral Trade Negotiations (hereinafter "the Agricultural Agreement"), Marrakesh,
15 April 1994.
104According to Article 2 (Product Coverage) and Annex 1 to the Agricultural Agreement,
this Agreement does not apply to fishery products, which means that the provision of Article
XI:2(c)(i) of the GATT remains effective.
l0SReport of panel on EC quantitative restrictions against imports of certain products from
Hong Kong, BISD 30S/129 (1984), supra note 26, para. 28; with regard to the present
agricultural case, BISD 36S/163 (1989), para. 5.4.1.4.; also in Report of panel on Japanese
measures on imports of leather, BISD 31S/94, supra note 4, para. 44; and in Report of panel
on Japanese customs duties, taxes and labelling practices on imported wines and alcoholic
beverages, BISD 34S/83 (1988), supra note 47, para. 5.13.*
i06Ibid., BISD 30S/129, para. 28.
l07For instance, the MITI was responsible for the Leather case, while the MAFF and MOFA




ii) It seems that the GATT dispute settlement procedure has been shifting from a
"pragmatic approach" (or "non-legalistic approach"), which mainly concentrating on
negotiations and conciliations, towards a "legalistic approach" with more emphasis
on impartial rules as happens in adjudication. In this case, the GATT panel
demonstrated a more legalistic approach by applying the provisions of the GATT
strictly to the agricultural trade in which the GATT had been conducting its
pragmatic approach in settling the dispute at issue for a long period.108 Whereas, as
explained, the stance taken by Japan toward this case was still based on a pragmatic
approach, although it was more legalistic than in previous cases to which Japan was a
party.
0
2. With respect to the panel
There are some points on which the panel took a legalistic approach in this case on
the one hand, but also approached pragmatically on the other:
i) The panel did not merely examine the issue of legal consistency with the GATT
rules but also provided the party concerned with guidance concerning the measures to
be adjusted in order to resolve the issues in dispute. For example, despite the seven
criteria to be met in full for invoking the exceptional provisions ofArticle XI:2(c)(i),
the panel actually did make a decision based on the fulfilment of some of those seven
requirements.109 Perhaps, this shows that the panel's decision in this case was made
not only legalistically but also pragmatically.
108This legalistic approach taken by the GATT in this case would be evident in aspects as
follows: its strict interpretation of Article XI:2(c)(i) of the GATT; its stance of no
consideration of the other countries' practices; its exclusion of the uniqueness of Japanese
agriculture, Japan alleged as "other pertinent elements" BISD 35S/163, supra note 90, paras.
5.4.1-5.4.1.5., at 240-242, in an attempt at settlement of disputing issue; the existence of
ongoing negotiations at the Uruguay Round.
109For instance, concerning Miscellaneous Import Quotas of Japan, in spite of the failure to
meet with the requirements designated for the categorised import quotas, the panel continued
its judgement to cover the case whether any other requirement were fulfilled if the
Miscellaneous Import System was abolished because ofminor changes in its administration.
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ii) Are there discrepancies in the rulings made by the panel?:
(a) The panel concluded that Japan was unable to provide evidence for its
import restrictions on dried leguminous vegetable and on groundnuts.
Nevertheless, the panel further concluded that "these two particular products
are otherwise justified under the provision ofArticle XI:2(c)(i)".110
(b) The panel stated that "those import restrictions on the other ten products
are not justified under the exceptional provisions ofArticle XL2(cXi),,in
Judging from the two rulings indicated, onemight infer that the panel made a definite
ruling as to ten agricultural items and indefinite rulings as for other two agricultural
items. One could, therefore, assume that the panel combined a pragmatic and
legalistic approach in arriving at a decision in this case.
iii) The panel examined the propriety of the exceptional provisions under Article
XI:2(c)(i) which had not been invoked by the parties to the dispute. For example, the
panel ruled Article XI: 1 to be also applicable to import monopolies. This panel
decision, therefore, brought into question the propriety of invocation of exceptions
ft
under Article XI:2(c)(i). Subsequently, the panel carried out its examination whether
the items subject to an import quota through an import monopoly and related items
fulfilled the requirements for the exceptional invocation under Article XI:2(c)(i). As
a result, the panel denied the possibility of the matter on the ground that Japan had
not met with the burden of proof as required. Nonetheless, Japan primarily had
asserted inapplicability of Article XI to import restrictions by means of an import
monopoly."2
To sum up, albeit this case left a number of questions unanswered in terms of the
Panel's examination, especially with respect to the area of agricultural trade, it had
made an impact in strengthening the liberalisation of agricultural trade which finally
ll0BISD 3SS/163, supra note 90, para. 6.9, at 245.
"]Ibid„ paras 6.5-6.8, at 244-5.
ll2In fact, Japan had not invoked the exceptional provisions under Article XI:2(c)(i) of the
GATT, at least, as far as prepared and preserved beefproducts are concerned.
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materialised in the Agricultural Agreement at the UR. Overall, since the Panel tried
to approach the issues more legalistically, this case could be recognised as one of the
leading cases dealing with the contentious issue of agricultural trade. While, Japan's
approach at the panel proceedings left questions unanswered. As mentioned, Japan
repeated the same arguments which were used unsuccessfully in the Leather case of
1983. This, as explained earlier, might have occurred because of the fact that
I
different Ministries were in charge in the respective cases, which may have led to a
lack of co-ordination.113 Furthermore, defeat in the present case influenced
substantially Japan's strategy in succeeding cases, in particular, the Beef and Citrus
case ('88) and the Semiconductor Retaliation dispute ('87), which will be examined
later. Thus, the present case became important in the dispute settlement history of
Japan, and therefore should be regarded as one of the essential cases in our case
studies.
»
7.1.1.4. The Semiconductor Case - Restrictions on Semiconductors (European
Community v. Japan)114
Summary of Facts and Procedure:
Since the 1980's, the United States, the largest producer and also exporter of
semi-conductors, had been replaced by Japan in terms of exports. Under such
circumstances, the semi-conductor industry in the U.S. was concerned about the
Japanese closed-market and also about the unfair trade practices conducted by
s
Japanese companies in the U.S. While an anti-dumping investigation was being
conducted by the U.S. Commerce Department (DOC), on 14 June 1985, the United
States Semi-conductor Industry Association (SLA) filed a petition against Japan
under Section 301 of the Trade Act of 1974. As a result of long-running negotiations
*
between Japan and the U. S., the Arrangement concerning Trade in Semi-conductor
ll3See, supra note 107 and infra notes 133 and 138.
1,4 Complaint was made on 20 February 1987 (L/6129); Japan - Trade in Semi-Conductors,
L/6309 (24 March 1988), in BISD 35S/116-63 (1988) (4 May 1988); for the summary of this
case can be found in, Hudec. The Enforcing, supra note 2, pp. 541-542, in Pescatore, The
Handbook, supra note 2, pp. CS68/1-/3; and in Matsushita, Mitsuo., International Trade and
Competition Law in Japan. Oxford University Press, Oxford, 1993, pp. 237-241.
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Products (hereinafter, the "Arrangement") was signed on 2 September 1986.115
After concluding the Arrangement between Japan and the U. S., on 20 February
1987,116 the EC filed a complaint that Japanese measures were contrary to the
GATTs prohibition on quantitative restrictions under Article XI. The primary focus
of the panel was on a prohibition on quantitative restrictions so provided for in
Article XI and also its application to this particular case. The panel also analysed the
nature of the monitoring procedure for third country dumping by the EC. In response
to the questions raised by the EC, Japan merely responded that its measures
practised by the government were "non-legally-binding" administrative guidance.
Semi-conductor exports and production were limited by the business decisions of
private companies.
According to the Arrangement, Japan would monitor the cost and export prices of
semiconductors exported by Japanese producers to overseas markets. These
nsJapan-U.S. Arrangement Concerning Trade in Semiconductor Products, 2 September 1986,
< reprinted in 25 I.L.M. 1409 (1986); the following is an overview of the Arrangement which
consists of three section:
The first section refers to market access, which provides that: (i) the Japanese
government will make efforts to encourage the sales of semi-conductors produced by .
foreign manufacturers in Japan through the establishment of an organisation which
provides various assistances to those foreign manufacturers; (ii) the government of the
U.S: will strengthen its promotion of sale for the U.S. semi-conductor manufacturers;
(iii) there should be full and equitable access available for foreign companies to
patents resulting from government-sponsored research and development; (iv) both
governments should refrain from policies or programmes which motivate inordinate
increases in the capacity of semi-conductor production. (BISD 35S/116, para 13)
The second section dealt with prevention of dumping in the following three
sub-sections; the first one mentions the suspension of all present anti-dumping cases;
the second one stated that the Japanese government will monitor costs and prices on
semi-conductor products exported to the U. S. and that if any monitored product is
being sold or exported at prices lower than the company-specific fair value, the U.S.
government may request consultations immediately, and based on monitoring and/or
consultation, the Japanese governmentwill prevent such exports to the U. S. and other
significant market by taking appropriate actions available under Japanese laws and
regulations; and, the last one deals with the monitoring costs and export prices on the
products exported by Japanese semi-conductor manufacturers to significant markets.
(Ibid., para. 14)
The third section refers to general provisions on the following matters: periodic and
emergency consultations; the conditions for amending and terminating the
Arrangement; a provision, of being in conformity to rights and obligations under the
GATT; and the duration of the Arrangement for five years ending on 31 July 1991.
(Ibid., para. 15)
ll6L/6129, supra note 114.
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arrangements were made possible by the Japanese government through the
introduction of an "administrative guidance" (or "gyoseishido" in Japanese).117 The
Japanese government took the measures to implement the Arrangement.118
ll7For detail explanation of "administrative guidance" ("Gyoseishido") in Japan, see
Matsushita, Mitsuo.. International Trade and Competition Law in Japan. Oxford University
Press, Oxford, 1993, pp. 59-73; Harley, John O., "Administrative Guidance versus Formal
Regulation: Resolving the Paradox of Industrial Policy", in Law and Trade Issues of the
Japanese Economy. Saxonhouse, Gary R. & Kozo Yamamura eds., University of
Washington Press, Seattle, 1986, pp. 107-128.
'"Implementation of the Arrangement by Japan:
(a) Access to the Japanese market (BISD 35S/116, paras. 17 and 18)
The Japanese government requested Japanese major users or purchasers of
semi-conductors to co-operate in increasing the purchase of foreign-based products,
also the MITI organised meetings with the top ten major users of the products in order
to make the same request. In addition, in March 1987, the International
Semi-conductor Co-operation Centre was established and whose main purpose was to
promote the sales of foreign semi-conductors.
(b) Monitoring (Ibid., paras. 20, 21 and 23)
With respect to the monitoring of the export prices of semi-conductors, i.e. the
Director-General of the Machinery and Information Industries Bureau and the
Minister ofMITI, organised meetings with producers and exporters in order to request
that dumping should be avoided. Nonetheless, these requests were not legally binding
but simply a form of general appeal.
The system of export approval for semi-conductors, based on the Foreign Exchange and
Foreign Trade Control Law, was introduced in order to enforce COCOM.* In addition, this
system had been utilised to monitor export prices of semi-conductors since November 1986.
The threshold for shipments of semi-conductors which required export licences was reduced
from one million to five hundred thousand Japanese yen in January 1987. As a result of this
change, the number of applications almost doubled, thus causing delay in the processing of
certain licence applications. In addition to the above factor, in some cases, incomplete
information in applications also caused delay. There was no time limit, whether maximum
or minimum, for processing export licence applications. The time taken to process licence
applications varied from a couple of weeks to several months depending on factors relating
to each case.
*COCOM (Co-ordinating Committee for Export Control) is a voluntary group, whose
headquarters was inside the U.S. Embassy in Paris, and which was set up by the Western
alliance (most ofNATO nations) for the purpose of export controls over strategic goods bound
to the Communist Areas such as the former USSR, China and Eastern European countries. Its
role, however, has been diminished in recent years.
The procedures for the price data collection were established in accordance with Article 67
of the Foreign Exchange and Foreign Trade Control Law, and Article 10 of the Export Trade
Control Order. In cases of failure to report or submission of false reports were liable to a
penalty like servitude not exceeding six months or a fine not exceeding two hundred
thousand Japanese yen. Non-compliance in this regard, however, would not lead to the
denial of export licence or prohibition ofexportation. In case theMITI found cases in which
export prices were "extremely below costs", it would inform such companies of the facts and
of MITTs concern. The MITI did not decide minimum export prices and MITFs
communication to die company were not bound by law. Companies were, therefore,
expected to understand that it was their own self-interest to deter dumping, and to take action
accordingly. The MITI did not take the existence or non-existence of injury in foreign
importing countries into consideration, when watching costs and export prices. The revised
Foreign Exchange and Foreign Trade Control Laws, effective from 10 November 1987,




The details of the legal claim expressed by the EC were:
(1) With respect to export restrictions:
-In spite of the lack of legal compulsion, the procedure formonitoring exports
to discourage exports at dumping prices established that an export restriction
was in violation ofGATT Article XI: 1; (Paras. 49, 51)
w
-Export restriction on dumped exports also constituted violation of GATT
►
Article VI, on grounds that this Article provides importing countries with sole
right to accept or prevent dumping; (Paras. 43,47)
-Delays in obtaining an "automatic" export permission were also considered
to be an export restriction, which consisted of a violation of GATT Article
XI: 1;
f
-The failure to apply an export restriction to the smallest export markets,
violated both the MFN obligation stipulated in GATT Article 1:1 (Article XIII
alternatively) (Para. 56) and the obligation of "commercial considerations" ■
|
under GATT Article XVII:l(c); (Para. 58)
i
-Whether a violation or not, Japanese measures to increase export prices of
important industrial component established a Non-Violation ofNullification
& Impairment ofbasic benefits of trade liberalisation under GATT. (Para. 69)
(2)With respect to import access:
-Japanese measures to improve access to Japanese market were in favour of
U. S. imports, which violated the MFN obligation under GATT Article 1:1.
(Paras. 60,61,63)
export approval frommonitoring as far as semi-conductors were concerned.
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In addition to the above two main measures, i.e. the export monitoring and import
access, Japan's measures lacked transparency, thus violating GATT Article X. (Para.
64)
In response to those assertion by the EC, the Japanese government argued:
(1) With respect to alleged violation of Article VI:
In Article VI, there was no specific provisions to prohibit actions taken to
prevent dumping by exporting countries. On the contrary, anti-dumping
actions conducted by exporting countries were in accordance with the spirit of
the GATT. (Para. 45)
(2) With respect to alleged violation of Article XI:
The monitoring of semi-conductor exports by the Japanese government was
simply for the purpose of checking cost and export prices. Furthermore, such
monitoring was not intended to prohibit or restrict trade, nor did it in practice
result in such. Through monitoring, Japanese companies were encouraged by
the Japanese government to prevent dumping, although this encouragement
was not legally binding by any means. In fact, the companies were expected
to refrain from dumping of their own will. Therefore, such voluntary actions
of the companies were irrelevant to the provisions of Article XI which
stipulated government action. (Para. 50)
In the present case, besides the disputing parties, the U. S."9 and five other interested
countries (Australia,120 Canada,121 Hong Kong,122 Singapore,123 and Brazil124)
submitted individual arguments to the Panel. This is an example of a case which
involves the issue of "co-defendants". Furthermore, in the case of disputes
concerning "grey area" measures125 involving two countries, a complainant normally
|
119For arguments submitted by the U. S., see BISD 35S/116, supra note 114, paras. 72-82.
120For Australia's arguments, see ibid., paras. 84-86.
12lFor Canada's arguments, see ibid., paras. 87-89.
l22For Hong Kong's arguments, see ibid., paras. 90-92.
,23For Singapore's arguments, see ibid., paras. 93-94.
I24For Brazil's arguments, see ibid., para. 95.
12SThe legality of this trade actions is not clearly addressed in the GATT rules. Those
actions, for instance, include Voluntary Export Restraint Agreements (VRAs) and Orderly
Marketing Agreements (OMAs). The issue of grey-area measures closely links with
"safeguards" issue (see, for example, GATT Article XIX, XII, XVIII); cf. Under the
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makes a complaint against one of the countries which is required to introduce such
measures due to its weaker position in a political scene between them. A country
(the U.S.), which requested the other country (Japan) to adopt such measures, can
only participate in a case as a third party at a panel procedure, which remains the case
under WTO.126
0
Summary ofFindings and Conclusions:
Finally, in 1988, the panel arrived at a decision: Article XI: 1 applied broadly to any
0
measures including non-mandatory governmental measures that had similar effects;
the panel examined measures not just as regards its legal status but as to the
substance of the Japanese government's action; the monitoring procedure, although
non-legal-binding administrative guidance, met with criteria being whether the
measures created incentives for the relevant businesses to observe restrictive policies
and also whether the measure was necessary for the efficacious implementation of a
restrictive policy; national measures adopted in order to prevent dumping did not
justify export restrictions contrary to Article XI: 1; Article VI did not prohibit actions
taken by exporting countries to restrict dumping; excessive delays such as up to three
months in issuing exporting licences resulting from the system ofmonitoring of costs
and export prices of semi-conductors were thus in contravention of Article XI: 1;
Japanese measures concerning restrictions of semi-conductors exports to overseas
markets were found to be inconsistent with Article XI: 1, and were considered to have
nullified and impaired benefits accruing to the EC under the GATT. Furthermore,
the panel also referred to the 1987 panel decision of administrative guidance
concerning a Japanese agricultural import restriction.127
Agreement on Safeguards Article 11 (b), the "grey area" measures are prohibited.
,26Cf. Article 4.11 of the DSU (Joint Consultation); for example, see India v. Turkey dispute
over Turkey's restrictions on imports of textile and clothing products (WT/DS34). Earlier,
India had requested to be joined in the consultation between Hong Kong and Turkey on the
same subject matter (WT/DS29). Hong Kong reserved its third-party rights along with four
other member states at the DSB meeting on 13 March 1998 when it established a panel.
l27See BISD 35S/163, supra note 90.
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As a result, Japan was required to alter its monitoring system concerning the export
and sale of semi-conductors in conformity with the requirements of the GATT. In
1989, the Japanese government changed the monitoring system so as to meet the
9
9
requirements of the panel report.128 In 1990, Japan and the EC reached an agreement
by which Japan agreed to sustain minimum export prices on semi-conductors for the
EC market.129
Remarks on the case:
In the case of ordinary VRA, exporting countries merely restrain export prices and
export volume of products for their counterparts, whereas in the case of the
Arrangement (between Japan and the U.S.) at issue, the provisions provided for an
increase in the market share of semi-conductors originating in foreign countries in
the Japanese market, and also for restrictions to the export prices of semi-conductors
destined for third countries. Needless to say, many countries demonstrated great
concern over the present case concerning the Arrangement between Japan and the U.
S. and many of them, in fact, reserved the right to make submissions to the Panel. In
the following, two main findings with respect to Article XI: 1 and Article VI: 1 in the
Panel report are analysed:
(1) With respect to GATT Article XI: 1
<
In the Panel report, there are three points to be noted in terms ofArticle XI: 1. First,
the issue of whether prevention of exports below specific prices would constitute
i
"prohibitions or restrictions" of exportation under Article XI: 1. Second, the issue
whether the measures taken should be legally mandatory. The last point is that if the
measures are non-mandatory, what sort of non-mandatory measure would be
128For commentary on this case, Amelia Porges, (International Decisions) "GATT Dispute
Settlement Panel", 83 Am. J. Int'l. L. (1989) pp. 388-394; Prendergast, James W., "The
European Economic Community's Challenge to the U. S. - Japan Semiconductor
Arrangement", 19 Law & Pol'y Int'l Bus (1987), pp. 579-601; Kingery, John C., "The U. S. -
Japan Semiconductor Arrangement and the GATT: Operating in a Legal Vacuum", 25 Stan.
J. Int'l L. (1989), pp. 467-497; for relevant study see Long, William J., "The U. S. - Japan
Semiconductor Dispute: Implication for U. S. Trade Policy", 13 Md. J. Int'l L & Trade
(1988), pp. 1-37.
,29Commission Regulation (EEC) 165/90 (23 January 1990) OJ. No. L20/5. (Export restraints
involved in antidumping settlements are implicitly authorised by MTN Antidumping Code.)
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regarded as measures within the definition of Article XI: 1? Further analyses
regarding each item follows:
i) In making its finding with respect to the first issue, the Panel did not differentiate
import and export restrictions. The Panel referred to a previous case130 whereby the
import of a product priced below a minimum price level constituted a restriction on
importation within the meaning of Article XI: 1. The Panel then applied the same
P
standards to restriction on exports below certain prices. According to the same
principle established by the Panel, this norm could apply to the restraint of export
volume, and perhaps the ordinary VER could be prohibited because of its
inconsistency with Article XI: 1.
ii) As mentioned earlier, the Panel confirmed that Article XI:1 would apply to any
measures which restricted exports, regardless of the legal status of the measures.
*
According to the Panel, Article XI: 1, unlike other provisions of the GATT, did not
refer to law or regulation but to measures in a broader sense.131 Accordingly, the
Panel concluded that systematic monitoring along with the utilisation of supply and
I
demand forecasts constituted a coherent system what restricted the sale for export of
semi-conductors at prices below specified cost to the company, inconsistent with
Article XI: 1.132 Judging from the wording and the objectives of this Article, it
seemed reasonable that the Panel made its conclusion with emphasis on the actual
effect of the measures at issue.
Furthermore, the Panel referred to a precedent which may be of extra assistance in
examining the measures at issue. The case133 cited by the Panel related to restrictions
0
on imports of certain agricultural products maintained by the Japanese government.
With respect to this citation, it is interesting to note that, unlike an ordinary citation
that merely refers to the gist and source of the case, a detailed reference was made
consequently, to the arguments between the complaining party and Japan. Then, the
130See, EEC - Programme of Minimum Import Prices, Licences and Surety Deposit for
Certain Processed Fruit and Vegetables in BISD 25S/99.
I3IBISD 35S/116, supra note 114, para 106.
mIbid.9 para. 132, A.




Panel supported Japan's contention and concluded that the "administrative guidance"
» I
in the special circumstances prevailing in Japan could be regarded as "governmental
measures" enforcing supply restriction.134 Here, it is worth noting that the panel
procedure of the Agricultural Products case coincided with the present Panel, the
Panel report on the former135 being adopted just before the adoption of the latter
case.136 Presumably, such an exceptionally detailed reference to another panel report
might have been made because of the fact that contradictory arguments137 were made
by the Japanese government on the same issue (i.e. the legal nature of "administrative
guidance") in the two different Panel proceedings. Did that contradiction have any
impact on this Panel decision? Whether the answer is "yes" or "no", one finds it
necessary to explain the Japanese strategy at the panel proceedings. One possible
reason might be that there had been a lack of co-ordination in the Japanese
government due to an inter-ministerial rivalry.138 On this assumption, the Ministry of
Agriculture, Forestry and Fisheries (MAFF) in consultation with the Ministry of
Foreign Affairs (MOFA) was in charge of the Agricultural products case; while the
MITI, normally acting independently in dealing with disputes, was in charge of the
present case. This could be one of the reasons why Japan made such contradictory
arguments at the two different panel proceedings, which is less than ideal in terms of
strategy.
iii) With respect to the third point, i.e. the Panel requested that two criteria be met in
order that non-mandatory measures be regarded as measures within the meaning of
Article XI: 1. Those essential criteria were: (1) there were reasonable grounds to
♦
believe that sufficient incentives or disincentives existed for non-mandatory
measures to go into effect; (2) the operation of the measures to restrict export of
l34BISD 35S/116, supra note 114, para. 107
I352 February 1988 (C/M/217).
I3fi4 May 1988 (C/M/220).
I3?See, the two different explanation for governmental measures (i.e. "administrative
guidance") in Japanese contention: for "Non-binding" one, ibid,, paras. 50, 54, 107 and 109;
for the "Binding" one, BISD 35S/163, supra note 90, paras. 3.2.6. and 5.2.2.2.
138See, Matsushita, Mitsuo., and Thomas Schoenbaum, Japanese International Trade and
Investment Tokyo University Press, Tokyo, 1989 at pp. 24-25 in Jackson, John H., W. J.
Davey and Alan O. Sykes, Jr., Legal Problems of International Economic Relations
[hereinafter, the "Int'l Econ. Relations"]. 3rd ed., West Publishing Co., St. Paul, Minnesota,




semi-conductors was essentially dependent on action or intervention of the
government.139
With regard to criterion (1), the Panel considered that this criterion was satisfied by
circumstances140 such as, the negotiation process between Japan and the U.S. and the
Japanese policy statement then made. The Panel, however, considered that these
circumstances were, of themselves, insufficient to ensure compliance.141 Therefore,
further governmental measures were required to ensure compliance.
The Panel then moved on to consider criterion (2) and concluded, based on all the
factors142 (e.g. the Japanese government's own description of its measures as provided
to the U.S. in its Position Paper of April 1987, the structure and elements of the
measures adopted by the Japanese government, the operation of the supply and
ft
demand forecast compiled by the Japanese government) that an administrative
structure had been created by the Japanese government which operated to exert
maximum pressure on the private sector to cease exporting at below costs specified -
by a company.143 In the process of confirming the existence of the second criterion,
what was important was that the Panel took considerable much account of a series of
concerted actions and measures taken by the Japanese government. Although the
Japanese government repeated its contention as to its consistency with Article XI: 1
and its intention to prevent dumping; no Japanese measures were in fact restrictions
under Article XI: 1 due to their failure to be legal binding or mandatory. The export
restraint of semi-conductors below company-specific cost was initiated by the
companies through a voluntary decision. It, therefore, would not make sense to
discuss each action or measure taken by the Japanese government, because it was
obvious that the Japanese government intended to restrict the export of
9
semi-conductors destined for third countries to below company-specific cost and
furthermore, the same objectives were shared by a series of actions and measures
taken by the Japanese government.
,i9Ibid., para. 109.






Besides the above explanation for conformity with criterion (2), the "administrative
guidance" of Japan should be mentioned briefly. It is essential to identify the nature
of Japanese administrative guidance and to ascertain whether it applied to "other
measures" under Article XI: 1. In general, the Japanese administrative guidance was
understood to be guidance, recommendation, or non-legal by binding advice.
Exceptionally, administrative guidance of a mandatory nature can be also noted
amongst the rights available to the competent governmental authorities to accomplish
their administrative policy objectives. For example, the Automobile Voluntary
«
Export Restriction to the United States144 was clarified by theMITI to be a restriction
that was, in practice, as a whole a mandatory measure despite the fact that the
company-specific volume of exports was decided by administrative guidance. In
cases where the guidance was not complied with, the MITI could consider invoking
mandatory action under the Export Trade Control Order. Additionally, as mentioned
above, non-mandatory administrative guidances can be recognised, for instance, in
guidance for the establishment of a trade association.
An administrative guidance in Japan is still an effective and important policy tool for
the Japanese government although its effectiveness has decreased to a certain degree, .
compared with previous decades, and in this respect, a few factors145 could be given
response to the question:
First of all, the wide usage of "administrative guidance"146 in Japan is explicable
because it is supported by the extensive authority of administrative approval reserved
to the governmental authorities. Secondly, the wide scope of powers retained by the
*
governmental authorities and broad discretion of the Japanese courts in choosing to
,44For further explanation, see in Matsushita, M., supra note 114, pp. 235-6; A number of
important trade issues raised between Japan and other major trading countries have been
resolved through Voluntary Export Restraints (VERs) despite criticisms against them, and in
that sense, they played an important role in settling trade disputes before reaching to GATT;
for the purpose of VERs in the case of Japan, there are mainly two reasons, see, infra note
149.
I45See the observation on administrative guidance by Professor Matsushita, ibid., pp. 67-69.
l46The definition of "administrative guidance" was expanded in the recent Panel report on
Japan - Measures Affecting Consumer Photographic Film and Paper [hereinafter, the "Japan
Film"], WT/DS44/R (31 March 1998), paras. 6.92-6.96 and 10.43-10.56; read in general




grant approval, ensured a strong incentive for those who received such administrative
guidance to abide by it. Thirdly, the attitude of the Japanese business community, in
general, is to welcome, with a degree of obedience or submissiveness, administrative
guidance constructively. Such a positive stance taken by the Japanese companies is
necessary because of benefits provided by the administrative guidance such as,
control over excessive competition, maintenance of order within the industrial
community, and evasion of responsibility, etc. Finally, in the case of trade conflicts
with other countries, it is essential for Japanese companies to have assistance from
the Japanese government. For example, if a Japanese company, which was unduly
discriminated against in another country, wants to pursue this foreign country under
the GATT rules, it needs to seek the involvement of the Japanese government and
request appropriate actions accordingly (i.e. diplomatic protection applies in case of
international trade dispute under the GATT/WTO system).
It is therefore important for the Japanese business community to maintain a sound -
relationship with the Japanese government. In addition, successful accomplishment
of administrative objectives set by the Japanese government have been achieved
through mutual respect and positive co-operation between the Japanese government
and business community. Further, in Japan, the effectiveness and efficiency of
administrative guidance has been established and has been functioning well. Hence,
Japanese administrative guidance could be reasonably deemed as an illustration of
restriction through "other measures" stipulated in Article XI: 1 at issue.
(2) With respect to GATT Article VI: 1
The Panel found that Article VI did not provide a justification for measures
restricting the exportation or sale for export of a product which was inconsistent with
>
Article XI: 1.147 The EC's contention was that the Article VI provision gave an
exclusive right of preventing dumping to importing countries. The Panel, however,
noted that Article VI provided importing countries with the right to levy
anti-dumping duties subject to specific conditions.148 Here, it may be noted that the
147BISD 35S/116, supra note 114.
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Panel did not refer to the actions taken by the exporting country. It might be the case
that the Panel have intentionally avoided giving a precise finding on this point at
issue.
As the Panel already noted, the only permissible anti-dumping measures provided for
in Article VI is to levy anti-dumping duties in specific conditions subject to
consistency with Article XI: 1. Accordingly, no countries, whether importing
countries or exporting, can take any actions if these are inconsistent with Article
XI: 1. Therefore, one could assume, based on the fact that no actions by exporting
countries are mentioned under Article VI, that it may be reasonable to draw a
4
conclusion that any actions taken by exporting countries that would be inconsistent
%
with other provisions of the GATT could not be justified by Article VI, even if such
actions were taken for antidumping purposes. In addition, this conclusion could be
reflected in the provision of Article VI:1 whereby "...the dumping, ..., is to be
condemned if it causes •or threatens material injury to an established industry in the
territory ofa contractingparty or materially retards the establishment ofa domestic
industry". Furthermore, the GATT defined anti-dumping action as a measure of
'exception' and 'remedy' and it also, in principle, gave priority to examining the abuse
of the right to levy anti-dumping duties. Accordingly, it would be difficult to
interpret this provision so as to extend the right of taking an anti-dumping action to
exporting countries (Japan in the present case).149
To sum up, there are three significant points to be noted in this Panel report. These
points are: 1) whether the bilateral agreement of voluntary restriction on exports
establishes a breach of provision of GATT Article XI; 2) whether an administrative
guidance (non-legal binding) is inconsistent with the provision of GATT Article
mIbid., para 121.
149The justification ofVERs made by Japan were based upon two points: (i) the prevention of
Anti-Dumping measures; (ii) the avoidance of unilateral measures (mainly the U.S. Section
301), which were reiterated even in the first report on Japan after the present panel, see the
Council Minutes of Meeting on Trade .Policy Review Mechanism: Japan, C/RM/M/8 (8
October 1990), Section II. Introductory Remarks by the Representative of Japan, paras.
16,17 and 145; Note that regarding Japan's justification of VERs listed above under (ii), one
should recall the consistent line in Japanese submission to the UR negotiations on DS, i.e.
Japan insisted upon the prohibition ofunilateral actions (mainly targeted the US Section 301)
and finally its strong request (along with the EC's and others) became Article 23 of the DSU.
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XI: 1; and 3) the nature of GATT Article VI - differences appeared between Japan
and the U. S. on one hand and the EC on the other. The foliowings are comments for
each of the aspects listed in the Panel report:
1) The most significant matter dealt with in this Panel report was the question of
whether the bilateral agreement of voluntary restriction on exports constituted a
contravention of the provision of Article XI.150 The Panel found that the voluntary
restriction on the export ofproducts, in particular, the one destined for third countries
was in violation of the GATT. It is more unlikely to find a disputing issue
concerning the VER between the signatories of the bilateral agreement. Nonetheless,
in this Panel report, the Panel indicated that the same grounds for its finding could
also be applied to the voluntary restriction on trade between the signatories of the
bilateral agreement. It would therefore be noteworthy to recognise that if the
voluntary restriction under the bilateral agreement involved third countries' interests,
a violation of the GATT would be constituted by the voluntary restriction. It should
be mentioned that the GATT legality of voluntary restrictions (also of other
n
variations such as export restrains, agreement, and arrangement) has been discussed
in the last few decades within the GATT framework. Recently, in particular, the UR
negotiations has achieved some significant progress to regulate the actions through
voluntary restrictions ("grey-area measures" in general), which can be found in the
WTO Agreement on Safeguards.151
l50"Under the GATT obligations, many and probably most of the so-called export restraint
arrangements are more than likely inconsistent with the obligations ofGATT" in Jackson, J.,
The World Trading System [hereinafter, the "Trading System - 2"], 2nd ed., The MIT Press,
Massachusetts, 1997, at 205.
lslFor example, Article 11.1(b) of the Agreement on Safeguards stipulates "Prohibition and
Elimination ofCertain Measures", which states "...a Member shall not seek, take or maintain
any voluntary export restraints, orderly marketing arrangements or any other similar
measures on the export or the import side". The WTO Agreement, therefore, prohibits the
grey-area measures; see also Article 11.2 which prescribes the timetable for phasing out of
those special measure as referred to in the para. 1(b) above: "...all measures ... to be phased
out or brought into conformity with the [Agreement on Safeguards] within ...four years after
the date ofentry into force ofthe WTO Agreement*'. Nevertheless, one exception is allowed
for each importing member, which must be mutually agreed between members concerned
and notified to the Committee on Safeguards within 90 days of the entry into force of the
WTO Agreement. This exception, to which the EC is entitled until 31 December 1999 [the
"commercial consensus"* on passengers cars, off road vehicles, light commercial vehicles,
light trucks (up to 5 tonnes), and the same vehicles in wholly knocked-down form (CKD
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2) Concerning the second point, the Panel also make it clear that non-legal binding
action such as "administrative guidance", under certain circumstances, could be
inconsistent with the provision of Article XI:1.152 The main issue here was whether
the actions taken by the Japanese government to implement the Arrangement signed
between Japan and the U. S. contravened "restrictions on the exportation or sale for
✓
export" stipulated in Article XI.153 As one can note from the wording "... the Panel
noted that Article XI: 1..., did not refer to laws or regulations but more broadly to
measures"154 in the Panel report, the Panel emphasised the effect of the actions taken
by the Japanese government, namely, an "export restriction", rather than the legal
status of that action itself. It could, therefore, be reasonable to say that the way the
Panel examined the action (i.e. "administrative guidance") taken by the Japanese
government was to focus on its "effect". Accordingly, the Panel raised a significant
question concerning the significance of administrative guidance to the Japanese
government and its importance in enforcing government policies.
3) In the present panel, the EC presented an argument as to the nature of Article VI,
which was noteworthy. The EC argued that Article VI did not condemn dumping
itself but imposed limits on potential for the taking measures to counteract dumping
and subsidisation.155 However, Japan and the U. S. disagreed with the EC's argument
and they contended that, according to the EC, the importing country had the right to
purchase a limitless amount of product at low prices, a right which GATT did not
ensure.156 Generally speaking, although the EC's interpretation of Article VI was
sets)] is indicated in the Annex to the Agreement on Safeguards [*The "commercial
consensus" was notified to the GATT, see L/6922 (16 October 1991)]; for further reading on this
issue, see Jackson, J.H. et al.. Int'l Econ. Relations, supra note 138, Section 13.3, pp. 643ff;
Jackson, J.H.. The Trading Svstem-2. supra note 150, Chapter 7, pp. 175-211; Nuzum, Janet
A, "The Agreement on Safeguards: U.S. Law Leads Revitalisation of the Escape Clause" in
Stewart, Terence P. (ed.L The World Trade Organisation - The Multilateral Trade
Framework For the 21st Century and U.S. Implementing Legislation [hereinafter, the
"WTO], American Bar Association, Washington, DC, 1996, Chapter Eleven, pp. 407-437;
Petersmann, E.-U., "Grey Area Measures and the Rule of Law", 22 J.W.T.L., No.2, (1988),
pp. 23-44.
l52See, ibid., the Japan Film case (WT/DS44/R), supra note 146, paras. 6.99 and 10.54 -
10.56.





more commonly accepted, in practice, an individual country takes recourse to
anti-dumping measures based on its domestic law which regards dumping as a
distortion of trade. Moreover, under such justification, anti-dumping measures work
as a substitute safeguard measures. This issue is one of the more contentious issues
of the GATT, which has been negotiated at each round but has remained unresolved.
It would be useful for Japan as one of the popular targets ofanti-dumping proceeding
to examine the EC's allegations mentioned above for future cases. Furthermore, with
the assistance of the newly established system of WTO, Japan certainly would be
able to follow a different policy with legal security as provided for in the WTO
Agreement on the issue of trade disputes. Japan, therefore, should not yield as much
as previously to political pressure imposed by other countries. Perhaps, through
lessons from the present case, Japan might have thought that it should not take a
bilateral approach but be multilateral in its approach to settling trade disputes.
To summarise the significance of the present case in terms of Japan's policy on the
trade dispute settlement system:
t
First, not following the conventional pattern, the EC made a claim in the Japan-U.S.
Semiconductor Arrangement. Japan, in fact, did not expect such a claim from the EC
because, as had happened before, Japan thought that the EC would be silent so long
as was offered some concessions.157 Second, the GATT panel, for the first time,
ruled on the issue of VRAs (Voluntary Restraint Arrangements), the prevention of
dumping, and finally denied their legality in accordance with GATT rules.158
Although, Japan was defeated, this bitter experience indeed became an important
experience in the history of Japanese dispute settlement of GATT/WTO. The lesson
which Japan learnt from this case among others is that the period of "bilateralism" is
over. For this reason, one should note the significance of the present case in Japan's
ft
DS history ofGATT/WTO.
lS6Ibid., paras. 71 and 75.
,57An interview with aMITI official, June 1998, Geneva.
,ssAfter the UR negotiations, VRAs and other "grey-area measures" are explicitly prohibited
as prescribed in Article 11 on the WTO Agreement on Safeguards; see supra note 151.
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7.1.1.5. The SPF Case - Imports of Spruce-Pine-Fir (SPF) Dimension Lumber
(Canada v. Japan)159
Summary of Facts and Procedure:
Canada made a complaint against Japan that the products, namely, "Spruce-Pine-Fir
(SPF)" dimension lumber, were "like products" to the dimension lumber made from
other wood species. Canada alleged that the tariff of 8 per cent on imports of SPF
imposed by Japan constituted a violation of equal treatment principle under GATT
Article 1:1. The main issue in this case was whether the "like product" concept
4
precluded a tariffdistinction according to specific wood species. Japan had imported
dimension lumber as home construction materials from both Canada and the United
4
States for some time. The key point, however, was that Japan granted a zero tariffon
dimension lumber made of hemlock-fir, which was mainly exported from the U. S.,
whereas Japan imposed an 8 per cent tariff on SPF which came from Canada. The





-A dimension lumber made from SPF and that made from non-SPF are like products
. under the meaning of Article 1:1; the existence of a difference in the application of
tariff rates between those two lumbers was in consistent withMFN under GATT.
-The dimension lumber produced by Canada is mainly SPF (which bears on 8 per
*
cent tariff), whereas the U.S. production is mainly non-SPF dimension lumber (on
which is imposed a zero tariff), thus the U.S. was more competitively advantaged in
the export of dimension lumber to Japan, and Canada was in a disadvantageous
position in the Japanese market; the discriminatory application of the Japanese duty
treatment of SPF dimension lumber had brought about a negative impact on
Canadian exports.
,59Complaint was made on 18 November 1987 (L/6262).




-Japan contended that SPF and non-SPF dimension lumber could not be deemed as
*
like products as argued by Canada, and that the different application of tariff duties
was not intended to discriminate against Canadian dimension lumber in favour of
imports ofdimension lumber from other countries.
%
Summary of Findings and Conclusions:
The Panel considered it essential to identify the GATT principles on tariff structure
and classification in order to understand the Canadian complaint. According to the
preceding panel, the General Agreement left wide discretion to the contracting parties
with regard to the structure of national tariffs and classification of goods within the
framework of such structures.161 Since the Japan's adoption of the Harmonised
System (hereinafter, the "HS"), a tariff classification going beyond the HS structure
was legitimate, as long as such tariff differentiations were not used in such a way that
was conducive to discrimination among like products originating in different
contracting parties.162 Then, the Panel stated that the tariffs referred to by the General
Agreement were those of the individual contracting parties, therefore it followed that
if a claim of likeness was raised by a contracting party in relation to the tariff
9
treatment of its goods on importation by some contracting party, such a claim should
be based on the classification used in the importing country's tariff.163
The Panel noted in this respect that "dimension lumber" as defined by Canada (i.e. an
exporting country) was extraneous to the Japanese Tariff. It was a standard applied
by the Canadian industry which appeared to have some equivalents in the U.S. and in
Japan itself, but it could not be considered for that reason alone as a category for
tariff classification purposes, nor did it belong to any customs classification accepted
internationally.164
16lSee, the report of the Panel on Tariff Treatment of Unroasted Coffee, BISD 28S/102 at
para. 4.4.






The Panel, therefore, concluded that reliance by Canada on the concept of dimension
lumber was an inappropriate basis for establishing "likeness" of products under
GATT Article I:1.,6S The Panel concluded this case by stating that is "...could not
establish that the tariff treatment ofCanadian dimension lumber applied by Japan ...
was inconsistent with Article 1:1 of the General Agreement"™6 and was in favour of
Japan. On 19 July 1989, a Panel report was adopted.167 In the meantime, Canada
announced memorandum which expressed its disagreement with the legal
conclusions arrived at by the panel.168
Remarks on the case:
The present case illustrated the question of definition and interpretation of "like
products", which was, a complex issue to deal with. In this case, the Panel did not
agree with the concept of "dimension lumber" asserted by Canada, as a category of
universal or internationally accepted tariff application, and granted priority to the
autonomy and originality of the tariff classification of the importing country (Japan
in this case).169 It is interesting to note that this case became Japan's first as well as1
only experience of a favourable decision at the GATT Panel despite the fact that
Japan had been involved as a respondent under the procedure provided for in GATT
Article XXIII:2.170
165Ibid.
l66Ibid., supra note 162, para. 6.1.
,67C/M/235.
,68L/6S28 (20 June 1989).
169Ibid, supra note 162, paras. 5.8 and 5.9.
l70This pattern of result (Japan won in a case in which Japan was involved as a respondent) is
rare according to the analyses conducted by Professor Hudec, that is, it is more likely to have
positive outcomes if a country involves in a dispute as a "Claimant", see Hudec, Robert., The
Enforcing, supra note 2, Chapter 11 (A Statistical Profile of GATT Dispute Settlement
Cases: 1948-1989), pp. 273 ff; Note that since the introduction ofWTO system, Japan once
again experienced its victory, as the same pattern as the SPF case, in Japan Film case
(WT/DS44) whose report was adopted by the DSB on 22 April 1998. In addition, there are a
few more cases in which Claimant lost a case, for instance: Brazil-Measures Affecting
Desiccated Coconut (complained by Philippines) in WT/DS22/R (17 October 1996) and in
WT/DS22/AB/R (21 February 1997); EC-Measures Affecting Importation of Certain Poultry
Products (complained by Brazil) in WT/DS69/R (12 March 1998); EC-Customs
Classification of Certain Computer Equipment (complained by the U.S.) in WT/DS62/AB
(circulated to Members on 5 June 1998) which reversed the Panel decision [i.e. the
complainant's victory (the U.S.) against the EC]; and Guatemala - Anti-Dumping
Investigation Regarding Portland Cement from Mexico, WT/DS60/AB/R (2 November
1998) which also reversed the Panel decision [i.e. the claimant's victory (Mexico) against the
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In the panel proceedings, Japan demonstrated two points of significance which
should be noted. First, Japan disputed the concept of "like products" based on one of
the GATT practices, including the GATT's drafting history (i.e. the fact that it was
generally recognised that the term "like products" had different meanings within the
different contexts of different articles of the GATT).171 Indeed, contracting parties
often referred to the drafting history of GATT at panel proceedings.172 In this
respect, Japan's contention based on the drafting history was reasonable to support its
argument under GATT.
Second, Japan made a persuasive contention concerning Canada's view on "tariff
sub-classification and the stability of concessions" based on the existing practice of
tariff negotiation within the framework of GATT. Namely, Japan argued that what
was unacceptable to it was the "sub-classification" of Japan's tariff classification
attempted by Canada, and the comparison for likeness of some of the products (i.e.
lumber) in different Japan's tariff classifications chosen by the complainant (i.e. the
exporting country).173 Canada maintained that SPF and non-SPF dimension lumber
are like products despite the fact that there was neither a clear definition nor
international standardisation of dimension lumber. However, Canada so decided
simply by selecting similar elements of these products. According to Canada's
contention, the dimension lumber could be made from any species of coniferous trees
as finished products with emphases on end-use criteria.
Nonetheless, Japan found this Canadian approach a "compulsory sub-classification".
Japan, furthermore, asserted that attempts to determine "likeness" ofproducts in an a
9
priori manner, with inadequate consideration to tariff classification, would cause
Guatemala].
171See, the drafting history and interpretation of "like products" in, ibid, para. 3.31; "the
expression had different meaning in different contexts of the Drafting Charter" in UN-:
EPCT/C.II/65 at 2; EPCT/CJI/PV/12 at 7 (1946); EPCT/C.II/36 at 8 (1946);
E/CONF.2/C.m/SR.5 at 4 (1947); GATT/CP/4/39 at para. 8; IC/SR. 9 at 2 (1953) and
BISD 2SS/49-53 and BISD 28S/92-98); the term "like products" can be found in several
GATT articles, i.e. I, II, III, VI, IX, XI, XIII and XVI.
,72For the issue of interpretation ofGATT/WTO law, see, Chapter 5 of the present thesis.
mIbid,t supra note 162, para. 3.34.
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confusion in existing tariff classification system and also in the context of tariff
negotiations in accordance with tariff position set by the GATT system.174 Japan
argued that if an introduction of tariff sub-classification based on "end-use" criteria
was allowed to be treated as like products under GATT, one could make a similar
assertion with regard to any tariff item and many nations' tariff schedules would be
found to be in violation ofArticle I.175
0
Japan therefore feared that any moves to introduce tariff sub-classifications based on
"end-use" criteria, would have the result that negotiators, when considering a
concession-request on a given tariff position, would have to examine for "likeness"
with the product covered by the requested position, with all other products covered
under any other tariff position, and if there existed such "like" products, the
negotiators would then have to decide whether or not they would be in a position to
grant the concession, bearing reciprocal obligations in mind.176 If such a situation
were to happen, negotiations on tariff concessions might be overly complicated, and
its operation would certainly be difficult.
The Panel, in principle, supported Japan's contention which was based on the existing
practice of tariff negotiation under GATT. The Panel indicated its stance by stating
that it is "... impossible to appreciate fully the Canadian complaint if it had not in a
preliminary way clarified the bearing of some principles of the GATT system in
relation to tariffstructure and tariffclassification".177 Nonetheless, this case invited
a number of objections and discussions over the findings of the Panel. The present
case left room for further analysis concerning the issue of the relationship between
the obligation ofArticle 1:1 and tariff structure and classification.
The meaning of the present case could be summarised:
•9
mIbid.> para. 3.31.





Victory for Japan was an anomaly, Japan being involved as a respondent. Notably,
Japan followed a rule-oriented approach throughout the panel proceedings. One may
assume Japan must have gained some confidence in utilising GATT rules especially
after this case (which came after its experience of a series of defeats in major cases
during that decade). Accordingly, this case could be regarded as one of the earliest
key cases which offered Japan another prospect of success in settling trade disputes.
In other words, the present case was a prelude to Japan's new policy on trade dispute
settlement (i.e. rule-oriented) which proved successful as will be demonstrated in the
following cases in this and the next chapters.
7.1.1.6. The Beef and Citrus Case - Restrictions on Imports of Beef and Citrus
Products (United States v. Japan)178
Despite the fact that the Beef and Citrus case was settled bilaterally, it should be
. - considered as a significant and essential case in demonstrating a transformation of
the Japanese approach towards dispute settlement under the GATT/WTO systems.
To understand the process by which the case was settled bilaterally, one must look at
it from various angles. To start with, a brief summary of the dispute needs to be
given. The United States claim against Japan was that quantitative restrictions on
beef and citrus products did not fulfil the requirements of exceptions for
price-support programmes under GATT Article XI:2(c), thereby being in violation of
Article XI: 1. Moreover, the U.S. also claimed that mixing requirement, according to
the MAFF's practice, for orange juice (i.e. requiring bottlers to mix imported
concentrate with domestic mikan juice) violated GATT Article 111:5. The
quantitative restrictions on these products had been the subject of previous bilateral
complaints brought by the U.S., which were settled bilaterally by short-term
agreements expanding quotas. The last agreement had expired on 31 March 1988.
Thus, the U.S. took action concerning this quota issue. A Section 301 petition was
filed by the Florida citrus industry after a GATT case had been filed and a panel,was
established on 4 May 1988.179 Nonetheless, the parties reached a settlement, and thus




the complaint was withdrawn on 7 July 1988.180 As a result, Japan agreed to remove
its quantitative restrictions on those products within a few years. With respect to
beef imports, those would be subject to possible tariff increase in the event of the
volume of imports increasing over a designated level. Furthermore, Japan also
agreed to reduce some tariffs on citrus products, and abolish the mixing requirement
for orange juice.181
As explained above, the bilateral settlement was reached in a conventional manner
(the way the two countries often relied on for settling their disputes), by political
factors as well as "threats" under the U.S. Section 301. Nonetheless, to reveal the
importance of this case, we shall examine it from a wider perspective, taking into
account, political negotiations, both domestic and international, which lay behind this
final settlement,182 linkage with other GATT cases and the political environment in
Japan at that time.
Let us first look at a few cases which have a strong link with the present case!
Among others, the Agriculture case ('86) and the Semiconductor Retaliation case
('87), are worth noting. The Beef and Citrus case was initiated in March 19881®3 by
the U.S. request for a panel and was established in May 1988.184 While, before filing-
that case, there was the Agriculture case in which the panel found that for 10 of the
12 product group, the GATT rules did not permit the import restrictions that were in
place; in addition, the panel found that the quota on prepared and processed beefwas
illegal under the GATT because the Japanese government, in fact, was promoting
l79OM/220 (4 May 1988).
IS0L/6322/Add.l.
""L/6370 (8 July 1988): USTR, Report 301-66.
'"Amelia Porges noted in her article that "...bilateral pressure and domestic politics are both
essential to explaining the result of trade negotiations. [The Beef and Citrus case] also offers
examples of creative interaction between the domestic and international levels, as well as
'aggressive multilateralism' (utilisation of the GATT) to achieve very specific goals in a
bilateral negotiation." in Porges, Amelia., "Japan: Beef and Citrus" in Bayard, Thomas O.
and Kimberly Ann Elliot (eds.) with contributions by Amelia Porges and Charles Iceland,
Reciprocity and Retaliation in U.S. Trade Policy Thereinafter, the "Reciprocity and
Retaliation"]. Institute for International Economics, Washington, DC, Sept. 1994, pp.
233-266.
'"L/6322, supra note 178.
l84C/M/220, supra note 179.
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beef production instead of reducing it. The panel report was adopted on 2 February
1988.185 This negative result put Japan under a great deal of pressure when the U.S.
filed the Beef and Citrus case to the GATT because, for Japan, those two products,
dairy products and starch (also "rice"), were politically sensitive, and accordingly
Japan could not afford to lose the case.
Before the Beef and Citrus case, on 21 April 1987, Japan (MITI) filed the
Semiconductor Retaliation dispute against the U.S. In this dispute, according to an
ex-MITI official, the MITI wanted to go ahead with a multilateral settlement at the
GATT.186 The MITI's action showed a change in its way of dealing with trade
disputes, at least, as regards the MITI which was in charge of the dispute. However,
as explained earlier, due to the greater importance of agricultural quotas on dairy
products and starch, there was some serious bargaining between the Ministries,
particularly between the MAFF and MITI, as to how the government should
approach the ongoing cases, the Beef and Citrus (MAFF/MOFA) case and the
Semiconductor Retaliation dispute (MITI).
The Prime Minister's Office (or "Kantei" in Japanese) supported a bilateral settlement
involving quota elimination in dealing with the Beef and Citrus issue, while, the LDP
(Liberal Democratic Party which was the ruling party at that time) preferred the issue
to be settled in the GATT (multilateral settlement) due to its merit from a
responsibility point of view.187 Nonetheless, there was a turning point for the LDP
*
during April 1988. Certain factors persuaded the LDP to agree to a bilateral solution
(thus, avoiding the question of proceeding to the GATT and a multilateral
resolution):
18SC/M/217; before this adoption (for the entire ruling), Japan first offered a partial adoption
of the panel ruling as to 10 of 12 products, i.e. excluding dairy products and starch, though,
the other cps objected.
,86An interview with a formerMITI official, June 1998, Geneva.
I87See, Porges, Amelia., "Japan: Beef and Citrus" in the Reciprocity and Retaliation, supra
note 181, at 250, "A bilateral settlement would be the responsibility of the [LDP],
nonetheless, if the GATT were to decide that the quotas were illegal, the Dietmen could
pleadforce majeure and let the [MAFF andMOFA] take responsibility for a losing the case."
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i) "MAFF and MOFA bureaucrats campaigned to persuade LDP Dietmen that
bilateral negotiations were better than a multilateral solution, i.e. going to
GATT;
ii) "Prominent members of the 'nourin-zoku' [the agriculture 'clan' ("zoku") of
LDP Dietmen] argued the need to face up to quota elimination and make a
positive policy for adjustment;
iii) "On 10 April, the LDP won a by-election by a wide margin in a citrus
district in Saga;
iv) "The LDP were reassured by the farm vote after the victory in the election,
and could talk freely about quota elimination;
v) "Most importantly, an evolution of a post-quota elimination deal worked out
among the ministers and the LDP (i.e., oranges would be liberalised in five
years, and beef in three years)."188
After the bureaucrats' campaign with support from the Prime Minster's Office, the
LDP became in favour of bilateral settlement in the Beef and Citrus issue. As a
result, the bilateral solution of the present issue became a priority for the
Government. Accordingly, the Semiconductor Retaliation dispute that had been filed
earlier by the Japanese government (MITI) to the GATT became a key issue in order
for Japan to succeed in a bilateral settlement with the U.S. on the Beef and Citrus
! issue. Eventually, despite the MITI's strong preference for multilateral settlement in
dealing with the Semiconductor Retaliation dispute, the Japanese government
r reached a deal with the U.S. government on the Beef and Citrus issue bilaterally in
return for the MITI's retreat from the Semiconductor Retaliation case.189 In other
words, the MITI had to give up its multilateral approach towards settlement in that
dispute. Finally, the U.S. government withdrew its complaint on the Beef and Citrus
issue due to its settlement with Japan over the Japanese claim in the Semiconductor
Retaliation. In short, the Japanese government (MITI) could not make its initial step
(or missed a good opportunity) towards amultilateral approach for dispute settlement
under GATT.
w
1S8See, ibid., pp. 250-251.
""Interviewed with aMITI official, Geneva, June 1998.
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7.1.2. Japan as a "Claimant"
Among other cases/disputes under the category in which Japan was involved as a
*
"claimant",190 the Parts and Components case ('88) became a landmark case since it
was a clearly successful performance and achievement on Japan's part in its dispute
settlement history during the GATT period. Apart from that case, one may also
examine the Semiconductor Retaliation dispute which illustrated the earliest sign of
Japan's new approach towards trade dispute settlement. This section mainly
examines one dispute and one case in order to demonstrate Japan's transformation in
its policy on a dispute settlement, i.e. from "bilateralism" to "multilateralism". The
rest of the cases'91 in this category will be listed in the Appendix IV at the end of the
thesis.
7.1.2.1. The Semiconductor Retaliation Dispute - Unilateral Measures on
Imports of Certain Japanese Products (Japan v. United States)'92
The Semiconductor Retaliation dispute, as has been mentioned in Section 7.1.1.6., is
closely related to the bilateral settlement in the Beef and Citrus case.
Japan claim against the U. S. was that an American tariff increase on certain Japanese
products was discriminating and in violation ofGATT Articles I and II. Increases in
the U. S. tariffwere introduced in retaliation for alleged violations of the Japan-U.S.
Semiconductor Arrangement signed on 2 September 1986 and finalised in exchange
for the suspension of three dumping proceedings against Japanese semiconductor
imports to the U. S. and a Section 301 proceeding launched by the U. S.
*
,90According to WTO Secretariat statistics, Japan brought 8 consultation requests (7
distinctive matters) under the GATT 1947 including the Tokyo Round Code (Nevertheless, a
complaint made under the Code will not be examined in the main text of this thesis).
19lFor example, the Zenith case, in which Japan had a positive outcome, showed the
possibility that a national court could play a role in resolving disputes. In this case, the
GATT/WTO law was referred to as a criterion in a domestic court; another case, i.e.
EEC-Import restrictive measures on video tape recorders (the "Poitiers" case) was settled
bilaterally, see the list of cases in Appendix IV to the thesis.
192Complaints were made on 21 April 1987 (L/6159); for relevant articles, see Kingery, John
C., "The U.S. - Japan Semiconductor Agreement and the GATT: Operating in a Legal
Vacuum", 25 Stan. J. Int'l L. (1989), pp. 467-497; Dallmeyer, Dorinda G., "The United
States - Japan Semiconductor Accord of 1986: The Shortcomings of High-Tech
Protectionism", 13 Md. J. Int'l L. (1989), pp. 177-222; also for a case related, see EC v.
Japan: Restrictions on Semiconductors in Section 7.1.1.4. of the thesis.
CHAPTER 7
Semiconductor Industry Association (SIA) against Japanese barriers to American
imports.
In this dispute, the U. S. claimed that, under the Arrangement, Japan had violated
obligations which were: (i) to open its semiconductor market (improving access to
the Japanese market); and (ii) to stop dumping semiconductors in third markets
(monitoring exports).193 The U. S., therefore, increased its tariff to 100% ad valorem
on a $300 million portion of the market in trade which represented the value of the
trade loss claimed for a breach of Japan's obligations. Japan,' however, took a "wait
and see" stance, in that it did not request a panel, which presumably was because of
the ongoing issues with the U.S., i.e. the result of the Agriculture case and the
priority given to success in a bilateral settlement of the Beef and Citrus issue.
Meanwhile, the U. S. had abolished a tariff increase on trade valued at $51 million in
June 1987 and a further $84million in November 1987 in recognition of the Japanese
agreement in compliance with the antidumping obligation of the bilateral agreement.
Removal of the remaining tariff increases on trade valued at $165 million became
effective on 1 August 1991 in response to the conclusion of an extension of the
bilateral agreement that contained a further commitment to accomplish the objectives
of market access.194 Some of the U. S. actions in response to the dispute were
withdrawn when Japan eventually acceded to the U.S. demands, while other actions
remained for five years until the U.S. gave them up.
With regard to the manner of settlement, it is important to note that the Prime
Minister's Office and MAFF/MOFA dissuaded the MITI from bringing the dispute to
GATT (where a multilateral solution could be withdrawn) because there was a fear
that the U.S. might bring another crucial issue regarding "rice" to GATT.195 After the
defeat in the Agriculture case, Japan wanted to avoid particular issues, such as, the
"rice" issue since that issue was closely linked to the domestic vote from farmers. As
4
,93Both obligations under the bilateral agreement became a central issue in the
Semiconductor case between the EC and Japan, which are dealt with in Section 7.1.1.4 of
this thesis.
I94BNA, 8 ITR 888(1991).




explained earlier in Section 7.1.1.6. (the Beef and Citrus case), as a priority, Japan
needed, above alh to reach a bilateral settlement on that issue. Thus, the settlement
of the present case was more political (or bilateral) than legalistical (or multilateral).
9
In other words, the political deal among Japanese Ministries seemed to have
interrupted MITI's further multilateral action at GATT. If Japan had decided to
further a multilateral approach to resolving disputes, the result might have been
different. Moreover, if Japan had maintained its multilateral approach in the present
case to the end, it could have marked a starting point in Japan's new approach to
dispute settlement under GATT, which could be seen as a transformation from
ft
"bilateralism" to "multilateralism", from "power-oriented" to "rule-oriented" and
from "non-legalistic" (i.e. "political" or "power-oriented") to "legalistic".
ft
7.1.2.2. The Parts and Components Case - Antidumping Regulation on Imports
of Parts and Components (Japan v. European Community)196
This case became one of the most important cases in Japanese dispute settlement
history under GATT/WTO since the claim was initiated by Japan under GATT
Article XXIII:2 for the first time, and concluded with Japan's first clear victory at •
GATT. The present case confirmed a turning point in Japan's dispute settlement
history. Since that victory, Japan's attitude towards trade dispute settlement has
indeed changed. Japan certainly increased its confidence in utilising the multilateral
approach towards settling disputes. One could describe this transformation in Japan's
approach as a shift from "bilateralism" to "multilateralism"; "power-oriented" to
"rule-oriented"; and "non-legalstic" to "legalistic".
196Complaints was made on 8 August 1988 (L/6381); Article XXIII of the GATT and
Antidumping Code complaints were merged in this case; L/6657 (22 March 1990) in BISD
37S/132-99 (1991); for an article related, see Petersmann, Ernst-Ulrich, "Settlement of
International and National Trade Disputes Through the GATT: The Case of Antidumping
Law" in E.-U. Petersmann and G. Jaenicke, (eds.), Adjudication of International Trade
Disputes in International and National Economic Law, University Press Fribourg,
Switzerland, 1992, pp. 77-138; Iwasawa, Yuji.. WTO no Funso Shori. Sanseido. (in
Japanese), Tokyo, 1995, Chapter 6, pp. 187-197.
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Summary of Facts and Procedure:
During the early 1980's, as a response to the traditionally high tariff and non-tariff
barriers imposed on certain products in Europe, Japan began to invest seriously in
production and assembly facilities in the EC.197 The EC, however, complained that
antidumping orders on finished products were being circumvented by importing parts
and assembling them locally in the EC.
To respond to this situation, the Council of the European Community (hereinafter,
. the "Council") adopted a regulation (hereinafter, the "Screwdriver Regulation")198 to
amend the antidumping laws of the EC.199 The Screwdriver Regulation allows for
the application of antidumping duties on products assembled in the EC subject to
certain criteria200 provided for in Article 1. The aim of the new law was to regulate
the practice by which certain exporters of products to the EC were alleged to avoid
antidumping duties by producing the products inside the EC out ofmainly imported
components under a technique called "Screwdriver Assembly Technique". The
extension of antidumping laws with respect to products assembled in the EC was
regarded as a new strategy for the EC whose market was struggling with the growth
l97For the history of the Screwdriver Regulation (infra note 199), see McDermott, Patrick J., • '
"Extending the Reach of Their Antidumping Laws: The European Community's 'Screwdriver
Assembly'Regulation", 20 Law &Plo'yInt'l Bus (1988), pp. 316-319.
198Protection Against Dumped or Subsidised Imports, Council Regulation No. 1761/87, 30
OJL167, 1987, p. 9.
I99The Screwdriver Regulation (Council Regulation No. 1761/87) amended the basic
European Community antidumping and countervailing duty law, i.e., the addition of a new
paragraph 10 to Article 13 of Council Regulation No. 2176/84, 27 OJ L201, 1984, p.l
[hereinafter "Council Regulation"] and its successor Council Regulation (EEC) No. 2423/88,
OJ L209, 1988 (i.e. the provisions ofCouncil RegulationNo. 1761/87 were incorporated into
Regulation No. 2423/88 in Article 13:10).
200Article 13:10(a) of the Council Regulation No.2423/88 provides that certain measures may
be taken if the following conditions are met:
Definitive antidumping duties may be imposed [...] on products that are introduced
into the commerce of the Community after having been assembled or produced in
the Community provided that:
-assembly or production is carried out by a party which is related or
associated to any of the manufacturers whose exports of the like products
are subject to a definitive antidumping duty;
-the assembly or production operation was started or substantially
i
increased after the opening of the antidumping investigation; and,
-the value of parts or materials used in the assembly or production
operation and originating in the country of exportation of the product
subject to the antidumping duty exceeds the value of all other part or




Japan brought a complaint against the European Community to the GATT claiming
that the imposition of antidumping duties on certain products assembled inside the
EC, on the basis of the antidumping order was not authorised by GATT Article VI or
Article XX(d) and therefore, resulted in violation ofGATT Article I, II, III, and VI.
Japan also claimed that the local content requirement of over 50% to avoid
antidumping duties on products assembled inside the EC was considered as an
internal requirement which imposed unfair treatment on imports in violation of
Article 111:4. While, Japan also challenged the imposition of antidumping duties on
locally assembled products because the GATT Antidumping Code does not cover
products manufactured inside of a customs area such as the European Community, in
other words, the Code only deals with imports. Nonetheless, this claim under the
Antidumping Code did not proceed due to a lack of findings of dumping and injury
required by Article 1 of the Code.
In the present case, Japan made a claim under two different rules: (i) GATT Article
XXIII, (ii) Article 15 of the Antidumping Code (Consultation, Conciliation and
Dispute Settlement). On 10 October 1988, despite a Japanese request for conciliation
regarding the Antidumping Code under Article 15(3), the EC refused to agree. The
reason for the EC's refusal was that the enforcement measures authorised by GATT
Article XX(d) were not subject to the Antidumping Code. Furthermore, under
I
GATT Article XXIII, a panel was already being established to deal with the same
issues.202 As a consequence of the EC's refusal, Japan did not maintain its assertion
201First four antidumping investigations can demonstrate the situation: see investigations on
'Electronic Scales', 30 OJ, C235, 1987, p. 3; 'Electric Typewriters', 30 OJ, C235, 1987, p. 2;
'Hydraulic Excavators', 30 OJ, C285, 1987, p. 4; 'Photocopiers', 31 OJ, C44, 1988, p. 3.
202What would have happened if two panel were established on the same issue? In this case,
even after setting up a panel under GATT Article XXIII:2, Japan still requested Antidumping
Code conciliation under Article 15(3) ofAntidumping Code. With respect to the matter in
question, Jackson described such situation as "Balkanisation" in the GATT dispute settlement
procedure. He explained in his article that the GATT dispute settlement system became
complexed and segmented as a result of each dispute settlement procedure defined under
Tokyo Round Code. This problem brought up the issue of "rule-shopping" for a dispute
settlement. For further argument on this point, see Jackson, J. H., "The Birth of the
GATT-MTN System: a Constitutional Appraisal", 12 L. Pol'y in Int'l Bus., 1980 at 21,44.
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any further regarding the Antidumping Code.203
Summary of Findings and Conclusions:
-The anti-circumvention duties (hereinafter, the "duties")204 levied on products
assembled within the EC were not "border tariffs' stipulated in GATT Article II but
"internal taxes' under Article 111:2. These duties were imposed on imported goods
alone, thus they were in violation of national treatment concerning 'internal taxes'
under Article 111:2 unless otherwise stated.
-With regard to the local content requirement needed to avoid new Antidumping
measures, these were considered to be internal requirements under GATT Article
111:4 because such requirements were required only to imported goods. Accordingly,
4
the requirements were in violation of'no-less-favourable* treatment of Article 111:4.
-The validity of GATT Article XX(d) stated that it could only authorise the use of
measures necessary to secure compliance with laws or regulations consistent with the
General Agreement, which can be regarded as the core of this panel decision.205
Thus, although this Article could justify the use ofmeasures (as general exceptions),
. in order to enforce the proper imposition ofAntidumping duties, it did not authorise
imposition of those duties beyond the scope of existing Antidumping orders for the
broader purpose206 of accomplishing the underlying objective of Antidumping laws.
203Imagine that two different panels were established concerning the same issue based on two
different rules and issued different decisions, it would have been controversial (see, ibid., the
"Balkanisation"); there was such a case, though, it was slightly different from the above
hypothetical case, namely, each panel (i.e. one was under the General Agreement and the
other was under the Licensing Code) examined a different issue, see the parallel complaints
made by the U.S. against (i) India - Import Restrictions on Almonds (under GATT XXIII)
and also against (ii) India - Import Licenses on Almonds (under the Licensing Code). See for
complaints (i) which was made on 17 June (C/M/211) and was withdrawn due to the
bilateral settlement on 8 June 1988 (C/154/Add.l), see for complaints (ii) which was made
on 17 June 1987 (C/M/211) and was withdrawn on 9 June 1988 (LIC/15).
204For "Anticircumvention Measures", see Jackson, et al., Int'l Econ. Relations, supra note
138, pp. 712-714.
20SIbid., paras. 5.14-5.18.
206Note, the panel's narrow interpretation of GATT Article XX(d) which defined exemption,






(i.e. the Panel's conclusion meant that the qualification under Article XX(d) should
not be interpreted so as to mean ensuring attainment of the objectives of laws and
b
regulations, but, rather, to enforce obligations under laws or regulations consistent
with the General Agreement). Thereby, the EC measures taken to avoid
circumvention were not authorised under Article XX(d).207
-The EC had declined to justify the measures in question under GATT Article VI,
therefore the panel did not consider this issue.208
-Decisions on other claims (e.g. the issue concerning lacking of transparency in
Article 13:10 of the Council Regulation under GATT Article X (1) and (3); the issue
of illegality of the existence of Article 13:10 of the Council Regulation) brought by
Japan209 were unnecessary due to the above ruling.
Remarks on the case:
The EC agreed to adopt the panel report. Nevertheless, the EC stated that it would
defer compliance with the report until the completion of undergoing negotiations
concerning the Antidumping Code at the UR.210 The issue of "circumvention" was
then under negotiation at the UR. Pending the outcome, the EC maintained its
existing circumvention regulations. In other words, the EC did not comply with a
decision made by the GATT panel. Although Japan's defence was successful in this
case, the EC, decided to take advantage of the leeway existing in the rules taken in
force, at least, until the introduction ofany news rule.
207The application of GATT Article XX(d) was already denied in the case: United States v.
Canada: Administration of the Foreign Investment Review Act [FIRA] in BISD 30S/140
(1984).
208,7n conformity with the practice ofpanels not to examine exceptions under the General
Agreement... and not to examine issues brought only by thirdparties (the U.S. in the present
case)" in ibid., para. 5.11; see also, infra note 215.
209Japan must have been concerned with this particular issue because if the panel took up the
issue in the present case, it could have indicated a certain direction on the legality of the U.S.
Section 301 under GATT. In addition, the unilateral measures was one of the contentious
issues at then ongoing Uruguay Round negotiations; cf. DSU23.
2l0See for more examples, United States v. European Community: Production Aids on
Canned Peaches, Canned Pears, Canned Fruit Cocktail and Dried Grapes, 19 March 1988,
(L/5306); see also the Agriculture case (Section 7.1.1.3. of this thesis) in which Japan
showed a similar behaviour as the EC took in the present case for implementation of the
panel's decision due to then ongoing UR negotiations.
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Taken as a whole, Japan opened a new era in its dispute settlement history after
4
having experienced a series of defeats (with the exception the anomalous success in
the SPF case in which Japan was a "respondent" in July 1989). In this regard, this
4'
decade eventually became a symbolic turning point in Japan's dispute settlement
history.
It is interesting to note that this new Japanese attitude towards dispute settlement (i.e.
more "rule-oriented", "multilateral" or "legalistic" approach) coincided with an
institutional as well as constitutional transformation from GATT to WTO by virtue
of the UR negotiations. This can be also described as the institutional/constitutional
transformation, i.e. "judicialisation" (from "pragmatic" to "legalistic"), as regards the
resolution of trade disputes. Presumably, there might have been a certain link
9
9
between the change in Japan's attitude towards trade disputes settlement and the
institutional/constitutional transformation (i.e. from GATT to WTO). If so, with a
strong trend towards increasing demand for multilateralism in world trade compelled
with the lessons leamt through bitter experience at the GATT panels during the 80's,
Japan must have realised not only the importance of multilateralism but also its
effectiveness in the fiercely competitive environment of the world trade scene, and its
role in protecting Japan's national interests utilising GATT/WTO rules.211 '
4
In fact, in this case, although Japan had achieved a successful result under the GATT
3
system, Japan was also presented with one of the defects of the GATT dispute
settlement mechanism (mentioned in Chapter 2), that is, a lack of enforcement
power, whose presence might have brought about a different outcome under the new
WTO system.212 Furthermore, it would have been more difficult for the losing party
(the EC in this case) to defer its compliance with the panel's decision unless, for
example, it could have afforded compensation which is provided for in a provision of
211See, in general, Japan's commitment to the multilateral trading system and to the active
participation in then on-going UR negotiations on dispute settlement, in TPRM on Japan
(C/RM/M/8 8 October 1990) at paras. 7 and 151.
212Apparently, the issue of enforcement, in particular, an "implementation" issue is currently
under discussion at the WTO by virtue of the Banana case. This case indeed revealed the
margin ofDSU procedure; for further detail about the case can be found in Conclusion of the
thesis and under its footnote 4. As of 29 January 1999, the U.S. and EU did not give in to




Furthermore, a few more points concerning the present case should be pointed out.
First, Japan's trust in the effectiveness of GATT dispute settlement procedures must
have increased since it was the first case that Japan had brought under Article
XXIII:2 ofGATT, and furthermore the first case in which Japan had been favoured.
Second, in the present case, unlike its usual approach, Japan demonstrated a
rule-oriented, legalistic or multilateral approach under GATT. Despite the small
number of precedents in GATT panel dealing with anti-dumping matters, Japan took
the brave step of initiating an action and bringing a case before the panel to resolve
anti-dumping measures which had long been a contentious issue under GATT. In
other words, Japan sought a settlement of this dispute within a multilateral
framework, i.e. GATT. This is a significant step in terms of Japan's dispute
settlement history under the GATT system since most of the Japanese cases were
resolved bilaterally before reaching a judicial stage (i.e. a panel). The fact that Japan*
did bring the alleged EC antidumping regulation to a GATT panel can be regarded as
a clear indication of a belief in multilateralism, in other words, a departure from
Japan's traditional "bilateral" approach.214 Third, the Panel did not examine the
consistency of the EC measures with Article VI (on the basis of the practice ofpanel,
i.e. "not to examine exceptions under the General Agreement which have not been
invoked by the contracting party complained against"21 s and "not to examine issues
0
brought only by third parties"216), nonetheless, it made clear that those measures were
inconsistent with Article III and were not justified under Article XX(d). The present
213See, Article 22 of the DSU; Note that Japan did offer some form of compensation to the
U.S. for the longer implementation period in Japan Alcohol-II case regarding Mutually
Accepted Solution on Modalities for Implementation, see (Japan's communication to the
U.S.) in WT/DS8/19; WT/DS10/19; WT/DS11/17 (12 January 1998), and see also (Japan's
communication to Canada) in WT/DS8/20; WT/DS10/20; WT/DS11/18 (12 January 1998).
2l4According to a MITI official, there was less resistance for Japanese government to bring
the issue to GATT because its claim was not against the U.S. (which normally contains more
sensitive political nature) but against the EC, which might, to some extent, psychologically
influenced on Japan's behaviour in the present case. (This interview was conducted in June
1998, Geneva).
21sSee, United States - Import Sugar from Nicaragua in BISD 31S/74, para 4.4.
2I6Cf. United States - Restrictions on Imports of Sugar in BISD 36S/331 (L/6514), para. 5.9.
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case, therefore, could be considered as a landmark case which gave a clear warning
to protectionists not to abuse anti-dumping measures under Article VI.
Nevertheless, the question remains as to why the EC did not choose to justify its
measures under Article VI rather than justifying them under the provision of general
exceptions provided for in Article XX(d) which requires a contracting party to meet
with strict requirements. One speculation which could be made is that the EC might
have preferred the panel to be silent on the question of the legality of
anti-circumvention measures because of then ongoing Antidumping Code
negotiations at the UR. In short, the EC simply wanted to avoid the Panel's
pre-emptive influence over that issue at the UR. Furthermore, by not referring to
Article VI to justify the anti-circumvention measures at the panel proceedings (and
even at the cost of losing the case as it actually happened), the EC might have
thought that it could have kept open the possibility of the legality of the measures at
issue for the time being, at least, until the conclusion of the UR negotiations.217
To sum up, after this first clear legal victory obtained in the present case, Japan
confirmed its new policy regarding trade dispute settlement (i.e. a "multilateral"
approach) under GATT/WTO dispute settlement system. Furthermore, Japan had
gained substantial confidence from this particular victory, as one can see from the
cases underWTO, which will examined in the next chapter.
2l7The provisions on anti-circumvention were on the agenda for the UR negotiations on the
Anti-Dumping agreement, as well as the Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Duties
but no agreement was reached. The GATT 1994, therefore, does not have a provision on
anti-circumvention, nonetheless, the Final Act deals with this issue; it recognised that "the
desirability of the applicability ofuniform rules in this areas as soon as possible", and further
decided to refer this matter to the Committee on Anti-Dumping Practices established under
that Agreement for resolution. See, Ministerial Decisions and Declarations, Decisions and
Declaration Relating to the Agreement on Implementation of Article VI of the General
Agreement on Tariffs and Trade 1994 (Decisions on Anti-Circumvention).
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Chapter 8. CASE STUDIES: JAPANESE TRADE DISPUTES
9
UNDERWTO - A NEW JAPAN'S POLICY ON DISPUTE
SETTLEMENTS
t
8.1. Japan's Experience of WTO Disputes 1
This chapter undertakes WTO case studies whose main goal is to demonstrate how
the new DS mechanism actually worked. This study also reveals Japan's new policy
on DS under the WTO. An early sign of this transformation which emerged in
Japanese policy during the GATT period has already been identified in the previous
0
chapter (for example, in the Semiconductor Retaliation dispute in 1987). Japan's new
policy on DS characterised as "multilateralism" became even more obvious through a
victory for Japan in the Parts and Components case ('88), and, further, this policy has
been followed in every Japanese case dealt with under the.WTO system. To
illustrate the Japanese "multilateral" approach in settling disputes, what I consider are
the most significant disputes have been selected and are examined in this chapter,
those cases being: the Auto dispute, the Alcohol Beverage (or "Alcohol-II") case and
the Film case.2
8.1.1. Japan as a "Claimant"3
8.1.1.1. The Auto Dispute
The present dispute between Japan and the U.S. over car and car parts was the first
case in which Japan (the Claimant) was involved under the WTO system.4 Although
4
'According to WTO Secretariat statistics (as of 10 June 1998), Japan was involved in 23
cases including those cases in which Japan has been involved as a "third party" (18
distinctive cases). As of 5 June 1998, the WTO Secretariat recorded, in total, 135
consultation requests. Accordingly, on the basis of the statistics above, the rate of Japanese
involvement in a WTO case is 17%.
2The cut-off date for the WTO case studies based upon in this thesis is 30 June 1998; see
Appendix III of the thesis for the new cases in which Japan has been involved after this
cut-off date, i.e., the "Indonesian National Car" case and the "Japan Apple" case.
3According to WTO Secretariat statistics (as of 10 June 1998), Japan became a
"complainant" in 5 cases (4 distinctive cases) out of 23 cases (22%).
"Articles on this dispute can be found in, The Economist, May 13th-19th 1995 at 18, 79-80;





tKe dispute was eventually settled through bilateral negotiations outwith the WTO
process, this dispute contains a number of important aspects which illustrate Japan's
new policy on DS. For instance, it was the first dispute in which a Section 301
(unilateral measures) was challenged under the WTO DS mechanism, and moreover,
by Japan.
To grasp the whole picture of this dispute, an overview of the present dispute5 is
given (iemphases added):
- 5 May, 1995: U.S. trade representative Mickey Kantor called off the talks
with Japan to be held in Whistler, Canada, after the two parties failed to agree
on granting the U.S. wider access to Japan's network of car dealers and on
deregulation of Japan's replacement car parts market.
- 7May: Ryutaro Hashimoto, the Japanese minister for MITI, said that Japan
would take the dispute to the WTO ifsanctions were imposed by the U.S.
- 10 May: The USTR issued its determination (certain acts, policies and
. practices of Japan restrict or deny U.S. auto parts suppliers access to the auto
. parts replacement and accessories market in Japan, and are unreasonable and
discriminatory) under Section 301 and 304 of the U.S. Trade Act. In the
meantime, M. Kantor sent Ruggiero (the current DG of WTO) a notification
..informing him of the U.S. intention to bring the issue against Japan to the
WTO.
-16 May: The U.S. announced under the affirmative determination that it
would impose a 100% tariff on 13 Japanese luxury cars models unless Japan
opened its market to U.S. cars and car parts (setting 28 June as the deadline for
a final determination of the imposition of a 100% punitive tariff).
-17 May: Japan requested the U.S. to enter into urgent consultations under
GATTArticle XXII: 1 and Article 4 DSU6 in Geneva by 29 May to discuss the
legality ofU.S. sanctions and added that it reserved its right to retaliate.
%
f
- 26 May: The U.S. rejected Japan's request but offered talks on 20 June in
Washington.
at 95; also in WTO, WTO Focus, (No. 3) May-June 1995.
sSee, this outline of the events is mainly based on, "Japan's carmakers to buy more parts
abroad", the Financial Times, 29 June 1995 at 5.
6Request for Consultations by Japan, WT/DS6/1 (22 May 1995).
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- 27May: Japan refused the U.S. proposal and replied that talks should be held
in Genevawithin the framework ofWTO.
- 12 June: The parties showed no sign of compromise during the talks as
agreed on 2 June. Japan said it would not negotiate under U.S. threat of
actions (The first round of Article XXII consultations in Geneva with the
participation of Australia as a third-country,7 nonetheless, the U.S. rejected the
EC request to participate8).
-IS June: No agreement was reached at the G-79 summit held in Canada.
President Clinton said sanctions would come into effect on 28 June if talks
failed. PrimeMinisterMurayama said that sanctions were invalid according to
international rules.
- 22-23 June: The second round of Article XXII consultations was held in
Geneva (with Australia as a third-country participant).
- 28 June: Agreement (The Japan-U.S. Framework Talks on Auto and Auto
Parts) was reached "in essence"10 just hours before deadline for the sanctions to
come into effect. The U.S. "threats", i.e. an imposition of 100 % tariff on
Japanese luxury cars unless Japan provided the U.S. with access to its car and
car parts market, was dropped.
As emphasised in italics above, to the U.S.'s surprise, Japan took an "assertive"
attitude throughout the latest car talks with the U.S. within a multilateral framework
despite the "threat" of Section 301. This indeed demonstrated Japan's new policy on
DS supporting a "multilateral" instead of a "bilateral" approach as had been the case
during most of the GATT period. This consistent as well as determined multilateral
0
attitude stands in contrast to its policy taken in the Semiconductor issue (f85) which
Japan regrettably gave in to U.S. "threats" under Section 301, and ended up signing
7Request for consultations under Article 4:11 DSU - Communication by Australia (1 June
1995), WT/DS6/3 (12 June 1995); Acceptance of the Request to Join Consultations -
Communication by the U.S., WT/DS6/4 (14 June 1995).
8Request to Join Consultations under Article 4:11 DSU - Communication by the EC (31 May
1995), WT/DS6/2 (2 June 1995).
9The G-7 (Group of Seven) consists of the U.S., Japan, France, Germany, Canada, Italy and
the U.K. The main aim of G-7 is to set broad directions for international economic and
monetary activities. While, the G-7 members hold an annual economic summit which
mainly deals with economic and financial matters (including trade policies) of common
interest to participants.
l0For Japan- U. S. car trade accord where differences emerged over interpretation between
Tokyo and Washington, "One man's promise is another's estimate", the Financial Times, 30




the Japan-U.S. Arrangement on Semiconductors (July '86) which was renewed once
in August '91 and eventually continued until the end of July '96.11 In April '87,
*
4
however, Japan retaliated against the U.S. discriminatory tariff increases on bound
items.12 Nevertheless, due to its domestic political decision (i.e. priority was placed
on the other ongoing dispute, namely, the Beef and Citrus case),13 Japan (MITI) had
to abandon its claim under GATT XXIII: 1 against the U.S. sanctions (which were
imposed because of failure to complywith the Arrangement). IfJapan had exhausted
the GATT panel procedures, that case would have yet an epochal precedent
illustrating Japan's new policy on DS without having to wait for another year when
$
Japan achieved its first legal victory in the Parts and Components case.14 In any
event, Japan undoubtedly indicated its new attitude towards DS in the present case.
Nonetheless, as explained earlier, Japan had learnt a number of lessons through
previous events, especially from the mid to the late 80's, such as the Japan-U.S.
Arrangement on Semiconductors ('86), the Semiconductor Retaliation dispute (Japan
v. U.S.) ('87) and the Semiconductor case (EC v. Japan) ('87). Hard lessons learnt by
Japan through those bitter experiences could include:
i) VRAs ("grey-area measures" generally) were over15: The GATT panel ruled, for
the first time, on the VRAs and decided they were GATT illegal;
ii) The end of "bilateralism": This approach had been indeed effective and popular,
but the EC did break its "silence" when the Arrangement between Japan and the U.S.
was made (Japan make a commitment to the Arrangement containing "grey-area
measures" such as VRAs and VIEs to avoid the imposition of unilateral sanctions
*
"The day after the expiration date (31 July 1996) of the Arrangement, die U.S. and Japan
agreed to have a deal on further co-operation in die Semiconductor sector, "U.S., Japan
Strike Industry and Government Deals on Semiconductors", Inside US Trade, 5 August
1996.
"See, Section 7.1.2.1. of this thesis.
"See, Section 7.1.1.6. of this thesis.
l4See, Section 7.1.2.2. of this thesis.
"See, supra note 150 (Chapter 7), the SGA (the WTO Agreement on Safeguards), Article 11




process under Section 301). This was a conventional pattern for some time in the
bargaining involving bilateral economic negotiations, especially as between the U.S.
and Japan.16
iii) No VIE17 commitments should be made: Japan realised this point after,
regrettably, signing the Arrangement with the U. S. Under this Arrangement, Japan
was in a difficult position due to a so-called "side letter" which referred to a
numerical target (the U.S. viewed this promise or target as "commitments" of the
Japanese government), i.e. a 20 % of market share for the U.S. Semiconductor
Industry, to be fulfilled by Japan.
iv) A "Multilateral" approach in line with the WTO should be followed: If Japan had
sanctions imposed against it under unilateral measures (e.g. a Section 301 order by
the U.S.), Japan should take such unilateral actions to a multilateral forum, namely,
• the WTO DS system. Japan arrived at this policy after a series of bitter experiences,
in particular, the Semiconductor issue in which Japan gave in to the U.S. threat under
Section 301, so that Japan could avoid going to a multilateral forum.18 Nevertheless,
to Japan's utter surprise, the EC make a claim against Japan and Japan eventually lost
the case at the GATT panel. In short, Japan lost two cases over the same issue on
semiconductors. Meanwhile, it is worth noting that Japan accepted the opening of its
"rice" market, which was a crucial issue for Japan, at the end of the Uruguay Round
"For example, the trade negotiations on textiles, colour TV sets, steel, machine tools and
semiconductor.
"Voluntary Import Expansion (VIE): "A bilateral arrangement under which a country agrees,
ostensibly voluntarily, to adopt measures promoting the use of imported products of
particular export interest to the other country. Such arrangements appear to be taking the
place of the grey-area measures which is illegal under the WTO rules (see, ibid.)", in Goode,
Walter.. Dictionary of Trade Policy Terms. 2nd ed., Centre for International Economic
Studies, University ofAdelaide , Australia, 1998 at 307; One could regards a VIE as a model
which is developed from a VRA. VIE requires a country to reply to another's trade sanctions
(i.e. a unilateral sanction such as the U.S. Section 301) by agreeing to buy more of certain
items from that county. It reminds us of "mercantilism", i.e., seeking maximisation of
exports, whereas minimisation of imports.
l8Japan had a little doubt about the efficacy of the multilateral trading regime, see in paras.
16 and 17 in C/RM/M/8 (8 October 1990) which was reproduced in GATT, Trade Policy
Review - Japan C1990V November 1990.
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of negotiations. This commitment led Japan's policy on DS towards favouring
"multilateralism" as well as the establishment of the WTO.
As a consequence, throughout the Auto dispute, Japan fought back against the U.S.
(i.e. the threat under Section 301) with the help of its new policy on DS (i.e.
"multilateralism"), which signified a significant difference from Japan's conventional
attitude towards the Japan-U.S. bilateral trade negotiations. Nevertheless, the U.S.
still insisted on taking the traditional approach based upon bilateralism (i.e. VRAs) in
the Auto dispute. It seems that the U.S. clearly misjudged in this dispute how far
Japan had transformed its attitude towards bilateral trade negotiation as well as its
policy on DS.19 Japan's new approach, at last, brought it a positive outcome which
was decided impartially at the multilateral table (despite the threats under Section
301). In this respect, this dispute not only marked a significant achievement but
assured the beginning of a new era in Japanese DS under GATTAVTO.
8.1.2. Japan as a "Respondent"
8.1.2.1. The Alcoholic Beverage Case
For Japan, the Alcoholic Beverages case is the first case which has gone through the
whole DS procedure under the new WTO DS mechanism. This case is particularly
noteworthy in the sense that the same issue was ruled on by the Panel in 1986 under
the GATT as examined in Section 7.1.1.2. of this thesis.20 This particular case,
"As a former MITI official, Mr. Ichiro Araki (Deputy Director, International
Communication Office) explicitly stated a new Japanese attitude towards the bilateral
economic relations in this article, "Yes, our present stance is inconsistent with our past
action, but we are now firmly committed to rejecting managed trade and VRAs". He also
commented that "Ambassador Kantor just does not seem to realise howfar Japan has come
into fully embracing the principle offree trade on multilateral rules and disciplines", The
New York Times, Letter to the Editor - "Japan Won't Take a Trade Back Seat Anymore", 14
May 1995; this article is also available on the Web site at
[http://www.jef.or.jp/auto/letter.html],
20Apart from the case on Japanese alcohol which was ruled under both GATT and WTO
panels, there is another issue, i.e. leather, which was brought to these two different panels.
One can find the first leather case in BISD 31S/94 (1984), also see Section 7.1.1.1. of this
thesis. While the second dispute on leather is under way, which was initiated by the EC
[Japan TariffQuotas and Subsidies Affecting Leather, WT/DS147 (8 October 1998)]; see OJ




therefore, can provide a number of points for our studying: how the defects of the
GATT mechanism has been improved on the WTO mechanism; and how Japan has
changed its attitude towards DS.
8.1.2.1.1. Report of The Panel
Background
ft
This case has been inherited from the 1987 Panel Report on Japan - Customs Duties,
$
Taxes and Labelling Practices on Imported Wines and Alcoholic Beverages
(hereinafter, the "1987 Panel Report" or "Japan - Alcohol-I") under the GATT 1947.
The previous case was initiated by the EC's request for consultation with Japan
concerning Japan's Liquor Tax Law ("Liquor Tax Law"), as it then existed. The
1987 Panel Report finally concluded that some aspects of the Liquor Tax Law were
not consistent with GATT Article 111:2, first and second sentences, and suggested '
that the CPs recommend that Japan brings its taxes imposed on whiskies, brandies,
other distilled spirits (i.e. gin and vodka), liqueurs, still wines and sparkling wines
into conformitywith its obligations defined under the General Agreement.21
Accordingly, on 2 February 1989, Japan informed the CPs: the ad valorem tax and
grading system had been abolished, resulting in a single rate for all grades of
whisky/brandies; and, the existing differences in taxation between whisky/brandies ■■
and shochu had been considerably reduced by decreasing the specific tax rate for
whisky/brandies and raising that on shochu. In addition, an interim measure was
provided for under the Special Taxation Measures Law in order to ease the pain of
adjustment for small scale manufacturers of shochu. On 1 May 1994, the Japanese
ft
government further amended the Liquor Tax Law, that is, it raised tax rates on
shochu and on spirits, while tax rates on whisky remained unchanged, and also the
ft
products in relation to trade in leather).
21The Panel Report on Japan - Customs Duties, Taxes and Labelling Practices on Imported
Wines and Alcoholic Beverages (Japan - Alcohol-I), BISD 34S/83 (1988) adopted on 10
November 1987, paras. 5.5, 5.6, 5.7, 5.9, 5.11, and 5.13., which are reproduced as II.B in the
Panel Report on Japan - Taxes on Alcoholic Beverages (Japan - Alcohol-II), WT/DS8/R;





application of the interim measures under the Special Taxation Measures Law was
*
extended by 3 years.
1
Summary of Facts and Procedure:
Nonetheless, the EC was dissatisfied with the internal tax treatment even after the
changes made by Japan in accordance with the recommendation of the Panel in the
1987 Panel Report. At last, on 21 June 1995, the EC requested consultations with
Japan under Article XXII22 with respect to the Liquor Tax Law.23 Subsequently, on 7
July 1995, the U.S.24 and Canada25 requested that they join in the consultations under
Article 4.11 DSU. On 19 July 1995, Japan agreed to their request.26 On 7 July 1995,
Canada requested consultations with Japan pursuant to GATT Article XXIII with
respect to certain Japanese liquor taxation laws.27 On 17 July 1995, the U.S. and the
EC requested the right to join in the consultations,28 pursuant to Article 4.11 DSU.
On 7 July 1995, the U.S. requested consultations with Japan under GATT Article
XXIII with respect to internal taxes imposed by Japan on certain alcoholic beverages -
under the Liquor Tax Law.29
Although the four parties held joint consultations on 20 July 1995 so as to reach a
mutually satisfactory resolution concerning the matter, no solution was reached. In
addition, the U.S. and Japan consulted under Article XXIII: 1 on 20 July 1995, yet no
mutually acceptable resolution ofthe matter was achieved.
The EC, on 14 September 1995, requested the DSB (Dispute Settlement Body) to
establish a panel under standard terms of reference in accordance with GATT Article
XXIII:2 and with Article 6 DSU.30 Canada, on 14 September 1995, requested the
22Unless otherwise stated, "GATT" Article (number of article) means Article (number of
article) of the "GATT 1994".
23WT/DS8/1.
24A request by the U.S.,WT/DS8/2.
25A request by Canada, WT/DS8/3.




30WT/DS8/5; see, the Report on Japan - Alcohol-II, supra note 21, para l.S.
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DSB to establish a panel under its standard terms of reference in accordance with
Article XXIII and with Articles 4 and 6 DSU.31 Furthermore, the United States, on
14 September 1995, requested the DSB to establish a panel under standard terms of
reference in accordance with GATT Article XXII:2 and Articles 4 and 6 DSU.32
On 27 September 1995, the DSB established a single panel,33 pursuant to Article 9
DSU,34 to examine the first request of all three complaining parties which related to
the same matter.
Claims of the parties
The claims made by the EC were:
The Liquor Tax Law violates GATT Article 111:2, first sentence, by applying a
higher tax rate on the category of spirits than on each of the two like products,
i.e. the two sub-categories of shochu, because "spirits" [particularly, vodka,
gin, (white) rum, genever] are like products to the two categories of shochu;
alternatively, if all or some of the liquors falling within the spirits mentioned
above were found by the Panel not to be like products to shochu within the
meaning of the first sentence of Article 111:2, the Liquor Tax Law violates
Article 111:2, second sentence, by applying a higher tax rate on all or some of
the liquors falling within the category of spirits than on each of the two directly
competitive and substitutable products, the two sub-categories of shochu; and
further,
the Liquor Tax Law violates GATT Article 111:2, second sentence, by applying
a higher tax rates on the categories ofwhisky/brandy and liqueurs than on each
of the two sub-categories of shochu, since whisky/brandy and liqueurs are
"directly competitive and substitutable products" to both categories of
"shochu". (para. 3.1)
The claims made by Canada were:
Whisky is a "directly competitive and substitutable product" to both categories
of "shochu", and by applying a higher tax rate on the categories of
whisky/brandy than on each of the two sub-categories of shochu, the Liquor
Tax Law distorts the relative prices ofwhisky and shochu, and in so doing the
Liquor Tax Law distorts consumer choice between these categories ofalcoholic
beverages and therefore distorts their competitive relationship. Accordingly,
3lWT/DS10/5; see ibid, para. I. 6
32WT/DSll/2; see ibid., para. 7.
33The Panel was constituted on 30 October 1995. [Panel members: Mr. Hardeep Puri
(Chairman); Mr. Luzius Wasescha and Mr. Hugh McPhail (Panellists)], see ibid., para. 11.
34Ibid., para. 1.8; WT/DS/M/7.
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the Liquor Tax Law is inconsistent with GAIT Article 111:2, second sentence,
(para. 3.2)
0
The claims made by the United States were:
The Japanese tax system applicable to distilled spirits has been devised so as to
afford protection to the production of shochu. In addition, since "white spirits"
and "brown spirits" have similar physical characteristics and end-uses, the US
claimed that "white spirits" and "brown spirits" are "like products" as defined
in the first sentence of Article 111:2, and thus the difference in tax treatment
between shochu and vodka, rum, gin, other "white spirits", whisky/brandy and
other "brown spirits" is inconsistent with Article 111:2, first sentence;
If this is not the case, alternatively, the Panel find that all "white spirits" are
"like products" in the sense of Article 111:2 first sentence, and all distilled
spirits are "directly competitive and substitutable" in terms of Article 111:2,
second sentence for the same reason; therefore, the Liquor Tax Law should be
found to be inconsistentwith Article 111:2. (para. 3.3).
With respect to those claims from the three complaining parties, Japan replied:
-The purpose of the tax classification pursuant to the Liquor Tax Law is not to
afford protection and also not to have the effect of protecting domestic
production. The Liquor Tax Law, therefore, does not violate Article 111:2;
-Spirits, whisky/brandy and liqueurs are not "like products" to either category
of shochu, within the meaning of GATT Article 111:2, first sentence, nor are
they "directly competitive and substitutable products" to shochu, within the
meaning ofArticle 111:2, second sentence;
According to the above reasons, the Liquor Tax Law cannot violate Article
111:2;
-In the meantime, Japan requests the Panel to turn down the claim of the US
with respect to Japan's Taxation Special Measures Law because it is not
mentioned in the terms of reference of the Panel, (para. 3.4)
Summary ofFindings and Conclusions:
The Preliminary Finding:
With respect to the U.S. claim concerning the Japanese Taxation Special
Measures Law, the Panel concluded that its terms of reference did not permit to
consider this claim (Articles 7 and 11 DSU).35 The Panel further noted that the
Japanese Taxation Special Measures Law is not referred to in any of those
documents mentioned. Accordingly, the Panel concluded that the U.S. claim
with respect to the Japanese Taxation Special Measures Law is not permitted




The Panel noted that the main claim of the complainants was that the Liquor Tax
Law was inconsistent with GATT Article 111:2. To examine this complaint, the Panel
referred to Article 111:2,36 Article 111:1,37 and an Interpretative Note Ad Article III,
Paragraph 2,38 contained in Annex I to GATT 1994.39 In addition, with respect to the
Interpretative Note Ad Article III, Paragraph 2, the Panel noted that "the annexes to
this Agreement are hereby made an integral part of this Agreement" as provided in
GATT Article XXXIV.
TheMain Findings:
1. General Principles of Interpretation
For resolving the dispute over the appropriate legal analysis to be applied, the Panel
was required to interpret the wording ofGATT Article 111:2. The Panel recalled that
Article 3:2 DSU stated:
...The Members recognise that [the WTO dispute settlement system] serves.to
preserve the rights and obligations ofMembers under the covered agreements,
36See, Appendix IV of the thesis.
GATT Article IH:2 provides that:
The products of the territory of any contracting party imported into the territory of
any other contracting party shall not be subject, directly or indirectly, to internal taxes
or other internal charges of any kind in excess of those applied, directly or indirectly,
to like domestic products. Moreover, no contracting party shall otherwise apply
internal taxes or other internal charges to imported or domestic products in a manner
contrary to the principles set forth in paragraph 1.*
[*The paragraph with the asterisk should be read in conjunction with Annex I (Notes and
Supplementary Provisions) of the General Agreement. Therefore, in reading this Article, the
Interpretative Note ad Article III, Paragraph 2 should be referred to].
"Ibid.
GATT Article 111:1 provides that:
The contracting parties recognise that internal taxes and other internal charges, and
laws, regulations and requirements affecting the internal sale, offering quantitative
regulations requiring the mixture, processing or use of products in specified amounts
or proportions, should not be applied to imported or domestic products so as to afford
protection to domestic production.*
[Although this Article refers to the Interpretative Note ad Article III, Paragraph 1, it is not
presented here because of its irrelevancy to this case.]
3*Ibid.
Interpretative Note Ad Article III, Paragraph 2 provides that:
A tax conforming to the requirements of the first sentence of paragraph 2 would be
considered to be inconsistent with the provisions of the second sentence only in cases
where competition was involved between, on the one hand, the taxed product and, on
the other hand, a directly competitive or substitutable products which was not
similarly taxed.
39Supra note 21, para. 6.6.
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and to clarify the existing provisions of those agreements in accordance with
customary rules of interpretation ofpublic international law.
The Panel mentioned that the "customary rules of interpretation of public
international law" indicated above were incorporated in the Vienna Convention on
the Law ofTreaties (hereinafter, the "VCLT");40 The Panel further noted that Article
3:2 DSU actually codified the practice previously established; The Panel understood
that Articles 31 and 32 VCLT41 gave the relevant criteria from the aspect of how
Article 111:2 should be interpreted in this case; The Panel concluded that the starting
point of interpreting of an international treaty such as the GATT 1994 was the
wording of the treaty (in accordance with Article 31 VCLT). (para. 6.9)
A0Ibid., para. 6.7.; Prior to this case, the Panel has already interpreted the GATT pursuant to
die VCLT. For example, see ibid., supra note 21, para. 6.7 as footnote 81, the Report on
Japan - Alcohol-I, supra note 21; the panel report on EC - Imposition of Anti-dumping
Duties on Imports of Cotton Yarn From Brazil, ADP/137, adopted on 30 October 1995,
. paras. 540ff.; the AB report on United States - Standards for Reformulated and Conventional
Gasoline, WT/DS2/AB/R, adopted on 20 May 1996.
41Article 31 (General rule of interpretation) of the Vienna Convention on the Law of
Treaties (VCLT) provides that:
1. A treaty shall be interpreted in good faith in accordance with the ordinary meaning
to be given to the terms of the treaty in their context and in the light of its object and
purpose.
2. The context for the purpose of the interpretation of a treaty shall comprise, in
addition to the text, including its preamble and annexes:
(a) any agreement relating to the treaty which was made between all the parties
in connection with the conclusion of the treaty;
(b) any instrument which was made by one or more parties in connection with
the conclusion of the treaty and accepted by the other parties as an instrument
related to the treaty.
3. There shall be taken into account together with the context:
(a) any subsequent agreement between the parties regarding the interpretation
of the treaty or the application of its provisions;
(b) any subsequent practice in the application of the treaty which establishes
the agreement of the parties regarding its interpretation;
(c) any relevant rules of international law applicable in the relations between
the parties.
4. A special meaning shall be given to a term if it is established that the parties so
intended.
Article 32 (Supplementary means of interpretation) of the VCLT provides that:
Recourse may be had to supplementary means of interpretation, including the
preparatory work of the treaty and the circumstances of its conclusion, in order to
confirm the meaning resulting from the application of article 31, or to determine the
meaning when the interpretation according to article 31:
(a) leaves the meaning ambiguous or obscure; or




Article 1 (b)(iv) ofGATT 1994 provides institutional recognition of the principle that
adopted panel reports constitute subsequent practice; the Panel was of the view that
panel reports adopted by the CPs constitute subsequent practice in specific cases,
and, as such, have to be taken into account by subsequent panels dealing with the
same or a similar issue; the Panel, however, noted that it does not necessarily have to
follow their reasoning or results; the Panel further noted that unadopted panel reports
have no legal status in the GATT and WTO system since they have not been
%





According to the Panel, Article 111:2 deals with two different factual situations:
Article 111:2, first sentence is about the treatment of "like products", while Article
111:2, second sentence deals with the treatment of "directly competitive or
substitutable products". In addition, the Interpretative Note Ad Article 111:2 further
9
spells out this distinction and confirms the two distinct obligations prescribed in
Article 111:2.
The Panel noticed that Article 111:1 covers general principles with respect to the
imposition of internal taxes, internal charges, and laws, regulations and requirements
affecting the treatment of imported and domestic products, while Article 111:2 refers
to specific obligations concerning internal taxes and internal charges; Furthermore,
the words used in Article III: 1, such as "recognise" and "should" as well as the word
in Article 111:2, second sentence, "the principles", confirms that Article 111:1 does not
9
contain a legally binding obligation but rather states general principles; On the other
hand, the wording "shall" in Article 111:2, both sentences, clarifies that Article 111:2
contains two legally binding obligations; Accordingly, the starting point for an
interpretation of Article 111:2 is Article 111:2 itself and not Article 111:1. If it is
relevant and necessary, reference to Article 111:1 (constituting part of the context of
Article 111:2) will be made. (para. 6.12)
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The Panel then referred to other contextual elements that had to be taken into
account, as required by Article 31 VCLT in light of the relationship between Article
II and III; The Panel concluded, as had previous panels that dealt with the same
issue,42 that one of the main purpose ofArticle III is to guarantee thatWTO Members
will not undermine through internal measures their commitments under Article II.
(para. 6.13)
3. Article 111:2, First Sentence
With respect to like products, the Panel noted that the Community essentially argued
«
in favour of a two-step procedure, namely, the Panel should establish first whether
the products in question are like, and, if so, then proceed to examine whether taxes
imposed on foreign products are in excess of those imposed on like domestic
products; The Community had stated that physical characteristics of the products
concerned, their end-uses, as well as consumer preferences could provide relevant
criteria for the Panel to judge whether the products concerned were like; The Panel
further noted in this respect, that complainants have the burden of proof to
|
demonstrate first, that products are like and second, that foreign products are taxed in
excess ofdomestic ones. (para. 6.14)
Furthermore, the Panel commented on the Japanese statements that essentially argued
in favour of the contested legislation concerning its aims and effect in order to
determine whether or not it was consistent with Article 111:2; According to this view,
in this case the aims and effect of the contested legislation did not operate so as to
afford protection to domestic production, and no inconsistency with Article 111:2
"Moreover, the Panel added to this point by citing the adopted panel report which had stated
that "...one of the basic purpose ofArticle III was to ensure that the contracting parties'
internal charges and regulations were not such as to frustrate the effect of tariffconcessions
granted under Article II..." (The panel report on "Canada - Import, Distribution and Sale of
Certain Alcoholic Drinks by Provincial Marketing Agencies", adopted on 18 February 1992,
BISD 39S/27, paras. 5.30-5.31.); in another adopted panel report, the panel remarked that
"...the mostfavoured-nation requirement in Article I, and also tariffbindings under Article
II, would become ineffective without the complementary prohibition in Article III on the use
of internal taxation and regulation as a discriminatory non-tariff trade barrier" (The panel
report on "United States - Measures Affecting Alcoholic and Malt Beverage" (U.S. - Malt
Beverages), adopted on 19 June 1992, BISD 39S/206, para. 5.9; see also, para. 6.21.).
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could be established; In addition to this statement by Japan, the U.S. argued that, in
determining whether two products that were taxed differently were 'like products' for
the purpose of Article 111:2, the Panel should examine not only the similarity in
physical characteristics and end-users, consumer tastes and preferences, and
classification of tariff for each product but also whether the tax distinction in
question was "applied ... so as to afford protection to domestic production", (para.
6.15)
*
The Panel noted that the proposed aim-and-effect test was inconsistent with the
wording of Article 111:2, first sentence; The Panel noted that Article 111:2, first
sentence, contained no reference to those words; The Panel noted that the
complainants, according to the aim-and-effect test, would have the burden of
showing not only the effect of a particular measure, which was in principle .
discernible, but also its aim, which was sometimes indiscernible; The Panel did not
accept the argument by the U.S. that the aim-and-effect test should be applicable only
with respect to origin-neutral measures; The Panel noted that neither the wording of
Article 111:2, nor that of Article 111:1 supported a distinction between origin-neutral
and origin-specific measures, (para. 6.16) i
The Panel further noted that the list of exceptions contained in GATT Article XX
could become redundant or useless because the aim-and-effect test did not contain a
definitive list of grounds justifying departure from the obligations that were
otherwise incorporated in Article III; In principle, a WTO Member could, for
example, invoke protection of health in the context of involving the aim-and-effect
test; The Panel noted that if this were the case, then the standard ofproof established
fc •
in Article XX would effectively be circumvented; WTO Members would not have to
prove that a health measure was 'necessary' to achieve its health objectives, (para.
6.17)
The Panel touched upon two GATT panel reports which referred to the
aim-and-effect test; In the Panel report on "United States - Taxes on Automobiles
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(US - Auto Taxes)"43, the Panel stated that the report remained unadopted and
therefore did not have to take it into account because it did not constitute subsequent
practice44; With respect to the U.S. - Malt Beverages case, the Panel made reference
to the fact that its interpretation of "like products" (Article 111:2) was largely
consistent with the interpretation of the 1987 Panel Report; In the 1992 Malt
Beverages report, the Panel took into account the product's end-uses, consumer tastes
and habits, and the product's properties, nature and quality when it interpreted "like
products"; In addition, that report also considered whether product differentiation
was being used "so as to afford protection to domestic production";45 The Panel
0
finally decided not to follow the interpretation of "like product" in Article 111:2, first
sentence, supported by the U.S. - Malt Beverage report in so far as it incorporated
the aim-and-effect test. (para. 6.18)
The Panel, having decided not to apply the aim-and-effect test proceeded to develop
the legal tests which it would apply in this case in order to determine whether Japan
had acted inconsistently with its obligations under Article III; In addition, more
specifically, the Panel considered the wording of Article 111:2, first sentence, which
required it to examine three points: (i) whether the products at issue are like, (ii)
whether the contested measure is an "internal tax" or "other internal charge" (this was
not an issue in this case) and (iii) if so, whether the tax imposed on foreign products
is in excess of the tax imposed on like domestic products; If those three tests resulted
in the affirmative, such a tax would result in the WTO Members holding it to be in
violation of obligations under Article 111:2, first sentence; The Panel further stated
that past GATT panels had followed this approach.46
i) "Like Products"
The Panel noted that the term 'like product' appears in various GATT provisions, and
thus the interpretation of this term varies; In this respect, the Panel referred to the
43DS31/R (11 October 1994) which is unadopted.
44Ibid., supra note 21, para. 6.10.
45The Report on U.S. - Malt Beverages, supra note 42, paras. 5.25-5.26.




discrepancy between Article 111:2 and 111:4, namely, the former referred to Article
111:1 and to "like", as well as to directly competitive or substitutable products (see
Article XIX), whereas the latter referred merely to like products, (para. 6.20)
The Panel noted that previous Panel and working party reports had unanimously
agreed that the term 'like product' should be interpreted on a case-by-case basis; To
establish likeness, previous Panels had used different criteria, such as the products'
properties, nature and quality, and its end-uses; consumers' tastes and habits, which
varied from country to country as well as the product's definition under tariff
nomenclatures; The Panel viewed that 'like products' need not be identical in all
respects; However, that term should be construed narrowly in the case of Article
111:2, first sentence; This approach was dictated by two independent reasons: (i)
Article 111:2 distinguishes between "like" and "directly competitive or substitutable"
0
products, the latter obviously being a much larger category of products than the
former; and (ii) the Panel's conclusions arrived at with respect to the relationship
< between Articles HI and II; As to the second point, as previous panels had noted, one
of the main objectives of Article 111:2 is to ensure that WTO Members do not
frustrate the effect of tariff concessions granted under Article II through internal
, taxes and other internal charges. It followed that a parallel required to be drawn in
this case between the definition of products for the purpose of Article II tariff
concessions and the term 'like product' as it appeared in Article 111:2; This is so in the •
Panel's view, because with respect to two products subject to the same binding tariff
and therefore subject to the same maximum border tax, there was no justification,
outside of those stipulated in GATT rules, to tax them in a different manner through
internal taxation; In the Panel's view, especially where it was in sufficient detail, a
product's description used for this purpose was an important criterion for confirming
likeness for the purpose ofArticle 111:2. (para. 6.21)
The Panel then stated its conclusions concerning the relationship between Articles II
and ni; In this context, it noted that (i) vodka and shochu had been classified under
. the same heading in the Japanese tariffs; and (ii) vodka and shochu were covered by
258
CHAPTER 8
the same Japanese tariffwere at the time of its negotiations; the Panel concluded that
vodka and shochu were like products; besides, substantial noticeable differences in
physical characteristics existed between the rest of the alcoholic beverages in dispute
and shochu which disqualified them from being regarded as like products; more
specifically, the use of additives disqualified liqueurs, gin and genever; the use of
ingredients disqualified rum; lastly, appearance (arising from manufacturing
processes) disqualified whisky and brandy; the Panel therefore decided to examine
whether the rest of the alcoholic beverages, other than vodka, could qualify as
products directly competitive or substitutable to shochu. (para. 6.23).
With respect to the question whether the products, in particular, vodka and shochu, at
issue in this case were like products, the Panel essentially followed the same
conclusion which had been reached in the 1987 Panel Report;47 The Panel expressed
its view that vodka and shochu shared most physical characteristics, though noted a
difference in the physical characteristics of alcoholic strength between the two
products; Despite that fact, the Panel did not preclude a finding of likeness especially
since alcoholic beverages are often consumed in diluted form; The Panel then moved
on to the issue concerning the relationship between Articles II and III. With respect
to vodka, the Panel noted that Japan offered no further convincing evidence that the
1987 Panel Report reached the wrong conclusion; The Panel also noted that Japan's
basic argument was not that the two products, i.e. shochu and vodka, are unlike, in
terms of the criteria applied in 1987, but rather that they were unlike because the
Japanese tax legislation did not have the aim and effect of protecting shochu;
Nonetheless, as referred to earlier on, the Panel had already refused to apply the
47The Report on Japan - Alcohol-I, supra note 21, para. 5.7 stated that "...agreed with the
arguments submitted to it by the European Communities, Finland, and the United States that
Japanese shochu (Group A) and vodka could be considered as 'like' products in terms of
Article 111:2 because they were both white/clean spirits, made ofsimilar raw materials, and
the end-uses were virtually identical".
"...the Panel found that the traditional Japanese consumer habits with regard to shochu
provided no reason for not considering vodka to be a 'like' product. ...Even if imported
alcoholic beverages (e.g. vodka) were not considered to be 'like' to Japanese alcoholic
beverages (e.g. shochu Group A), the flexibility in the use of alcoholic drinks and their
common characteristics often offered an alternative choice for consumers leading to a
competitive relationship".
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aim-and-effect test; In the end, the Panel concluded that vodka and shochu were like
products; According to the Panel, only vodka could be considered as a like product to
shochu since they shared the most physical characteristics; The only difference was
the means employed for filtration. There were substantially noticeable differences in
the physical characteristics between the rest of the alcoholic beverages in dispute and
shochu, which disqualified them from being regarded as like products; Accordingly,
the Panel decided to examine whether the alcoholic beverages, excluding vodka,
4
could qualify as directly competitive or substitutable products to shochu; In fact, the
1987 Panel Report has also considered this point regarding these products but only
with respect to the question under Article 111:2, second sentence.
ii) "Taxation in Excess of those on Like Domestic Products"
The Panel then examined whether vodka was taxed higher than shochu under the
Liquor Tax Law; the phrase "not in excess of those applied to like domestic
products" should be understood to meant at least identical or better tax treatment.
Since the Japanese tax was calculated on the basis of and varied according to the
alcoholic content of the product, the taxes imposed on vodka (i.e. 9,927 Yen per
degree of alcohol) were obviously higher than those imposed on shochu (i.e. 6,228
Yen per degree of alcohol). The Panel, therefore, concluded that the tax imposed on
vodka was in excess of the tax imposed on shochu. (para. 6.24)
The Panel addressed the Japanese argument that its legislation, by keeping the
tax/price ratio 'roughly constant', was trade neutral and consequently no protective
aim and effect of the legislation could be detected. In this connection, the Panel
considered Japan's argument that its aim was to achieve neutrality and horizontal tax
equity; The Panel noted that it had already decided that the existence or
non-existence of a protective aim and effect was irrelevant in an analysis under
Article 111:2, first sentence. Eventually, the Panel rejected Japan's argument [i.e. the
Liquor Tax Law did not impose on foreign products a tax in excess of the tax
ft
|
imposed on domestic like products for the following reasons:
"(i) Essentially, in the context of Article 111:2, first sentence, it is irrelevant
whether 'roughly' the same treatment through, for instance, a 'roughly constant'
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tax/price ratio is afforded to domestic and foreign like products or whether
neutrality and horizontal tax equity is achieved;
"(ii) There were significant problems with the methodology for calculating
ft
tax/price ratios submitted by Japan, such that arguments based on that
methodology could only be viewed as inconclusive. More particularly,
although Japan had argued that the comparison of tax/price ratios should be
done on a category-by-category basis, its statistics on which the tax/price ratios
were based excluded domestically produced spirits from the calculation of
tax/price ratios for spirits and whisky/brandy. Since, the prices of the domestic
spirits and whisky/brandy are much lower than those of the imported goods,
this exclusion has the impact of reducing considerably the tax/price ratios
specified by Japan for those products. In this connection, the Panel noted that
one consequence of the Japanese tax system was to make it more difficult for
cheaper imported brands of spirits and whisky/brandy to enter the Japanese
market. In addition, the Panel noted that the Japanese statistics were based on
suggested retail prices and there was evidence in the record that these products
were often sold at a discount at least in Tokyo. To the extent that the prices
were unreliable, the resultant tax/price ratios would be unreliable as well;
"(iii) The legislation contested did not refer to its purpose that it was to
maintain a 'roughly constant' tax/price ratio. This was rather an ex post facto
rationalisation by Japan, and there are no guarantees in the legislation that the
tax/price ratio will always be maintained 'roughly constant'", (para. 6.25)
The Panel then turned to the arguments put forward by Japan concerning taxation
systems in other country. The Panel noted that there has been only one instance of
%
adjustment since the modification of Japan's Liquor Tax Law in 1989. Despite
Japan's arguments concerning taxation systems in other countries, the Panel noted
that its terms of reference in this case were strictly limited to Japanese legislation.48
Consequently, the Panel concluded that, by taxing vodka in excess of shochu, Japan
violated its obligation under Article 111:2, first sentence.49
4. Article 111:2, Second Sentence
i) "Directly Competitive or Substitutable Products"
In the view of the Panel, Article 111:2, second sentence require it to make two
determination: (i) whether the products concerned (whisky, brandy, gin, genever, rum





treatment afforded to foreign products was contrary to the principles set forth in
9
paragraph 1 ofArticle III. In the view of the Panel, the complainants had the burden
of proof to demonstrate first, that the products concerned were directly competitive
or substitutable and second, that foreign products were taxed in such a way so as to
afford protection to domestic production; the Panel decided that the term 'directly
competitive or substitutable product', in accordance with its ordinary meaning,
should be interpreted more broadly than the term 'like product'. In this respect the
Interpretative Note Ad Article 111:2, second sentence refers to products 'where
competition was involved between...' them. In this respect, the Panel noted that
independent of similarities with respect to physical characteristics or classification in
tariff nomenclatures, greater emphasis should be placed on elasticity of substitution.
The Panel noted the conclusions in the 1987 Panel Report50 (i.e. a tax system that
discriminates against imports has the consequence of creating and even freezing
preference for domestic goods. In the Panel's view, this meant that consumer surveys
in a country with such a tax system would likely understate the degree of potential
»
competitiveness between substitutable products, (para. 6.28)
0
9 a
With respect to the evidence lodged in this case, the Panel noted that the
complainants had submitted a study (the ASI study) that concluded that there was a
high degree of price-elasticity between shochu, on the one hand, and five brown
spirits (Scotch whisky, Japanese whisky, Japanese brandy, cognac, and North
American whisky) and three white spirits (gin, vodka and rum), on the other. Japan
questioned the relevance of this ASI study by noting that consumers were not
allowed to choose other than the eight products mentioned above (for example, they
were not allowed to choose beer, sake or wine) and also argued that if choices were
*
too limited even such disparate products as hamburger and ice cream could be
regarded as being directly competitive or substitutable products. In the Panel's view,
however, price-elasticity between the products mentioned was not altered by the fact
that consumers were presented with a limited choice. At best, the Japanese





mentioned by Japan had a greater degree of price-elasticity in relation to shochu. It
would not, however, in the Panel's view, amount to a rejection of the existence of a
significant directly competitive or substitutable relationship between shochu and the
examined eight products, (para. 6.29)
The Panel further noted that the distinction between "premium whisky", "first grade
*
whisky" and "second grade whisky" was abolished as a result of the 1989 Japanese
tax reforms. This tax reform disadvantaged domestically produced whisky, by
substantially increasing the tax rate on second grade whisky compared to the other
alcoholic beverages at issue in the present case. The market share of domestic
whisky including second grade fell from 26.7 percent in 1988 to 19.6 percent in
1990. This proved to the Community that there was elasticity of substitution
between whisky and shochu. The Panel took note in its response, Japan's argument
that a combination of an expansion of shochu consumption and declining whisky
prices tended to indicate a lack of competitive relationship between the two
commodities. In the Panel's view, Japan failed to take account of the fact that shochu
and foreign whisky were in fact capturing the market share lost by domestically
produced whisky. In the Panel's view, the fact that foreign produced whisky and
shochu were competing for the same market was evidence that there was elasticity of
substitution between them. (para. 6.30)
The Panel noted Japan's argument that there was no elasticity ofsubstitution between
shochu and the rest of the alcoholic drinks in dispute in this case; Japan based its
argument on a survey conducted among consumers that showed, according to Japan,
that if shochu was not available, 6 percent of consumers would switch to spirits,
whereas only 4 percent would switch to whisky; if whisky was not available, 32
percent of consumers would choose brandy and only 10 percent would choose
shochu. Japan submitted this survey to the Panel. The Panel did not accept Japan's
argument on the grounds that Japan, in conducting this survey, failed to take into
account price distortions caused by internal taxation. In other words, consumers
would switch to spirits and whisky. This, in the Panel's view, was proof of
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significant elasticity of substitution between shochu, on the one hand, and whisky
and spirits, on the other, (para 6.31)
The Panel concluded by adding that whether shochu and the other products in dispute
were directly competitive or substitutable products, it was notable that the products
concerned were all distilled spirits and it would give particular emphasis to factors
such as: the findings of the 1987 Panel Report; the ASI studies submitted by the
complainants (this study demonstrated persuasive evidence that there was significant
9
elasticity of substitution among the products in dispute); the survey submitted by
Japan, notwithstanding the fact that it failed to take into account price distortions
caused by internal taxation, but, nonetheless, illustrated elasticity of substitution
among the products in dispute; and, the evidence submitted by the complainants
concerning the 1989 Japanese tax reform, which indicated that whisky and shochu
0
9
were essentially competing for the same market. In the view of the Panel, the
conclusions of the 1987 Panel Report, buttressed by any of the other three factors,
were sufficient for the Panel to conclude that shochu and the other products subject
of the dispute were directly competitive or substitutable under Article 111:2, second
sentence, (para. 6.32)
ii) "So as to Afford Protection"
In the Panel's view, if directly competitive or substitutable products were not
'similarly taxed', and if it were found that the tax favoured domestic products, then
protection would be afforded to such products, and Article 111:2, second sentence was
violated; Although the 1987 Panel Report did not focus on the Interpretative Note Ad
Article III, its conclusion on the issue of 'so as to afford protection' was essentially
the same, as it concluded that higher (i.e. dissimilar) Japanese taxes on imported
alcoholic beverages and the existence of substitutability were 'sufficient evidence of
fiscal distortions of the competitive relationship between imported distilled liquors
and domestic shochu affording protection to domestic producers of shochu';5' The
9
Panel agreed with this conclusion. In this connection, the Panel noted that for it to
51Ibidat para. 5.11.
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conclude that dissimilarity in taxation afforded protection, it would be sufficient for
it to uphold this view to find that the dissimilarity in taxation was not de minimis;
The Panel took the view that it was appropriate to conclude, as have other GATT
9
panels including the 1987 panel, that it was not necessary to demonstrate any adverse
*
effect on the level of imports, as Article III generally was aimed at providing imports
with 'effective equality of opportunities' in 'conditions of competition'.52 In line with
«
these interpretations of Article III, the Panel concluded that it was not necessary for
the complainants to establish the purpose or aim of tax legislation in order for the
Panel to conclude that dissimilar taxation afforded protection to domestic production;
In the Panel's view, the following indicators were relevant in determining whether the
products in dispute were similarly taxed in this case: tax per litre of product, tax per
degree ofalcohol, ad valorem taxation, and the tax/price ratio.
*
a. With respect to taxation per kilolitre ofproduct, the Panel concluded that the
amounts of tax were not similar and that the differences were not de minimis.
Shochu A (25°) ¥155,700
Shochu B (25°) ¥ 102,100
Whisky (40° ) ¥ 982,300
Brandy (40°) ¥ 982,300
Spirits (38°) ¥ 377,230 (gin, mm, vodka)
Liqueurs (40°) ¥ 328,760
b. With respect to taxation per degree of alcohol, the Panel concluded that the
amounts of tax were not similar and that differences were not de minimis.
Shochu A (25°) ¥6,228
Shochu B (25°) ¥ 4,084
Whisky (40° ) ¥ 24,558
Brandy (40°) ¥24,558
Spirits (38°) ¥ 9,927 (gin, mm, vodka)
Liqueurs (40°) ¥8,219
c. The Panel noted that Japan's Liquor Tax Law did not provide for ad valorem
taxation and this criterion was, consequently, irrelevant in this case.
d. With respect to the tax/price ratio, the Panel noted that the statistics
submitted by Japan showed that significant differences existed between shochu
and the other directly competitive or substitutable products and also noted that
52See, for example, the U.S. - Taxes on Petroleum and Certain Imported Substances (U.S. -
Superfund), BISD 39S/206 at para. 5.6.; the Panel Report on "Italian Discrimination Against




there were significantly different tax/price ratios within the same product
categories.
The Panel consequently concluded that the products in dispute were not similarly
taxed and that taxes on shochu were lower than the taxes imposed on the other
products subject to dispute, leading the Panel to the conclusion that protection was
afforded to shochu inconsistent with Japan's obligations under Article 111:2, second
sentence, (para. 6.33)
In the Panel's view, the argument brought by Japan that its legislation, in keeping the
tax/price ratio 'roughly constant' was trade neutral and did not operate 'so as to afford
protection to domestic protection', should be rejected, (para. 6.34)
*
*
The Panel accepted the evidence submitted by Japan, according to which a
shochu-like product was produced in various countries outside Japan, including the
Republic of Korea, the People's Republic of China and Singapore; the Panel noted,
however, that Japanese import duties on shochu were set at 17.9 percent; At any rate
what was at stake, in the Panel's view, was the market share of the domestic shochu
_ «
market in Japan that was occupied by Japanese-made shochu; the Panel took the view
that the combination of custom duties and internal taxation in Japan had the
following impact: on the one had, it made it difficult for foreign-produced shochu to
penetrate the Japanese market and, on the other hand, it did not guarantee equality of
competitive conditions between shochu and the rest of the "white" and "brown"
spirits, (para. 6.35)
The Panel reached the conclusions:
-Shochu and vodka were 'like products' and Japan, by taxing the latter in excess
of the former, was in violation of its obligation under GATT Article 111:2, first
sentence.
-Shochu, whisky, brandy, rum, gin, genever, and liqueurs were 'directly
competitive or substitutable products' and Japan, by not taxing them similarly,
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was in violation of its obligation under GATT Article 111:2, second sentence,
(paras. 71-72)
The Panel recommended that the DSB request Japan to bring its Liquor Tax Law into
conformity with its obligations under the GATT 1994.
8.1.2.1.2. Report of the Appellate Body33
As explained earlier, the function of the Appellate Body ("AB") can be defined as to
ensure the predictability and transparency of dispute procedures by means of
I
improving coherence of panel reports. For that reason, as stipulated in Article 17:6
DSU, the scope of the AB is limited to legal issues contained in the panel report and
legal interpretations arrived at by the panel. Up to now, Members are actively
utilising this appellate service.54
0
9
Summary ofArguments of Participants:
In this appeal, Japan and the U.S. were both an appellant /appellee, while Canada and
the EC were an appellee. The appeal was initiated pursuant to the Working
Procedures for Appellate Review (hereinafter, the "Working Procedures"):55 ■
"On 8 August 1996, Japan notified the DSB of the WTO of its decision to
appeal certain issues of law covered in the Panel Report and legal
interpretations developed by the Panel (para. 4 ofArticle 16 DSU), and filed a
Notice of Appeal with the Appellate Body (Rule 20 Working Procedures
[Commence ofAppeal]);
then, on 23 August 1996, the U.S. filed an appellant's submission (Rule 23(1)
Working Procedures [Multiple Appeals]); and,
on 2 September 1996, the E.C., Canada and the U.S. submitted an appellees'
submission (Rule 22 Working Procedures [Appellee's Submission]), and on
"Report of the AB on Japan - Alcohol-II, WT/DS8/AB/R; WT/DS10/AB/R;
WT/DS11/AB/R (4 October 1996). The members of the AB in this case were: Julio
Lacarte-Muro (Presiding Member); James Bacchus; Said El-Naggar.
S4As of 3 November 1998, there are only three cases which have not been appealed, that is,
the Japan - Film case (WT/DS44), the Indonesian National Car case (WT/DS54, 55, 59 and
64) and the India Patent case (complained by EC) (WT/DS79).
55WT/ABAVP/1 (15 February 1996), which was consolidated, revised and replaced by
WT/AB/WP/3 (28 February 1997).
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that same day, Japan submitted an appellee's submission (Rule 23(3) Working
Procedures [Multiple Appeals])".56
All the participants submitted their respective arguments in the appeal.
1. Japan:
Apart from arguments concerning the Panel's errors which are listed below,
0
Japan responded be stating that the U.S.'s arguments were not based on a
correct understanding of the Japanese liquor tax system, namely, the Liquor
Tax Law, which had the legitimate policy purpose of ensuring neutrality and
equity, in particular, horizontal equity, and it had neither the aim nor the effect
0
of protecting domestic production. Japan asserted that it was incorrect to
conclude that all distilled liquors were "like products" (Article 111:2, first
sentence), or to conclude that the Liquor Tax Law was inconsistent with Article
111:2 because it imposed a tax on imported distilled liquors in excess of the tax
imposed upon like domestic products.
According to Japan, the Panel erred in
-failing to interpret Article 111:2, first and second sentences in light of Article
III:1;
-disallowing an "aim-and-effect" test to determine whether the Liquor Tax Law
was applied "so as to afford protection to domestic production"; 1
-ignoring whether there was "linkage" between the origin of products and the
tax treatment they incurred and, in this respect, not comparing the tax treatment
of domestic products as a whole and foreign products as a whole under the
Liquor Tax Law;.
-not giving proper weight to tax/price ratios as a yardstick to compare tax
burdens;
-failing to interpret correctly the principle of Article 111:1, in particular, the
language "so as to afford protection to domestic production", erroneously
placing excessive emphasis or the phrase "not similarly taxed" in the Note Ad
Article 111:2;
56See, the Report of the AB on Japan - Alcohol-II, supra note 53, at 2.
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-placing excessive emphasis on tariff classification in finding that shochu and
vodka were "like products" within the meaning of Article 111:2, first sentence,
arguing that the relevant tariff binding indicated that these products were not
"like".
2. United States:
The U.S. supported the Panel's conclusions in general but alleged several
I
errors, as listed below, in the Panel's findings and in the legal interpretations
developed by the Panel in drawing its conclusions in its Report. Apart from
arguments with respect to the those errors, the U.S. responded to the claims of
error pointed out in Japan's (appellant's) submission that: the national treatment
provisions (Article III) could apply to origin-neutral measures; Japan's taxation
under the Liquor Tax Law had the aim and effect of affording protection to
9
domestic production; and the tax/price ratios quoted by Japan were not the
appropriate basis for evaluating the consistency of taxation under the Liquor
Tax Law with Article HI:2.
*
• 0
According to the U. S., the Panel erred in
-disregarding Article 111:1, which the U.S. saw as an integral part of the context
that must be considered in interpreting Article 111:2, and Article III generally;
-not finding that all distilled spirits constituted "like products" under Article
*
111:2, first sentence;
-drawing a connection between national treatment obligations and tariff
bindings;
-interpreting the term "directly competitive or substitutable products" provided
for in the Ad Article to the second sentence of Article 111:2 by not considering
whether a tax distinction was applied "in a manner contrary to the principles set
forth in Article III, paragraph 1", that is, "so as to afford protection to domestic
production";
-using cross-price elasticity as the "decisive criterion" for whether products




-not addressing the hill scope of the products subject to the dispute in that there
4
was inconsistency between the Panel's conclusions on "directly competitive or
substitutable products" (para. 7.1 (ii) of the Panel Report) and the conclusions
(paras. 6.23-6.33 of the Panel Report);
-incorrectly assessing the relationship between Article 111:2 and Article 111:4 by
stating that the product coverage of the two provisions was not identical; and
-incorrectly characterising adopted panel reports as "subsequent practice"
4
within the meaning ofArticle 31(3)(b) of the VCLT.
ft
3. European Communities:
a. Article 111:2, first sentence
The EC supported the Panel's conclusions, especially the Panel's rejection of
the "aim-and-effects" test with respect to the interpretations of Article III, first
and second sentences. The EC also supported the Panel's holding that the
essential criterion for a "like product" determination was similarity of physical
characteristics and that tariff nomenclatures might be relevant for a
determination of "likeness". Nonetheless, the EC was not entirely satisfied
with the Panel's conclusions regarding the range ofproducts found to be "like"
under Article 111:2, first sentence, namely, the EC claimed that those
conclusions primarily involved an assessment of facts and, thus, were not
P
reviewable by the AB, which was limited to the consideration of issues of law
under Article 17:6 DSU.
b. Article 111:2, second sentence
The EC asserted that Japan's argument, i.e. the Liquor Tax Law was not applied
"so as to afford protection to domestic production" of shochu because shochu
ft
was also produced in other countries and, thus, was not an "inherently domestic
product" resulted in two wrong propositions: (i) that "domestic production" of
shochu was not "protected" if the same tax treatment was accorded to foreign
shochu; and, (ii) the mere fact that shochu was produced in third countries was




much as domestic shochu and, consequently, thus protection to production was
not afforded only to domestic production.
0
c. The status ofadopted panel reports
The EC concluded that the Panel's characterisation of those adopted panels as
"subsequent practice in a specific case" was intrinsically contradictory, since
the essence of subsequent practice was that it consisted of a large number of
legally relevant events and pronouncements. The EC view was that one
adopted panel report "would merely constitute part of a wall of the house that
constitutes subsequent practice"The EC, therefore, asked the AB to modify
the Panel's legal terminology regarding this issue.
4. Canada
Canada limited its submission and arguments on appeal to Article 111:2, second
sentence, that is, Canada supported both the Panel's conclusion that the Liquor
Tax Law was inconsistent with Article ni:2, second sentence, as well as its
interpretation that the phrase "so as to afford protection" in Article III: 1 does
not require a consideration of both the aim and the effect of a measure to
determine whether that measure affords protection to domestic production.
%
*
Summary ofConclusions and Recommendations:
%
The AB referred to errors in law found in the Panel report:
-the Panel erred in law in its.conclusion that 'panel reports adopted by the
0
GATT CPs and the DSB ofWTO constituted subsequent practice in a specific
case by virtue of the decision to adopt them';
-the Panel erred in law in failing to take into account Article 111:1 in
m
interpreting Article 111:2, first and second sentences;
-the Panel erred in law in limiting its conclusions in paragraph 7.1 (ii) on
'directly competitive or substitutable products' to 'shochu, whisky, brandy, rum,




gin, genever, and liqueurs', which was inconsistent with the Panel's Terms of
Reference; and
-the Panel erred in law in failing to examine 'so as to afford protection' in
Article III: 1 as a separate inquiry from 'not similarly taxed' in the Ad Article to
Article 111:2, second sentence.
With the modification to the Panel's legal findings and conclusions set out in this
report, the AB affirmed the Panel's conclusions that shochu and vodka were like
products and that Japan, by taxing imported products in excess of like domestic
products, was in violation of its obligations under Article 111:2, first sentence of
GATT 1994. Moreover, the AB concluded that shochu and the other distilled spirits
and liqueurs listed in HS 2208, except vodka, were "directly competitive or
substitutable products", and that Japan, in the application of the Liquor Tax Law, did
. not similarly tax imported and directly competitive or substitutable domestic
products and afforded protection to domestic production in violation of Article 111:2,
second sentence of GATT 1994. The AB recommended that the DSB request Japan




Remarks on the Case:
i) Treaty Interpretation
In the present case, both the Panel and AB defined the principles of interpretation to
be applied in cases under the WTO DS procedures. Articles 31 and 32 of the VCLT
are regarded to be the "customary rule of interpretation of public international law"
as provided for in Article 3:2 DSU. The AB took the same position in the U.S. -
Standards for Reformulated and Conventional Gasoline (hereinafter, the "U.S. -
Gasoline case").58 The AB stressed the need to achieve such clarification by
reference to the fundamental rules of treaty interpretation provided in Article 31(1) of
the VCLT. In the U.S. - Gasoline case, the AB noted that "[o]ne of the corollaries of
the 'general rule of interpretation' in the VCLT was that interpretation must give





meaning and effect to all the terms of the treaty. An interpreter is not free to adopt a
reading that would result in reducing whole clauses or paragraphs of a treaty to
redundancy or inutility".59
ii) Status ofAdopted Panel Reports
The AB rejected the Panel's decision that adopted reports constituted "subsequent
practice" in accordance with the VCLT Article 31(3)(b), i.e. "in a specific case". The
basic approach of the Panel, seems to have been the same as that of the AB. Namely,
since such a condition was incompatible with the notion of "subsequent practice" as a
precedent, the essence of the Panel's decision seems not to have been that adopted
panel reports had to be taken into account by subsequent panels dealing with the
same or similar issue, but that their legal reasoning or results did not have to be
followed by subsequent panels.60 It seems that the expression used in the Panel
Report in this respect is inappropriate.
Furthermore, it seems to be appropriate that the AB rejected the Panel's legal"
reasoning regarding the status of the adopted panel reports, i.e., the adopted panel
reports constitute "other decisions of the CONTRACTING PARTIES to GATT
1947" for the purposes of the WTO Agreement, Annex 1A, the GATT 1994, para.
l(b)(iv).61 Nonetheless, no logical reason was given for this decision by the AB.
0
. Under the WTO system, as prescribed in Article IX:2 in the WTO Agreement, it is
clear that the Ministerial Conference and the General Council have exclusive
authority to interpret the WTO Agreement and the Multilateral Trade Agreements.
From this, it is sufficient to conclude that such authority does not exist by implication
or by inadvertence elsewhere, whereas, under the GATT 1947, panel reports were
adopted by the Council (which was as being equivalent to the CONTRACTING
PARTIES). According to the report by the AB, it said that "a decision to adopt a
panel report did not under GATT 1947 constitute agreement by the CONTRACTING
PARTIES on the legal reasoning contained in that panel report," and further that
"subsequent panels did not feel bound by the details and reasoning of a panel report",
59Ibid., at 23.




referring to the EEC Import ofDessert Apple case.62 Such a historical explanation is
deemed to constitute sufficient grounds for arriving at the above conclusion.
iii) Purpose ofArticle III
The findings of the AB in this report seems to be reasonable. According to the AB,
the protection of negotiated tariff concessions under Article II is certainly one
purpose of Article III. Nonetheless, this should not be overemphasised because the
scope of Article III was not limited to products that were the subject of tariff
concessions under Article II.63
a) "likeproducts"
This case explained an important criteria with regard to the term "like products". In
the Panel Report, the meaning of the term "like product" in Article 111:2 was treated -
#
» differently from that in Article 111:4, namely, the former referred to like product and ■
directly competitive or substitutable product, while the latter mentioned only like
product. According to the Panel Report, the term "like product" should be construed
ft
narrowly in the case of Article 111:2, first sentence.64 The AB agreed with the Panel
on this point.
However, the AB disagreed with the Panel's observation (in para. 6.22) that the
distinction between "like product" and "directly competitive or substitutable
products" under Article 111:2 was "an arbitrary decision". The AB amended this
wording to "a discretionary decision" that must be made by considering the various
characteristics ofproducts in individual cases.
The AB upheld the Panel's reasoning on the decisive criterion to be used in
determining whether products were "like" or "directly competitive or substitutable".
As for deciding "likeness" of products, they must have not only common end uses
but also common physical characteristics; while, with respect to "direct
competitiveness or substitutability" of products, they must have common end-uses
62The Panel Report on EEC - Restrictions on Imports of Dessert Apples (EEC - Desert
Apples), adopted on 22 February 1959, BISD 36S/93 at para. 12.1.
"The Report of the AB on Japan - Alcohol-II, supra note 53, Section G.
"The Report on Japan - Alcohol-I, supra note 21, para. 6.20, which was reproduced in the
Report of the AB, ibid., Footnote 55.
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which may be shown by elasticity of substitution.65
b) determination ofthe likeness of products
The Panel examined the following tests, the so-called "two-step" test and the
"aim-and-effect" test. The Panel rejected the aim-and-effect test because of the
following reasons: (i) the difficulty of demonstrating the purpose of legislation; (ii)
the potential misuse of the burden of proof, for example, this test could seek for
exceptions under Article XX (General Exceptions). To reject the aim-and-effect test
proposed by the U.S. and Japan, the Panel had to reject previous cases in which this
test was employed. Those cases were: the U.S. - Auto Taxes (unadopted) and the
U.S. - Malt Beverages (adopted). It seems that the Panel in this case tried to clarify
the validity of the aim-and-effect test for its analysis ofArticle 111:2.
c) "In excess of'
The AB agreed with the Panel's legal reasoning and its conclusion on this aspect. -
Namely, if the products were found as "like products", even the smallest amount of
"excess" was deemed to be illegal.66 In other words, the de minimis exemption was
not available.
d) "directly competitive or substitutableproducts "
According to the,AB, in the same way as for "like products", the determination of the
appropriate range of "directly competitive or substitutable products" must be made
on a case-by-case basis. It seemed appropriate to look at competition in the relevant
markets as one of the means available to identify the broader category of products
4
that might be described as "directly competitive or substitutable". AB supported the
Panel whereby that the elasticity of substitution in the relevant market should be
examined to determine whether products were "directly competitive or substitutable".
Nonetheless, the AB noted that the Panel made an error of law by not addressing the
test to the full range of alcoholic beverages included in the Terms ofReference.67
65The Report on Japan - Alcohol-I, supra note 21, para. 6.22.
66U.S .-'Malt Beverages, supra note 42, at para. 5.6; U.S.- Superfund, supra note 52 at para.





e) "Not similarly taxed"
The AB challenged the Panel's reasoning in arriving at its decision that "if directly
competitive or substitutable products were 'not similarly taxed', and if it were found
9
that the tax favoured domestic products, then protection would be afforded to such
products, and Article 111:2, second sentence, would be violated".68 However, in the
view of the AB, the standard of "not similarly taxed" and that of "so as to afford
protection" were different. Nonetheless, the AB agreed with the Panel that the
amount of difference in taxation had to be more than de minimis to be deemed "not
similarly taxed".69 In addition, the AB supported the Panel's reasoning that whether
any particular differential amount of taxation was de minimis or not had to be
determined on a case-by-case basis. In short, to be "not similarly taxed", the tax
burden on imported products must be heavier than on "directly competitive or





- f), "so as to affordprotection to domesticproduction "
The Panel equated dissimilar taxation above a de minimis level with the "separate
and distinct" (as the AB held above) requirement of demonstrating that the tax
measure "affords protection to domestic production". According to the report of the
AB, the dissimilar taxation must be more than de minimis. Furthermore, the
dissimilar taxation levied differently must also be applied "so as to afford protection"
to domestic products. In addition, a determination of "the existence of protective
taxation" must be made based on a careful, objective analysis of each and all relevant
facts and all the relevant circumstances.
vi) A new approach to interpretation could be recognised in the reports of Panel and
AB
67See the Report on Japan - Alcohol-II, supra note 21, para. 7.1(ii) which referred only to
"shochu, whisky, brandy, rum, gin, genever, and liqueurs". The U.S., in fact, referred the
range of products to the DSB as "all other distilled spirits and liqueurs falling within HS
heading 2208" (see WT/DS11/2).




The reports of Panel and AB extensively dealt with treaty interpretations.70 The
customary law rules for textual, systematic and functional methods of treaty
interpretation71 were becoming more evident in panel practice. In addition, Article
3:2 DSU explicitly refers to it: "The Members recognise that the WTO DS
mechanism serves to preserve the rights and obligations of Members under the
covered agreements, and to clarify the existing provisions of those agreements in
accordance with customary rules of interpretation of public international law"
(emphasis added). The customary rules of interpretation of public international law
it
are codified by Articles 31 and 32 of the VCLT, which is often cited to when
interpreting a treaty, such as, the WTO Agreement.72 However, this legal concept
had not explicitly been referred to previously (which was rather unpopular during the
GATT period) and, in fact, most disputes were resolved within the scope of GATT
jurisdiction.73 Accordingly, the GATT Panel often had recourse to the drafting
history of GATT (or the drafting history of the Havana Charter) which should have
been referred to only as a "supplementary means of interpretation" under public
international law, inter alia, under Article 32 of the VCLT.74 In this respect, the
70See, ibid., Section D. "Treaty Interpretation".
"Petersmann, E.-U., The GATT/WTO Dispute Settlement System: International Law.
International Organisations and Dispute Settlement [hereinafter, the "GATT/WTO DS
System"]. Kluwer Law International Ltd., the Hague, 1997 at 113.
72See, Territorial Dispute (Libyan Arab Jamahiriya/Chad), ICJ Reports 1994, p.6, at p. 21,
para. 41, reaffirmed in Maritime Delimination and Territorial Questions Between Qatar and
Bahrain (Jurisdiction and Admissibility), ICJ Reports 1995, p.6, at p.21, para. 33 (see also
cases cited in Sinclair, Ian.. The Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties. 2nd ed.,
Manchester University Press, Manchester, 1984, Chapter Five, pp. 114-158). This view is
also reflected in the WTO practice: apart from the present case (Japan - Alcohol-I, BISD
34S/83), see for example: the Panel Report on "EC - Cotton Yarn", ADP/137 (30 October
1955), paras. 540ff; the Panel Report on "US - Reformulated Gasoline", WT/DS2/R (29
January 1996), WT/DS2/AB/R (29 April 1996) at 16 and also ILM 1996, pp. 247-300,
603-634; the AB Report on "Japan - Alcohol-II", supra note 53 (1 November 1996); the
Report of the Panel and the AB on "US - Cotton Underwear", WT/DS24/R,
WT/DS24/AB/R (25 February 1997); the Report of the Panel and the AB on "Brazil -
Desiccated Coconut", WT/DS22/R, WT/DS22/AB/R (20 March 1997) (this case referred to
the VCLT extensively); the Report of the Panel and the AB on "EC - Bananas",
WT/DS27/R/ECU, WT/DS27/R/GTM, WT/DS27/R/MEX, WT/DS27/R/USA,
WT/DS27/AB/R (25 September 1997); the Panel Report on "EC - Hormones",
WT/DS6/R/USA, WT/DS6/R/CAN (24 September 1997).
"According to Professor Petersmann, "Under the GATT 1947most panel reports have not
devoted much space to explaining their methods of treaty interpretation"., in E.-U.
Petersmann, The GATT/WTO DS System, supra note 71 at 112.
14uUp to the 1980's panels often attached undue importance to the drafting history ofGATT
1947 which, should be used only as a supplementary means of interpretation in view of the
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Panel and AB seem to have made efforts to clarify treaty interpretation in accordance
0
with customary rules as defined in the VCLT.
*
Second, the Panel demonstrated its "strict" rule-oriented attitude in light of the issues
in dispute throughout the DS procedures (e.g., para. 6.26 of the Panel report) which
eventually resulted in favouring the EC's arguments. Nonetheless, despite the
request by Japan, the Panel did leave aside the issue of the legality of the Alcohol
Tax System of the Complainants. In other words, the Complainants must have been
%
awared of some impact on their Alcohol Tax System in future cases. In this regards,
the present case will have substantially influenced future cases dealing with similar
issues originating from the Complainants' tax system.
%
Third, the Panel used the issue of "tariff' (or customs duties) as one of the grounds
for issuing recommendations which decided that Japan's Liquor Tax Law was not in
accordance with the GATT rules. Nonetheless, a tariff is one of the border controls
or measurers used in order for a country to protect its national industries in
accordance with tariffs agreed under the GATT/WTO rule. In other words, a tariff is
the only means ofprotection permitted under the GATT/WTO system. Furthermore,
one should recall that a principal goal of the GATT is to promote trade liberalisation
through substantial reduction of tariffs (through tariff negotiations conducted in
accordance with the GATT rule provided in Article XXVIII bis), which can be found
in the Preamble to the General Agreement. The Preamble states: "Being desirous of
contributing to these objectives by entering into reciprocal and mutually
advantageous arrangements directed to the substantial reduction of tariffs and other
barriers to trade and to the elimination of discriminatory treatment in international
commerce" (emphasis added).75 This paragraph was once again reiterated in the
Preamble to the WTO Agreement. Accordingly, one could recognise the proper goal
of tariffs (i.e. protection of national products in accordance with certain conditions
such as agreed tariff concessions) as being clearly indicated in the text. In the present
fact that, for example, most GATT contracting parties did not participate in the drafting of
the GATT 1947"., ibid., at pp. 112-113.
"See, the Preamble of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT).
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case, however, the issue was whether Japan's national legislation (i.e. internal
measures such as taxation and regulation) was in violation of Article III. It,
therefore, excluded the issue ofborder controls/measures (i.e. tariffs/customs duties),
from the scope of this provision. For this reason, it seems fair to say that the Panel
examined an issue beyond its original terms of reference which were merely
concerned with the legality ofJapan's national measures under Article III.
*
v) Japan's tactical approach in DS proceedings
It should be noted that Japan made a timely response to the U.S. over the issue of
terms of reference. Although the U.S. requested consultations with Japan under
GATT Article XXII concerning internal tax imposed by Japan on certain alcoholic
beverages pursuant to the Liquor Tax Law (WT/DS11/1), the U.S. later tried to
expand the factual and legal basis of its original claim,76 which stated "...the
reduction in excise taxes for small volume producers, contained in the 1989
legislation, discriminates on its face against imported shochu, sake and wine and ■ >
therefore violates Article 111:2 first sentence". Japan responded to this U.S. claim
immediately and condemned the U.S. for its action. Furthermore, Japan promptly
requested the Panel to consider that the U.S. claim as being beyond the terms of1
reference of the present case.77 The Panel turned down the U.S. claim regarding the
Japanese Taxation Special Measures Law, and only dealt with the other claims.78 In
this respect, unlike its previous behaviour in such matters, Japan responded
efficiently and promptly to this U.S. tactic and eventually succeeded in overcoming
it.
16Cf. Japan - Measures Affecting Distribution Services, complained by the U.S. (WT/DS45)
on 13 June 1996. Later, on 20 September 1996, the U.S. requested further consultations
with Japan in order to stretch or expand its original claim in terms of the factual and legal
basis.
4
The Report on Japan - Alcohol-I, supra note 21, para. 4. 3.
"See, ibid. para. 6.5. which stated that "...concluded that its terms of reference do not permit
it to entertain the claim of the United States with respect to the Japanese Taxation Special
Measures Law and it proceeded, therefore, to examine the other claims".
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vi) Careless statements in Japan's argument
Although Japan displayed sound tactics during the panel proceedings, it also made
careless statements in its argument. For instance, with respect to the interpretation of
Article 111:2, second sentence, Japan argued: "the 'effect' of'so as to afford protection'
must be judged by whether the tax distorts the competitive relationship between
imported and domestic products" (para. 4.153). Japan argued that the Liquor Tax
Law did not distort the competitive relation between imported and domestic products
because "the tax/price ratios of all tax categories are roughly the same. Concerning
the examination of the tax burden, the tax/price ratio is a superior yardstick and better
indicates the impact on consumers' choice than the ratio of tax over product volume
or alcohol content...(emphasis added); ..." (para. 4.153). To support this argument,
Japan submitted charts (one is on the Average Retail Prices and Taxes ofLiquor, and
the other on the Percentage of Taxes in Retail Prices) which identified the "roughly
4
the same" tax/price ratios in Annex VI of the Panel Report (para. 4.143).
Nonetheless, among the evidence rebutted by the Community, it was pointed out that
"[t]he tax/price ratio calculated • by Japan is far from being 'roughly constant'
(emphasis added) (para. 6.155).
Following the arguments put by the parties to the dispute, the Panel addressed the
argument submitted by Japan which, in the Panel's view, aimed to achieve horizontal
equity (i.e. a level playing field, namely, requires the same tax burden regardless of a
various level of tax-bearing ability).79 Nonetheless, since the aim-and-effect test put
forward by Japan and the U.S. had already been dismissed by the Panel, the Panel
noted that Japan's argument could be regarded as being that Liquor Tax Law taxed
directly competitive or substitutable products similarly. The Panel considered that
this argument should be rejected due to the following reasons (para. 6.34):
a) The benchmark in Article 111:2, second sentence, is whether internal taxes
operate "so as to afford protection to domestic production", which means
dissimilar taxation ofdomestic and foreign directly competitive or substitutable
products; ... the Panel considered that it is not at all clear that maintaining a
"roughly constant" tax/price ratio avoids violating this requirement (emphasis
added);




b) The statistics on the tax/price ratio indicate that significant differences exist
between shochu and the other directly competitive or substitutable products and
also that there are significantly different tax/price ratios within the same
product categories. Therefore, the tax/price ratios could not be regarded as
being "roughly constant", and horizontal equity could not be demonstrated;
... there were significant problems with the methodology used for calculating
tax/price ratios submitted by Japan (para. 6.33), thus arguments based on that
methodology could be regarded as inconclusive;
... its statistics on which the tax/price ratios were based excluded domestically
produced spirits and whisky/brandy from the calculation of tax/price ratios for
spirits and whisky/brandy. Since the prices of the domestic spirits and
whisky/brandy are much lower than the prices of the imported ones, this
exclusion has the impact of reducing considerably the tax/price ratios cited by
Japan for those products.
In this connection, ...one consequence of the Japanese tax system was to make
it more difficult for cheaper imported brands of spirits and whisky/brandy to
enter the Japanese market (emphasis added); and,
c) ... the purpose of [the contested legislation], i.e. maintaining a constant
tax/price ratio was not mentioned in the legislation. This is ex post facto
rationalisation by Japan, and ... there are no guarantees in the legislation that
the tax/price ratio will always be maintained at a constant (or "roughly
constant") level (emphasis added).
Consequently, the Panel considered that Japan's argument should be rejected. As
examined above, first of all, it seems that the phrase, "roughly constant", was not
persuasive in the Panel's view. In this regard, Japan argued that the tax/price ratios
under the legislation calculated by Japan was neutral, and furthermore Japan
0
submitted the data which was supposed to demonstrate the neutrality of the tax. On
the contrary, the data was deemed as evidence which showed it not to be neutral.
The percentage of taxes on retail prices might vary from 5 to 22 percent, which
seemed quite different from what Japan had argued. Therefore, there was some
weakness in Japan's argument which was consequently unconvincing. It seems that
Japan made careless statements in its arguments which led Japan to being in an
disadvantageous position and eventually gave a negative impression to the Panel. To
%
sum up, the Japanese argument seemed to be based on a defacto rationalisation of its
Liquor Tax Law. Accordingly, this point was not appreciated from a legal point of





It should be mentioned that one phenomenon, subsequent to the present panel has
become apparent, that is, the WTO ruling against Japan has already triggered similar
cases against other member states (i.e., South Korea and Chile respectively) as had
been anticipated. First, complaints against Korean taxes on alcoholic beverages were
made by the EC (WT/DS/75/1) on 4 April 1997 and the U.S. (WT/DS84/1) on 23
May 1997.80 Chilean taxes on alcoholic beverages were complained against by the
EC (WT/DS87/1) on 4 June 1997.81 Furthermore, one can expect a number of similar
cases to be brought in the future. Since the WTO Panel has already expressed its
opinion over similar issues in the present Japanese case, it will be worth examining
those forthcoming reports for the purpose of comparison, but I leave this for a future
project.
80On 13 July 1998, the Panel issued a panel report which supported the U.S. (complainant)
challenge to Korean laws, see "WTO Panel Backs U.S.-EU Case by Shooting Down Korean '
Liquor Tax", Inside US Trade, 7 August 1998; Report of the Panel on Korea -Taxes on
Alcoholic Beverage, WT/DS75/R; WT/DS84/R (17 September 1998); On 20 October 1998,
Korea appealed certain issues of law covered in the Panel Report and legal interpretations
developed by the Panel. The appellate body informed that it would not be able to circulate
its Report by 21 December 1998 due to the time required for translation of the Report
(according to Article 17.5 of the DSU, the Appellate Body will circulate its report no later
than 60 days after the appellant has formally notified its decision to appeal; in this case, the
60-day period would expire on Monday, 21 December 1998). Instead, the Report of the
Appellate Body was circulated to WTO Members by Monday, 18 January 1999; see Korea -
Taxes on Alcoholic Beverages: Communication from the Appellate Body, WT/DS75/10,
WT/DS84/8 (17 December 1998); fort he report of the Appellate Body, WT/DS75/AB/R;
WT/DS84/AB/R (18 January 1999).
8lThis request is in respect of Chile's Special Sales Tax on spirits, which allegedly imposes a
higher tax on imported spirits than on "Pisco" (a locally brewed spirit). The EC contends
that this differential treatment of imported sprits violates Article 111:2 of GATT 1994. The
panel was established on 18 November 1997. In addition, on 15 December 1997, the EC
made another request in respect of Chile's internal tax regime for alcoholic beverages
complained of by the EC (DS87) and by the U.S. (DS109). The EC's request concerns with
the modification to the law on taxation on alcoholic beverages passed by Chile to address
the concerns of the EC (DS87). The EC contends that the modified law still violates GATT
Article 111:2. The DSB established a panel on 25 March 1998. The DSB agreed, pursuant to
Article 9.1 of the DSU, that the two complaints be examined by a single panel; the Chairman
of the Panel circulated communication regarding delay of its work. According to the
communication, it will be impossible for this Panel to complete its work in six month "due to
the parties' wish to use the maximum time periods prescribed in Appendix 3 of the DSU".
The Panel now expects to circulate the final report to the parties by the end of April 1999;
see for Communication from the Chairman of the Panel, WT/DS87/7; WT/DS1I0/6 (25
January 1999); Report of the Panel on Chile - Taxes on Alcoholic Beverage, WT/DS87 /R;




8.1.2.2. The Film Case82
Background:
The present case was initiated with the Kodak's petition (18 May 1995) under
Section 301 of the Trade Act of 1974 with the USTR. On 3 July 1995, the USTR
commenced an investigation and subsequently requested bilateral consultations with
Japan. The MITI, however, refused this U.S. request.83 On 13 June 1996, the U.S.
finally requested consultations with Japan regarding certain Japanese
"unreasonable"84 tolerance of anitcompetitive practices in the film market.85 On 20
September 1996, the U.S. requested the establishment of a Panel86 and in its request
the U.S. made certain allegation concerning Japan's implementation and maintenance
of certain laws, regulations, requirements and measures (or "taisaku" in Japanese)87
affecting the distribution, offering for sale, and internal sale of imported consumer
photographic film and paper.
Summary of Arguments:
The gist of the claims raised by the U.S. was that 21 Japanese measures,88 though not
in violation of WTO rules, impaired the "legitimate expectations" of the U.S. (by
82Report of Panel on Japan - Measures Affecting Consumer Photographic Film and Paper
(Japan - Film), WT/DS44/R (31 March 1998).
83See, Letter from MITI Vice-Minister Yoshihiro Sakamoto to USTR Ambassador Ira
Shapiro, reproduced in Inside US Trade, 12 January 1996 at 23-24.
MFor the definition of "unreasonable", see Trade and TariffAct of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-573,
98 Stat. 2948, 19 U.S.C. §2411(d)(3)(A), (B) (1984).
85WT/DS44/1 (21 June 1996).
86On 12 December 1996, the U.S. requested the DG to determine the composition of the
Panel (Article 8.7 DSU); On 17 December 1996, the DG composed of the Panel consisting of
Mr. William Rossier (Switzerland) as Chairman, Mr. Adrian Macey (New Zealand) and Mr.
Victor Luis do Prado (Brazil) as panellists; the Panel held two substantive meetings with the
parties to the dispute: the first was held on 17 and 18 April 1997, and the second on 2 and 3
June 1997 (the Panel had one meeting with the third parties to the dispute, i.e. the EU and
Mexico, on 18 April 1997).
87The parties raised translation problems (in total, 24 separate translation issues) including
the term "taisaku". "Taisaku", for example, was translated as (liberalisation)
"countermeasures" by the U.S. or as (liberalisation) "measures" by Japan. For resolving this
issue, the Panel, accordingly, pursuant to Article 13 of the DSU, appointed two Japanese
language experts, i.e. Professor Zentaro Kitagawa (Kyoto Comparative Law Centre, Japan)
and Professor Michael Young (Columbia University, New York) [para. 1.10 of the Panel
Report in WT/DS44/R (31 March 1998)]; for the Procedure for the Resolution of Possible
Translation Issue, see, ibid. para. 1.9.; The reports by these experts are attached as an
"Annex on Translation Problems" in Section XI of the Panel Report.
88The List of 21 Measures at Issue:
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virtue of the tariff negotiations of the Kennedy, Tokyo and Uruguay Rounds) for
access to the Japanese photographic film market. The U.S., in this case, grouped 21
1. DISTRIBUTION MEASURES
(1) 1967 Cabinet Decision
(2)*Japan Fair Trade Commission Notification 17 on Premiums to Business (1967 JFTC
Notification 17)
(3)* 1968 Sixth Interim Report on "Distribution Modernisation Outlook and Issues" (1968
Sixth Interim Report)
(4) 1969 Seventh Interim Report on "Systemisation ofDistribution Activities" (1969 Seventh
Interim Report)
(5) 1969 Survey on Transaction Terms (1969 Survey)
(6) 1970 Guidelines for Rationalising Terms of Trade for Photographic Film (1970
Guidelines)
(7)**1971 International Contract Notification under the Antimonopoly Law and JFTC Rule
1 (1971 International Contract Notification requirement)
(8) 1971 Basic Plan for Systemisation ofDistribution (1971 Basic Plan)
(9) 1975 Manual for Systemisation of Distribution by Industry: Camera and Film (1975
Manual)
(10)**1976 Japan Development Bank funding to Konica for joint distribution facilities (1976
JDB funding for Konica's wholesalers)
(H)*#1977 Small and Medium Enteiprise Agency financing to photoprocessing laboratories
(1977 SMEA funding for photoprocessing laboratories)
2. RESTRICTIONS ON LARGE RETAIL STORES
(12) 1974 Large Scale Retail Stores Law (1974 Large Stores Law)
(13) 1979 Diet amendment to Large Stores Law (1979 Amendment)
3. PROMOTION MEASURES
(14)**1971 JFTC Notification 34 on open lotteries (1971 JFTC Notification 34)
(15)* 1977 JFTC Notification 5 on Premiums to Consumers (1977 JFTC Notification 5)
(16) 1981 JFTC Guidance on Dispatched Employees
(17) 1982 Self-Regulating Rules Concerning Fairness in Trade with Business (1982
Self-Regulating Rules)
(18) 1982 Establishment ofFair Trade Promotion Council (1982 Promotion Council)
(19)** 1983 JFTC guidance on the establishment of rules on loss-leader advertising and
dumping (1983 JFTC guidance on advertising rules)
(20) 1984 Self-Regulating Standards Concerning Display of Processing Fees for Colour
Negative Film (1984 Self-Regulating Standards)
(21) JFTC approval of the 1987 Retailers Code and its enforcement body, the Retailers Fair
Trade Council (1987 Retail Code)
Note 1: Japan argued that those measures marked with an asterisk(s) were not properly
before the panel because of procedural defects in the U.S. complaint (para. 3.11).*
*Under the heading "Procedural Objections" (Section III, B of the Panel Report), Japan
requested the panel to dismiss some of the US claims because these "measures" were raised by
the U.S. for the first time in its initial submission to the Panel, and had not been identified
specifically in the request for the establishment of the panel. Article 6:2 DSU requires the
complaining party "to identify the specific measures at issue" (emphasis added). In Japan's
view, the U.S. requests for consultations as well as the establishment of a panel insufficiently
identified the measures in dispute, and particularly the U.S. panel request did not fulfil the
specificity requirements prescribed in Article 6:2 DSU; Japan also argued that the U.S. request
for consultations was "overly broad and vague", and did not identify the measures as required
in Article 4:4 DSU which read: "Any request for consultations shall be submitted in writing
and shall give reasons for the request, including identification ofthe measures at issue and an
identification ofthe legal basis for the complaint" (emphasis added).
Note 2: The Panel sustained Japan's procedural objections (Note J) in respect of 5 measures,
marked with two asterisks above, which were not within the Panel's terms of reference.
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measures into 3 broad categories: (i) distribution measures, which allegedly
encouraged and facilitated the creation of a vertically integrated market structure for
photographic film and paper in which imports were excluded from traditional
distribution channels; (ii) restrictions on large stores (i.e. Large Stores Law), which
allegedly restricted the growth of alternative distribution channels for imported film;
and (iii) promotion measures, which allegedly disadvantaged imports by restricting
the use of sales promotion techniques.
In this case, the U.S. alleged the following:
-"The distribution countermeasures, Large Stores Law and related measures,
and promotion countermeasures in combination nullify or impair benefits
within the meaning ofArticle XXIII: 1(b);
-"The distribution countermeasures, as a set, also
i. violate Article 111:4 and
ii. nullify or impair benefits within the meaning ofArticle XXIII:1(b);
-"The Large Stores Law and related measures also nullify or impair benefits
within the meaning of Article XXIII: 1(b), in the context of the restrictive
distribution structure in Japan;
-"The promotions countermeasures, as a set, nullify or impair benefits within
the meaning ofArticle XXIII: 1(b), in the context of the restrictive distribution
structure in Japan;
-"The specific failures to publish the fair trade councils' and JFTC enforcement ;
actions as well as guidance by MITI, prefectural and local authorities under the
Large Stores Law or related local regulations, that establish or modify criteria
applicable in future cases, each constitute a violation of Article X:l." (para.
4.26)
Japan rejected all these U.S. claims. In Japan's view, "none of the alleged measures
individually adversely affected imported products or altered the conditions of
competition facing imported products; Japan further emphasised that even if these
three broad categories of measures were considered as 'sets of measures' with
combined effects, they did not in any way disadvantage imports because combining
nothing with nothing still produces nothing" .89
89The Report on Japan - Film, supra note 82, para. 4.27.
285
CHAPTER 8
Summary ofFindings and Conclusions:
1. Procedural objection
Of 21 Japanese measures objected to by the U.S., Japan argued that 8 measures were
outside the Panel's terms of reference and were not proper to be put before the Panel
because of procedural defects in the complaint. The Panel sustained Japan's
procedural objections with respect to 5 measures90 out of 8 because the U.S. had not
complied with the requirements of Article 6:2 DSU which requires the complaining
party to "identify the specific measures at issue" when requesting the establishment
of a panel. Furthermore, these items had not been mentioned in the U.S. panel
request, nor were they subsidiary or closely related to measures specifically
identified. In addition, the Panel decided that the 3 remaining measures91 out of 8
were within its terms of reference because they were also subsidiary or closely
related to measures specifically identified (i.e. the respondent and third parties had
received adequate notice of the scope of the complainant's claims), (paras.
10.20-10.21)
2. Non-violation claims
As mentioned earlier, the U.S. grouped measures of the Japanese government into 3
categories, namely, distribution measures; restrictions on large retail stores; and
promotion measures. The central theme of the U.S. claim was that these three sets of
measures attributable to the Government of Japan, though not in violation of WTO
rules, impaired or nullified, individually and in combination, the legitimate
expectations of U.S. (which, in the U.S. view, resulted from the tariff concessions
granted by Japan in the Kennedy, Tokyo and Uruguay Rounds of tariff negotiations)
for access to the Japanese photographic film market.
*
With respect to the non-violation claim under the GATT, Article XXIII: 1 (b) reads:
90(i) 1976 JDB funding to Konica for joint distribution facilities; (ii) 1977 SMEA funding
photoprocessing laboratories; (iii) 1971 International Contract Notification requirement (and
Rule 1 under Article 6 of the Antimonopoly Law); (iv) 1971 JFTC Notification 34; and (v)
1983 JFC guidance on advertising and dumping.





"If any Member should consider that any benefit accruing to it directly or
indirectly under this Agreement is being nullified or impaired... as the result of
...(b) the application by another Member of any measure, whether or not it
conflicts with the provisions of this Agreement... " (emphasis added).
Despite its recognition under the GATT/WTO rules, there have only been three
successful non-violation cases (out of, just eight cases in which panels or working
parties have substantively considered Article XXIII: 1(b) claims92) brought in the
fifty-years-history ofGATT. In the most recent successful case, the Oilseeds panel, a
persuasive explanation for the purpose ofArticle XXIII: 1(b) was expressed:
"The idea underlying [the provisions of Article XXIII: 1(b)] is that the
improved competitive opportunities that can legitimately be expected from a
tariff concession can be frustrated not only by measures prescribed by the
General Agreement but also by measures consistent with that Agreement. In
order to encourage contracting parties to make tariff concessions they must
therefore be given a right of redress when a reciprocal concession is impaired
by another contracting party as a result of the application of any measure,
whether or not it conflicts with the General Agreement" .93
• • •
i "The Panel considered that the main value of a tariff concession is that it
provides an assurance of better market access through improved price
competition. Contracting parties negotiate tariff concessions primarily to
obtain that advantage. They must therefore be assumed to base their tariff
negotiations on the expectation that the price effect of the tariff concessions
will not be systematically offset. If no right of redress were given to them in
such a case they would be reluctant to make tariff concessions and the General
Agreement would no longer be useful as a legal framework for incorporating
the results of trade negotiations".94
"•Report of the Working Party on Australian Subsidy on Ammonium Sulphate, adopted on
3 April 1950, BISD11/188; *Panel Report on Treatment by Germany of Imports of Sardines
("Germany - Sardines"), G/26, adopted on 31 October 1952 BISD IS/53; Uruguayan
Recourse, adopted on 16 November 1962, BISD 11S/95; Panel Report on EC - Tariff
Treatment on Imports of Citrus Products from Certain Countries in the Mediterranean
Region ("EC - Citrus Products"), L/5576 [7 February 1985 (unadopted)]; Panel Report on
EEC - Production Aids Granted on Canned Peaches, Canned Pears, Canned Fruit Cocktail
and Dried Grapes ("EEC - Canned Fruits"), L/5778 [20 February 1985 (unadopted)]; Japan -
Semi-conductors, adopted on 4 May 1988, BISD 35S/116; *EEC - Oilseeds, adopted on 25
January 1990, BISD 37S/86; United States - Agricultural Waiver, adopted on 7 November
1990, BISD 37S/228 (those cases marked with an asterisk are three successful ones).





Both GATT contracting parties and WTO Members have treated a non-violation
claim with caution and have treated it as an exceptional remedy which requires the
complaining party to provide a detailed justification to support its allegations.
Article 26:1 DSU confirms this point as follows:
"Where and to the extent that such party considers and a panel or the Appellate
Body determines that a case concerns a measure that does not conflict with the
provisions of a covered agreement to which the provisions ofparagraph 1 (b) of
Article XXIII of GATT 1994 are applicable, the procedures in this
Understanding shall apply, subject to the following:
(a) the complainingparty shall present a detailedjustification in support
of any complaint relating to a measure which does not conflict with the
relevant covered agreement ...".9S (emphasis added)
w
As explained, the requirements for establishing a non-violation case are stricter than
those in a violation case. A "detailed justification" with respect to three elements are
required to be demonstrated:
i) that a governmental measure exists;
ii) that it was not anticipated at the time of the relevant tariffnegotiations; and




To begin with, the present dispute centred on whether the "measures" cited were
governmental and whether they were still in effect. Japan argued that several of the
measures cited were merely studies by non-governmental bodies or actions taken be
private organisations. The U.S. countered, however, that such Japanese studies (by
order of the MITI) or actions taken by private organisations were equivalent to
governmental action. Those issues have been considered in three GATT cases dealt
with below, involving Japanese government "administrative guidance" and a
Japanese-government approved "fair competition code" applicable to a private
association. The definitions of "measures" ofeach party are:





In the Japanese view, it must provide benefits or impose obligations. In other
words, it must be a governmental policy or action which imposes legally
41
binding obligations or their substantive equivalent. While, in the U.S. view, it
should not be limited to refer only to legally binding obligations or their
substantive equivalent and should be given a broader definition.
a) "administrativeguidance"
The issue of government attributability had been considered in the following GATT
*
cases which involved "administrative guidance" of the Japanese government and a
Japanese-government approved "fair competition code" applicable to a private
association.
1. In the Japan - Semiconductor case, the Panel held that where administrative
guidance creates incentives or disincentives largely dependent upon governmental
action for private parties to act in a particular manner, non-mandatory measures
would be operating in a manner equivalent to mandatory requirements so that the
difference was only one ofform and not of substance.96 (emphasis added) (para.
10.54)
2. In the Japan - Agricultural Products case, informal administrative guidance to
restrict production of certain agricultural products could be considered to be a
governmental measure because it was a traditional tool of Japanese Government
policy based on consensus and peer pressure, and due to its effectiveness in the
Japanese context in spite of its lack of transparency.97 (emphasis added)
3. In the EEC - Dessert Apples case, the Panel noted that the EEC internal regime for
apples was a hybrid one, which combined elements of public and private
responsibility, namely, direct buying-in of apples by Member State authorities and
"Japan - Semiconductors, BISD 35S/116 at 155; see Section 7.1.1.4. of this thesis.
97Panel Report on Japan - Restrictions on Imports ofCertain Agricultural Products ("Japan -





withdrawals by producer groups, and considered both systems to be governmental
measures.98 (emphasis added) (para. 10.55)
In the Panel's view, a government policy or action need not necessarily have a
substantially binding or compulsory nature for it to entail a likelihood of compliance
«
by private actors in a way so as to nullify or impair legitimately expected benefits
0
within the purview of Article XXIII:l(b). Furthermore, in cases where there was a
high degree of co-operation and collaboration between government and business
(e.g. where there was substantial reliance on "administrative guidance" and other
more informal forms of a government-business co-operation), it was conceivable that
even non-binding, hortatory wording in a government statement ofpolicy could have
a similar effect on private actors as legally binding measure or what Japan referred to
as regulatory "administrative guidance", (para. 10.49)
The Panel, furthermore, stated that the incentive/disincentive test (in the Japan -
Semiconductors panel) should not be deemed as an exclusive means of characterising
formally non-binding measures as governmental.99 The Panel on EEC - Parts and
Components considered that the term "laws, regulations or requirements" included
requirements which an enterprise voluntarily accepts in order to obtain an advantage
from the government.100 Given that the scope of the word requirement would seem
to be narrower than that ofmeasure, the broad reading given to the word requirement
by past panels supported an even broader reading of the word measure.™ The Panel,
therefore, concluded that the term "measures" should be defined not in an unduly
restrictive manner but on a case-by-case basis. Otherwise, there was a risk that
cases, in which governments had been involved one way or another in the
nullification or impairment ofbenefits (i.e. legitimate expectations ofbenefits arising
0
98Panel Report on EEC - Dessert Apples (Complained by Chile), BISD 36S/93, 126, supra
note 62.
"Ibid., para. 10.48.
IOOPanel Report on EEC - Regulation on Imports ofParts and Components ("EEC - Parts and
Components"), adopted on 16 May 1990, BISD 37S/132, 197, para. 5.21; see for the case
study at Section 7.1.2.2. of this thesis.




from tariff negotiations) would not be redressable under GATT Article XXIII: 1(b),
thereby preventing the achievement of the purpose ofnon-violation claims.
b) Continuing application and effect
The Panel noted that the disputing parties agreed on the fundamental point that only a
measure that continues to be applied, and not the market structure which may or may
not result from the application of such measure, may be the basis for a cognisable
non-violation complaint under GATT Article XXIII: 1(b). Whereas, with respect to
the issue whether or not certain of the "measures" in question were still in effect, the
Panel noted the parties' disagreement. Japan argued that most of the "measures"
ended years ago and thus were not currently actionable, while the U.S. contended that
0
at most two "measures"102 were formally repealed and that all the policies underlying
the "measures" continued currently in the form of "continuing administrative
guidance". (para. 10.59)
Regarding the issue of the continuing effect of measures, it was not the practice of
GATT/WTO panels to rule on measures which have expired or which have been
repealed or withdrawn.103 In only a very small number of cases, involving quite
particular situations, had panels proceeded to adjudicate claims involving measures
which no longer existed or which were no longer being applied.104 (para. 10.58)
I02The two measures are: 1967 JFTC Notification 17; and 1971 International Contract
Notification requirement.
103See footnote 1221 of the Panel Report on Japan - Film, supra note 80, U.S. - Gasoline,
WT/DS2/R, para. 6.19, where the Panel stated its opinion that "it had not been the usual
practice ofa panel established under the General Agreement to rule on measures that, at the
time thepanel's terms ofreference werefixed, were not and would not become effective"; see
further Panel Report on Argentina - Measures Affecting Imports of Footwear, Textiles,
Apparel and Other Items (Argentina - Footwear), WT/DS33/R, circulated on 25 November
1997, pp. 84-86.
,04See footnote 1222 of the Panel Report on Japan Film, for example, Panel Report on U.S. -
Wool Shirt and Blouses, WT/DS33/R, upheld by the AB, WT/DS33/AB/R, where the Panel
ruled on a measure that was revoked after the interim review but before issuing the final
report to the parties; Panel Report on EEC - Measures on Animal Feed Proteins (adopted on
14 March 1992), BISD 25S/49, where the panel ruled on a discontinued measure, but one
that had terminated after the terms of reference of the Panel had already been agreed; Panel
Report on United States - Prohibitions on Imports of Tuna and Tuna Products from Canada
(adopted on 22 February 1982, BISD 29S/91, 106, para. 4.3., where the Panel ruled on the
GATT consistency of a withdrawn measure but only in light of the two parties' agreement to




The Panel did not rule out the possibility that old "measures" that were never
officially revoked may continue to be applied through "continuing administrative
guidance". Even if measures were officially revoked, the underlying policies may
continue to be applied through "continuing administrative guidance". Nonetheless,
the Panel noted that the burden was on the U.S. to demonstrate clearly that such
guidance did in fact exist and that it was currently nullifying or impairing benefits.
(para. 10.59)
Proceeding on its broad reading as to what constituted governmental attributability of
measures in a Japanese context, the Panel found that 11 measures105 were attributable
to the Japanese government, 4 were non-governmental106 and 1 originally
governmental measure had been repealed.107
Two reports, a survey and a manual authorised by private research institutes or
MITI-affiliated councils were found to be non-governmental because of the merely
descriptive and advisory nature of the studies. The Panel noted that they were
general reports to the government and therefore could not be deemed as
governmental exhortation to the private sector to take specific actions.
#
The Panel, however, assimilated to governmental measures: two sets of
"self-regulating standards and rules" enacted by business associations in close
consultation with governmental entities; two fair trade councils composed of private
business on a voluntary basis which were created under the guidance of
governmental entities, as well as fair competition codes that were enacted by such
councils with the explicit authorisation of the JFTC. The Panel based these findings,
*
(adopted on 10 November 1980), BISD 27S/98, where the Panel ruled on a measure which
terminated measure and, given its seasonal nature, there remained the prospect of its
reintroduction.
105These were: (i) 1967 Cabinet Decision; (ii) 1970 Guidelines; (iii) 1971 Basic Plan; (iv)
1974 Large Stores Law; (v) 1979 Amendment; (vi) 1977 JFTC Notification 5; (vii) 1981
JFTC Guidance on Dispatched Employees; (viii) 1982 Self-Regulating Rules; (ix) 1982
Promotion Council; (x) 1984 Self-Regulating Standards; and (xi) 1987 Retail Code.
l06These were: (i) 1968 Sixth Interim Report; (ii) 1969 Seventh Interim Report; (iii) 1969
Survey; and (iv) 1975 Manual.
,071967 JFTC Notification 17.
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inter alia, on the fact that compliance with JFTC-approved fair competition codes
entailed involvement of the relevant council. Furthermore, the Panel did not reject
the argument that the JFTC was likely to use these codes as a reference point for
antitrust enforcement also against other companies that were active in the same sector
of industry but which did not participate in the relevant council.
#
ii) The existence of reasonable anticipation
The U. S. claim was based on reasonable expectations of improved market access of
foreign made photographic products accruing to tariff concessions made by Japan
through three consecutive rounds of tariff negotiations, i.e. the Kennedy, Tokyo and
Uruguay Rounds. Japan argued that the Uruguay Round was the only relevant round
because it covered a new balance and assessment of tariff concessions.
In the Panel's view, two provisions of GATT 1994 appeared to be relevant for
resolving this issue. Namely, the GATT 1994 (or the WTO legal' system)
incorporated protocols and certifications relating to tariffconcessions under 1947 and
the Marrakesh Protocol to GATT 1994. Furthermore, the Panel found, also in line
with past GATT panel reports,108 that reasonable expectations might co-exist with
respect to tariff concessions made in successive rounds of Article XXVIII&is
negotiations, (para. 10.64)
It is important to note that Japan made tariff concessions only on black and white
photographic film and paper in the Kennedy Round. Thus, U.S. expectations from
the Kennedy Round were limited to these items. Japan started making tariff
concessions on colour film and paper at the Tokyo Round, (para. 10.71)
According to the U.S., it could not have anticipated the measures cited because, even
at the time of the Uruguay Round, it could not fully appreciated the opaque nature of
these Japanese measures. Japan submitted that most of the measures dated from the
108See, EEC - Canned Fruit, L/5778 (unadopted); EEC - Oilseeds, supra note 92, BISD
. 37S/86.
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late 1960's and 1970's and must have been known to the U.S. and that, in any event,
these measures did not change long-standing policies.
In the Panel's view, measures introduced and published subsequent to the conclusion
of a tariff negotiation need not presumed to be reasonably anticipated, whereas
measures introduced prior to the conclusion of a tariff negotiation should be
presumed. In this connection, in the Panel's view, (the U.S.) was charged with
having knowledge of Japanese government measures as of the date of their
publication. The Panel realised, however, that knowledge of the existence of a
measure is not equivalent to understanding the impact of the measure on a specific
product market. The Panel recognised the possibility of circumstances where the
exporting countrymight not reasonably be aware of the significance of a measure for,
or its potential impact on, imported products until some time after its publication.
Nonetheless, the Panel expected the complaining party to clearly demonstrate why it
could not have reasonably anticipated the effect of an existing measure on the film or
paper market and when it did come to realise the effect. The Panel found that the
. simple statement by the U. S. that Japanese measures were so opaque and informal
that their impact could not be assessed, was insufficient to show such exceptional
circumstances, (para. 10.80)
With respect to the issue whether a measure was published prior or subsequent to the
dates of the conclusion of the three rounds of tariff negotiations, the Panel found the
following:
-The U.S. should have reasonably anticipated one particular measure109 at the
time of the Kennedy Round (1967);
-The U.S. should have anticipated all measures, except 5 of the promotion
measures,110 at the time of the Tokyo Round (1979);
-The U.S. should have anticipated all measures at the time of the Uruguay
Round (1993);
l091967 JFTC Notification 17.
"°1981 JFTC Guidance on Dispatched Employees; 1982 Self-Regulating Rules; 1982
Promotion Council; 1984 Self-Regulating Standards; and 1987 Retail Code.
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-With respect to a single measure111 (which was published nine days before the




iii) Upsetting (nullifying or impairing) the competitive relationship - causality:'12
The third required element of a non-violation claim under Article XXIII: 1(b) is that
the benefit accruing to a WTO Member (e.g., improved market access from tariff
concessions) is nullified or impaired as the result ofthe application of a measure (not
reasonably anticipated) by another Member. According to GATT/WTO panel
practice, a complaining party had to demonstrate a clear correlation between the
measures at issue and an adverse effect on the relevant competitive relationship
between domestic and like foreign products, (para. 10.82)
*
.
Most past non-violation cases dealt with situations where a GATT-consistent
m
> domestic subsidy for the producer of a product had been introduced or modified in
accordance with the grant of a tariff concession on that product. Whether assistance
was financial or non-financial, direct or indirect, did not determine the issue as to
whether its effect did in fact offset legitimate expectations accruing to a Member
from tariff concessions.
In the present case, the competitive relationship between domestic and imported film
and paper at the time when market access was improved through a tariff concession
had to be compared with the competitive relationship between domestic and imported
products after the introduction of the measures at issue. The purpose of the
non-violation remedy is to prevent an existing competitive relationship between
domestic and imported products from worsening, while in the case of a violation
'"It is 1967 Cabinet Decision which was published on 21 June 1967. Note that the Kennedy
Round was concluded on 30 June 1967.
"2The Panel considered that this element (causality) may be one of the more factually
complex areas of its examination of a non-violation claim: in three past GATT panel cases,
the complaining parties failed to provide a detailed justification to support their claim (i.e.,
Uruguayan Recourse, BISD 11S/95, 100, para. IS; Japan - Semiconductors, BISD 35S/116,




claim against less favourable treatment (e.g. under national treatment clause), its
remedy is to ensure the equality of competitive opportunities of imported and
*
domestic products.
Even if competitive relationships had changed to the detriment of imports, it still
needed to be demonstrated that this adverse effect had been caused by measures in
dispute. In previous cases, as mentioned, complainants often failed to establish
non-violation claims due to lack of evidence of causality. Regarding the requisite
degree of causation, the Panel considered that a complainant need not show the
measure at issue "but for" causes for impairment of market-access conditions for
imported film and paper. Furthermore, the Panel did not accept the view that a
complainant need only demonstrate that measures were, among others, "a" cause of
such distortion. It did not matter for the Panel whether market intervention
attributable to the government was a necessary condition for the emergence of
vertical integration that prevented market penetration by foreign products, nor .
whether governmental intervention merely supported the development of
single-brand distribution which private market forces would have created even in the
absence ofany governmental intervention.
■k
Accordingly, the Panel concluded that Japan should be responsible for what was
caused by measures attributable to its government as opposed to what was caused by
restrictive business conduct attributable to private economic participators. In the
Panel's view, the issue was whether the measures had caused individually or
collectively more than a de minimis contribution to nullification or impairment,
(para. 10.84)
a) Distribution measures
The gist of the U.S. claim in respect of distribution measures was that Japan had
created vertical integration between manufacturers, primary and secondary
wholesalers and retailers, and single-brand distribution in the Japanese film and
paper market. Japan responded that such vertical integration and single-brand
296
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wholesale distribution predated the measures cited by the U.S. and therefore could
not be caused by these measures. In addition, Japan also contended that single-brand
distribution was the common practice in the photographic materials market in most
countries including the U.S. (para. 10.204)
The Panel found a fundamental flaw in the U.S. claim., namely, vertical integration
and single-brand wholesale distribution predated the measures cited by the U.S.
Accordingly, because of the timing issue, the Panel found that the U.S. had been
unable to prove how the measures challenged by the U.S. could have caused vertical
integration, (para. 10.204)
Furthermore, the Panel noted that proof of an underlying intention to nullify or
impair of benefits was not required under Article XXIII: 1(b). The Panel therefore
found that the intent of a measure was irrelevant. Instead, what was relevant for
showing causality was the actual impact of a measure. The Panel also considered the 1
issue of potential effects, whether procompetitive or anticompetitive, of single-brand
distribution in the Japanese film market. In the view of the Panel, this issue was
irrelevant for the purpose of examining whether the competitive relationship between
. domestic and imported products had been upset as a result of distribution measures
attributable to the Japanese government, (paras. 10.206,10.208)
*
b) Large stores law
Concerning measures restricting the opening of large scale retail stores, the main
issue was whether large stores were more likely to sell imported film, and whether
Japanese regulation of large stores was currently stricter than in 1967, 1979 and
1993.
The Panel noted that neither U.S. nor Japanese studies were conclusive, i.e. U. S.
studies demonstrated that stores with large floor space were more likely to carry
imported film, while Japanese studies demonstrated that stores with a high volume of
sales were more likely to carry foreign film, (paras. 10.212,10.213)
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The Panel limited itself to a finding that the U.S. had not been able to demonstrate
that the Japanese regulation of large stores was currently more restrictive than in
1967, 1979 or 1993. Accordingly, the U.S. failed to establish that its legitimate
expectations about competitive relationships in the film market had been denied,
(para. 10.232)
c) Promotion measures
The U.S. claim regarding the measures affecting the promotion of products was that,
f
the restrictions on promotional methods technically applied de jure equally to
Japanese and U.S. film producers. In actuality, however, these restrictions prevented
U.S. film imports de facto from challenging the allegedly entrenched Japanese film
market. Japan responded that only a few kinds of promotional methods were
restricted. Nonetheless, the basic tools ofpromotion, such as truthful advertising and
price competition, remained open.
r
In the view of the Panel, the measures at issue could have had a disparate impact on
imports although they were neutral in terms of the origin of products. Nevertheless,
the U. S. failed to demonstrate any single instance where the implementation of the
promotion measures had affected the competitive relationship between imported and
domestic film and paper in the Japanese market. In the Panel's view, the U.S. only
demonstrated that a few kinds ofpromotional methods were restricted, such as false
advertising, and certain premiums for customers. Other basic promotion methods,
however, such as truthful advertising and price competition, remained open.
Accordingly, the Panel found that the U.S. had failed to demonstrate that these basic
*
tools could not be utilised effectively in the Japanese market, (para. 10.349)
d) Combination Effect
As to the combined effect of the three different measures examined above, (i.e.,
distribution, large store and promotion measures), the Panel noted that it was not
implausible that individual measures which did not impair benefits when considered






when considered collectively ("nothing combined with nothing is still nothing"). The
Panel, however, found that it was incumbent on the U.S. to provide this Panel with a
detailed demonstration of the complementary and cumulative effects of these
measures, acting in combination, on film and paper (i.e., how they interacted with
ft
each other in their implementation so as to cause effects different from, and
additional to, those effects which were alleged to be caused by each measure acting
individually). The Panel concluded that the U. S. had failed to demonstrate such an
impact, (para. 10.353)
To sum up, the Panel found that none of these measures, either individually or
collectively, had upset the competitive relationship between imported and domestic
products.
3. Violation claims
i) National treatment clause
ft
Apart from a non-violation claim, the U.S. further argued that the distribution
measures were inconsistent with the requirement of national treatment under GATT
Article 111:4 !
a) "Laws, regulations and requirements"
The Panel noted that a broad reading had been given in the previous GATT/WTO
cases to the terms "laws, regulations and requirements" in Article 111:4. The Panel
concluded that these terms should be given an interpretation similar to the term
"measure" found in Article XXIII: 1(b). (paras. 10.374,10.375,10.376)
In consequence, along with its findings regarding the governmental attributability of
"measures" for non-violation claims, the Panel found that 3 distribution measures113
constituted "requirements" in Article III and might still be effective, while 1
measure114 was no longer in effect. The other 4 distribution measures115 were found
"3The three distribution measures were: (i) 1967 Cabinet Decision; (ii) 1970 Guidelines; and
(iii) 1971 Basic Plan.
""It was 1967 JFTC Notification 17.
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not to be attributable to the Japanese government and thus did not fall within the
scope ofArticle III. (para. 10.377)
b) Less favourable treatment
Furthermore, the Panel concluded that the U.S. had failed to demonstrate that the
distribution measures accorded less favourable conditions of competition to imports
than to domestic film or paper in the Japanese market. The Panel was unconvinced
that there was a meaningful nexus between the distribution measures (i.e. the 1967
Cabinet Decisions or the 1970 Guidelines) and the largely pre-existing system of
single-brand distribution which was a common market structure in most major
national film markets including the U.S. In addition, in the Panel's view, the
recommendations of the 1971 Basic Plan appeared to have been neutral as to the
source of products, promoting the standardisation and modernisation of business
practices and management techniques, including computerisation, (para. 10.381)
ii) Publication of administrative rulings of general application
As for another violation claim, the U.S. made a further claim under GATT Article X
which required that administrative rulings of general application had to be published.
The U.S. argued on the following points in particular: (i) unpublished enforcement
actions by the JFTC and fair trade councils under the Premiums Law and relevant
fair competition codes that established or modified criteria applicable in future cases;
and (ii) unpublished guidance through which the Japanese authorities (i.e. regional
MITI offices, prefectural government and local authorities) made applicants for new
or expanded large stores co-ordinate their plans with local competitors before
submitting a notification for government review, and continued to impose a "prior
explanation" requirement inconsistent with Article X: 1. (para. 10.383)
Although the Panel accepted the notion that not only administrative decisions of
general application needed to be published, but also individual decisions that
II5These were: (i) 1968 Sixth Interim Report; (ii) 1969 Seventh Interim Report; (iii) 1969
Survey; and (iv) 1975 Manual.
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established or modified criteria applicable in future cases. The U.S. had not been
able to demonstrate any criteria applicable to future cases which these individual
decisions established or modified (i.e. the U.S. simply cited a great number of
unpublished individual decisions), (para. 10.401)
Remarks on the case:
The present case represented an important but difficult challenge for the WTO. For
example, it went beyond the jurisdiction of traditional GATT dispute issues, namely,
issues with respect to domestic distribution structures and private business practices.
Furthermore, the issue dealt more broadly with market access and the international




(i) Non-violation claims: its limitation and the risk ofexpanded application
The Panel ruled that:
-government measures other than subsidies, including distribution measures,
could be used to prove a nullification and impairment case;
-"measures" within the meaning ofArticle XXIII can include not only a formal
law or regulation but also guidance, such as administrative guidance of the kind
utilised by Japanese government.
The Panel affirmed, as in the past, in its findings the limited, exceptional and
supplementary nature of non-violation complaints. The Panel noted that there had
only been eight cases116 of referrals regarding non-violation complaints during the
whole history of GATT. This record shows that the GATT contracting parties and
WTO Members had regarded non-violation claims as exceptional cases.
The U.S., nonetheless, sought for an expansion of the scope of non-violation
0
complaints in the present case. The Panel maintained the strict requirements that had
been applied in previous cases, i.e. the complainants had the burden of presenting a
1,6Of eight, in five cases in which the Panel/Working Party upheld the non-violation claim.
Of five, three reports of Panel/Working Party were adopted, see cases marked with asterisks




detailed justification in support of their claims, and showed that when measures
themselves were de jure non-discriminatory, a detailed demonstration of the
relationship between measures and goods would have to be provided to support
complaints. As indicated in the past GATT cases, the panels have allowed
non-violation complaints in which there was clear evidence that the introduction of
measures at issue by the government had distorted the competitive conditions for
imports, for example, such measures relating to subsidies and tariffs associated with
specific goods.117
Another point to be noted is that the scope of WTO agreements was extended after
the Uruguay Round. This means that it narrowed the supplementary functions of
non-violation complaints (which had been designed to address measures not covered
by the GATT, for instance, competition policy). Accordingly, a difference was
further clarified between violation and non-violation complaints to the DSU. For
example, non-violation complaints did not constitute a prima facie case of
nullification or impairment (Article 3:8); and non-violation complaints required a
4
complaining party to present a detailed justification in support of its complaint
(Article 26:l(a)).118
With respect to remedies of non-violation complaints, if such complaints are upheld, '
there is no obligation to withdraw the measure (unlike a violation case). Instead, a
mutually satisfactory adjustment is made.119 If no such adjustment is reached,
retaliatory measures may be invoked (just as for violation claims).120
'"There are some examples of non-violation claims that tried to ignore the limitations,
though they set dangerous precedents in terms of the expanded application of non-violation
claims. Accordingly, they were unadopted. See, the EC citrus case, supra note 92.
II8For other agreements that defines the exceptional nature of non-violation complaints, see,
for instance, Article 64:2 of the TRDPs Agreement, which prescribes that "Subparagraphs
1(b) and 1(c) of Article XXIII of GATT 1994 shall not apply to the settlement of disputes
under this Agreementfor a period offive years from the date of entry into force of the WTO
Agreement (emphasis added).
'"Article 26:l(b) DSU.
120See, ibid., Article: 1(d).
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In the meantime, one should be aware of the danger that an expanded interpretation
of what constitutes non-violation complaints would mean that countries might have
to pay compensation even though they applied measures which were not in violation
of the Agreement (for example, "compensation may be a part ofmutually satisfactory
adjustment"121). It would be equivalent to allowing tariff concessions to be altered
without any formal negotiation, which would not only undermine legal stability but
also damage the credibility ofconcession negotiations.
(ii) Limitation ofjurisdiction in the WTO rule: trade and competition
As mentioned earlier, the dispute concerning the Japanese film market had been
initiated in May 1995 by Kodak's complaint to the USTR under Section 301 of the
1974 Trade Act alleging that it was unfair and irrational for Japan to permit
anticompetitive practices engaged in by Fuji Photo Film involving the Japanese
consumer photographic film and paper market. Nonetheless, unlike previous patterns
of behaviour, Japan did not agree to enter into bilateral consultations under Section
301. In Japan's view, Kodak's complaint was essentially regarding the administration
of Japanese Anti-monopoly Law and was therefore unsuitable for bilateral
negotiation. Instead, this claim should have been made directly to the Japan Fair
Trade Commission (JFTC) (which concluded an investigation in July 1997 by
finding that there was no violation of the Anti-monopoly Law).
As is already known, the issue of competition has not yet been included within the
WTO's jurisdiction. In the meantime, the Working Group on the Interaction between
Trade and Competition Policy (established in 1996 at the WTO Singapore
Ministerial Conference) will issue a report on trade and competition.122 Meantime,
"'Ibid.
122The U.S., Japan and Korea presented papers to the meeting (July 27-28 1998) of the WTO
competition policy working group. Both Japan and Korea stated in their paper that
antidumping could be reformed to incorporate the principles of competition policy. See for
further detail of each papers submitted to the Working Group, i.e.. Japan Paper for the Fifth
Formal Meeting of the Working Group on Interaction between Trade and Competition
Policy. 27 July 1998; Impact of Trade Policy on Competition: An Assessment of
Anti-Dumping Rule (Communication from Republic of Korea), 27 July 1998; Korea's
Intervention on Agenda Item Ilfbl: Impact of Trade Policy on Competition: Observations on




the Joint Group on Trade and Competition in the OECD is also working on this issue
in order to clarify the relationship between trade and competition policies.123
(iii) Procedural ambiguity ofremedies in cases ofnon-violation claims
No provision covers anti-competitive policies and practices in the WTO Agreements.
Nonetheless, GATT Article XXIII provides for remedies for non-violation
nullification and impairments.
As had been the case in the past panels, "non-violation complaints" were resorted to
only in exceptional cases. It is further noted in Article 26:1(a) of the DSU that a
complainant must present a detailed justification in support of its complaints. The
remedies sought by the U.S. in this case (i.e. seeking the Japanese government to
take measures to eliminate "anticompetitive practices" that had developed in its
distribution system as a result of measures that were no longer in effect) would be
exceeding the bounds of the current WTO DS system and constitute an additional or
reduction of obligations under the Agreement, which could be in violation of Article
19:2 of the DSU.124 Eventually, the Panel did not reject the substance of the U.S.
claim on technical or procedural grounds but instead, the Panel found against the
U.S. on the fundamental issues of factual evidence.
for the Working Group meeting of 27-28 July 1998); Impact ofTrade Policy on Competition
(Submission of the U.S.); The Impact of Regulatory Practices. State Monopolies, and
Exclusive Rights on Competition and Internal Trade (Submission from the U.S.), see also
"Korea, Japan Seek Changes to Dumping Laws to Allow More Competition", Inside US
Trade, 21 August 1998; see also the communication from the European Community and its
member states, WT/WGTCP/W/78 (7 July 1998); see generally, "Report (1988) of the
Working Group on the Interaction Between Trade and Competition Policy to the General
Council",WT/WGTCP/2 (8 December 1998).
l23See, in general, OECD. Strengthening the Coherence Between Trade and Competition
Policies - Joint Report bv the Trade Committee and the Committee on Competition Law and
Policy. OECD/GD(96)90, Paris, 1996; OECD. The Scope. Implication and Economic
Rationale of a Competition-Oriented Approach to Future Multilateral Trade Negotiations.
TD/TC(96)6, Paris 15 February 1996 (deristricted on 22 April 1996); OECD, Trade and
Competition Policies. OECD/GD(94)63, Paris, June 1994; OECD, Trade and Competition
Policies. OECD/GD(93)10, Paris, June 1993.
,24Article 19:2 DSU prescribes that the Panel and Appellate Body cannot add to or
diminish rights and obligations provided in the covered agreements."
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One may argue that in the case of complaints on new issues such as anticompetitive
practices, perhaps it would be an alternative for a complainant, for example, to
require exhaustion of local remedies before initiating a panel proceedings at the
WTO. Otherwise, the WTO would be faced with the danger of increasing complaints
in relation to new complexed issues such as competition which are beyond the
currentWTO jurisdiction. This may eventually undermine the WTO DS mechanism.
J
(iv) Rule-oriented trade policy to be re-affirmed
*
The Panel showed its support for a rule-oriented trade policy in the present dispute.
i
The U.S. perception that the "Japanese market is closed", was used to justify its
claims in the dispute. The Panel, however, judged this case based upon the
arguments and evidence presented to it after extensive tests as to whether the U.S.
claims satisfied the requirements of the WTO rules. This impartial as well as
objective attitude should be supported in order to give further credibility to the DS
system and support WTO Members' confidence in the multilateral DS mechanism
available from theWTO.
(v) The U.S. reaction to the Panel ruling .
The U.S. complaint regarding the Japan - film issue was very much factual based
because the issue centred on convincing a panel that Japan did in fact seek to close its
markets to imports. As a result of this being a factual-based claim, the U.S. have
%
refrained from appealing because WTO appeals have to be limited to "issues of law"
comprised in the panel report and to legal interpretations of the WTO Agreements.125
The U.S. decided not to appeal, which lead us to be reminded of a provision which
states that a report unappealed shall be deemed to be adopted unless the DSB decides
by consensus not to adopt the appeal.126 The U.S. therefore adopted the Panel's
ruling.
'"Article 17:6 DSU.
'"Articles 16:4 and 17:14 DSU.
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Instead, the U.S. however decided that it would regard Japanese representations made
by the Japanese government at the panel on the openness of the Japanese market to
9
constitute formal "commitments". To that end, the U.S. government established an
inter-agency Monitoring and Enforcement Committee to review implementation of
formal representations made by the Japanese government to the WTO panel
regarding its efforts to ensure the openness of its market to imported film. In the
view of the U.S., Japanese representations made to the WTO by the Japanese
government should ensure the openness of its market. In this respect, Japan informed
the U.S. that it would not cooperate with the U.S. on this new effort ("initiative").127
Under current WTO rules, no provisions define such a notion, i.e. representations
%
which are made by a party to the WTO panel will constitute "commitment" to certain
obligations. In other words, representations to a panel are seen by Japan more as
individual "efforts" by a party. It seems that this U.S. strategy is akin to demands
with threats for the removal of impediments.
In the meantime, however, despite the panel's ruling favourable to Japan, the Japan
Fair Trade Commission (JFTC) has began two new surveys to determine whether
anti-competitive practices were hindering market access in Japan for film and
photographic paper (and also flat glass). In addition, Japanese advisory industry
councils agreed with the U.S. to the elimination of a law regulating the establishment
of large stores as part of a deregulation initiative agreed in 1997 between Japan and
the U.S.
9
On 19 August 1998, the U.S. government (USTR) released the first semi-annual
monitoring report on Japan's film market.128 One may foresee potential dangers
behind such a report. That is, in the event that Japan does not ensure the openness of
l27"House Calls on Japan to Open Market For Film, Other Sectors", Inside US Trade, 13
March 1998, p. 1.
I28The first semi-annual Monitoring Report on foreign access to Japan Film, titled "USTR
Report on Japanese Film" was issued on 19 August 1998, the reproduction of the report is
available in Inside US Trade, also see "U.S. Calls for Increased Japanese Efforts on Film
Market Access", Inside US Trade, 21 August 1998; So far, since the result of this monitoring
showed some progress in several areas related to market access for foreign film. The next




its market, another dispute may arise or even unilateral sanctions may be imposed. If
this happens, this new type of U.S. programme could hinder or even undermine the
progress of the WTO DS system.
*
(vi) Criticisms of the report
In a letter to the USTR office, Dewey Ballentine, a lawyer representing Kodak,
alleged that "most of the decisions in the case were not made by the three-strong
panel but by the WTO secretariat 'who lacked both the competence and the mandate
to do som.n9 Nonetheless, responsibilities of the Secretariat are limited, as prescribed
in Article 27:1 DSU, to assist panels in respect to "legal, historical and procedural
aspects" of cases. Furthermore, in order to fulfil these requirements, the Secretariat
provides secretarial and technical support to panellists. Accordingly, the decision of
the present case must have been made by the panel as in other cases.
To my knowledge, through my internship at the WTO Secretariat, the above
accusation seems to be unfounded. The report drafting is normally conducted by the
panel and further the Legal Affairs and operational divisions (components of the
Secretariat service assisting a panel) do not necessarily share the same opinion
towards the issues.130 Nonetheless, objectively, one can not rule out the possibility
that a particular panel might exceptionally be Secretary-driven. For example, from
my own limited observation, one might assume that the influence of the Secretariat
could be stronger in cases where both the Legal Officer and Panel Secretary are
provided by one division, for instance, the Legal Affairs or Rules Division.131
Nonetheless, no definite basis for such an allegation exists at this stage.
129The Financial Times, "Kodak attack on handling ofWTO case", 7 July 1998 at 7.
"Ichiro, Araki., "WTO ni okeru junshoshori no jissai" [The reality of dispute settlement in
WTO (translated by myself)], 46 Boueki to Kanzei (no. 9), September 1998 at 31.
13lSo far, there are three cases in which only the Legal Affairs Division has been involved
(i.e. providing both Panel Secretary and Legal Officer/Legal Advisor). Those cases are: the
three Alcohol cases involved three countries respectively Japan (WT/DS8/R;WT/DS10/R;
WT/DS11/R), Korea (WT/D75/R; WT/DS84/R, these report was issued on 31 July 1998
and its appellate report was out on 18 January 1999, WT/DS75/AB/R; WT/DS84/AB/R),
Chile (WT/DS87/...; WT/DS110/..., which are still on); Japan - Film case (WT/DS44/R); the
Argentina - Footwear case (WT/DS56/R). While, note that only the Rules Division gets
involved in cases on Dumping and Subsidies. Nonetheless, even in such a case, the Director
of Legal Affairs Division normally attends at an internal meeting but not at a formal panel
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meeting. According to a Legal Officer ofWTO, there is one new development, that is, as for
cases concerning Safeguards, both Rules and Legal Affairs Divisions are involved.
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GENERAL CONCLUSION
"We must take the responsibilityfor the life ofall men, and develop on an international scale what all
great countries have developed internally, a relative sharing of wealth and a new and more just
division of economic resources. This must lead eventually to forms of international economic
co-operation andplanning, toforms ofworld government".l
In the last fifty years, the GATT/WTO Dispute Settlement ("DS"), due to the
i
commitments and efforts of the contracting parties, has been progressively
judicialised.
In line with the institutional and constitutional developments of the GATT/WTO,
Japan's trade policy towards DS has also gone through significant changes. The most
striking feature of this change is a shift from what I call "bilateralism" to
"multilateralism";2 that is a transformation from a political/power-oriented to a more
judicial/rule-oriented approach in resolving disputes.
%
The above two themes constitute the main focus of this work.
The judicialisation process has been most prominent with regards to the institutional
ft
aspects of the GATT/WTO. There has been, for example, the introduction of the
"panel" procedure, the establishment of the Legal Affairs Office at the GATT
Secretariat in 1983 and more recently the creation of the General Council (which
transforms itself, as needed, into the Dispute Settlement Body and the Trade Policy
Review Body) and a second tribunal, the Appellate Body ("AB").
ft
While, similar developments could be noted in the constitutional sphere, with respect
4
to the DS system, among a number of events discussed in this thesis, perhaps one of
the most important turning points in the history ofGATT could be the Tokyo Round
ft
ft
'Fromm, Erich., The Sane Society. 2nd ed., Routledge, London, 1992 at 360.
2See, for instance, significant cases in terms of the "transformation", such as the
Semiconductor case (Section 7.1.1.4. in Chapter 7 of the thesis) and the Auto and Auto Parts
dispute (Section 8.1.1.1. in Chapter 8 of the thesis).
("TR") Agreements which contained a set of provisions dealing with the DS (the
"Understanding").3 Moreover, this has provided a detailed procedure of the DS
system, and it eventually became the basis of the DSU which constitutes an integral
part of the WTO Agreement. The further developments in the area ofDS subsequent
to the TR emerged in later documents, which are examined in Chapters 2 and 5, such
as the 1984 Action on DS, the Leutwiler Report (1985), the 1989 Improvements (i.e.
the Mid-Term Review), the Dunkel Draft (1991), and, above all the DSU of the
WTO Agreement (1994).
There is no doubt that the DS system is more effective, efficient and predictable
under the new WTO system. As explained at the outset of this study, there were a
number of defects under GATT, for instance, a country against which the complaint
has been made might have delayed the DS process at various stages. Delays
occurred especially in the forming of a panel and also in the adopting of a panel
report. The major cause of delay was the consensus rule (i.e. the consensus of all
countries present in the meeting where the matter was being considered). Whereas,
as has been explained in Chapter 5, now it is almost impossible to delay the process
under the new DS rules, because the decisions are almost automatically made (e.g. in
establishing a panel, in adopting a report of a panel) except if there is a negative
consensus. Furthermore, by the introduction of the stringent time-frame at various
stages of the DS process, an undue delay has been effectively eliminated.
However, this does not mean that all those defects in the system were totally
eliminated. In fact, the DS system still may not be quite perfect; certain
shortcomings of the new system are emerging, for example, an issue of
implementation which is apparently under discussion in the ongoing Banana
dispute.4 hi this dispute, the different views between the EU and the U.S. legal
Understanding Regarding Notification, Consultation, Dispute Settlement and Surveillance,
adopted on 28 November 1979, BISD 26S/210; also see, in general, Section 2.4.1.5. in
Chapter 2 of the thesis.
4In the Banana case, the period for implementation was set by arbitration at 15 months and a
week from the adoption of the reports, i.e. the expire date is on 1 January 1999, WT/DS27/15
(7 Januay 1999). The EC has undertaken to comply with the DSB's recommendations within
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interpretations arise from lack of clarity in the DSU procedures due to the ambigous
DSU language. For instance, the way how to implement recommendations of the
panel or AB is prescribed in Article 19.1 of the DSU which provides "..., the panel
or Appellate Body may suggest ways in which the Members concerned could
implement the recommendations" (emphasis added). For this reason, the Panel
viewed that such suggestions on implementation are not part of the recommendation,
and are not binding on the Member affected.5 In fact, so far, panels have been
somewhat reluctant to suggest specific ways and means on how to implement their
the implementation period. The complainants requested consultations with the EC for the
resolution of the disagreement between them over the WTO-consistency of measures being
proposed by the EC in puiported compliance with the recommendations and rulings of the
Panel and AB. At the DSB meeting on 25 Nov. 1998, the EC announced that it had adopted
the second Regulation to implement the recommendations of the DSB, and that the new
system will be fully operational from 1 January 1999. ' The complainants have expressed
their dissatisfaction with the WTO- consistency of the new system and consultations are
continuing between the two sides to this dispute. On 15 December 1998, the EC requested
the establishment of a panel (under Article 21.5 of the DSU) to determine that die
implementing measures of the EC must be presumed to conform to WTO rules unless
challenged in accordance with DSU procedures [WT/DS27/40 (15 December 1998)]. On 18
December 1998, Ecuador requested the re-establishment of the original panel (pursuant to
Article 21.5) to examine whether EC measures to implement the recommendations of the
DSB are WTO-consistent [WT/DS27/41 (18 December 1998)]. At its special meeting on 12
January 1999, the DSB agreed to reconvene the original panel (pursuant to Article 21.5) to
examine both Ecuador's and EC's requests [WT/DS27/44 (18 January 1999),
WT/DS27/44/Corr.l (26 January 1999) and WT/DS27/45 (18 January 1999),
WT/DS27/45/Corr.l (25 January 1999) respectively]; see the Communication from
Guatemala, Honduras, Panama and the United States on European Communities - Regime
for the Importation, Sale and Distribution of Bananas, WT/DS27/42 (12 January 1999); the
Financial Times, "WTO orders review but fails to cool temper", 13 January 1999 at 4; the
Financial Times, "US seeks WTO backing for sanctions in banana war", 15 January 1999 at
5; see for the U.S. request for authorisation to suspend the application to the EC (and its
member sates) tariff concessions and related obligations under the GATT 1994, covering
trade in an amount of US$520 million, WT/DS27/43 (14 January 1999); the Financial
Times, "EU appeals to WTO over US threat of trade sanction", 22 January 1999 at 5; ibid.,
"Island growers spike US sanctions move", 26 January 1999 at 6; ibid., "Trade goes
bananas", "Cappinig CAP", 26 January 1999 at 19; ibid., "US augments weaponry for trade
disputes", 27 January 1999 at 6; ibid., "Italians urge EU to retreat in banana dispute with the
US", 27 January 1999 at 6; ibid., "Sanctions threat starts to tell", 27 January 1999 at 6; ibid.,
"Yellow peril", 27 January 1999 at 23; see also Request for Consultations by Honduras,
Mexico, Guatemala, Panama and the United States, WT/DS158/1; G/L/290; S/L//65;
G/LIC/D/27 (25 January 1999); Request for Joint Consultations by Ecuador, WT/DS158/2
(27 January 1999); for the summary of the 25 January week concerning the Banana dispute
(since the 25 January DSB meeting whose agenda was blocked by St. Lucia and Dominica),
see Inside US Trade, 29 January 1999; the Financial Times, "Exporters apoplectic at being
placed in bananas firing line", 29 January 1999 at 5.
5See, para. 8.2 in the report of the Panel on Guatemala - Anti-Dumping Investigation
Regarding Portland Cement From Mexico, WT/DS60/R (19 June 1998); also see the first
sentence ofArticle 19.1 of the DSU.
recommendations. Usually they give what seems to be a declaratory judgement on
what is consistent or inconsistent and leave the countries concerned the leeway to
choose mechanisms for compliance. However, panels are becoming aware that they
should be more precise so as to facilitate implementation.6 Under the new WTO
system, the novelty however is that there is a procedure of reconvening the original
panel to check whether compliance was full or merely partial,7 and furthermore there
are provisions concerning compensation and retaliation.8 One can therefore say that
there is indirect or political pressure to implement more or less fully. In any event,
the Banana dispute seems to be an emerging opportunity for clarification of the
ambiguous implementation procedure. If it turns sour, however, it could become a
prelude to breakdown the whole WTO system.
6With regard to "suggestions on implementation" by the Panel/AB under Article 19.1 of the
DSU, see, para. 8.3 in the report of the Panel on United States - Restrictions on Imports of
* Cotton and Man-Made Fibre Underwear, WT/DS24/R (8 November 1996), which stated
"[The Panel] further suggest that the United States bring the measures challenged by Costa
Rica into compliance with US obligation ... by immediately withdrawing the restriction
imposed by the measure" (emphasis added); regarding the same aspect, see also, para. 8.6 in
the Panel report on Guatemala Cement case, WT/DS60/R, supra note 5, which stated that
"[The Panel] suggest that Guatemala revoke the existing anti-dumping measure on imports of
Mexican cement,..." (emphasis added); cf. the awareness of the Panel regarding "suggesting
ways to implement" in recent reports, for example, the report of the Panel on India-
Quantitative Restrictions on Imports' of Agriculture, Textile and Industrial Products,
WT/DS90/R (6 April 1999), Section VIII (Suggestions for Implementation), which provided
a detail suggestion, in my view, which will certainly help to prevent facing to a future
dispute over implemenation between the parties concerned. The prolonged dispute over
implementation in the Banana dispute might have lead to such an awareness of the Panel in
the India RQs case. (cf. Section F "Suggestions on Implementation" in the Ecuador claim
recourse to Article 21.5 of the DSU over Banana dispute, with respect to GATT Articles I
and XIII, the requirements of the Lome Convention and the coverage of the Lome waiver,
suggested three options for bringing the EC Banana import regime into conformity with
WTO rules. However, no specific suggestions in respect of licence allocation were made.
The report noted, though, "licences would not be needed at all in a tariff-only regime".); see
further, in particular, Section VII. in the report of the Panel on U.S. - Anti-Dumping Duty on
Dynamic Random Access Memory Semiconductors (DRAMS) of One Megabit or Above
from Korea, WT/DS99/R (29 January 1999), the Panellist simply said that "However, in the
light of the range of possible ways in which we believe the U.S. could appropriately
implement our recommendation, we decline to make any suggestion in the present case."
(emphasis added) which clearly shows the reluctancy of the Panel to suggest means in this
case.
7Cf. In the Banana dispute, the Ecuador's panel request for re-establishment of the original
panel to consider and verify whether the DSB recommendations have been effectively
implemented by the EC (Article 21.5 of the DSU), and to suggest to the EC how to
implement its findings (Article 19.1 of the DSU), WT/DS27/41, supra note 4.
8See, ibid., Article 22; cf. the U.S. claim in the Banana dispute.
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In parallel to the GATT/WTO evolution, Japan has transformed its trade policy on
DS in order to be more in tune with the nature of the new WTO DS system, i.e.
multilateralism: Japan now follows a more rule-oriented or quasi-judicial approach at
the multilateral table (WTO) in resolving trade disputes.9
To start with, it should also be noted that Japan's contribution towards* the
development of the present DS mechanism of the WTO has been significant not only
in terms of its involvement in the UR negotiations but also in terms of its willingness
to take part and indeed abide by the findings of the panels and appellate bodies'
recommendations.10 For example, as examined in Chapter 3, we should recall that by
far the largest contribution made by Japan in the area of DS during the UR
negotiations was its insistence on the inclusion of a provision regarding prohibition
of unilateral measures, particularly the U.S. Section 301. As the result of its
. insistence on this point, Article 23 of the DSU was adopted. Indeed, the inclusion of
this provision in the new DS system (DSU) was crucial for Japan (and some other
countries) which had been the target in many occasions of Section 301. In recent
cases (e.g. the Auto and Auto Parts dispute," the Film case,12 the Indonesian
National Car case13) Japan has already shown its multilateral approach in resolving
its dispute under WTO. However, a serious assessment of Japan's commitment to
9See, Appendix II to the thesis; the current trend of Japanese policy regarding DS could be
recognised under the column titled "Japan's attitude: a current pattern" in this appendix. In
short, Japanese involvement in disputes is based more on a multilateral, legal and
rule-oriented approach.
10Japan also made a series of proposals regarding substantive issues (which included
safeguards, subsidies and countervailing measures, the TR Codes, such as anti-dumping,
standards, import licensing, customs valuation, government procurement and subsidies). In
addition, it was the meeting in Tokyo* convened at the instance of Japan, which was
instrumental in the re-launching of the negotiations, especially when the UR negotiation
were held up in the early half of 1993. Furthermore, Japan also showed its contribution in
other areas, such as, market access, trade in services, agriculture and so on. In short, success
of the UR negotiation was achieved not by a particular member's contribution but by the
accord of all member states collectively, including Japan.
*Before the Tokyo Economic Summit held on 7-9 July 1993, on the eve of the summit on 7
July 1993, the Quadrilateral Trade Ministers (the United States, the European Community,
Japan and Canada) announced a substantial market-access agreement that enabled
re-engagement in the Uruguay Round negotiation; for the text of the announcement of 7 July
1993, see GATT, GATT Focus, No. 101, August-September 1993.
"See, Section 8.1.1.1. in Chapter 8 of the thesis.
"See, Section 8.1.2.2. in Chapter 8 of the thesis.
"For the summary of the case, see Appendix III of the thesis.
313
multilateralism would be in a dispute in which Japan is a loser (e.g. the Alcohol-II
ft
case,14 the Japan "Apple99 case15). It is therefore significant to see how Japan
implements the recommendations ofPanel/AB in accordance with the DSU.
From the case studies, one can speculate as to why Japan has transformed its attitude
towards DS under GATT/WTO:
1) The new Japan's policy on DS favouring a "multilateral"/
"rule-oriented" approach emerged after experiencing defeats in four
successive cases16 during the 80's. In other words, these "defeats" may
have propelled Japan to shift its approach towards DS from a "bilateral"
to a "multilateral" one under the GATT(WTO) system.17 Among other
cases, as examined in Chapter 7, the defeat experienced at the
Semiconductor case became a decisive one for Japan to change its policy
on DS. Japan realised that bilateralism is no longer an optimum solution
for securing settlement.
2) Japan's arguments during the panel proceedings seemed to become
more legal and technical. As demonstrated through the case studies,
"See, the 3rd status report of Japan, pursuant to Article 21(6) of the DSU, titled, Status
Report by Japan on Implementation of the Recommendations and Rulings of the DSB
regarding "Japan - Taxes on Alcoholic Beverages", WT/DS8/18/Add.2;
WT/DS10/18/Add.2; WT/DSll/16/Add.2 (7 November 1997); also see the Japan's
communication (dated 9 January 1998) between Japan and the U.S. titled, Mutually
Acceptable Solution on Modalities for Implementation (regarding Japan - Taxes on
Alcoholic Beverages), WT/DS8/19; WT/DS10/19; WT/DS11/17 (12 January 1998); also see
the communication between Japan and Canada under the same title as the previous
document, WT/DS8/20; WT/DS10/20; WT/DS11/18 (12 January 1998).
lsSee, for the summary of the case in Appendix III to the thesis; this case was appealed on 24
November 1998 (WT/DS76/5) and the report of the AB is expected to be out at the end of
February 1999.
16In 1984, the GATT panel ruled that Japanese measures on import of leather violated GATT
rules. In addition, during the period 1987-88, a GATT panel judged that Japan violated
GATT rules in three cases. These cases are: Alcohol-I case in 1987; Agricultural Products
case in 1988; Semiconductors case in 1988. For those cases, see Section 7.1.1. in Chapter 7
of the present thesis. For Japan, after that difficult period, a more active usage of the dispute
settlement procedure under GATT rules (i.e. multilateral approach) was gaining importance.
,7See for this case, Section 7.1.1.4. in Chapter 7 of the thesis; As seen from this study, the
conventional Japanese way to resolve trade disputes had been, for a long time, mainly by
"bilateral" approach (utilising less legal and relying on more political approach; perhaps, it
was partly due to its long non-litigious legal tradition, namely, Japan preferred non-judicial
means of settling disputes).
*
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more technical and legal arguments were put forward by Japan, in
particular, in recent cases. Whereas, in the old cases, particularly in the
Agriculture case,19 the Leather case,20 and the Alcoholic Beverages case,21
Japan made less legal or technical, (i.e. irrelevant) arguments in its
defence. For instance, Japan relied on to its own domestic "social and
cultural" reasons in justifying its actions despite their irrelevancy under
the GATT rules. Perhaps, such defence could be explained by the fact
that those cases were, in fact, handled by different Ministries, which
often caused the problems of "communication" and "know-how sharing"
among various Ministries.22 The problem basically arose from the
"inter-rivalry" relationship among Ministries, which could be deemed to
. have influenced some of Japanejse defeats experienced during the 80's.
In stark contrast to those cases, the Parts and Components case23 ('88) in
which Japan was a "Claimant" brought it its first legal victory. This case
could be seen as an earliest signal which demonstrated appropriate and
technical legal arguments being made tactically under the GATT system.
One cannot deny that this positive, though unprecedented result for Japan
must have given a great deal of confidence to its authorities for further
0
reliance on the multilateral approach under GATT. In other words, they
realised that the GATT system could work in favour of their national
interests if they pursue more technical and legal arguments in accordance
with the multilateral rules.
*
See generally, Appendix II to the thesis.
"Agriculture case, see BISD 35S/163 (1989); also see Section 7.1.1.3. in Chapter 7 of the
thesis.
20Leather case, see BISD 31S/94 (1985); also see Section 7.1.1.1. in Chapter 7 ofthe thesis.
2iAlcohol-I, see BISD 34S/83 (1988); also see Section 7.1.1.2. in Chapter 7 of the thesis.
22Matsushita, Mitsuo,, and Thomas J. Schoeribaum, Japanese International Trade and
Investment. Tokyo University Press, 1989, pp. 24-25, reproduced in Jackson, J.H., William
J. Davey and Alan O. Sykes, Jr., Legal Problems of International Economic Relations -
cases, materials and text. Third Edition, West Publishing Co., St. Paul, MN, 1995, pp.
222-223.
"Parts and Components case, see BISD 37S/132 (1991); also see Section 7.1.2.1. in Chapter
7 of the thesis.
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One should also mention another successful story for Japan, that is, the
SPF Dimension Lumber case.24 What is noteworthy in this particular
case is that Japan won for the first time as a respondent. This result may
have increased "trust" among Japanese authorities in the credibility of the
GATT DS system. Furthermore, Japan also may have been reassured
that its tactics towards leading trade disputes could result in a positive
- outcome under the multilateral system.
3) Japanese behaviour in the recent dispute on Auto and Auto parts
between Japan and the United States23 could be regarded as a clear
illustration of Japan's new attitude towards its dispute. This dispute
displayed a number of important aspects in terms of Japan's multilateral
approach in resolving disputes in accordance with the GATT/WTO DS
procedures. The dispute was eventually resolved "bilaterally" and an
agreement was reached on 28 June 1995.26 In fact, Japan persisted in
taking a multilateral/rule-oriented approach throughout its talks with the
U. S. In other words, Japan has insisted on a multilateralism as an
approach against the U.S. threats of sanctions under Section 301, which
was not the case before in the Japanese DS history.
Besides the findings from the case studies, the following also offer a significant
circumstantial evidence to support the same line of argument pointed out above.
24SPF Dimension Lumber case, see BISD 36S/167 (1990); also see Section 7.1.2.2. in
Chapter 7 of the thesis.
25Articles on this dispute can be found in, The Economist, May 13th-19th 1995 at 18, 79-80;
ibid., May 20th-26th 1995 at 81; ibid., June 17th-23th 1995 at 97; ibid., June 24th-30th 1995
at 95; also in WTO, WTO Focus, (No. 3) May-June 1995; for criticisms on the U.S. trade
policy [with respect to the two elements, i.e. (1) "aggressive unilateralism", (2) demands for
managed trade in the form of "Voluntary Import Expansions (VIEs)"] over the car disputes,
see Bhagwati, Jagdish., "The US-Japan car dispute: a monumental mistake", 72 Int'l affairs
No. 2 (April 1996), pp. 261-279; also read in general Abels, Tracy M., "The World Trade
Organisation's First Test: The United States - Japan Auto Dispute", 44 UCLA L. Rev., Part. 2
(1996), pp. 467-526.




One aspect is human resources, i.e., the Japanese diplomats who have been involved
in negotiations with trade partners. Unlike the previous generation of diplomats,
Japan's new generation of bureaucrats are tougher and more eloquent at the
negotiation table. For example, it was this new generation of diplomats that the U. S.
negotiators had to face in the recent Auto and Auto parts dispute.27 There are two
characteristics shared in common by the new-type diplomats:
"(i) as they grew up after World War II, they are free from the mixed feelings
of the previous generation as regards the occupation by the United States; and,
(ii) they were agreed in resolving the prolonged dispute, and not to be 'pushed
about' by the U. S. any more, and this, contrary to Washington's expectations,
has indeed happened."28
4
Thus, this factor could also encourage Japan, which now follows "multilateralism" in
its dispute, to be more active in the use of the GATT/WTO DS system with less
*
hesitation. Indeed, a new era is emerging in Japanese policy towards DS.
The other event to be noted here is that the Industrial Structure Council, an official
advisory body to the MITI, has been publishing an annual report since 1992,29 which
lists the trade policies and measures, and violations of internationally agreed rules, of
its trade partners, and clearly expresses its opinion that Japan would bring such
illegal acts to the DS system ofGATT/WTO ifnecessary. In these reports, the MITI
explicitly supports a rule-oriented/multilateral approach for resolving disputes, and
states that Japan would apply to the GATT/WTO DS system, if no progress could be
seen concerning such alleged illegal acts conducted by Japan's trade partners.30 This
27The Financial Times, "Japan's new breed ofdiplomat, 26 June 1995 at 12.
28A recent report cited the new generation's toughness exposed as a one of the factors in
prolonging the dispute over cars between Japan and the U. S.; see ibid., Congressional
Research Service Report (No detail was given).
29Industrial Structure Council (ed.), Report on Unfair Trade Policies. Research Institute of
International Trade and Industry Publication Department, Tokyo, 1992, 93, 94; this report
series was re-titled in 1995 as, 1995 Report on the WTO Consistency of Trade Policies bv
Major Trading Partners.
30According to this report, there are three main target areas:
(i) identifying and analysing trade policies and measures taken by Japan's major trading
partners nominated by Japan, such as the United States, the European Union, Korea, Hong
Kong, Singapore, Thailand, Australia, Malaysia, Indonesia and Canada, based on
internationally agreed rules; (ii) promoting free trade by seeking to bring a dispassionate and





report may be regarded as a manifestation of Japan's policy on DS towards a
multilateral approach.
Finally, to reiterate the obvious but important point that the WTO DS system will be
successful only if the major world economies set an example for the rest, including
the less developed countries which have been rather sceptical about the GATT DS
system for many years. Now, it is time for Japan and other major economies to
contribute to developing world trade under the multilateral trading system. As for
%
Japan, as we have seen in this study, whenever dispute arises, it has already
committed itself to observe the multilateral rales under the new WTO system.
the importance of using WTO DS procedures to resolve problematic trade policies and
measures multilaterally.
In fact, in October 1992, Japan requested the establishment of a panel against the EC
concerning antidumping duty imposing by the EC on imports of audio cassettes from Japan.
As a result of discussions over the terms of reference between the parties, the panel
(established on 30 October 1992) finally set out its work in February 1994. In 28 April
1995, the panel report (ADP/136) was circulated to the members of the Committee on
Anti-Dumping Practices [the "Cttee"]. The Panel recommended that the Cttee request the
EC to reconsider its anti-dumping determination in the light of its obligation under the
Anti-Dumping Agreement [the "Agreement"]. The Panel also recommended that the Cttee
request that the EC bring its Basic Regulation into conformity with its obligation stipulated
in the Agreement. At the first regular meeting of the Cttee, held on 12 June 1995, the panel
report was considered by the Cttee members. At this meeting, although Japan urged the
adoption of the panel report, the EC requested extra time to examine it. In October 1995, the
Cttee once again discussed the report, nonetheless, failed to adopt it; for a summary of this
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-BISD 23S/91 (1977), U.S. v. Canada: Import Quotas on Eggs.
-BISD 24S/135 (1978), Japan v. U.S.: Suspension of Customs Liquidation [Zenith
Case].
-BISD 25S/49 (1978), U.S. v. EC: Measures on Animal Feed Proteins.
-BISD 25S/68 (1979), U.S. v. EC: Programme of Minimum Import Prices (MIPS),
Licences and Surety Deposits for Certain Processed Fruit and Vegetables..
-BISD 27S/98 (1981), Chile v. EC: Restrictions on Imports ofApples from Chile.
-BISD 28S/102 (1982), Brazil v. Spain: TariffTreatment ofUnroasted Coffee.
-BISD 29S/91 (1983), Canada v. US: Prohibition on Imports of Tuna and Tuna
Products from Canada.
-BISD 30S/129 (1984), H.K. v. EC: Quantitative Restrictions on Imports of Certain
Products form Hong Kong.
-BISD 30S/140 (1984), U.S. v. Canada: Administration of the Foreign Investment
Review Act [FIRA].
-BISD 31S/67 (1985), Nicaragua v. U.S.: Import of Sugar from Nicaragua.
-BISD 31S/94 (1985), U.S. v. Japan: Measures on Imports ofLeather.
-BISD 34S/83 (1988), EC v. Japan: Restrictions on Alcoholic Beverages.
-BISD 34S/136 (1988), Mexico, Canada and EC v. U.S.: Taxes on Petroleum and
Certain Imported Substances ["Superfund" Taxes].
-BISD 35S/163 (1989), U.S. v. Japan: Restricting on Certain Agricultural Products:
-BISD 35S/116 (1989), EC v. Japan: Restrictions on Semiconductors.
-BISD 36S/135 (1990), U.S. v. EC: Restrictions on Imports ofApples.
-BISD 36S/345 (1989), EC v. U.S.: Section 337 of the Tariff Act of 1930 ["Aramd
Fibers" Case].
-BISD 36S/167 (1990), Canada v. Japan: Imports of Spruce-Pine-Fir (SPF)
Dimension Lumber.
-BISD 37S/86 (1991), U.S. v. EC: Payments and Subsidies on Oilseeds and
Animal-feed Proteins.
-BISD 37S/132 (1991), Japan v. EC: Antidumping Regulation on Imports of Parts
and Components.
-BISD 37S/200 (1991), U.S. v. Thailand: Restrictions on Importation of and Internal
Taxes on Cigarettes.
-BISD 37S/228 (1991), EC v. U.S.: Restrictions on the Importation of Sugar and
Sugar-Containing Products Applied Under the 1955 Waiver and Under the Headnote
to the Schedule ofTariff Concessions.
-BISD 39S/27 (1993), U.S. v. Canada: Import, Distribution and Sale of Certain
Alcoholic Drinks by Provincial Marketing Agencies.
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-BISD 39S/206, Canada v. U.S.: Measures Affecting Alcoholic and Malt Beverages.
Press releses and annual report on international trade (since 1948) (GATT/...)
-GATT/CP/4/39
Committee on Trade and Development (COM.TD/...)
-COM.TD/F/4.
Committee on Anti-Dumping Practices (ADP/...)
-ADP/136
-ADP/137
Basic Instruments and Selected' Documents (BISD) [41 volumes have been
issued as ofOctober 1998]
-BISD IS/7 (1953), Intersessional Procedures (I. Matters to be Dealt with by the Ad
Hoc Committee on Agenda and Intersessional Business).
-BISD 3S/247, 250 (1955), Organisational and Functional Questions (Continuing
Administrating of the Agreement).
-BISD 4S/1 (1956), Protocol of Terms of Accession of Japan to the General
Agreement on Tariffs and Trade. ■ r
-BISD 7S/7 (1959), Amendments to the Rules of Procedures for Sessions of the
Contracting Parties.
-BISD 7S/24 (1959), Procedures under Article XXII on Questioning Affecting the
Interests ofNumber ofContracting Parties.
-BISD 9S/8 (1961), Decision of 4 June 1960 Establishing the Council of
Representatives.
-BISD 9S/19(1961), Procedures for Dealing with New Import Restrictions Applied
■for Balance-of-Payments Reasons and Residual Import Restrictions (B. Residual
*
Import Restrictions).
-BISD 13S/2 (1965), Protocol Amending the General Agreement on Tariffs and
Trade to Introduce a Part IV on Trade and Development.
-BISD 13S/19 (1965), Director-General - Change of Title From "Executive
Secretary".
-BISD 14S/18 (1966), Conciliation - Procedures under Article XXIII (Decision of 5
April 1966).
-BISD 14S/20 (1966), Customs Union and Free-Trade Areas.
-BISD 14S/139 (1966), Committee on Trade and Development (IX. Legal
Amendments to the General Agreement, (a) Article XXIII).
-BISD 18S/24-26 (1972), Waivers - Generalised System ofPreferences.
-BISD 22S/15 (1976), Consultative Group ofEighteen.
-BISD 25S/37 (1979), Consultative Group of Eighteen - Report to the Council of
Representative.
-BISD 25S/68 (1979), EEC's Programme of Minimum Import Prices, Licences and
Surety Deposits for Certain Processed Fruit and Vegetables.
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-BISD 26S/284 (1980), Consultative Group of Eighteen - Report of the Consultative
Croup ofEighteen to the Council Representatives.
-BISD 26S/203 (1980), Differential and More .Favourable Treatment, Reciprocity,
and Fuller Participation ofDeveloping Countries.
-BISD 26S/210 (1980), Understanding Regarding, Notification, Consultation,
Dispute Settlement and Surveillance.
-BISD S29/13 (1983), The 1982 Ministerial Declaration (Dispute
Procedures).
-BISD S31/9 (1984), Action Taken on 30 November 1984 (Dispute
Procedures) - formation ofpanels.
-BISD 32S/9 (1986), Decisions and Reports - Contracting Parties.
-BISD 33S/19-30 (1987), Ministerial Declaration on the Uruguay Round.
-BISD 36S/61 (1990), Improvements to the GATT Dispute Settlement
Procedures.
-BISD 36S/403, Functioning of the GATT System.
Council Minutes (C/M/...)
-C/M/Index/28 (31 January 1996): Index to Minutes of Council of Representatives,
(29 September 1960 - 11 December 1995)(C/M/l-C/M/278, C/RM/M/1-57 and
Add.l, C/RM/OVYM/1-5) and Intersessional Committee, (15 January 1952 - 16 May
1960) (IC/SR. 1 -IC/SR.49).
-C/M/102 (12 December 1974).
rC/M/107 (25 July 1975).
-C/M/109 (10 November 1975).
-C/M/113 (11 May 1976).
-C/M/122 (19 August 1977).
-C/M/123/Corr.l (5 December 1977).
-C/M/128 (27 October 1978).
-C/M/132 (13 February 1979).
-C/M/133 (10 April 1979).
-C/M/135 (14 November 1979).
-C/M/136 (22 November 1979).
-C/M/139 (24 April 1980)).
-C/M/139/corr.l (5 May 1980).
-C/M/165 (14 February 1983).
-C/M/167 (6 May 1983).
-C/M/170 (10 August 1983).
-C/M/178 (13 June 1984).
-C/M/191 (11 September 1985).
-C/M/201 (16 March 1989).
-C/M/205 (12 December 1986).
-C/M/206 (23 February 1987).
-C/M/207 (30 March 1987).
-C/M/211 (8 July 1987).





-C/M/217 (8 March 1988).
-C/M/218 (19 April1988).
-C/M/219 (26 April 1988).
-C/M/220 (8 June 1988).
-C/M/228 (16 March 1989).
-C/M/230 (5 April 1989).
-C/M/235 (22 August 1989).
-C/M/247 (5 March 1991).
Committee on Anti-Dumping Practices (ADP/...)
-ADP/78 (21 April 1992).
-ADP/100 (16 June 1993).
Council ofRepresentatives
-C/l 54/Add. 1C/M/211 (9 June 1988).
Summary Records of Annual Sessions of the Contracting Parties (SR.../ :..)
(Before the seventh session in 1952, documents issued during a session of the
Contracting Parties or in connection with session were issued under the session
symbol, and intersessional documents were issued in the series CP/...)
-SR 25/9, Twenty-fifth session of the Contracting Parties, 25 November 1968,
(December 1968).
-GATT/CP.2/SR.22 (9 September 1948).
-GATT/CP.2/SR.23 (10 September 1948).
-GATT/CP.2/43 (13 September 1948). -
-SR.7/1-17 (2 Oct.-10 Nov. 1952).
-SR.9/1-47 (28 Oct. 1954-8 Mar. 1955).
-SR. 43/4 (2 Dec. 1987).
-SR. 43/6 (3 December 1987).
Trade Policy Review Mechanism (C/RM/M...)
-C/RM/M/8 (8 October 1990)
-The GATT Secretariat, Trade Policy Review of Japan (First review). Geneva,
November 1990.
-The GATT Secretariat, Trade Policy Review of Japan (Second review!. 2 Vols.,
Geneva, January 1993.
-WTO, Trade Policy Review ofJapan (Third reviewl. 2 Vols., Geneva, 1995.






Committee of Import Licensing
-(LIC/15).
Uruguay Round Documents Series
-MIN(86)/6 (Sept. 20 1986), Ministerial Declaration on the Uruguay Round.
Trade Negotiations Committee (MTN.TNC/...)
-MTN.TNC/7(MIN) (9 December 1988), Trade Negotiations Committee Meeting at
Ministerial Level, Montreal, December 1988.
-Draft Final Act Embodying the Result of the Uruguay Round ofMultilateral Trade
Negotiations, MTN.TNC/W/35 (26 November 1990).
-MTN.TNC/W/35/Rev. 1 (3 December 1990).
-MTN.TNC/W/FA (20 December 1991) which included (Section S., Understanding
on Rules and Procedures on Dispute Settlement; and Section T., Elements of an
Integrated Dispute Settlement System).
-MTN/FA,II, the Understanding on Rules and Procedures Governing the Settlement
of Dispute contained Annex 2 of the Agreement Establishing the World Trade
Organisation for the decision, Decision of 22 February 1994 on Extension of the
April 1989 Decision on Improvements to the GATT Dispute Settlement Rules and
Procedures (L/7416).
-Final Act Embodying the Result of the Uruguay Round of Multilateral Trade
Negotiations, MTN/FA (15 December 1993).
-MTN/FA II. the Final Act Embodying the Results of the Uruguay Round of
Multilateral Trade Negotiations.
-Final Act Embodying the Result of the Uruguay Round of Multilateral Trade
Negotiations (Marrakesh, 15 April 1994).
Minutes ofMeetings
-MTN.GNG/NG13/1 (10 April 1987) - Meeting of6 April 1987.
-MTN.GNG/NG13/2 (15 July 1987) - Meeting of 25 June 1987.
-MTN.GNG/NG13/3 (12 October 1987) - Meeting of 21 and 24 September 1987.
-MTN.GNG/NG13/4 (18 November 1987) - Meeting of 9 November 1987.
-MTN.GNG/NG13/5 (7 December 1987) - Meeting of20 November 1987.
-MTN.GNG/NG13/INF/1 (21 September 1987) - List ofRepresentatives.
-MTN.GNG/NG13/4/Corr.l (11 January 1988) - Meeting of9 November 1987.
-MTN.GNG/NG13/5/Add. 1 (29April 1988) - Meeting of20 November 1987.
-MTN.GNG/NG13/6 (31 March 1988) - Meeting of2 and 3 March 1988.
-MTN.GNG/NG13/6/Add. 1 (27 April 1988) - Meeting of 2 and 3 March 1988.
-MTN.GNG/NG13/7 (11 May 1988) - Meeting of27 and 28 April 1988.
-MTN.GNG/NG13/8 (5 July 1988) - Meeting of23 and 24 June 1988.
-MTN.GNG/NG13/9 (21 July 1988) - Meeting of 11 July 1988.
-MTN.GNG/NG13/10 (4 October 1988) - Meeting of6 and 7 September 1988.
-MTN.GNG/NG13/11 (15 November 1988) - Meeting of 10-12 October 1988.
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-MTN.GNG/NG13/11/Corr.l (21 October 1988) - Meeting of 10-12 October 1988.
-MTN.GNG/NG13/12 (15 November 1988) - Meeting of 2 November 1988.
-MTN.GNG/NG13/13 (24 November 1988) - Meeting of 15 November 1988.
-MTN.GNG/NG13/14 (2 June 1989) - Meeting of 12 May 1989.
-MTN.GNG/NG13/15 (26 July 1989) - Meeting of 20 July 1989.
-MTN.GNG/NG13/16 (13 November 1989) - Meeting of28 September 1989.
-MTN.GNG/NG13/17 (15 December 1989) - Meeting of 7 December 1989.
-MTN.GNG/NG13/18 (21 March 1990) - Meeting of 7 February 1990.
-MTN.GNG/NG13/19 (28 May 1990) - Meeting of 5 April 1990.
-MTN.GNG/NG13/20 (14 June 1990) - Meeting of6-7 June 1990.
-MTN.GNG/NG13/21 (19 July 1990) - Meeting of 12 July 1990.
-MTN.GNG/NG13/22 (24 October 1990) - Meeting of 12-13 September 1990.
-MTN.GNG/NG13/23 (24 October 1990) - Meeting of 24 Sept. to 11 Oct. 1990.
Uruguay Round documents of the Working Group on Dispute Settlement
(NG13)
-MTN.GNG/NG13/W/1 (6 April 1987) - Proposal byMexico.
-MTN.GNG/NG13/W/2 (22 April 1987) - Communication from New Zealand.
-MTN.GNG/NG13/W/3 (22 April 1987) - Communication from the U.S.
-MTN.GNG/NG13/W/4 (10 June 1987) - Note by the Secretariat.
-MTN.GNG/NG13/W/5 (25 June 1987) - Communication from Jamaica.
-MTN.GNG/NG13/W/6 (25 June 1987) - Discussion Paper Prepared by the U.S.
Delegation.
-MTN.GNG/NG13/W/7 (1 July 1987) - Communication from Japan.
-MTN.GNG/NG13/W/8 (18 September 1987) - Communication from Switzerland.
-MTN.GNG/NG13/W/9 (18 September 1987) - Communication from Japan.
-MTN.GNG/NG13/W/10 (18 September 1987) - Communication from the Nordic
Countries.
-MTN.GNG/NG13/W/11 (24 September 1987) - Communication from Australia.
-MTN.GNG/NG13/W/12 (24 September 1987) - Communication from the EEC.
-MTN.GNG/NG13/W/13 (24 September 1987) - Communication from Canada.
-MTN.GNG/NG13/W/14 (3 November 1987) - Summary ofComparative Analysis
ofProposals for Negotiations.
-MTN.GNG/NG13/W/15 (6 November 1987) - Communication from Nicaragua.
-MTN.GNG/NG13/W/16 (12 November 1987) - Communication from the
Delegations of Argentina, Canada, Hong Kong, Hungary, Mexico and
Uruguay.
-MTN.GNG/NG13/W/17 (12 November 1987) - Communication from Argentina.
-MTN.GNG/NG13/W/18 (12 November 1987) - Communication from Hungary.
-MTN.GNG/NG13/W/19 (20 November 1987) - Communication from Korea.
-MTN.GNG/NG13/W/14/Rev.l (26 February 1988) - Summary ofComparative
Analysis ofProposals for Negotiations.
-MTN.GNG/NG13/W/14/Rev.2 (22 June 1988) - Summary ofComparative Analysis
ofProposals for Negotiaitions.
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-MTN.GNG/NG13/W/20 (22 February 1988) - Concepts, Forms and Effects of
Arbitration.
-MTN.GNG/NG13/W/21 (1 March 1988) - Communication from Japan.
-MTN.GNG/NG13/W/22 (2 March 1988) - Communication from the EEC.
-MTN.GNG/NG13/W/23 (3 March 1988) - Communication from Peru.
-MTN.GNG/NG13/W/24 (7 March 1988) - Communication from Brazil.
-MTN.GNG/NG13/W/25 (8 March 1988) - Communication from Australia.
-MTN.GNG/NG13/W/26 (23 June 1988) - Communication from Mexico.
-MTN.GNG/NG13/W/26/Rev.l (10 October 1988) - Communication from Mexico.
-MTN.GNG/NG13/W/27 (30 June 1988) - Differentialand More Favoured Treatment
ofDeveloping Countries in the GATT Dispute Settlement System.
-MTN.GNG/NG13/W/27/Rev. 1 (22 August 1988) - Differentialand More Favoured
Treatment ofDeveloping Countries in the GATT Dispute Settlement System.
-MTN.GNG/NG13/W/27/Rev.1/Corr. 1 (22 August 1988) - Differential and More
Favoured Treatment ofDeveloping Countries in the GATT Dispute
Settlement System.
-MTN.GNG/NG13/W/28 (5 July 1988) - Multi-Complaints Procedures and
Intervention by Third Parties in GATT Dispute Settlement Procedures.
-MTN.GNG/NG13/W/29 (5 July 1988) - Comparison ofExisting Texts and
Proposals for Improvement to the GATT Dispute Settlement System.
-MTN.GNG/NG13/W/29/Corr.l (19 August 1988) - Comparison ofExisting Texts
and Proposals for Improvement to the GATT Dispute Settlement System.
-MTN.GNG/NG13/W/29/Rev.l (21 September 1988) - Comparison ofExisting
Texts and Proposals for Improvement to the GATT Dispute Settlement
System.
-MTN.GNG/NG13/W/29/Rev.l/Add.l (3 October 1988) - Comparison ofExisting
Texts and Proposals for Improvement to the GATT Dispute Settlement
System.
-MTN.GNG/NG13/W/30 (10 October 1988) - Dispute Settlement Proposal.
-MTN.GNG/NG13/W/4/ (10 November 1989) - GATT Dispute Settlement System.
-MTN.GNG/NG13/W/31 (14 July 1989) - Non-Violation Complaints Under GATT
Article XXIII.2.
-MTN.GNG/NG13/W/32 (14 July 1989) - Comparison in the Context ofGATT
Dispute Settlement Rules and Procedures.
-MTN.GNG/NG13/W/33 (19 July 1989) - Communication from Switzerland.
-MTN.GNG/NG13/W/34 (14 November 1989) - Communication from Bangladesh.
-MTN.GNG/NG13/W/35 (1 December 1989) - Rulings and Recommendations in
Terms ofArticle XXIII.2.
-MTN.GNG/NG13/W/36 (18 January 1989) - Communication from Switzerland.
-MTN.GNG/NG13/W/37 (24 January 1989) - Discussion and Proposals in Other
Negotiating Groups and in the Code Committees Relating to Dispute
Settlement.
-MTN.GNG/NG13/W/37/Add.l (1 February 1990) - Discussion and Proposals in





-MTN.GNG/NG13/W/37/Add.2 (26 March 1990) - Discussion and Proposals in
Other Negotiating Groups and in the Code Committees Relating to Dispute
Settlement.
-MTN.GNG/NG13/W/37/Add.3 (5 June 1990) - Discussion and Proposals in
Other Negotiating Groups and in the Code Committees Relating to Dispute
Settlement.
-MTN.GNG/NG13/W/37/Add.4 (6 July 1990) - Discussion and Proposals in
Other Negotiating Groups and in the Code Committees Relating to Dispute
Settlement.
-MTN.GNG/NG13/W/38 (30 March 1990) - Third-Party Rights in GATT Dispute
Settlement.
-MTN.GNG/NG13/W/39 (5 April 1990) - Statement y the Spokesman of the
European Community at the Meeting of 5-6 April.
-MTN.GNG/NG13/W/40 (6 April 1990) - Communication from the U.S.
-MTN.GNG/NG13/W/41 (28 June 1990) - Communication from Canada.
-MTN.GNG/NG13/W/42 (12 July 1990) - Proposal byMexico.
-MTN.GNG/NG13/W/43 (18 July 1990) - Profile of the Status of the Work in the
Group.
-MTN.GNG/NG13/W/44 (19 July 1990) - Statement by the Spokesman of the
European Community.






News of the Uruguay Round (NUR/...)
-GATT, News of the Uruguay Round ofMultilateral Trade Negotiations, Geneva.
#
GATT Activities
-GATT. GATT Activities 1978. Geneva, 1979.
-GATT, GATT Activities 1979. Geneva, 1980.
-GATT. GATT Activities 1982. Geneva, 1983.
-GATT, GATT Activities 1986. Geneva 1987.
-GATT, GATT Activities 1988. Geneva, 1989.
-GATT. GATT Activities 1989. Geneva, 1990.
-GATT, GATT Activities 1990. Genva, July 1991.
-GATT, GATT Activities 1991. Geneva, July 1992.
-GATT, GATT Activities 1992. Geneva, June 1993.






-GATT, Analytical Index. 5th ed., Geneva, 1989.
-GATT, Analytical Index : Guide to GATT Law and Practice. 6th ed., Geneva, 1994
-GATT, Analytical Index : Guide to GATT Law and Practice. Updated 6th ed., 2
vols., Geneva 1995.
Other Useful Publications
-GATT Secretariat, GATT Directory. (Looseleaf, year not specified).
-GATT, GATT. What it is. What it does. Geneva 1992.
-GATT, International Trade 90-91. Vol. I (Special Topic: Trade and Environment)
and Vol. II, Geneva, 1992.
-GATT, Helping the World Grow. Geneva, (year not specified).
-GATT, The Uruguay Round: A giant step for trade and development, and a response
to the challenges of the modern world. Geneva, (year not specified).
-GATT Secretariat, The Results of the Uruguay Round of Multilateral Trade
Negotiations: The Legal Texts. Geneva, June 1994.
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WTO Documents
List of Selected Disputes
-WT/DS2/R (29 January 1996): Brazil, Venezuela v. U.S. - Standards for
Reformulated and Conventional Gasoline.
-WT/DS2/AB/R (29 April 1996): Report of the Appellate Body.
-WT/DS8/R, WT/DS10/R, WT/DS11/R (11 July 1996): EC, Canada, U.S., v. Japan
-Taxes on Alcoholic Beverages.
-WT/DS8/AB/R, WT/DS10/AB/R, WT/DS11/AB/R (4 October 1996): Report of the
Appellate Body.
-WT/DS18/R (12 June 1998): Canada v. Australia - Measures Affecting the
Importation ofSalmon.
-WT/DS18/AB/R (20 October 1998): Report of the Appellate Body.
*
-WT/DS22/R (17 October 1996): Philippines v. Brazil - Measures Affecting .
Desiccated Coconut.
-WT/DS22/AB/R (21 February 1997): Report of the Appellate Body.
-WT/DS24/R (8 November 1996): Costa Rica v. U.S. - Restrictions on Imports of
Cotton and Man-Made Fibre Underwear.
-WT/DS24/AB/R (10 February 1997): Report of the Appellate Body.
-WT/DS26/R/USA (18 August 1998): U.S. , Canada v. EC - Measures Concerning
Meat and Meat Products (Hormones).
-WT/DS26/15, WT/DS48/13 (29 May 1998): EC Measures Concerning Meat and
Meat Products (Hormones) - Arbitration under Article 21.3(c) of the DSU - Award of
the Arbitrator.
-WT/DS27/R/ECU, WT/DS27/R/GTM and WT/DS27/R/ HND, WT/DS27/R/MEX,
WT/DS27/R/USA (22 May .1997): Ecuador, Guatemala, Honduras, Mexico, U.S. v.
EC - Regime for the Importation, Sale and Distribution ofBananas.
-WT/DS27/AB/R (9 September 1997): Report of the Appellate Body.
-WT/DS31/R (14 March 1997): U.S. v. Canada - Certain Measures Concerning
Periodicals
-WT/DS31/AB/R (30 June 1997): Report of the Appellate Body.
-WT/DS44/R (31 March 1998): U.S. v. Japan - Measures Affecting Consumer
Photographic Film and Paper.
-WT/DS50/R (2 September 1997): U.S. v. India - Patent Protection for
Pharmaceutical and Agricultural Chemical Products.
-WT/DS50/R (19 December 1997): Report of the Appellate Body.
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-WT/DS54/R, WT/DS55/R, WT/DS59/R, WT/DS64/R (2 July 1998): Japan v.
Indonesia - Certain Measures Affecting the Automobile Industries.
-WT/DS56/R (25 November 1997): U.S. v. Argentina - Certain Measures Affecting
Imports ofFootwear, Textiles, Apparel and Other Items.
-WT/DS56/AB/R (27 March 1998): Report of the Appellate Body.
-WT/DS58/R (15 May 1998): Malaysia, Pakistan, Thailand v. U.S. - Import
Prohibition ofCertain Shrimp and Shrimp Products.
-WT/DS58/AB/R (12 October 1998): Report of the Appellate Body.
-WT/DS62/R, WT/DS67/R, WT/DS68/R (5 February 1998): U.S. v. EC, U.K.,
Ireland - Customs Classification ofCertain computer Equipment.
-WT/DS62/AB/R, WT/DS67/AB/R, WT/DS68/AB/R (5 June 1998): Report of the
Appellate Body.
-WT/DS69/R (12 March 1998): Brazil v. EC - Measures Affecting the Importation of
Certain Poultry Products.
-WT/DS69/AB/R (13 July 1998): Report of the Appellate Body.
-WT/DS75/R, WT/DS84/R (17 September 1998): EC, U.S. v. Korea - Taxes on
Alcoholic Beverages.
. -WT/DS75/AB/R, WT/DS84/AB/R (18 January 1999): Report of the Appellate
Body.
-WT/DS6/1 (22 May 1995): Request for Consultations by Japan on U.S. -Imposition
of Import Duties on Automobiles from Japan Under Sections 301 and 304 of the
Trade Act of 1974.
-WT/DS6/2 (2 June 1995): Request to Join Consultations under Article 4.11 of the
DSU.
-WT/DS6/3 (12 June 1995): Request for Consultations under Article 4:11 of the
DSU, Communication by Australia.
-WT/DS6/4 (14 June 1995): Acceptance of the Request to Join Consultations,
Communication by the United States.
-WT/DS6/5 (27 June 1995): Communication by Japan.
-WT/DS6/6 (27 June 1995): Communication from Japan.
-WT/DS29: India had requested to be joined in the consultation between Hong Kong
and Turkey on the same subject matter.
*Other Useful documents
-WT/DSB/RC/1 (11 December 1996): Rules of Conduct for the Understanding on
Rules and Procedures Governing the Settlement ofDisputes.
-WT/DSB/RC/2 (22 January 1997): Rules of Conduct for the Understanding on
Rules and Procedures Governing the Settlement ofDisputes (a revised version).
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-WT/AB/WP/1 (15 February 1996): Working Procedures for Appellate Review.
-WT/AB/WP/3 (27 February 1997): Working Procedures of Appellate Review (a
consolidate, revised version of the Working Procedures of Appellate Review, and a
replacement ofWT/AB/WP1).
-WT/DSB/11 (5 December 1997)
-WT/DSB/13 (19 October 1998): Indicative List of Governmental and
Non-Governmental Panellists.
-WT/DS/M/7 (27 October 1995).
-WT/DSB/M/35 (18 July 1997): Minutes of Meeting held on 25 June 1997, Item 4
[Terms of Office ofAppellate Body Members (Article 17.2 of the DSU) - Statement
by the Chairman]
-WT/DSB/M/26 (15 January 1997).
-WT/GC/15 (26 January 1999): General Council 9-11 and 18 December 1998,
Annual Report (1998).
-WT/WGTCP/2 (8 December 1998): Report (1998) of the Working Group on the
Interaction between Trade and Competition Policy to the General Council.
-WT/WGTCP/W/78 (7 July 1998): The communication from the European ,v
Community and its member states.
-WT/MIN(96)/DEC (18 December 1996): Singapore Ministerial Declaration adopted
13 December 1996.
-WT/L/160.
-WT/L/160/Rev.l (26 July 1996): The Procedures for the Circulation and
Derestriction ofWTO Documents.
-PRESS/TPRB/70 (30 January 1998): Trade Policy Review Body - Review of Japan, ■
TPRB's Evaluation.
WTO Publications
-WTO Focus, No. 1, January-February 1995.
-WTO Focus, No. 2, March-April 1995.
-WTO Focus No. 3, May-June 1995.
-WTO Focus, No. 4, July 1995.
-WTO Focus, No. 5, August-September 1995.
-WTO Focus, No. 6, October-November 1995.
-WTO Focus, No. 7, December 1995.
-WTO Focus, No. 8, January-February 1996.
-WTO Focus No. 9, March-April 1996.
-WTO Focus, No. 10, May 1996.
-WTO Focus, No. 11, June-July 1996.
-WTO Focus, No. 12, August-September 1996.
-WTO Focus, No. 13, October-November 1996.
-WTO Focus, No. 14, December 1996.
-WTO Focus, No. 15, January 1997.




-WTO Focus, No. 17, March 1997.
-WTO Focus, No. 18, April 1997.
-WTO Focus, No. 19, May 1997.
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APPENDIXI
THE STRUCTURE OF THEWTO AGREEMENT
MARRAKESH AGREEMENT ESTABLISHING THE WTO
ANNEX 1
ANNEX1A: MULTILATERALAGREEMENTSON TRADE INGOODS
General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade 1994
-Understanding on the Interpretation ofArticle II: 1(b) of the General
Agreement on Tariffs and Trade 1994
-Understanding on the Interpretation ofArticle XVII of the General Agreement
on Tariffs and Trade 1994
-Understanding on Balance-of-Payments Provisions of the General Agreement
on Tariffs and Trade 1994
-Understanding on the Interpretation ofArticle XXIV of the General
Agreement on Tariffs and Trade 1994
-Understanding in Respect ofWaivers ofObligations under the General
Agreement on Tariffs and Trade 1994
-Understanding on the Interpretation ofArticle XVIII of the General
Agreement on Tariffs and Trade 1994
-Marrakesh Protocol to the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade 1994
Agreement on Agriculture
Agreement on the Application ofSanitary and Phytosanitary Measures
Agreement on Textiles and Clothing
Agreement on Technical Barriers to Trade
Agreement on Trade-Related Investment Measures
Agreement on Implementation ofArticle VI of the General Agreement on Tariffs and
Trade 1994
Agreement on Implementation ofArticle VII of the General Agreement on Tariffs and
Trade 1994
Agreement on Preshipment Inspection
Agreement on Rules ofOrigin
Agreement on Import Licensing Procedures
Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures
Agreement on Safeguards
ANNEXIB: GeneralAgreement on Trade in Services
ANNEX1C: Agreement on Trade-RelatedAspects ofIntellectualPropertyRights
ANNEX 2: Understanding on Rules and Procedures Governing the Settlement of
Disputes
ANNEX 3: Trade Policy Review Mechanism
ANNEX 4: Plurilateral Trade Agreements
-Agreement on Trade in Civil Aircraft
-Agreement on Government Procurement
-International Dairy Agreement*
-International Bovine Meat Agreement*




THE TABLE OF GATT/WTO CASES/DISPUTES
(Cases in upper-case are not dealt with in the main text of the thesis;























































































No formal action was taken bv the Rule-oriented approach: a
Government fi.e. an action would public accusation of
have been taken entirely at private contentious issues through
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the Leather ('83); the Alcohol-I the Alcohol-II ('95); the Film
('86); the Agriculture ('96); the JAPAN "APPLE" (an
('86); the Semiconductor ('87); the appellate report due in Feb.
Beefand Citrus ('88) '99)*; the JAPAN
"LEATHER-II" (WT/DS147)*
[cf. the SPF ('87) may be
included in this group]
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;<y sss
See, in general, an annual report published since 1992, entitled, Report
Policies bv Major Trading Partners - Trade Policies and GATT Obligations and re-titled
as, Report on the WTO Consistency of Trading Policies bv Major Trading Partners, since
1994, Industrial Structure Council, theMITI, Tokyo, Japan.
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APPENDIXIII
SUMMARIES OF THE RECENT CASES
The next two disputes have come to an end after the cut-off date (30 June 1998) of
the case studies in Chapters 7 and 8 of the thesis. The aim of this appendix is to keep
up with the new developments in the dispute settlement system of WTO.
Furthermore, due to the restrictions of both time and the volume of words in this
dissertation, I simply provide a summary of each case as an addendum of the case
studies conducted in Chapters 7 and 8.
1. Indonesia - Certain Measures Affecting the Automobile Industry (WT/DS54,
55, 59 & 64/R) (2 July 1998) [On 23 July 1998, the DSB adopted the Panel Report
and currently in implementation process]1
Background:
Indonesia has had programmes to support the development of its automotive industry
since 1960. The present dispute concerned three programmes maintained by
Indonesia with respect to motor vehicles and parts and components, and those
programmes were: (i) the 1993 Incentive System (which was amended in 1995 and
1996); (ii) the February 1996 National Car Programme (the "February 1996 Car
Programme); (iii) the June 1996 National Car Programme, i.e. an extension of the
February 1996 Car Programme (the "June 1996 Car Programme).
(i) The 1993 Incentive System consisted of:
(a) import duty relief for parts and components of cars depending on meeting
local content requirements for the finished products, where the amount of
duties varies according to the percentage of local content (Decree 645/93
amended by 223/95); above a certain local content percentage, a full exemption
from duties applies to imports ofparts and components.
(b) reduction from sales tax on goods (the "sales tax") on certain categories of
motor vehicles (below 1600cc), depending on them being manufactured locally
and in some cases depending on a minimum local content requirement of 60%
(Decree 645/93 as amended in 1996 by Regulation 36).
4
(ii) The 1996 National Car Programme consisted of two main sets of measures
(Decree 31/96):
'On 8 October 1988, the EC requested that the "reasonable period of time" for
implementation of recommendations and rulings of the DSB regarding the 1993 Programme
be determined by binding arbitration pursuant to Article 21:3(c) of the DSU. Mr.
Christopher Beeby (arbitrator) determined that the reasonable period of time for Indonesia to
implement the recommendations and rulings of the DSB in this case is twelve months from
23 July 1998 (i.e. the date of adoption of the Panel Report by the DSB); WT/DS54/15,
WT/DS55/14, WT/DS59/13, WT/DS64/12 (7 December 1998).
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(a) The first set ofmeasures (Presidential Decree 42/96), the February 1996 Car
Programme, provided for the grant of "pioneer" or National Car company
status to Indonesian car companies that meets specified criteria as to ownership
of facilities, use of trademarks, and technology.
Maintenance of the pioneer status was depend on the National Cars' meeting
increasing local content requirements over a three year period (i.e. 20% at the
end of the 1 st year; 40 % at the end of the 2nd year; 60% at the end of the 3rd
year).
The benefits provided were: (1) exemption form luxury tax on sales ofNational
Cars; and (2) exemption from import duties on parts and components.
(b) The second set of measures (Presidential Decree 42/96 and Ministerial
Decree 142/96), the June 1996 Car Programme, provided that National Cars
manufactured in a foreign country by Indonesian nationals and which fulfil the
local content requirements prescribed by the Ministry of Industry and Trade,
shall be treated the same as National Cars manufactured in Indonesia, i.e.
exempt from import duties and luxury tax. In accordance with Decree 142/96,
imported National Cars are deemed to comply with the 20% local content
requirement for the end of first production year if the overseas producer
manufacturing the National Cars "counter-purchases" Indonesian parts and
components that account for at least 25% of the C&F value of the imported
cars.
In fact, there was only one "National Car" company, PT TPN, which was granted
pioneer status only a few days after the adoption of the National Car programme on
19 February 1996. In June 1996, PT TPN was authorised to import duty free under
the June Extension of the National Car Programme (i.e. the June 1996 Car
Programme) 45,000 units of the model Timor S515.
On 25 February 1998, Indonesia notified the Subsidies Committee that, as of 21
January 1998, it had terminated all subsides previously granted under the National
Car programme. On 2 March 1998, Indonesia notified the Panel and requested the
Panel to terminate the dispute settlement proceedings, at least it relates to the 1996
National Car programme measures.
(Notifications by Indonesia to WTO Committees)
On 23 May 1995, Indonesia made a notification with respect to the 1993 Incentive
System to the TRIMs Committee under Article 5.1 of the TRIMs Agreement.2 On 28
October 1996, Indonesia notified the TRIMs Committee that it was "withdrawing" its
notification related to automobiles because it considered that its programme was not
a TRIM;3 on the same day Indonesia made a notification with respect to its 1993





(Claims of the Complainants)
The complainants were Japan, the EC and the U.S., who challenged against the
Indonesia's car programme. Although a similar argument was made as a main focus
of their claim, there were some differences among them. The complainants made a
claim on: i) Local-content requirements; ii) Tax discrimination; iii) MFN
discrimination; iv) Absence of notification and partial administration; v) Serious
prejudice; vi) Extension of the scope of existing subsidies; vii) National treatment
violation with respect to the acquisition and maintenance of trademarks, and the use
of trademarks; viii) Introduction of special requirements in respect of the use of
trademarks.
(Indonesia's General Defence)
The Indonesia's general defence to the above claims was that the SCM Agreement
was lex specialis to this dispute. For Indonesia, this principle meant that because the
measures at issue were subsidies, they were governed by exclusively by Article XVI
ofGATT and the SCM Agreement. The Indonesia's argument was to be two-fold:
(i) The only law applicable to this dispute is the SCM Agreement:
1. There is a general conflict between Article III of GATT and the SCM
Agreement. (Indonesia in its second submission expanded this argument
to include claims under Article I ofGATT as well);
2. The application to this dispute of Article III of GATT would reduce
the SCM Agreement to "inutility";
3. General rules of treaty interpretation require rethinking the scope of
Article IH:8(b);
4. Since Article III is not applicable, the TRIMs Agreement is not
applicable.
(ii) Should Article III and/or the TRIMs Agreement be considered to apply to
this dispute?; There are specific conflicts between some of the provisions of the
SCM Agreement, on one hand, and some provisions ofArticle III on which the
complainants base their claims, on the other hand; For Indonesia, any and all
conflicts should be resolved in favour of the SCM Agreement (which permits
the car programmes under examination according to Indonesia).
Findings and Conclusions:
(Preliminary Objections with respect to 4 issues)
i) Presence ofprivate lawyers (i.e. the U.S. request to exclude from meetings of
the Panel two private lawyer in the Indonesian delegation):
On 3 December 1997, at the first meeting of the parties, the Panel ruled
that it was for the Indonesian government to nominate the members of its
delegation to meeting of this Panel.5 The Panel insisted that all members
5Cf. The Banana case contained a specific provision requiring the presence only of
government officials, see the Appellate and Panel Reports on EC- Regime for the
Importation, Sale and Distribution ofBananas, WT/DS27, adopted on 25 September 1997.
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of parties' delegations to respect the provision of the DSU and the
confidentiality of the proceedings.
ii) The alleged loan to PT TPN as a measure covered by the terms of reference
of this panel:
Indonesia raised a preliminary objection, at the first meeting of the Panel
with the parties, to the U.S.' claim with respect to a $US 690 million loan
to PT TPN, on the basis that this loan was not within the Panel's terms of
reference. The Panel ruled that the loan was not identified as a specific
measure in that document as required by Article 6.2 of the DSU.
Furthermore, the U.S. indeed stated that the loan was not identified in the
U.S. request, because it had not yet been made. For the Panel, the U.S. in
its request for panel had clearly identified the measures to be considered
by the Panel, and those measures did not include this loan. Accordingly,
the Panel concluded that the loan in question was not within the terms of
reference of this Panel.
iii) Business proprietary information:
With respect to three points in its first submission, the U.S. indicated that
it had further information relevant to its serious prejudice claims but that
this information was "business proprietary" and that the U.S. was
reluctant to provide it to the panel in the absence of "adequate
procedures" to protect such information.
At the first meeting, the Panel ruled that it encouraged all parties to
submit relevant data to the Panel as early as possible. The Panel,
however, noted that it was a matter for each party to decide when and if '
to submit information and argumentation within the schedule set forth by
the Panel. The Panel also stated that if any party considered that it had
not' had an adequate opportunity to address any such new data and
argumentation, the Panel would take all reasonable steps to insure that all
parties have had a full opportunity to respond to the factual information
and argumentation submitted to the Panel. Despite the invitation by the
Panel, the U.S. did not propose or request the Panel to adopt any such
procedure.
0
iv) Whether the National Car programme has expired and should therefore not
be examined by this panel:
On 25 February 1998, Indonesia notified the Chairman of the Subsidies
Committee by letter that, as of 21 January 1998, it had terminated all
subsidies previously granted under the National Car programme. (On 2
March 1998, Indonesia notified the Panel and requested the Panel to
terminate the dispute settlement proceeding, at least as it relates to the
1996 National Car programme measures.) Indonesia, therefore,
considered the Presidential Instruction establishing the National Car
programme as to be "obsolete". In fact, this communication form
Indonesia reached to the Panel after the deadline of 30 January 1998 set
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by the Panel for the submission of information and arguments in this
case.
The Panel considered that it was appropriate for it to make findings in
respect of the National Car Programme. In this respect, the Panel noted
that in the previous GATT/WTO cases, in which a measure included in
the terms of reference was otherwise terminated or amended after the
commencement of the panel proceedings, panels have nonetheless made




With respect to the Indonesia's argument that there was a general conflict between
Article III and the SCM Agreement (and Article XVI) and that the Indonesian car
programmes were governed exclusively by the SCM Agreement, the Panel noted that
Article III and Article XVI have co-existed since the inception of the GATT system
of rules. As to Article III of GATT and the SCM Agreement, the Panel considered
that Article III and the SCM Agreement have, in general, different coverage and do
not impose the same type of obligations. The Panel further rejected the Indonesia's
argument that the application of Article III of GATT to subsidies would reduce the
SCM Agreement to "inutility". With respect to Indonesia's argument that its
measures are only governed by the SCM Agreement, the Panel responded that Article
• Ill:8(b) confirms that the obligations ofArticle III and those ofArticle XVI (and the
SCM Agreement) are different and complementary: subsidies to producers are
subject to the national treatment provisions of Article III when they discriminate
between imported and domestic products.
The Panel rejected Indonesia's general defence that the only applicable law to this is
the SCM Agreement, and concluded that the obligations contained in the WTO :
Agreement are generally cumulative and can be complied with simultaneously and
that different aspect and sometimes the same aspects of a legislative act can be
subject to various provisions of the WTO Agreement.
As to the Indonesia's argument that since Article III was not applicable, the TRIMs
Agreement which did not add anything to Article III was not applicable to this
dispute, the Panel stated that Article III was, in general, applicable and further that
the TRIMs Agreement was legally distinct from Article III. Accordingly, even if




(a) that the local content requirements of the 1993 and of the February 1996 car
programmes to which are linked (i) sales tax benefits on finished motor vehicles
incorporating a certain percentage value of domestic products or on National Cars
6See, for example, the report of Appellate Body on Argentina -Certain Measures Affecting
Imports ofFootwear, Textiles, Apparel and Other Items, WT/DS/56/AB/R (27 March 1998).
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and (ii) customs duty benefits for imported parts and components used in finished
motor vehicles incorporating a certain percentage value ofdomestic products or used
National Cars violate the provisions ofArticle 2 of the TRIMs Agreement;
(b) that the sales tax discrimination aspects of the 1993 and the February and June
1996 car programmes in favour of domestic motor vehicles incorporating a certain
percentage value of domestic products and National Car violated the provisions of
Article 111:2 ofGATT;
(c) that the customs duty and sales tax benefits of the June 1996 car programme in
favour of imported National Cars and the customs duty benefits ofFebruary 1996 car
programme in favour of imported parts and components to be used in National Cars
assembled in Indonesia violate Article I ofGATT;
(d) that the European Communities have demonstrated by positive evidence that
Indonesia has caused, through the use of specific subsidies provided pursuant to the
National Car programme, serious prejudice to the interests of the European
Communities within the meaning ofArticle 5(c) of the SCM Agreement;
(e) that the United States has not demonstrated by positive evidence that Indonesia
has caused, through the use of specific subsidies provided pursuant to the National
Car programme, serious prejudice to the interests of the United States within the
meaning ofArticle 5(c) of the SCM Agreement;
(f) that Indonesia has not violated Article 28.2 of the SCM Agreement;
(g) that the United States has not demonstrated that Indonesia is in breach of its
obligations under Article 3 of the TRIPS Agreement in respect of the acquisition1 of
trademark rights or the maintenance of trademark rights or in respect of the use of
trademarks specifically addressed in Article 20 of the TRIPS Agreement nor has it
demonstrated that measures have been taken that reduce the degree of consistency
with the provisions of Article 20 and which would therefore be in violation of
Indonesia's obligations under Article 65.5 of the TRIPS Agreement.
2. Japan - Measures Affecting Agricultural Products (WT/DS76/R) (27 October
1998) [The report of the Panel was circulated to Members on 27 October 1998]7
Background:
Despite the U.S. efforts to export various fruit products to Japan since the early
1970's, the size of exports of those products to Japan represent only a small part in
7The Financial Times, "Japan to appeal over apples", 29 October 1998 at 6. According to
this article, the MAFF (Ministry of Agriculture, Forestry, and Fisheries) of the Japanese
government said that it would appeal against the panel ruling; the Notification of an Appeal
by Japan, WT/DS76/5 (24 November 1998); the report of the Appellate Body will be out at
the end ofFebruary 1999.
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comparison to that of U.S. exports to world-wide, which was caused by Japan's
troublesome and time-consuming varietal testing requirement. In fact, in some cases,
the U.S. filed varieties application of a product over a decade ago.
Facts andProcedure:
Japan's prohibition, under quarantine measures, of imports of agricultural products
was the main issue in the present dispute. According to the measures, Japan
prohibited the importation of U.S. agricultural products on which Japan claimed the
pest codling moth might occur. Japan therefore required, under the measures,
quarantine treatment until the quarantine treatment has been tested for each varieties,
even if the proposed treatment has proved to be effective for other varieties of the
same product category. The products at issue included apples, nectarines, cherries
and walnuts. There were a number of different varieties within each of the product
categories. Such varieties could be noticed, for instance, in colour, ripening time,
taste or other characteristics. To obtain approval to import additional varieties of a
product through such a test could take up to 4 years. While, in the U.S. view, it
would be sufficient to test the treatment on one variety within each product category
in order to prove that the treatment would be effective for the rest of varieties within
that category. The U.S. alleged that Japan's measures at issue were introduced in
order to protect its own agricultural products for that pest, which in fact did not occur
in Japan.
(Consultation with experts)
The Panel recalled that Article 11:2 of the SPS Agreement provided that, for a
dispute under this Agreement involving scientific or technical issues, a panel should
seek advice for experts chosen by the panel in consultation with the parties to the
dispute. In this panel, the Panel selected three experts in the area of entomology and
pesticide fumigation and sought a scientific and technical advice individually subject
to a number of questions (the Panel submitted initially 18 questions and a few
additional ones). In the final report, the Panel referred to the advice submitted by
those experts in support of a number of its legal findings.
Findings and Conclusions:
The Panel considered that the main issue in dispute was the Japan's requirement that
the exporting countries need to demonstrate the efficacy of their quarantine treatment
in order to obtain access to the Japanese market for each variety of a given product (
the "Japan's varietal testing requirement").
To begin with, the Panel examined whether there was sufficient scientific evidence in
support of the varietal testing requirement maintained by Japan (Article 2.2 of the
SPS Agreement). With respect to four out of eight products at issue (i.e. apples,
cherries, nectarines and walnuts), the Panel found Japan maintained the verietal
testing requirement without scientific evidence. The Panel further reached the
conclusion that the varietal testing requirement could not be considered as a
provisional measure in cases where scientific evidence is insufficient, since Japan did
not seek to obtain the additional information necessary for a more objective
assessment of risk and review the measure accordingly within a reasonable period of
time (Article 5.7 of the SPS Agreement).
A
The Panel also found that there was alternative measures which would also satisfy
the level of sanitary and phytosanitary protection expected by Japan and which
would be less trade-restrictive than the current level required by Japan. The Panel
particularly examined certain alternatives proposed by the experts. The current
Japan's requirement was found to be more trade-restrictive than required to achieve
appropriate level ofprotection, taking into account technical and economic feasibility
(Article 5.6 of the SPS Agreement). Nonetheless, the Panel was not convinced that
there was sufficient evidence to decide that "testing by product" (proposed by the
U.S) would fulfil the appropriate level ofprotection expected by Japan.
%
%
The Panel found that Japan, by not having published the varietal testing requirement
with respect to any of the products at issue, had acted inconsistently with its
transparency obligations under paragraph 1 ofAnnex B of the SPS Agreement.
Finally, the Panel concluded that Japan, by maintaining the varietal testing








1. United States - Suspension of customs liquidation ("Zenith case") (BISD
24S/135)
2. EEC - Import restrictive measures on video tape recorder ("Poitiers case")
%
3. United States - Restrictions on certain Japanese products ("Semiconductor
Retaliation case")
4. EEC - Regulation on imports ofparts and components (BISD 37S/132)
5. EEC - Regulation on imports ofparts and components (Anti-dumping Code)
6. EC - Anti-dumping duties on audio tapes in cassettes originating in Japan
(ADP/136)
7. EEC - Refund of anti-dumping duties (ADP/78)
8. United States - Provisional anti-dumping measures against imports of certain
steel flat products (ADP/100)
[Japan as "respondents"]
1.15 Developed Countries (including Japan) - Uruguayan recourse to Article
XXIII (Uruguay) (BISD 11S/95; BISD 13S/35)
2. Japan - Restrictions on imports ofbeef and veal (Australia) (BISD 26S/81)
3. Japan - Measures on imports of thrown silk yam (United States) (BISD
25S/107)
4. Japanese measures on imports of leather (United States)
5. Japan - Restraints on import ofmanufactured tabacco from the United States
(United States) (BISD 28S/100)
6. Japan's measures on imports of leather (Canada) (BISD 27S/118)
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7. Japan - Certification procedures for metal softball bats (United States)
»
8. Japan - Nullification and impairment ofbenefits and impediment to the
attainment ofGATT objectives (EEC)
9. Panel on Japanese measures on imports of leather (United States)
(complained on 5/1/83) (BISD 31S/94)
10. Japan - Single tendering procedures (United States)
11. Japan - Quantitative restrictions on imports of leather footwear (United
States)
12. Japan - Customs duties, taxes and labelling practices on imported wines
and alcoholic beverages (EEC) (BISD 34S/83)
4
4
13. Japan - Restrictions on imports of certain agricultural products (United
States) (BISD 35S/163)
14. Japan - Restrictions on imports ofherring, pollock and surimi (United
States)
15. Japan - Trade in semiconductors (EEC) (BISD 35S/116)
16 Japan - Copper trading practices in Japan (EEC) (BISD 36S/199)
17. Canada/Japan: Tariffon imports of spruce, pine, fir, (SPF) dimension
lumber (Canada) (BISD 36S/167)
18. Japan - Import restrictions on beef (New Zealand)
19. Japan - Restrictions on imports ofbeef and citrus products (United States)
20. Japan - Restrictions ofbeef (Australia)
21. Japan - Restrictions on imports of certain agricultural products [follow-up]
(Australia, New Zealand, United States) (DS25)





[Japan as a "complainants"]
1. United States - Imposition of import duties on automobiles from Japan under
Sections 301 and 304 of the Trade Act of 1974 (WT/DS6/...)
2. Brazil - Certain automotive investment measures (Japan) (WT/DS51/...)
3. Indonesia - Certain measures affecting the automobile industry (1) (Japan)
(WT/DS55/R)
4. Indonesia - Certain measures affecting the automobile industry (2) (Japan)
(WT/DS64/R)
>
5. United States - Measure affecting government procurement (Japan)
(WT/DS95/...)
6. Canada - Certain measures affecting the automotive industry (WT/DS139/...)
[Japan as "respondents"]
1. Japan - Taxes on alcoholic beverages (EC) (WT/DS8/R; WT/DS8/AB/R)
%
1
2. Japan - Taxes on alcoholic beverages (Canada) (WT/DS10/R;
WT/DS10/AB/R)
3. Japan - Taxes on alcoholic beverages (United States) (WT/DS11/R;
WT/DS11/AB/R)
4. Japan - Measures affecting the purchase of telecommunications equipment
(EC) (WT/DS 15/...)
*
5. Japan - Measures concerning sound recordings (United States)
(WT/DS28/...)
i
6. Japan - Measures concerning sound recordings (EC) (WT/DS42/...)
7. Japan - Measures affecting consumer photographic film and paper (United
Sates) (WT/DS44/R)
9
8. Japan - Measures affecting distribution services (United States)
(WT/DS45/...)





10. Japan - Procurement of a navigation satellite (EC) (WT/DS73/...)
11. Japan - Measures affecting agricultural products (United States)
(WT/DS76/R)
12. Japan - Tariffquotas and subsidies affecting leather (EC) (WT/DS147/...)
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